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Abstract
The Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) - popularly known as the Tamil
Tigers- was militarily defeated in May 2009 after three decades of civil war against the
Sri Lankan government. Nearly four years on since their demise, the evolution of the
LTTE campaign still remains an understudied subject. While literature on the LTTE
campaign is abundant, there is still a need for research that systematically examines the
campaign dynamics. Within the field of terrorism studies more generally, there is also a
need to pay more attention to the historical dynamics of terrorism and how
organisations develop over time.
With this in mind, this thesis addresses an important knowledge gap. The
primary goal of this research isto examine the evolution of the LTTE campaign in
detail, within the framework of existing theories of terrorist lifecycles. The central
question is, ‗which factors influenced the changes in the LTTE lifecycle over time, and
how?‘
First, the different phases of a terrorist lifecycle were defined. Existing literature
indicates that the terrorist lifecycle can be generally divided into four stages:
emergence, escalation, de-escalation, and demise. Having defined the phases, the next
step was to identify the different factors which commonly influence a terrorist
organisation to shift from one phase of its campaign to another. Six key variables played
a crucial role: the role of ideology; ceasefires and peace talks; public support,
international networks and external support; funding;organisational dynamics;
andmilitary interventions. In the final step, the dynamics of the LTTE campaign was
examined through each of the selected variables.
In conducting this case study, the researcher referred to a variety of open source
materials such as academic literature (books and journal articles), press reports, and
newspaper articles. Besides the available publications, the researcher obtained
additional primary data through interviews in Sri Lanka and Australia with formerLTTE combatants, government officials, law enforcement agents, Tamil Diaspora
members, and experts in this field. The study also combined qualitative analysis with
quantitative data in determining the temporal relationship between the different factors
and their possible impact on the LTTE campaign.

12

The findings of this research demonstrate that existing theories pertaining to
terrorist lifecycles are indeed helpful in explaining the evolution of the Tigers‘
campaign. First, the LTTE campaign progressed according to the four phases of a
terrorist lifecycle, and the developments in each phase largely conformed to the
anticipated outcomes. Second, the selected factors played a relevant role across time in
moulding the campaign dynamics. Despite broadly conforming to theoretical
predictions, the study also found some deviations which were not in sync with the
anticipated behaviour of terrorist groups: 1) ideology does not always direct the target
selection; 2) the loss of external sponsorship is unlikely to affect movements that are
self-sufficient with a robust international network; 3) terrorist groups can meet their
demise despite substantial funding 4) the decline of a campaign may sometimes
counter-intuitively witness a stark rise in terrorist attacks; 5) non-violent political
activities do not necessarily substitute terrorist violence;6) military defeat of a terrorist
campaign seems more likely when the group is facing an overall decline in the
campaign and when the desired outcome is a pyrrhic victory; and finally, 7) the death of
a leader, while important, does not necessarily catalyse the demise of the group. In this
way, outcomes which deviated from the hypothetical assumptions contributed to
refining the theoretical explanations of terrorist lifecycles. The thesis concludes by
highlighting possibilities for future research based on the outcome of the study.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Overview of research
‗Terrorism studies‘ has increasingly gained academic attention since September
2001.To date, researchers continue to pursue findings that are directly relevant to
counter-terrorism policymaking. Indeed, this pursuit is far from over, as terrorist
organisations continue to sustain and expand their activities globally. From both
academic and policymaking standpoints, experiences of past terrorist outfits become a
source of knowledge which –taking into account the uniqueness of context- can be
applied in forecasting and countering ongoing campaigns worldwide. Thus, an overall
observation of a group‘s struggle is imperative in further understanding how groups
come into being, how and why they transform, and ultimately how they come to an end.
The metamorphosis of a campaign occurs as a result of interplay between
several factors that influence the course of the struggle. Whether external or internal,
diverse conditions play a role in shaping the group dynamics and the manner in which
the battle is fought. In fact, an armed struggle cannot be created, sustained and
developed without the interplay of numerous variables. Similarly, other conditions may
be responsible in catalysing the demise of a group. Public support, membership, funding
and resources are a few of the many factors that mould the campaign trajectory at any
movement. A comprehensive observation of a struggle enables the investigation of how
and to what extent these aspects contribute to the evolution of the organisation‘s battle.
This study focuses on the evolution of the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers campaign.
Founded in May 1976, the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
emerged as a violent group which sought an ethnically independent Tamil state in the
North and Northeast segment in the island state of Sri Lanka (also referred to as the
Tamil Eelam). Its emergence resulted from years of failed democratic political effort
initiated by Tamil leaders led by the Federal Party, the Tamil United Liberation Front
(TULF), and other organisations in pursuit of increased opportunities, rights, and
equality for the Tamil population in a Sinhala-majority Sri Lanka.1 Hariharan observes
that the LTTE‘s multi-pronged strategy for growth included the creation of: first,
Diaspora networks, second, front organisations responsible for lobbying and political

1

Kaarthikeyan, S, ―Root causes of terrorism? A case study of the Tamil insurgency and the LTTE‖ in
Bjorgo, T., Root Causes of Terrorism (2005) Oxon: Routledge, 132
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support, and third, an intricate arms procurement and logistics network.2 Described by
the FBI as the ―most dangerous and deadly extremist outfit in the world‖3, the LTTE is
recognised to have perfected the tactics of suicide terrorism, including the invention of
suicide belts and the use of female suicide bombers. The armed struggle came to an end
in May 2009, when the Sri Lankan army gunned down the leader of the Tamil separatist
movement, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, in Mullaitivu, Northern Sri Lanka. Nearly 80,000
lives were lost in the 26-year long civil war,4 and 35,000 of these were the lives of the
LTTE cadres.5Nearly four years since the military defeat of the outfit, the Tamil
nationalist separatist ideology continues to live on, especially among the global Tamil
Diaspora communities.
Given its ruthless nature, resilience and durability for nearly three decades, and
the formidable technological innovation it underwent over the years, this terrorist outfit
and their struggle are worthy of empirical examination. There are many studies that
have been conducted on the LTTE over the past few decades, yet most of the works
tend to focus on a particular feature of the LTTE‘s campaign. Indeed, various aspects of
the group make it ideal as a case study- whether it be on suicide terrorism, the cult
figure of the leader, or its conventional military capacity. However, this research
employs a systematic analysis in pursuit of an examination of the LTTE campaign.
Specifically, it tests and refines the existing knowledge on the lifecycle of a terrorist
movement, and examines the factors that instigate the evolution of the campaign
dynamics over time.
The process to conduct this study was multi-fold. The first phase of the research
consisted of a comprehensive review of the literature in the subject area of terrorism
studies and the Tamil Tigers, in order to identify the lacunae in the existing field of
research. The second stage presented the general patterns of a terrorist lifecycle based
on existing literature, followed by identification of factors which commonly influence a
terrorist campaign. This provided the theoretical framework of the study. The final step

2

Hariharan, R.,―LTTE Strategies for Growth and War‖, Sri Lanka Guardian, October 27, 2009,
<http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2009/10/ltte-strategies-for-growth-and-war.html> at December 20,
2012
3
―Ruthless LTTE Most Dangerous Extremists: FBI‖, Express India, January 11, 2008
<http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Ruthless-LTTE-most-dangerous-extremists-FBI/260325/> at
December 20, 2012
4
―How Beijing won Sri Lanka‘s Civil War‖, The Independent, May 23, 2010,
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/how-beijing-won-sri-lankas-civil-war-1980492.html> at
December 20, 2012
5
Hariharan, ―LTTE Strategies for Growth and War‖
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analysed the variables of interest against the LTTE lifecycle, and assessed whether the
development of the LTTE campaign conformed to the existing theories.

1.2 Defining terrorism
Despite an unprecedented amount of research post-9/11 on the subject of ‗terrorism‘,
the term itself remains ambiguous. Kiras notes that this is due to the lack of general
consensus in defining the legitimacy of terrorist means and methods. Definition of this
concept is subjective, as some view terrorist acts as legitimate under the condition that
the violence coincides with a just cause, proportional use of violence, and the use of
force as a last resort.6 Others suggest that violence perpetrated by terrorist groups is
illegitimate because it is only states which have a monopoly on the legitimate use of
violence.7 Nonetheless, the opposing narratives remain subjective. While it is important
that a working definition of the term ‗terrorism‘ be established8 for academic research,
law enforcement agencies, and other interested parties, this research does not intend to
delve extensively into this debate. For the purpose of this research, terrorism will be
defined broadly as9:
a. The use or threat of force or violence,
b. conducted either by a sub-national group or individuals directly influenced,
motivated, or inspired by political or religious ideologies,
c. often directed toward non-combatants and civilian populations in addition to
states, governments and law enforcement
d. and intended to instil fear,
e. as a means of coercing individuals or groups to change their political or
social positions.
Terrorism is employed as a means to achieve political change ―for the purposes
of obtaining power in order to right a perceived wrong‖.10Although there is a fine line
6

Kiras, J., ―Terrorism and Globalization‖ in Baylis, J., Smith, S., Owens, P.(eds), The Globalization of
World Politics (2008) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 373
7
Ibid.
8
Schmid‘s (1984) study of over 100 definition of this term exemplifies the challenge in establishing a
universal agreed description of this term. He expressed that not one single definition was applicable in
explaining the multitude of terrorist organisations.
9

Marsella, A., ―Reflections on international terrorism: issues, concepts, and directions‖ in Moghaddam, F.
and Marsella, A. (eds), Understanding Terrorism (2005) Washington DC: American Psychological
Association, 16
10
Kiras, ―Terrorism and Globalization‖, 373
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between political violence and terrorism, based on the broad definition of terrorism, it is
understood as a modus operandi within the spectrum of political violence. Terrorism is
neither an ideology nor an end; it is merely a means to pursue political goals, and it does
not define the legitimacy or illegitimacy of those goals.11

1.3 LTTE as a terrorist organisation
The conflict in Sri Lanka is characterised as a terrorist problem and/or an ethnic
conflict.12There are numerous drawbacks in promulgating an analytically useful
definition of terrorism: issues of relativity and subjectivity; the evolving nature of
terrorism; emotional responses surrounding terrorism13; varied forms of terrorism and
conflation with other acts of political violence and crime. The famous phrase ―one‘s
man terrorist is another man‘s freedom fighter‖ confuses means and ends, and thus
complicates the process of empirical research. Depending on the political climate of the
time, the concerned parties and their interests, the perception of the LTTE has differed
significantly. While the Sri Lankan government and security establishments adamantly
label the LTTE as ‗terrorists‘,14 many pro-LTTE elements both in Sri Lanka and abroad
support them as ‗freedom fighters‘ fighting for the self-determination of the Tamils in
Sri Lanka.15
Amidst the diverging perceptions, Larison rightly points out that ―[a] group can
employ terrorist tactics while also seeking to achieve self-determination for the people it
claims to represent….Their status as terrorists is determined by the civilian targets they
attack or the indiscriminate tactics they use to attack them.‖16 For the purpose of this
study, the LTTE is regarded as a terrorist organisation largely because of the
organisations‘ target selection over the years (deliberate and indiscriminate targeting of
Sinhala, Tamil, and Muslim civilians and non-military installations), the employment of
terrorist tactics (e.g. suicide attacks and breach of all rules and conventions of war) to

11

Ambrost, A., ―Modelling Terrorism and Political Violence‖ (2010) International Relations, 24:4, 422
Bandarage, A., The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, ethnicity, political economy (2009)
Colombo: Vijitha Yapa, 14
13
Ross, J., Political Terrorism (2006) New York: Peter Lang, 2-5
14
E.g. D.B Wijetunga, former President of Sri Lanka, is quoted saying that ―there is no ethnic problem in
Sri Lanka; there is only a terrorist problem‖. Gunasekara (1996) cited in Bandarage, The Separatist
Conflict in Sri Lanka, 14
15
E.g. Mylvaganam, K., The LTTE are Freedom Fighters , Tamil Sangam Website, April 7, 2006
<http://sangam.org/taraki/articles/2006/04-10_Freedom_Fighters.php?uid=1642> at December 23, 2012
16
Larison, D., Of Terrorists and Freedom Fighters, The American Conservatives, May 17, 2012,
<http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/of-terrorists-and-freedom-fighters/> at December 23,
2012
12
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further their cause, and that the attacks were underpinned by a political motive (creating
a separate state of Eelam). Although the LTTE was active since 1976, several leading
countries and institutions did not recognise the LTTE as a terrorist organisation until
later:


India since 199217;



The United States (designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation since
1997 by Department of State 18 and as a Specially Designated Global
Terrorist since 200119);



Sri Lanka from January 1998 to September 2002 20 , and again from
January 2009.21



The United Kingdom since 2001 under its Terrorism Act 200022;



Australia since 200123;



The European Union since 200624;



Canada since 200625

The LTTE is interchangeably described as a guerrilla, militant, rebel, insurgent and
terrorist group in the study. The aforesaid definition justifies the categorisation of the

17

―Indian Courts upholds LTTE Ban‖, BBC Sinhala, November 11, 2008
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2008/11/081111_india_ltte.shtml> at December 23, 2012
18
―Sri Lanka Welcomes LTTE Arrests in the US‖, Embassy of Sri Lanka in the United States of America,
Summer 2006,
<http://www.slembassyusa.org/press_releases/summer_2006/sl_welcomes_ltte_22aug06.html>
December 23, 2012
19
―US Worthy of Emulation‖, Sunday Observer, November 18, 2007,
<http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2007/11/18/main_Editorial.asp> at December 23, 2012
20
Ladduwahetty, R., and Fernando, M., ―Peace talk teams for Thailand finalised: Government lifts LTTE
proscription‖ Daily News, September 5, 2002 <http://www.dailynews.lk/2002/09/05/new001.html> at
December 23, 2012
21
LTTE is banned by the SL Govt: with immediate effect, Ministry of Defense, Sri Lanka, January 7, 2009
<http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20090107_15> at December 24, 2012
22
Horne, A. and Douse, D., The Terrorism Act 2000: Proscribed Organisations, House of Commons
Library January 7, 2013 <www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn00815.pdf> at January 13, 2013
23
Charter of the United Nations (Anti-terrorism — Persons and Entities) List 2001, Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Australia, December 2001,
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/icat/persons_entities/2_proscribed_entities_10dec2001.html> at December 27,
2012
24
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LTTE as a terrorist organisation. The different terms used to describe the Tigers are by
no means mutually exclusive and simply avoid a repetitive writing style.

1.4 Research questions
The overarching research question for this project is:
What factors have facilitated or driven the transitions between the different phases of
the LTTE lifecycle, from emergence to demise?

In other words, what factors contributed to the evolution of the LTTE campaign?
Furthermore, how did these factors impact the campaign trajectory over time?
Answering this question consists of addressing the following sub-questions: First, what
are the different phases of a terrorist campaign? Second, what variables commonly
influence a campaign trajectory? Finally, in what ways do the variables of interest
influence a terrorist campaign?
Terrorist groups come and go. From their birth, militants continue to develop and
evolve until they finally meet with demise. Over the years, there has been an upsurge of
research that focuses on the evolution of militant groups, including how and why
organisations emerge, evolve, and eventually come to an end. As a result of reviewing
the existing literature on terrorism studies, insurgency and warfare, four main stages of
a terrorist campaign were identified: Emergence; Escalation; De-escalation; and
Demise. The Emergence phase is generally defined as the birth of an armed struggle.
This is a protracted phase that involves a combination of factors that culminate in the
establishment of a terrorist movement. Escalation is the intensification in the
operational, strategic, and tactical aspects of the campaign. De-escalation marks the
decline of a group‘s campaign in terms of their activities and their attacks. And finally,
Demise signals the apparent complete abandonment of violence, and ultimately, the end
of a terrorist campaign. Together, these four phases comprise a terrorist lifecycle.
The various developments in each phase define the evolution of a campaign. Further,
the progression of a terrorist campaign is moulded by the interplay of various
endogenous and exogenous factors. To this end, the researcher identified six variables
that commonly contribute to the evolution of a terrorist campaign: the role of ideology;
ceasefires and peace agreements; public support, terrorist networks and external
supporters; funding; organisational dynamics; and military intervention. These emerged
as the most salient variables of interest from the literature review. They were
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operationalised according to available information (see chapters 5-10) and provided a
theoretical framework to examine the development of the outfit from beginning to end.
Finally, the study identified to what extent the evolution of the LTTE campaign
conformed to existing theories on terrorist lifecycles.

1.5 Methodology
This is primarily a qualitative study which requires an extensive investigation of the
LTTE campaign, including: strategic, ideological, logistical, and organisational
transformations over multiple periods of time.

1.5.1 Research design
This research presents a single case study design. As Punch explains, ―the basic idea is
that one case will be studied in detail, using whatever methods seem appropriate. While
there may be a variety of specific purposes and research questions, the general objective
is to develop as full an understanding of that case as possible‖.26 Because the main
objective of this research is to assess the contribution of the variables to the evolution of
the LTTE campaign, no attempt was made to generalise beyond this particular single
case or to build entirely new theories.27 The aim is to gain a better understanding of the
circumstances in which the variables will and will not hold within this particular
movement.28 Nevertheless, findings from this case study can be used to refine existing
knowledge on terrorist lifecycles.
The analysis is not driven by any single theoretical approach because the study
of terrorism in general is multi-disciplinary, and it is thus a challenge to restrict research
to any one approach. Furthermore, this study eschews the use of hypotheses because in
several cases, the historical outcomes were known in advance, thus negating the utility
of a predictive approach and otherwise risking a tautological analysis. Furthermore, it
would be an oversimplification of research findings and an even greater methodological
challenge to reduce such a complex subject to simple cause-and-effect relations between
independent and dependent variables.
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1.5.2 Data collection
Due to the nature of this research theme, the qualitative method dominated the
analytical process of this investigation. Like the vast majority of terrorism research, this
study relied extensively on open source materials. The main sources were as follows:
-

Academic literature (books and journal articles)

-

Press reports and newspaper articles

-

Government records

-

Online sources

Having searched for a solid LTTE incident database, the researcher found that to
date, there is no single source that compiles a list of all the major LTTE attacks during
the Eelam Wars. Different sources offer separate lists of incidents in disparate time
frames. To this end, the researcher created the ―LTTE Attack Database 1975-2009‖
(Appendix 1), a comprehensive database which lists the publicly recorded major attacks
and incidents perpetrated by the LTTE since its birth to demise in chronological order.
Although the database should not be assumed to be an exhaustive list which includes
every single attack perpetrated by the LTTE, the dataset includes all major terrorist
attacks. Additionally, the database included information about the target, number of
casualties, and the modus operandi of the attacks in order to facilitate quantitative data
analysis for the study. In compiling the incidents, the researcher referred to numerous
open source materials, mostly online newspaper articles. The criteria for
inclusion/exclusion of cases in the database are as follows:
1) References of the attacks are available as evidence in open sources;
2) The list omits incidents that are not definitely attributed to the LTTE. For
example, there are a few incidents which took place during the Sri Lankan civil
war for which the culprit cannot be verified (e.g. the assassination of Minister
of Education, National Security, Food and Agriculture Lalith Athulathmudali
in April 1993 and the slaughter of 17 Action Contre le Faim aid workers in
August 2006).
3) The database omits any attacks which took place as a part of the
conventional military confrontations against the Sri Lankan security forces or
the Indian Peacekeeping Forces. These were omitted because these clashes are
considered to be part of an armed battle in more or less direct confrontations
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with the adversary, as opposed to specific acts of terrorism.29In addition, the
belligerents engaged in countless military clashes during the 26 year war,
making it practically impossible to document all of these incidents. By
separately quantifying specific acts of terrorism in the ‗LTTE Attack Database‘
vis-à-vis the conventional battles, it is possible to assess the use of terrorism
tactics against the backdrop of ongoing military confrontations.

The database is not only functional in examining the LTTE attacks during their
campaign, but also in identifying changes in the patterns of LTTE attacks over a long
period of time. The list alone does not identify the various phases within the LTTE
lifecycle. Rather, the compiled dataset supplements the overall analysis of the Tigers‘
campaign trajectory when examined in conjunction with the proposed variables.
The use of a variety of sources aimed to avoid bias and bring forth more
objective findings. Besides the available publications based on research, the researcher
obtained additional primary data through interviews in Sri Lanka and Australia with
former- LTTE combatants, government officials, law enforcement agents, Tamil
Diaspora members, and experts in this field. A total of 15 subjects were interviewed,
both in Sri Lanka and Australia, for the duration of approximately one to two hours. The
researcher applied opportunity sampling, where participants were identified within the
relevant categories based on the researcher‘s connections and availability of the
respondents. Conducting interviews was useful especially when collecting information
on personal, subjective matters, interviewees‘ direct experiences relating to the conflict
and information that has not been publically disseminated at an open source level.
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Based on the working definition provided earlier, ‗terrorist attacks‘ also included attacks against
security installations and armed forces. These attacks were distinguished from military clashes because
they occurred separately from conventional military battles. The attacks were not perpetrated as a part of
an organised confrontation, but were surprise attacks which took place outside of the battleground.
Moreover, most of the LTTE attacks against the security establishments recorded in the database utilised
typical terrorist tactics such as suicide attacks and IED explosions. The suicide attack on the Army
Headquarters in Colombo in April 2006 is a classic example. Although the target was a military
installation, this incident was recorded as a terrorist attack as it was suicide attack that took place outside
of military clashes (and during the official ceasefire period). Less evident incidents include artillery
attacks against a naval base in Trincomalee which took place in August 2006. Although Eelam War IV
had commenced by this time, this surprise attack took place outside of the main battleground, and more
importantly no retaliatory firing was exchanged between the two entities. Such attacks stood out from
more conventional battles that took place, and they are by their nature quantifiable. Moreover, they
demonstrate the variety in the LTTE modus operandi and they help achieve the goal of constructing the
most comprehensive database of attacks as possible- hence their inclusion.
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1.5.3 Data analysis
The researcher referred to a variety of open source materials in order to collect a wide
array of data and to cross-check validity. Specifically, two main forms of data were
used: the LTTE attacks since its inception to demise (LTTE attack database), and
qualitative accounts of the overall progress of the LTTE campaign and the events
surrounding the group over time. Given the highly complex nature of the phenomena
being studied, it is impossible to establish definite causal relationships between the
variables and the changes in LTTE behaviour (indeed, there are countless possible
variables which may simultaneously exert influence on organisational development).
Instead, this research examines-occurrences between the variables and changes in the
LTTE behaviour over time. Based on the findings, we are able to draw (tentative)
conclusions as to whether or not the evolution of the LTTE campaign confirms existing
theories on terrorist lifecycles.

1.6 Justification and goals
The relative lack of research on continuity and change in terrorist organisations, and the
inadequate exploration of the LTTE campaign from its birth to demise thus far call for
research which addresses this knowledge gap. Consequently, the primary goal of this
research is to systematically examine the LTTE campaign - an approach which has not,
so far, been attempted. The LTTE is an ideal organisation to be examined as a case
study due to its durability in decades of battle, extraordinary levels of tactical and
technological innovation, and experience of multiple peace talks involving foreign
facilitators. The LTTE has thus clearly gone through several transformations until its
demise in 2009, providing a broad range of variables and conditions that can be studied.
The completed research project examines the LTTE campaign in light of the theoretical
framework within terrorism studies, and seeks to refine the existing knowledge on
terrorist lifecycles.

1.7 Limitations and scope of research
The timeframe of this research is restricted to the organisation‘s military defeat in 2009.
Any incidents regarding the group which followed beyond this time are not addressed
for the purpose of this thesis. Although the LTTE‘s armed campaign led by Velupillai
Prabhakaran has been militarily vanquished for now, this does not necessarily preclude
the possibility of re-emergence in the future as the separatist ideology still lingers
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among certain segments of the Tamil population. However, as this issue in itself is
worthy of a separate research of its own, this thesis defines the conclusion of the LTTE
with the demise of Prabhakaran in May 2009. This study deals with a hugely complex
topic over decades, and despite the best efforts to cover as many incidents and major
developments of the conflict as possible, there remains a possibility of missing and
biased information in the data collected.
Caveats in this research are the challenge in empirically demonstrating how the
variables affect change in the campaign dynamics. To begin with, it is very rare to have
direct access to many of the data of interest when studying clandestine groups. Some
variables are difficult to operationalise, especially if they concern subjective and
unquantifiable matters. This includes ideological commitment of members and level of
public support. Such variables must be ‗measured‘ indirectly, by way of proxy variables
or indicators.30Whilst not ideal, this is unavoidable due to the clandestine and complex
nature of terrorism research and should be borne in mind when evaluating the strength
of conclusions.
Moreover, not all variables would exert their influence with an immediate effect.
For instance, the depletion of a group‘s resources and income do not necessarily reflect
an immediate decrease in the frequency of attacks- the group might first exhaust their
‗reserves‘ prior to shifting their strategy. Additionally, other minor factors may
implicitly play a role in collaboration with the proposed variables. These issues pose a
challenge in assessing the correlation of the variables vis-à-vis the transformation of
campaign dynamics. There is difficulty in clear cut identification of the different phases
in the lifecycle. Four different phases are theoretically identifiable, but they
undoubtedly overlap and the transition between phases is not always conspicuous in
reality. Transitions are likely incremental, and characteristics apparent in the previous
phases might remain in the next phase. Moreover, movements can experience a
spontaneous ‗escalation‘ and ‗de-escalation‘ of their violent campaign within each
phase. Therefore, the four broad phases are determined in hindsight by the overall
development of the campaign, and the nature and the frequency of the attacks
perpetrated by the group. Bearing such limitations in mind, this thesis attempts to
broadly delineate the four phases of the LTTE lifecycle, and analyses the role of the
factors in question on the Tigers campaign.
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The operationalisation of each variable is discussed in subsequent chapters
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1.8 Thesis structure and outline
Because this research examines the evolution of the LTTE campaign over time vis-à-vis
the six variables, the thesis is structured accordingly to fulfil the research objectives.
The chapters of the thesis have been divided in a manner where each variable serves as
an independent ‗lens‘ to examine the overall campaign dynamics. Consequently, some
related or overlapping themes within the study may be dealt with separately in different
chapters. Additionally, the chapters may not necessarily be organised in chronological
order that is in line with the developments of the Tigers campaign. Although the
chapters of the thesis are seemingly disintegrated, this structure is inevitable given the
nature of the study. The concluding chapter brings together the various findings of each
chapter and presents a coherent picture of the LTTE lifecycle.
The outline of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of the
related literature in the field, and where and how this particular study is placed within
the overall subject area. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework of the research by
outlining the phases of a lifecycle and identifying the variables that are prevalent in each
of the phases. This is substantiated by extrapolating from the experiences of several
terrorist campaigns around the world. The fourth chapter is an introduction to the
overall LTTE movement and the Sri Lankan conflict in order to familiarise the readers
with the case study. Chapters 5 to 10 are dedicated to an in-depth analysis of the impact
of the variables in relation to the LTTE campaign. Chapter 5 focuses on the role of
ideology, Chapter 6 examines the role of ceasefires and peace talks, Chapter 7 focuses
on public support, the following chapter focuses on funding, Chapter 9 deals with the
impact of organisational dynamics, and finally, Chapter 10 examines the impact of
military interventions on the LTTE campaign. The final chapter offers a summary of
findings and concluding remarks, including implications for future research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Political Violence, Terrorism and the LTTE

This chapter examines the existing literature on the topic of terrorism and the LTTE.
The first section of this chapter will start off with a brief introduction on political
violence in order to familiarise the readers with the discipline. Subsequent parts will
look into the subject of terrorism. While there are vast numbers of studies conducted on
terrorism, this review will specifically examine the evolution of terrorist campaigns, as
it relates most directly to the scope of this research. Findings reveal that within the field
of terrorism studies more generally, there is a need to pay more attention to the
historical dynamics of terrorism and how organisations develop over time.
Subsequently, an overview of the literature on the Sri Lankan conflict and the LTTE
will be presented. Nearly four years on since their demise, the evolution of the LTTE
campaign still remains an understudied subject. The literature review reveals that there
is still a need for research that systematically and comprehensively examines the
campaign dynamics. The following section will therefore identify the two lacunae in
this field: an examination of the historical dynamics of terrorist campaign, and an
examination of the evolution of the LTTE campaign from its birth to demise.

2.1 The changing trends of political violence
Political violence is a catch-all term which embraces everything from asymmetric
warfare, revolutionary guerrilla campaigns and insurgencies to inter-state conflicts.
Rosebraugh defines political violence as actions harming humans for political purposes.
This concept includes violence committed against a nation state to another state,
violence taken by states against international or domestic non-state actors, action taken
by nation states against their own population, and non-state actors taking action against
governments.31
Notably, the nature of conflicts has transformed over the centuries. Warfare was
previously discussed as a state-centric matter in the Westphalian era where the ―order
rested on a notion of sovereignty that granted state protection from interference by
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outsiders‖.32Hence any conflict that took place outside of the state domain was
considered a form of resistance against the colonial powers or against the state. The
post-Westphalian setting provided a different framework in understanding the changing
nature of political violence. Sheehan opines that changes in the international system,
especially in the post- Cold War period, resulted in a decrease in state-to-state military
confrontation, and an increase in a more amorphous and less predictable threat
stemming from terrorism and insurgencies.33 A study conducted by Harbom and
Wallensteen shows that there has been a global shift from interstate to intrastate
conflicts. Of the 118 armed conflicts that have taken place from the years 1989 to 2004,
99 of them have been intrastate wars.34 This new era has marked an exponential rise in
intrastate wars on a global scale, transcending borders. Generally speaking, most
conflicts today are based on ethnic or religious identity, which are used to violently
mobilise people to achieve political objectives.35 Wieviorka notes that the 1950s-1970s
marked the struggle for national liberation, and the 1970s to 80s was characterised
predominantly by extreme-leftist terrorism.36 Additionally, Kaldor contends that ‗new
wars‘ have been driven by culture and identity, underpinning the exponential rise in the
demands of various groups for national self-determination in the 1990s.37 Often, the
complexity of these conflicts means that they are difficult to resolve using conventional
conflict resolution methods, leading to protracted campaigns of violence.38
Placing emphasis on economic and cultural issues as the main driving forces,
Fitzgerald et al. contend that the interaction of the two affect the politics of self32
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determination at both local and global levels.39 The authors argue that violence is an
inherent aspect in the pursuit of self-determination, and political and economic forces
condition the trajectory of conflict. Works produced over the decades demonstrate that
changes in the political, social, cultural and economic climate continually impact upon
the dynamics of political violence. This eventually gave birth to the academic subdiscipline known as terrorism studies (discussed below).

2.2 Understanding political violence
Different socio-political models have been used to explain the underlying causes of
political violence. Broadly speaking, political violence and conflict may be understood
as the outcome of culminating historical circumstances, thereby producing and
legitimising armed conflict.40 Conflicts are often explained by ‗imbalances in different
subsystems‘, notably in the political, economic, and the cultural domain. The
fragmentation of society and culture came to highlight inequalities, thus fuelling
frustration and radicalisation among certain segments of the population. This is
underpinned by Gurr‘s frustration-aggression hypothesis and relative deprivation
theory41, which sow the seeds for potential political violence in the modern era. He
contends that frustration does not necessarily lead to anger and violence except when it
is sufficiently prolonged and deeply felt. Where there is a significant discrepancy
between what people think they deserve (compared to others) and what they perceive
they will obtain, there is a likelihood of violence, which is the ‗relative deprivation
theory‘.
Feierabend et al. concur with Gurr, stating that political turmoil is the
consequence of social discontent.42 Peleg elucidates how human needs drive people to
participate in protracted conflicts, and when these needs are not met in changing sociopolitical settings, this drives mankind to political violence in pursuit of their needs.43
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His argument very much relates to the positions held by Gurr and Feierabend et al.,
where frustration and relative deprivation become the underlying theme of conflicts.
Rosebraugh delves into this concept by analysing why discontented populations do not
necessarily resort to violence. He opines that those who resort to violence justify the
taking up of arms as a choice of last resort, because all other nonviolent means have
successively failed.44 This statement suggests that collective violence is operationalised
only under certain conditions, and social frustration alone does not create conflicts.
Understanding political violence therefore translates to comprehending the
various circumstances and processes that lead to conflict. Peleg shares a similar notion,
emphasising the crucial role of ‗identity groups‘ in understanding protracted conflicts.
In addition to the willingness to take up violence, the aggrieved population need to seize
opportunities in organising and mobilising a group under a common identity (i.e.
religion or ethnicity) or common grievances.45 In this light, della Porta identifies a
number of variables that are pre-requisite to instigating political violence: the
emergence of actors, creation of collective identities, founding of organisations, and
motivating followers.46She dissects the conditions which led to the emergence,
escalation, and de-escalation of political violence in Italy and the Federal Republic of
Germany from the late 1960s to 1990s. Her research explores the circumstances which
brought about the changes in the dynamics of armed conflicts through the use of
multiple levels of analysis (i.e. macro, meso and micro). She examines how violence
developed in the respective settings through external conditions, organised group
dynamics, and individual perceptions and motivations. Finally, the research concludes
that the evolution of political violence can be attributed to the amalgamation of factors
at these different levels. In essence, although seeds of social discontent are always
present, the ―timing and forms of mobilization of discontent in protest are defined by
political conditions‖.47 Any type of political conflict is thus the product of multiple
factors converging at the ‗opportune‘ moment. Further, the dynamics of the campaign
evolve according to changes at the macro, meso and micro levels. Della Porta contends
that once violence erupts, organisational dynamics assume a determining role, thereby
influencing developments at the macro (external conditions), and micro (individual)
44
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levels. Towards the end of the violent cycle, the micro-level becomes crucial in
sustaining the morale of the actors and the longevity of the campaigns.48
Comprehending how campaign dynamics transform over time allows the forecasting of
future campaign trajectories. This consequently facilitates the formulation of
appropriate strategies in order to counter political violence.
Similarly, Owen identifies relevant variables which conspire to engender
political violence, specifically suicide terrorism. These include: culture,
collectivism/individualism, family, honour, gender, psychological factors, social and
contextual issues, socio-demographic characteristics, media and religion.49 Culture, for
instance, impacts the way in which violence is constrained, legitimised, applied, and
endorsed, depending on the group. Familial devotion is another factor which can drive
individuals into violence. For example in Palestine, some tend to enforce their familial
commitment through opting to become a suicide bomber, knowing that the families of
suicide bombers are financially compensated or are rewarded with honour. In this
manner, a large part of understanding the discipline is to understand the circumstances
and the factors which drive people to engage in political violence.
2.3 Evolution of terrorism
Terrorism is essentially a modus operandi of political violence.50 Over the years,
‗terrorism studies‘ has gained prominence to the extent that it has morphed into an
academic discipline in its own right and produced a large amount of research. Because
this thesis deals with terrorism specifically, the following section explores the literature
available on terrorism studies.
Like political violence in general, the nature of terrorism has also evolved over
the years with changing global political dynamics. Modern terrorism studies originate
from international terrorism experienced in the early 1970‘s, such as the airplane
hijackings and the massacre of Israeli delegates at the Munich Olympic Games.51 Kiras
argues that three factors led to the birth of transnational terrorism beginning in 1968: the
expansion of commercial air travel, the availability of media coverage, and the political
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and ideological interests shared among extremists fighting for a common cause.52
Resultantly, terrorism grew from a local to transnational threat, and expanded terrorist
networks. The 1980-90s witnessed an emergence of three trends: ―fewer attacks that
were more deadly and indiscriminate; the increasing sophistication of attacks; and a
greater willingness to perform suicide attacks‖.53 Hoffman examines the
transformational trends of international terrorism in the twentieth century.54 His
argument overlaps with Kiras, stating that contemporary terrorist attacks have witnessed
an increase in lethality. This can be attributed to several factors, including the ease of
terrorist adaptations across the technological spectrum, the greater attraction of media
coverage, the active role of states sponsoring terrorist outfits, the increasing religious
dimension of terrorism, as well as the increasing sophistication and operational
competence of terrorists.55
The al-Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on September
th

11 , 2001 reinforced a resurgence of interest in the field of terrorism studies. Much
research has been limited to understanding terrorist attributes and behaviours, predicting
potential future asymmetric threats, and developing strategies to counter such threats.
Well before 9/11, Carlton proposed the prospects of future terrorism and political substate violence.56Because lethal weapons are becoming easier to obtain, he predicted that
the technological innovation and tactical capabilities of sub-state organisations would
facilitate the escalation of violence and destruction. This is a continuing trend
exacerbated by globalisation, where technologies allow the efficient transfer of goods,
services and information, and borders become more porous. Indeed, globalisation has
contributed to the rise of modern terrorism. Carlton argues that increasing numbers of
terrorist activities will expand, transcending borders, and hence calling for strengthened
international cooperation in combating terrorism in the future.57 Certainly, the majority
of terrorism research has become policy-oriented, and thus tends to be event-driven. To
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this end, Ranstorp argues that the lack of attention to theory building and theory
formation in this discipline has been due to the high demand for policy-relevant
research and for practical purposes.58
In order to fill such a knowledge gap, scholars have attempted to unravel the
changing trends in global terrorism through a multi-disciplinary approach. Rapoport
identifies changing patterns of terrorism over the years, categorising four main waves of
terrorism since the 1880s. Starting from the ―Anarchist Wave‖ (1880s-1920s) followed
by the ―Anti-Colonial Wave‖ (1920s-1960s), the ―New Left Wave‖(1960s-1970s) and
the ―Religious Wave‖ (1979-present), he analyses their characteristics and the sociopolitical background which gave birth to each wave.59 Similarly, Pedahzur et al. contend
that since the 1980s, the emergence of new terrorist organisations substantially
decelerated,60 while the 1990s marked the appearance of so called ‗religious‘ terrorist
groups, which were not prevalent in preceding decades. Interestingly, this finding places
a different emphasis than that of Rapoport, who contends that the rise of terrorism
began in 1979. The political developments around the world during that time (e.g. the
Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in particular) marked a new
phase of terrorism. Pedazhur‘s finding focuses more on the latter years, as Hezbollah
and the like were formed in the early 1980s, and more religious groups emerged later in
the 90s.

2.4 Understanding and explaining terrorist campaigns
As numerous politically violent groups have continued to emerge and diminish, there
has also been a focus in examining the evolution of such groups and their campaigns.
The Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency provides a comprehensive overview of
insurgency. It describes that insurgencies often progress through certain common stages
of development: pre-insurgency phase, incipient conflict stage; open insurgency stage;
and resolution phase. This study examines the factors and characteristics prevalent in
each stage, and discusses how insurgency develops and ends over time.61 Similarly,
Roberts proposes five main steps which constitute a terrorist lifecycle in the context of
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al-Qaeda, and discusses the effectiveness of deterrence at each stage.62 The ―Formative
stage‖ marks the formation of the organisation, and is shaped by ideology and increased
recruitment and training of members. The next stage marks the initial acts of violence,
where deterrence has limited effectiveness. The third phase is the ‗adaptive‘ stage, when
change to the status quo is not achieved through violent campaigning. Roberts suggests
that depending on the nature of the struggle, movements either collapse or adapt when
facing this point. The subsequent stage is defined as the ‗endgame‘, where the purpose
and frequency of violence is dependent upon the group‘s level of achievement of its
ideological objectives. Splinter groups are also created at this phase. The final stage is
marked by the demise of the group, or by splinter groups forming a new campaign.
Given that a terrorist lifecycle is characterised by different phases,
understanding how and why groups emerge, evolve and eventually come to an end has
attracted much academic interest. This research consists of examining patterns of
attacks over time, and synchronising political and socio-economic conditions in which
the attacks take place. Crenshaw‘s ongoing research attempts to identify patterns in the
evolution of a terrorist organisation worldwide, and further applies this framework in
understanding the development of al-Qaeda in a systematic manner.63 Crenshaw gives
particular emphasis to organisational evolution as terrorist groups form, grow, split,
merge, transform and decline. Both inter- and intra- group interactions over an extended
time period are assessed. The work presents an overarching theory which explains the
emergence of the group and its interaction with both governments and other existing
groups, as well as how changes in society, logistical support and technological
innovation impact upon organisational behaviour of the outfit.
Study on the decline and demise of a campaign has recently received more
academic attention, as it is directly relevant to counter-terrorism policy prescription. For
example, Connable and Libicki‘s work comprehensively examines how insurgencies
come to an end. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, they assess the impact
of several factors including time, foreign intervention, availability of sanctuary,
organisational structure, insurgent capability, and system of government on the
insurgencies around the world. Based on historical experiences, they conclude that
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government forces have advantages and a high chance of winning over the insurgent
groups, and in fact governments defeat themselves more often than they are defeated by
an insurgency.64
Similarly, Lockett argues that factors which are internal to the movement
influence strategic reasoning, hence triggering actions that are counterproductive to the
group‘s strategic goals.65 He further argues that the destruction of a group is inevitable
once organisational issues override instrumental ones. In other words, Lockett suggests
that terrorism comes to an end when bonds between members of the group weaken, or
where ideology or justification of violence is demolished. Smith and Damphousse
conclude that US environmental groups tend to adopt a short planning cycle compared
to other right-wing and international terrorist groups,66 while Wragg contends that
separatist/nationalist movements have greater longevity in comparison to others.67
Alternatively, Henke concludes that survival of groups is dependent upon the internal
dynamics of leader selection, and the manner in which the group expands due to
increased membership.68 In addition, Blomberg et al69 conclude that terrorist groups can
be broadly categorised as one of two types- recidivists and so called ‗one-hit wonders‘.
The survivability of the former dramatically decreases when regional, socio-economic
and political factors impact the organisation‘s survival. The latter, however, is not easily
deterred by these factors, thus can only depend on counter-terrorist operations to
decrease its durability.
One of the most prominent works within this aspect of terrorism research is
presented by Cronin, as she elucidates how terrorist groups of varying nature have
ended. She identifies six elements which commonly contribute to the demise of the
group: (1) capture or killing of the group‘s leader, (2) entry of the group into a
legitimate political process, (3) achievement of the group‘s aims, (4) implosion or loss
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of the group‘s public support, (5) elimination by brute force, and (6) transition from
terrorism into other forms of violence.70 The most crucial finding of her research is that
the decline of a group can be attributed to the interplay of both internal and external
factors, and that a single factor alone is unlikely to be responsible for the end of
terrorism.71 If campaigns end due to an amalgamation of various factors, the same logic
can be translated to understanding how groups emerge, develop, peak, disintegrate and
end. To this end, Cronin‘s contention that the evolution of terrorist campaigns is driven
by the interplay of different internal and external dynamics seems to be substantiated by
existing literature. As with della Porta‘s aforementioned work, the dynamics of political
violence, including terrorism, is very much moulded by an amalgamation of several
exogenous and endogenous elements which converge at an opportune moment, thereby
influencing the lifecycle of a violent campaign.
While there is abundant literature which examines the general transformation of
a terrorist campaign over time, many other studies analyse the impact of a single
variable on the longevity of a terrorist group. For instance, Paul looks into the role of
public support and its contribution to campaign durability. His investigation
demonstrates the conditions which encourage terrorist support and motives for such
support. These can be broadly categorised into three types:72 1) motivations for support
in response to context (e.g. perceived oppression, grievances, humiliation, etc.); 2)
motivations stemming from cultural or social processes (e.g. socio-cultural obligations,
revenge, cost-benefit calculations); and 3) motivations relating to direct activities of
terrorist groups (e.g. intimidation, provision of social services, propaganda, etc). The
myriad of support factors, according to Paul, impacts the legitimacy of the campaign,
hence affecting its durability and longevity. Similarly, Metelits provides an analysis of
how and why insurgents gradually change their treatment of civilian constituents which
they claim to represent. This research examines how connections between insurgents
and local communities are institutionalised, and in what context groups determine their
interaction with the local population. Through personal encounters with rebels from
four different insurgent groups, Metelits contends that several conditions such as
resource level, competition between other rival groups, possibility of survival, and
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national government policies impact the groups‘ strategy (especially vis-à-vis their
behaviour towards civilian constituencies).73 The ‗active-rivalry theory‘ as Metelits calls
it, is the main factor in determining the relationship between the two sides.
Alternatively, Weinberg and Pedahzur demonstrate how terrorist organisations
can turn into political parties under several conditions and vice versa. In cases with
political parties transforming into terrorist groups (eg. Argentina‘s People‘s
Revolutionary Army and El Salvador‘s National Republican Alliance), the authors
contend that it is due to the following conditions: 1) crisis of national integration; 2)
crisis of disintegration of the political party; 3) lack of or decrease in legitimacy; 4)
elections and change in political order; and 5) polarisation of multiparty systems. They
present the case studies of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Basque Homeland and
Liberty (ETA) and the African National Congress (ANC) and conclude that the
following conditions are key to exiting terrorism: 1) a transformation in the prevailing
political order; 2) severe state repression; 3) lack of clandestinity, and; 4) when the state
issues amnesty and forgiveness.74 In essence, their work demonstrates that there is a
high level of interdependency between terrorist groups and political parties. Often-times
the two entities are spin-offs of the same social movement, and entering politics or
opting for violence are merely a strategic tool to achieve their political goals. Further,
Wiegand75 examines the metamorphosis of Hezbollah to a Lebanese political party.
Although the party still maintains a well-armed military branch, Wiegand attributes the
exit of terrorism to two major conditions: 1) Hezbollah‘s political leverage over the
government and 2) the group‘s moderation of their objectives in order to achieve their
domestic political goals.

2.5 Identifying the lacunae
Having acknowledged the wide ranging literature in the field, there still remains a
lacuna in understanding the process of a terrorist lifecycle, and there is no established
theoretical framework which clearly defines this model. Plenty of research has been
conducted examining and analysing different terrorist groups and their impact upon
(in)security and the socio-economic infrastructure at both global and/or regional
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levels.76 Terrorism experts often present a descriptive finding of the group‘s
organisational structure, leadership, history, government response, strategy, background
behind its emergence and/or demise, and the group‘s modus operandi. For instance,
Jackson and Frelinger explore how terrorists are selective in their modus operandi for
different types of operation. They argue that there are significant differences in the way
that weapons are employed and the adaptability of technology in each movement.77 For
instance, terrorists are selective in their weapons depending on the nature of the target
(e.g. mortars and rockets are largely used for attacks on defended targets, whereas
general explosives and hand grenades are used to attack against undefended targets).78
Further, the variety and versatility of weapons available to the outfit, and the expertise
on the use of different modus operandi would expand the scope of terrorist operations.79
Similarly, Dolnik examines the historical trends in terrorist innovation and the
factors which are responsible in determining the modus operandi employed by a
terrorist group. These include the role of ideology and strategy, dynamics of the
struggle, countermeasures, targeting logic, attachment to weaponry, group dynamics,
relationship with other organisations, resources, openness to new ideas, durability, and
nature of the technology. Through identifying the characteristics of four different
terrorist organisations- Aum Shinrikyo, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Riyadus-Salikhin Suicide Battalion, and
November 17- he explores the motives which drive the groups to adopt innovative
technology and modus operandi. He concludes by assessing the degree to which the
aforementioned factors impact the outfits to adopt new and innovative tactics.
Resultantly, this potentially enables the assessment of future trajectories of other
terrorist campaigns.80 Studies like this that observe a single group81 or conduct
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comparative analyses between different groups82 are abundant, and such research has
undoubtedly enhanced the understanding of numerous global terrorist outfits and their
activities. The shortfall in examining a single factor of an organisation is the lack of a
comprehensive examination of a group and its campaign pattern.
Despite the invaluable contributions made in this field, there is a lack of analysis
across ―functional lines within a wider body of knowledge and research on terrorist
groups‖.83 Popularly addressed issues include the preconditions that generate violent
movements, which group adopts most violent tactics and why, and what sort of
individuals resort to political violence. Particularly, there is an evident need for a
research approach that gives special attention to observing the interplay of factors and
preconditions which urge the metamorphosis of a terrorist organisation. This problem
does not lie solely in the absence of a universal definition of terrorism, but also because
of the ongoing demand in producing policy-relevant findings, which ostensibly
undermines the relevance of examining groups in hindsight beyond their demise. The
changing trends and patterns in terrorism have attracted much academic interest, while
looking at the interactions of different conditions in the evolution of groups has received
less attention. In this light, this research attempts to explain the lifecycle of the LTTE,
which in turn has implications in refining the existing knowledge on terrorist lifecycles.
Analysis will be conducted through identifying the relevant variables (see Chapter 3)
and their impact on the group‘s campaign.

2.6 The Sri Lankan conflict
While much research has been conducted on the LTTE in the past, there has been little
effort to explain the evolution of the group‘s terrorist campaign in a systematic and
conceptually consistent way. The Sri Lankan conflict is often dealt with in several
components of analysis, while the ethnic conflict is often presented from a historical
and socio-political perspective.
The separatist conflict is often explained by Tamil self-determination and
nationalism and whether federalism, devolution, territorial integrity, and central power
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sharing are practically feasible in solving the conflict in Sri Lanka.84 Alternatively,
some scholars view the conflict from the Sinhala Buddhist-nationalist point of view,
through examining the manner in which it develops social political identities, and
ultimately motivates violence and intolerance. The nationalist sentiments are influenced
heavily by their respective myths, legends, cosmologies, and other traditional values.
Kapferer asserts that rituals, traditions, legends and myths are significant in explaining
the collective violence of nationalism, and are greatly relevant in moulding state
behaviour and in understanding the passion for ethnic destruction of the people.85
Sinhala nationalist discourse is deep-rooted in the legends of the Buddhist chronicle, the
Mahavamsa, which stir people to pursue violence to guard their nationalism.
As the above illustrates, the conflict in Sri Lanka is a complex phenomenon that
could be examined through various perspectives. Samaranayake rightly summarises that
the ethnic conflict in the country could be attributed to the ―emergence of new social
forces which came about due to socio-economic and political transformation‖.86
Whether it is Sinhala or Tamil nationalism or the military-industrial complex which
gave birth to the conflict in Sri Lanka, there is no single element which can underpin the
rise of Tamil militancy in the country. Against this backdrop, understanding the main
antagonist of the Sri Lankan war, the LTTE, is equally a complex process. Their
sophistication and the innovation as a terror group has attracted much academic interest
from various disciplines including political science, anthropology, psychology, and
economics. For the purpose of this thesis, the following section will explore the
literature available on the LTTE as a terrorist/guerrilla/insurgent group.

2.7 Explaining the LTTE campaign
Similar to existing literature on other terrorist groups, many of the works published on
the LTTE tend to highlight a certain aspect within the campaign and the socio-economic
impact of its activities on the country.87 Suicide terrorism is one of the most prominent
aspects highlighted in the study of the LTTE. Having perfected the use of suicide
terrorism, the LTTE is undoubtedly a fascinating case study. One of the more formal
pieces of research that address the trends of the LTTE‘s modus operandi is by Van de
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Voorde.88 While his work provides a historical overview of the LTTE‘s development
and concludes with a series of policy recommendations to tackle the group‘s strategies,
his focus is limited solely to suicide terrorism. Bloom‘s Dying to Kill, provides a
detailed background to the Sinhala-Tamil conflict but she limits her argument as to how
suicide terrorism emerged as a form of outbidding the other existing Tamil militant
outfits and to further mobilise and radicalise the Tamil population.89
Further, Hopgood provides a focused profiling of the Black Tigers, the suicide
mission squad of the LTTE. His description gives a comprehensive overview of the
squad, starting from its first attack, the number and type of missions, target selection,
recruitment, training, and even individual and organisational motivations for employing
this modus operandi.90 Dearing follows a constructivist interpretation in explaining the
use of female suicide bombers in the LTTE. He argues that while many associate female
bombers as a tactical advantage in furthering the outfit‘s objectives, the case of LTTE is
better understood by a broader spectrum of components. First, discrimination and
suppression against the Tamils were institutionalised by the Sri Lankan government;
second, the LTTE was successful in harnessing discontent, and further encouraging and
mobilising women in serving as the ‗protectors‘ of the Tamil community; and third, the
two aforementioned preconditions were reinforced by the notion of cultural liberation,
which urged female martyrdom.91Although most of the works focused on LTTE and
suicide terrorism shed light on the outfit, the scope of study so far has been limited,
failing to examine the campaign as a whole.
Swamy‘s biography of the LTTE leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, is another case
in point. This work examines the LTTE and its strategy from the eyes of the leader
Prabhakaran himself, but develops into a descriptive narrative of the group‘s
organisational struggle.92Some works examine the Tamil Tigers through the eyes of its
adversary, the Sri Lankan government, by analysing the counter-terrorism efforts and
series of negotiations it initiated over the years. An edited book compiled by
Rupesinghe encompasses the series of negotiations which Sri Lanka experienced since
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the inception of the Thimpu Talks in 1985.93 Mendis94, Peiris95, and Gunasekara96
describe the various government policies and rounds of peace talks initiated by the
government, and the reaction of the LTTE. For instance, Peiris asserts that the 2002
ceasefire agreement was destined to fail from the outset, and criticises the various
components within the process, such as the LTTE‘s proposed Internal Self-Governing
Authority and the Norwegian mediation.97 He also foresees the direction of the war and
the eventual demise of the LTTE de-facto state. Mukarji extends his analysis of the Sri
Lankan peace process by asserting that the state is liable to be held responsible for the
failure in bringing an end to the conflict sooner, while demonstrating its inability to
protect the Tamil people in the LTTE-held territory from the group.98Again, the series
of literature examines one particular aspect within the LTTE campaign.
Literature that attempts to explicate the general Sri Lankan conflict mostly
concentrates on developing a broader analysis of the conflict, such as the backdrop to
the crisis prior to 1983, and its contribution to the creation of LTTE. Most of the works
on the early stages of the conflict explore the historical struggle of the Sinhalese- Tamil
relations prior to the 1983 Black July riots (which are considered the main catalyst of
the Sri Lankan conflict).99
Edirippulige‘s doctoral thesis refers extensively to the impediments of
establishing lasting peace and the challenges that are to be faced in proceeding with the
peace process in the particular conflict.100 He concludes that both domestic and external
factors hinder such efforts. Domestic issues include the existing political structure,
characteristics of devolution, and sources of violence. External factors address the
impact of geopolitics and the role of the Sri Lankan Diaspora and the international
community. The combination of these factors constrains efforts for a sustained liberal
democratic political structure, and the deepening conflict (Eelam War III) is a result of
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the failure of both internal and external actors to promote democracy in the nation. The
post-Cold War environment, he concludes, should be conducive in creating lasting
peace in Sri Lanka. This work examines the interplay of several exogenous and
endogenous factors in explicating the failures of peace building in the nation.
The final days of the LTTE campaign have also become another topic of
research interest since 2009. In Sri Lanka: From Peace to War, Gokhale depicts the
final stages of the war from a journalistic approach. As a journalist of NDTV, an Indian
national media channel, he provides an anecdotal account of Sri Lanka‘s military
advancements in defeating the terrorist group, and the LTTE‘s retaliation against the
government in the final phases of their campaign.101 The author offers four main
elements which attributed to the decimation of the LTTE. First, the robust political will
of President Mahinda Rajapakse to defeat the terror group militarily; second, the
unprecedented level of synergy among the three armed forces (army, navy, and air
force); third, the military support of China, Russia, and India, and finally, the severe
mistreatment of the Tamil civilians towards the final days of the war.102
Wijewardana similarly focuses on the final phase of the battle, but instead
offers analytical insights on how President Mahinda Rajapakse succeeded to end the
struggle when his predecessors continuously failed to do so. The writer attributes the
success of Rajapakse to few elements including the unprecedented political will to
militarily defeat the LTTE, the appropriate appointment of military personnel to the
relevant positions to devise effective counter-insurgency strategies, effective
engagement with the Indian government, and withstanding international pressure.
Moreover, the work delves further into the issues leading up to the death of Prabhakaran
and the blunders which he committed in hastening the defeat of the movement.
According to the writer, among many, the supremo‘s strategic failures included: 1)
underestimation of President Rajapakse; 2) assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi; 3) killing his way to achieve the Tamil Eelam; 4) attacking innocent civilians
and places of worship, and forced recruitment of child soldiers, 5) centralisation of
power with Prabhakaran and not promoting a successor, and 6) the ―Eelam or Nothing‖
approach.103
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Battle‘s thesis highlights how the rapid loss of public support and local
legitimacy towards the LTTE from the year 2007 accelerated the military defeat of the
outfit in 2009.104 This work particularly concentrates on the role of public support, and
how it was lost over the years. Through discussing the significance of the global Tamil
Diaspora, the Sri Lankan military offensive and the effects of 9/11 as a turning point in
the LTTE struggle, he argues that local public support is imperative to any insurgent
movement and can determine the course of its fate.
In contrast to the aforementioned views of Edirippulige, Swamy opines that the
creation of the LTTE itself became an impediment to the possible resolution of the
conflict.105 This is underpinned by the supremo‘s intransigence to settle for any solution
other than a Tamil Eelam, and those who opposed against him were executed. Further,
the Tamil population resultantly paid a heavy price because of the LTTE, as the large
section of the Sri Lankan Sinhalese community came to ―unfortunately view the LTTE
and the Tamil problem as two faces of the same coin‖.106 Successive Sinhala regimes
repeatedly failed to offer meaningful concessions to the Tamils, and when President
Kumaratunga was ready to make peace, war was ignited.107 Swamy therefore concludes
that the interplay of war and politics in the country has led to a situation where
negotiations and peaceful solutions were deemed far from possible, thereby justifying
President Rajapakse‘s option for a military solution to the protracted conflict in the
country.
A more comprehensive examination of the LTTE battle is presented by Senaka
Silva, in his work Sri Lanka: Three Decades of Hostilities.108 This is the closest attempt
to a comprehensive overview of the LTTE campaign. The author commences by
discussing the issues that led to the emergence of the LTTE, which progresses to
discussing Prabhakahran, suicide terrorism, peace talks, political parties in Sri Lanka,
Indian intervention, and the Norwegian facilitation. Although Silva presents significant
events and key players of the conflict during the years 1983 to 2008, his analysis is
limited to providing descriptive and anecdotal accounts of a few historical events and
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themes within the conflict. The key difference in this particular thesis lies in a more
systematic analysis of the campaign, examining how individual variables altered the
course of the outfit‘s battle over time.
Given that the demise of the LTTE campaign marked just four years ago, the
amount of academic literature produced on the final phases of the campaign and the
demise of the group is naturally far less than the research conducted on the emergence
and the developmental stages of the LTTE. In the wake of the conclusion of the military
confrontation, the dominant theme of research into the LTTE and the Sri Lankan
conflict has involved analysing the factors that contributed to the military defeat of the
outfit. The aforementioned works by Wijewardana, Gokhale, and Swamy are prime
examples. Additionally, it is pertinent to note that the strongest common denominator
among the findings is that the demise of the LTTE, or the emergence and the
development of their campaign dynamics for that matter, is not a product of a single
factor, but an amalgamation of many. The evolution of the LTTE lifecycle- from its
birth, escalation, de-escalation, and demise- can therefore only be explained by the
interplay of various internal and external elements surrounding the socio-political
environment of the group.

2.8 Conclusion
In conclusion, despite numerous important contributions there are continuing gaps in
the existing literature. May 2009 signified the end of the LTTE‘s 33-year long existence
and subsequent post-war research has produced only preliminary conclusions. Although
several studies on the LTTE delineate the evolution of the organisation, the scope of
their analysis is limited to a restricted timeframe, and consequently, the question of how
and why LTTE evolved over time has been insufficiently studied. The proposed
research therefore attempts to address and synchronise the two lacunae in this academic
field: an assessment of the variables which influence a campaign trajectory, and an
overall examination of the transformation in the LTTE campaign.
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Chapter 3: Terrorist Lifecycle and Variables

This chapter identifies the factors that affect the transition between the different phases
of the lifecycle of a terrorist movement. As this is the primary focus of research, it is
important that these phases are clearly defined. The detection of the phases ultimately
enables a comprehensive analysis of the lifecycles of terrorist campaigns. The findings
presented below are drawn from a collection of various academic disciplines in the
related fields of terrorism studies109, conflict studies110, and theories of insurgency and
guerrilla warfare.
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Through examining the general trends of various terrorist

organisations and their campaign trajectory, the complete lifecycle of a campaign
generally comprises of four main phases: Emergence; Escalation; De-escalation; and
Demise (Fig.1). The dynamics and the function of violence correlate to the different
stages of the campaign.

Fig.1 Theoretical Phases of a Terrorist Campaign
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3.1 Phases of a lifecycle
The Emergence phase of a movement is generally defined as the birth of a violent
campaign. This is often a protracted phase that involves a combination of factors that
culminate in the establishment of a movement. Scholars such as Eckstein and Johnson
observe that certain preconditions are necessary in producing an environment that is
conducive to terrorist activities, and other precipitating factors particularly induce the
outbreak of violence.112 Ahmad suggests that the necessary ‗ingredients‘ for instigating
a campaign are:113
1. Successfully creating a common interest and collective goals;
2. The functioning of a group, or the extent to which they remain accountable to
the population and are able to facilitate rapid recruitment, and;
3. The integrity of the leaders and their ability to practice and promote principles
proclaimed by the campaign
In other words, three elements are required in the emergence phase: identification of
ideology, public support and recruitment, and a robust leadership.
First, the ideology of a movement is futile if it does not have any representation,
or if it is unrelated to a certain constituency where it looks for potential supporters.114
Once the ideology of a movement resonates with a population, it can facilitate the
launching of a campaign of violence by justifying or rationalising these actions.115
Furthermore, this also serves to give members an exaggerated sense of their own
importance in fighting for a cause116, which as a result consolidates their commitment
and sense of raison d‘etre within the movement. Therefore, ideology serves as a
mobilisation tool at both organisational and individual levels, as it gives strength to
organise members for violent actions against the prevailing order.117 Ideology is also
crucial in defining the campaign objectives, thus moulding the strategy for operational
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activities. This also includes tactical considerations, such as determining target selection
and propaganda.118
Ideology alone does not produce a movement, if it is not capitalised upon
effectively. Attracting recruitment and garnering public support is vital at this stage.
This is where leadership comes into play, whereby leaders exploit the ideology to define
the (violent) strategy of the group, and further provide vision, direction, and
coordination to generate political and military actions.119 Securing support of a
substantial portion of a population comprises the following: indoctrination;
establishment of an infrastructure in a controlled base area; and further demonstrating
the group‘s significance by accomplishing successful armed actions, thus exposing the
government‘s vulnerability, or by seemingly providing a better alternative to the
existing government and system.120 When such conditions are met, this can instigate
support (active and passive) and membership of the movement, both locally and
internationally. Such factors may also contribute to establishing the political legitimacy
of the movement, which is paramount in sustaining the campaign and to inducing
further support.
Another crucial feature in the emergence phase of a campaign is to preserve
and to consolidate the campaign to ensure the completion of the necessary political and
military preparations for the succeeding phases. The tactics employed to achieve this
can be both psychological and physical, such as propaganda and continuous
recruitment, to initial acts of strategic violence (e.g. small arms resistance/ hit and run
attacks in the local area121). This is part of the strategic aim to gain political legitimacy
and a wider support base, in preparing for the escalation of the campaign. Based on the
above elements, the emergence phase of a terrorist group will witness the identification,
acceptance, and spread of an ideology in relation to an identifiable political cause, along
with garnering public support and securing membership to instigate a campaign.
Escalation is the intensification of the operational, strategic, tactical, and
logistical aspects of the campaign. Many of the activities and the characteristics
demonstrated in the nascent stage of a group are usually continued and strengthened
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during this stage, thus elements are likely to overlap with the previous phase. As the
campaign progresses, groups opt to expand and intensify their campaign.122The rise of
the movement is facilitated by increasing popular support leading to more funding and
logistical support as well as political legitimacy, which in turn enable more
recruitment.123 These factors determine the extent and the capability of a group to
escalate its campaign and thereby attempt to undermine and challenge the government.
Another intended effect is to isolate people from the government and to obtain a wide
base of popular support for the longevity of the campaign.124As violence escalates
during this phase, government retaliation intensifies. Government operations also tend
to have adverse effects in mitigating a terrorist campaign, as they may provoke a
backlash of violence, hence contributing to a more destructive campaign as an
outcome.125 Moreover, escalation as a strategic choice is also employed in instances
where groups face the possibility of disintegration. Leaders may escalate violence in the
hope to appear more powerful, and so that the government response will infuriate their
group‘s members and thus increase their group solidarity as a result.126Another reason
for the escalation of a campaign is not just to fight against the government, but to outbid
rival groups. Della Porta claims that in any collective movement, multiple organisations
cohabit within the same social movement.127 To this end, there may be networks of
cooperative, but more likely antagonistic relationships among these groups.128
Consequently, groups attempt to wield their influence in order to stress their relevance
and legitimacy over rivals in the same environment. This process may also have a spillover effect in securing further public support, coerced or otherwise.
Given the nature of this particular phase, securing sources of funding becomes
vital in order to develop and sustain the intensification of the campaign dynamics.
Terrorist groups frequently resort to various methods in securing and expanding their
source of income, as it is the key to enhancing innovation of tactics, continuing
propaganda work, and to financing all other aspects necessary for escalating activities.
Overall, this stage will witness an increased severity, if not frequency and lethality of
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attacks. The reasons for escalation are many, depending on the circumstances and
capabilities of the particular organisation. During this phase, terrorist groups will
galvanise further public support for logistics, recruitment, and political legitimacy. As
funding will assume more significance at this stage, groups will also focus on
expanding sources of income to match the intensification of their activities.
De-escalation generally marks the decline in the frequency of attacks and a
group‘s activities. Once a group reaches a peak in escalation, the campaign dynamics
almost inevitably trend downwards. The downfall of the movement often occurs when
it loses direction and operational capacity. Debray defines this phase as when terrorist
organisations cease to have political objectives- although they may continue to exist
they often drift towards other activities that are not of a terroristic nature.129
As conflicts drags on there can be significant loss of life, widening gaps of
inequality, and even a loss of hope in continuing the fight.130 This results in the spread
of dissatisfaction and disillusionment among the public and/or members of the
movement. The downfall of the group can also be marked by the stagnation of a group‘s
‗military‘ operations against government actions, leading to the gradual decline of
military confrontations. Moreover, internal rivalry and disputes among members may
create instability within the movement, in some cases leading to organisational
splitting.131 This as a result can affect the movement‘s morale, and even the loss of
public support, along with a loss in logistical and strategic functions of the group. In
sum, this phase will commonly witness a drastic, if not gradual decline in the frequency
and lethality of attacks, a decline in public support and recruitment, and a loss of
territory, if any.
Finally, Demise signals the complete abandonment of violence, and ultimately,
the end of a terrorist group‘s campaign. It is rare for the group to abandon their
campaign as a result of achieving political and military goals. Quite often, the demise of
a campaign occurs when political goals become no longer relevant in the face of a
changed political environment. Hypotheses on how groups end tend to be derived from
the broader study on how groups emerge; however Cronin draws attention to the
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oversimplification of such assumptions.132 This phase can be underpinned by several
factors.
Terrorist campaigns can lose focus due to various socio-political factors which
they face in their particular environment. Cronin identifies six primary ways that
terrorist groups end: (1) capture or killing of the group‘s leader, (2) entry of the group
into a legitimate political process, (3) achievement of the group‘s aims, (4) implosion or
loss of the group‘s public support, (5) defeat and elimination by brute force, and (6)
transition from terrorism into other forms of violence.133 Mass arrests could also
catalyse the demise of a movement, as this serves to undermine the organisational
morale in addition to limiting manpower, and thus the campaign trajectory shifts to
defending the internal cohesion of the group to prevent its demise.134 Furthermore,
Lockett suggests that terrorism comes to an end when bonds between members of the
group weaken, or where the justification of violence is demolished.135 Finally the
demise of the group can be catalysed when splinter groups emerge and start new
campaigns,136 which tend to be even more violent and radical than that of the ‗parent‘organisation. Ultimately, the demise of an organisation will be characterised by a
complete halt in violent activities.
The four phases of a lifecycle137 are a general categorisation established for the
purpose of facilitating analysis of a terrorist campaign. The reality is of course more
complex, as no terrorist campaign will fall neatly into four entirely distinct stages. As
Gupta convincingly argues, during the course of a lifecycle a movement ―goes through a
number of peaks and troughs when levels of violence escalate and when they
subside‖.138 For instance, a movement may seem to be shifting to its escalation stage,
and yet may be experiencing a series of ‗waves‘ in terms of operational capabilities. A
decline in the frequency of attacks does not necessarily indicate that the movement is
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hitting its de-escalation phase. Consequently, there is great difficulty in determining and
delineating the stages of an ongoing terrorist campaign.
Just like any other disciplines within the social sciences, causal relationships are
not always definitive in terrorism studies. A ceasefire does not necessarily urge terrorist
campaigns to decline, and a greater frequency of attacks does not always indicate the
lasting escalation of a campaign. One of the purposes of this thesis therefore is to
identify the co-occurrences between the variables and changes in the LTTE behaviour
over time. While noting such possible limitations, this investigation will follow the next
important step.

3.2 Identifying the factors
The evolution of a struggle is moulded by the interplay of various endogenous and
exogenous factors that lead the movement to shift from one phase to another in its
lifecycle. Based on existing literature, the following six factors were identified as
significant variables which commonly influence a terrorist campaign:

1. The role of ideology
2. Ceasefires and peace agreements
3. Public support, terrorist networks and external supporters
4. Funding
5. Organisational dynamics
6. Military interventions

The following section explains these variables in-depth, and presents
hypothetical assumptions for how each variable commonly moulds campaign dynamics,
based on historical research. Primarily, this chapter refers mostly to Al Qaeda, Shining
Path, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Kurdistan Worker‘s Party, Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Al Qaeda in Iraq. These organisations cover
different geographical settings including the Middle East, Europe, Latin America and
Asia. They also encompass a wide range of motivations including Islamist, leftistrevolutionalist, and ethno-nationalist. Finally, the selected cases encompass two broad
types of organisational structure- namely, hierarchical and de-centralised.
The six variables for this study were selected as the most salient variables
identified in the literature, which are believed to significantly impact upon terrorist
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campaigns. As discussed below, each of these variables have seemingly played an
important role in influencing a variety of other militant groups; hence their relevance for
examining the LTTE.
Some variables are of course interrelated. Consequently, it may be a
combination of several variables that drive the shift to the next phase of a lifecycle. To
this end, there is a challenge in attributing the changes in a campaign to a single
variable. While acknowledging this caveat, it is necessary to isolate factors for the
purpose of analysis.

1. The Role of Ideology
As noted earlier in the chapter, ideology is crucial to the birth and the escalation/
sustenance of a movement. The significance of ideology is demonstrated especially in
the case of Al Qaeda (AQ), a movement that is ―multigenerational, without a
geographic centre, transnational in nature, virtual in design, and exceptionally difficult
to detect and interdict‖.139 In the pre-9/11 era, AQ was more centralised due to its
logistical base and infrastructure located in Afghanistan. The organisational structure of
the group has transformed overtime from a monolithic entity to more of a concept or an
idea. Presently, the group does not follow a hierarchical structure and the members are
not necessarily always directed by the current AQ leadership. Rather, it is comprised of
a loose transnational network sustained by the ideology of the movement, based on
insidious hatred of Western (particularly the US and Israeli) foreign policy and military
occupation in Muslim lands.140 As a result, AQ has become an enterprise consisting of
―like-minded local representatives, loosely connected to a central ideological or
motivational base, but advancing their common goal independently of one another‖.141
Hoffman‘s claim as mentioned above is particularly evident in the growth of
home-grown terrorism in the post-2003 setting. Nesser argues that the US invasion of
Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively, gave birth to a new generation of
radicalised youths especially in Europe.142 These individuals and groups started to
139
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operate autonomously from AQ, but were inspired by their ideologies, strategies and
tactics.143 Europe gradually became the theatre of ‗global jihad‘, as the militants from
different nationalities and ethnic backgrounds planned and orchestrated attacks against
the countries cooperating with the US led global war on terror. For these home-grown
terrorists, the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and its broader foreign policy served
as a mobilising factor to justify and legitimise their ‗global‘ jihad. Their broad ideology
transcends geographical boundaries and nationalities, enabling different groups and
individuals to ―locate their particular grievances in a larger framework‖.144 In essence,
ideology serves as the glue of collective identity which simultaneously enforces the
common cause shared by the likeminded. Regardless of the categories (i.e. ethnonationalist, irredentist, religious) or the locality (i.e. home grown, transnational or
domestic) of the terrorist groups, it is precisely the role of ideology which determines
the objectives and the strategy of the campaign. This subsequently directs the group to
determine how and through what means these objectives are to be achieved at an
operational level.145
While clearly articulated ideology maintains organisational cohesion, scholars
like Heraclides argue that ideology may impede the group‘s ability to raise funds from a
variety of sources. He contends that whatever ideology a group may possess,
movements in general tend to be ideologically ambivalent. This is due to the need to
raise funds from a variety of sources without imposing restraints. Heraclides notes that
this is particularly the case with ethno-nationalist groups that are based primarily on the
diffuse ideology of nationalism.146 Similarly, Dolnik rightly argues that in reality, an
ideology hardly stays constant throughout the course of a campaign.147 Given this
argument, a slight shift in an ideology, an increase in, or lack of ideological conviction
can impact the dynamics of a group‘s campaign at both strategic and tactical levels. As
discussed, terrorist groups can ensure its survival and ward off the possibilities of their
decline as long as their ideological conviction is intact.
The level of its ideological commitment can also urge the movement to shift
from the ‗emergence‘ to the ‗escalation‘ phase of their campaign. Likewise, the erosion
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of ideological relevance can lead to the decline of a campaign. Ideology and cause can
perish over time for numerous reasons depending on the context and/or the objectives of
the movement. For instance, Cronin notes that few political terrorist groups148 active in
the 1970s demonstrated the inability to pass their cause on to the succeeding
generations, leading to their decline.149 This can be attributed to the bankruptcy of
communism symbolised by the fall of the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Cold
War. This historic event catalysed the decline of left wing groups, as the nature of their
ideology seemed no longer relevant to the political climate of the time.150The decline in
the ideological commitment alone does not become a decisive factor in the fall of a
movement; however, the erosion of ideological relevance can trigger the decline of a
violent campaign.

Defining Target Selection
Ideology serves as a tool to identify the enemy and to justify the organisation‘s struggle
to redress their perceived grievance. Further, ideology defines the strategy and directs
the target selection of the group. For instance, the Shining Path is a group that primarily
aims to overthrow the Peruvian government to establish a communist peasant
revolutionary regime. With a blend of Andean mysticism and Maoist ideologies, the
movement initially attracted the Ayacucho population in Peru, where it was politically,
culturally, and economically isolated and impoverished from the rest of the country.151
After raiding the town hall in Chuschi in May 1980, the Shining Path launched various
attacks on ―the symbols of the fascist state‖: police stations, government offices, and a
number of nationally sponsored development projects in the Ayacucho region. A year
later, the group expanded its target selection to include infrastructure sites such as
bridges, rail tracks, electric power stations and telecommunications facilities.152 FitzSimmons notes that over the years, the Shining Path has also attacked and/or murdered
several government officials, police officers, judges, village elders, teachers, social
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workers, missionaries, and agricultural professionals.153 The group also targeted
civilians residing in the rural areas, who were thought to be siding with the
government.154 The Shining Path aims to establish a communist state through
undermining the government, disrupting the government‘s development plans and
initiatives, and attacking those who are in support of the regime.
Throughout the course of the battle, strategies and the target selection tends to
fluctuate, as it is largely influenced by the environmental context under which the
movement operates. Figure 2 delineates multiple terrorist targets and the intended
effects. Target selection in most part reflects the organisation‘s strategy and their
campaign focus. Elimination of rival groups and ideological and political opponents at
times overrides ideological objectives to boost intra-organisational morale or to garner
public support and attention. As such, group ideology and target selection influence the
magnitude of violence in its campaign trajectory.

Fig 2. Terrorist target selection and objectives
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To sum up, ideology generally provides justification for violence, dictates target
selection and contributes to organisational unity and motivation. Conversely, a decrease
in the ideological commitment of members may contribute to group demise.
2. Ceasefire and Peace Agreements
Peace agreements and ceasefires often impact the dynamics of the campaign trajectory
in various manners, and it does not necessarily guarantee an improvement between the
antagonising parties. This variable potentially leads to three different outcomes: 1)
abandonment of violence by joining the political process (e.g. IRA, ANC); 2) formation
of a splinter group which is often more violent than the ‗original‘ group (e.g. PFLP-GC,
REAL IRA); or 3) platform for the terrorist organisation to recuperate for a more
intensified comeback against the enemy in the future (e.g. ETA, HAMAS, FARC).
Entering into the political process often marks the decline in the violent
activities of the group, resulting in the end of their armed campaign. The entering of
Provisional IRA (PIRA) and its political wing, Sinn Fein, into the political process
directed the faction to adopt a different strategy in pursuing their goal of ending the
British rule over the North and achieving the unification of Ireland under the
Republican banner. Having realised that that aggression and violence may not be a
viable option, they abandoned violence and accepted a ceasefire which led to the 1998
Good Friday Agreement.156 By 2003, the level of violence in Northern Ireland
significantly decreased, where related deaths have dropped from nearly 100 per year
since 1994 to approximately 20 per year.157
However, although negotiations are intended to facilitate the decline of violence
and attacks, they can also serve as a catalyst in creating splinter groups. The split can
occur between those who support negotiations and those who wish to continue the
armed conflict.158 The PIRA was disintegrated, creating the Real Irish Republican
Army and Continuity IRA. Similarly, the Popular Front for the Liberation of PalestineGeneral Command (PFLP-GC) withdrew itself from the Palestinian Liberation
Organisation (PLO) as it was opposed to the peace talks with Israel.159 The emergence
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of splinter groups or factions may exacerbate violence in order to surpass other existing
parties. Consequently, the campaign dynamics may shift to a new escalation phase
depending on the level of clashes between the rival groups. To this end, ceasefires may
trigger the intensification of violence instead of reducing it.
Some groups take advantage of the ceasefire and adopt a ‗carrot and stick‘
approach to gain concessions. Edward Luttwak argues that a ceasefire ―tends to arrest
war-induced exhaustion and lets belligerents reconstitute and rearm their forces‖.160The
terrorist attacks in April 2009 executed by the Kurdistan Workers‘ Party (PKK) in
Turkey in fact took place during the period of a unilateral ceasefire which was declared
in early March the same year, later extended until June. During this time, the leader of
the political wing of the PKK stated in an interview to the Turkish press that they would
be willing to ―withdraw [their] militants from Turkish territory if the authorities adopted
a ―positive attitude‖ towards the Kurdish question‖.161 Subsequently, the PKK leader
Murat Karayilan asserted that the group would further intensify its violent campaign
against the Turkish government if it failed to accept the PKK‘s ceasefire positively. 162
This case illustrates that the ceasefire and peace process can potentially serve as a
platform for political bargaining and as bait to further a group‘s objectives.
Similarly, the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)‘s call for a ceasefire in September
1998 and March 2006 proved to be a tactical choice in revamping their campaign. The
first truce was called off by ETA in December 1999, blaming the Spanish government
for the lack of progress in peace talks.163 Violence resumed soon after, as January and
February 2000 recorded a car bomb explosion in Madrid and Victoria,164 and 20 more
assassinations and attacks until August 2000.165 The second truce in 2006 was violated
by the ETA in the same year in the December Madrid Airport bombings, and the
Spanish Interior Minister of the day declared the peace process to be ―broken,
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liquidated, finished‖. 166 Meanwhile, ETA asserted that despite the bombings, the
declared ceasefire was still in effect. They reiterated their vows for peace in April 2007,
but called off the truce two months later.167 Despite arrests of key members since the
abrogation of the ceasefire, the organisation resumed their attacks in December 2007.168
The group calls off the truce when it perceives a lack of progress in their demands, and
prepares for the pursuit of a violent path when no progress is observed. The latest
ceasefire declaration in 2011 seems to give a different impression to many because the
group claims it is a ‗verifiable‘ and ‗permanent‘ ceasefire. However, the Spanish
government remains sceptical about their intentions169, given their previous track
record. In some cases like ETA, a ceasefire can be a proverbial silence before the storm.
Thus, ceasefires can shape the campaign trajectory in different ways, depending on the
strategic intentions and strength of the group.
To sum up, ceasefires and peace agreements lead to different results depending on
the specific organisation and circumstances. While they are primarily intended to bring
an end to a terrorist campaign, we can also expect organisational splintering, leading to
a resurgence of violence. Some groups also exploit this period to recuperate militarily
with an intention to resume violence in the near future.

3. Public support, terrorist networks, and external supporters
Public support, both active and passive, is an important factor in determining the
strategy and tactics adopted in a campaign. Community acceptance of the terrorists
reflects the level of support given to their campaign. Many groups garner support by
cultivating consent from the community by winning their ‗hearts and minds‘ or, by
coercion to accept their cause. In some cases, the groups already possess a certain level
of support by ‗default‘, as they are born directly out of their representing communities.
Community support of terrorist groups can be characterised in various degrees as
illustrated below (Fig. 3).
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Fig 3: “Continuum of community acceptance of violent activities by terrorists and political
insurgents”
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The civilian population‘s logistical, financial and ideological support determines
the legitimacy of the movement and their chance of survival. Metz and Millen (2004)
identify five categories of resources required for insurgents to sustain their campaign:
manpower, funding, material, sanctuary, and intelligence.171 The size of the group, their
goals, and the nature of their operations greatly influence the level of need for these
resources.172 Paul identifies a range of possible external supporters that sustain a
terrorist campaign. These include: community, states, Diasporas, charities and NonGovernmental Organisations (NGOs), organised crime groups, and other terrorist
groups.173 The findings of this section will touch upon the role of community
acceptance, states, other terrorist networks in influencing the campaign trajectory of a
terrorist group. The role of Diasporas is discussed later at length, as they are more
directly relevant for analysis under the ‗funding‘ variable.
Public support is critical in various aspects of sustaining a terrorist campaign,
from ensuring a continuous replacement of manpower to developing an environment
conducive to conducting terrorist operations. Although not applicable in every case,
expansion of membership reflects the perceived legitimacy of the movement, which
becomes a powerful synergy in encouraging further support and recruitment. Passive
acceptance and tolerance of insurgent activities allows them to operate within their
extant resources base, and is invaluable in protecting the secrecy of the group and
facilitating its operations by ―avoid[ing] detection, surveillance, and elimination by the
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security forces of the target society‖.174 Material and intelligence are necessary to
conduct operations. These can be more easily obtained where there is both logistical and
human support for the movement. The significance of funding will be discussed in the
latter section as an independent variable. In essence, the higher the society‘s tolerance
for violence, the easier it is for a terrorist organisation to instigate and escalate a
campaign.
Various methods are adopted in garnering public support. The ideology of the
Peruvian Shining Path, for example, was widely accepted by the local population
especially in the Ayacucho region in the early 1980s, which enabled the establishment
of ―zones of liberation‖ in various regions of the Sierra.175 Not only was the group
successful in addressing the grievances of the poor inhabitants of the rural areas, but it
also sustained popular support by staging ‗people‘s trials‘. This system punished the
landowners, money lenders, thieves, corrupt officials, village merchants and others who
committed crimes against citizens. In villages that resisted the movement, the Shining
Path gathered local community leaders and traitors and, after a brief trial, executed them
for ―treason‖. By 1983, the Shining Path expanded its power and influence beyond the
Sierra and in 1992 the movement had an estimated five to six thousand armed militants
and fifty thousand people within its support network.176
While support is usually obtained because the people empathise with the cause
and the ideology of the group, there are other means in which the groups manage to
harvest sympathy and support. Like the case of the Shining Path, a group‘s legitimacy
and support can be garnered by pursuing ―justice‖ that is favourable or appealing to the
masses‘ needs. Another prominent method is to provide the constituencies with nonprofit health and welfare services, the availability and quality of which often outperform
that of the state. There are two tenets to this logic: One, terrorist provision of services
that are superior to the state undermines the latter‘s function and legitimacy. This
environment enables the terrorists to fill the vacuum created as a result of the incapacity
of the state, by providing the people with what the state fails to grant. Second, as the
groups provide satisfactory services, this naturally increases legitimacy and public
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support towards the terrorists‘ activities.177 Groups which provide services tend to have
a monopoly in their service areas and can exert a considerable amount of influence to
their constituencies. Hence, when the public relies on a particular group for their social
welfare services, it becomes difficult for the recipient to resist or question the service
provider‘s demands. 178
Hizballah in Lebanon is a fitting case study. Easy access to their services
attracted much attention and support from the public of all social strata. In a survey
conducted by Harik in 1993, the group garnered most loyalty among the Lebanese
Shi‘ite community, as 64% of the survey participants concluded that Hizballah provided
the most social, health and educational services within the country.179Further, 41% of
the survey respondents rooted for Hizballah for their political preference over Amal and
the Syrian Social National Party.180 Their popularity can be partially attributed to the
effectiveness of their services, which inevitably undermined the legitimacy and the
function of the Lebanese government. Harik explains that the massive destruction as a
result of the civil war combined with government impotency produced the need for
welfare services that appealed to all socio-economic status of the masses. For instance,
Hizballah regularly provided drinking water to almost all of the southern suburb‘s
residents due to the area‘s damaged water distribution system.181 This illustrates one of
the many channels in which terrorist organisations garner their support base in order to
legitimise their activities and raison-d‘être. The provision of social services
simultaneously demonstrates the incapability of the state in delivering for the masses,
which adds legitimacy to the group‘s campaign and to prove their ambition and ability
to take over the government.
The media, if used strategically, is useful for propaganda purposes and to garner
support both locally and internationally. Traditionally, states were able to control
information flows to a certain extent, using ―their resources to win the battle of hearts
and minds against terrorist groups‖.182 However, the spread of the Internet in recent
years has transformed the campaign dynamics and increased the exposure of terrorist
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incidents to a wider audience around the world.183AQ‘s adaptability is one feature
which is effectively sustaining their survivability in this hostile security environment.184
When AQ maintained its sanctuary in Sudan until 1996 and in Afghanistan until 2002,
the group‘s structure was hierarchical with a strong central leadership. Since the
movement lost its control base in Afghanistan, it experienced an evolutionary process
where the structure became more de-centralised, and relied on allied groups or semiautonomous network cells to carry out their operations. Further, they have significantly
increased their dependence on the Internet as a means of communication.185 Neumann
argues that the Internet has enabled people to stay connected with AQ, and in turn, the
group‘ s leaders find it easier to reach out to their supporters regardless of the
geographical location. It ensures that the AQ ideology continues to inspire people even
when the training camps are destroyed and the leaders are dead. The Internet ―has
become the ―virtual glue‘ that holds al-Qaeda together‖.186 Thus the Internet and other
media outlets play a crucial role in escalating and sustaining the movement.
Conversely, decline in public support can greatly impact the trajectory of a
terrorist campaign and may well lead to the de-escalation of their struggle. Groups that
have committed atrocities resulting in mass civilian casualties are more prone to a
decline in public support. Paul suggests that such incidents can cause an erosion of
sympathy and material support. The impact of the atrocities is context dependent. Some
groups tend to be more reliant upon popular support to sustain their activities, and some
populations may be relatively tolerant to civilian casualties.187 Nonetheless the erosion
of popular consent of terrorist activities may instigate a shift in their campaign
trajectory.
For instance, ETA (the Spanish Basque separatist movement) is one group
which faces repeated public criticism. Anti-ETA protests are frequently observed in
Spain in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. In July 1997, more than two million Spanish
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anti-ETA protestors rallied against the movement in Barcelona and Madrid following
the assassination of Miguel Bianco, a young local politician. In San Sebastian, hundreds
of protesters attacked offices and a bar used by the group‘s political wing, Batasuna.188
Following this incident, 23 leaders of Batasuna were sentenced to jail for their explicit
collaboration with ETA and in September 1998 the group announced its first indefinite
ceasefire which lasted until December 1999.189 Moreover, January 2007 recorded a
massive anti-ETA rally in Madrid and Bilbao drawing 250,000 people in reaction to the
December 2006 Madrid Airport bombings that killed two people.190 Three months
following the protests, ETA offered to make commitment to peace under the condition
that the Spanish government halt their counter-terrorism operations against the group.
This offer was short lived: in June 2007, ETA ended its ‗permanent‘ ceasefire with the
Spanish government and resumed the violent struggle for an independent Basque
country.191 In January 2011, ETA declared a permanent ceasefire, and later in October
the group called for an indefinite cessation of armed violence.192 This development is
said to have occurred following the pressure exerted from ETA‘s political allies in the
―Basque separatist left‖. The reports speculate that ETA has not just lost power over its
political allies, but also experienced a sharp decline in the public support they once
enjoyed, who traditionally voted for pro-ETA parties.193 This case illustrates the impact
of public support in moulding the campaign trajectory. Groups are urged to alter their
strategy based on community condemnation, hence demonstrating their vulnerability to
public criticism and protests. Loss of support can lead to a temporary intensification of
violence in order to provoke the enemy into overreactions that may result in increased
radicalisation of the group‘s constituency. This can revive the group‘s popularity,
although it equally risks further alienation of the militants from the constituents.
To sum up, conventional wisdom suggests that terrorist groups simply cannot
survive without popular support. Widespread community acceptance generally reflects
the perceived legitimacy of the movement, and allows the campaign to escalate. A lack

188

Nash, E., ―Spain Gripped by Mass Protest Against the ETA Gunmen‖, The Independent, July 15, 1997
<www.independent.co.uk/news/world/spain-gripped-by-mass-protest-against-the-eta-gunmen1250773.html> at April 23, 2001
189
―ETA Timeline‖, The Guardian
190
―Anti-ETA Protests in Spain Draw 250,000‖, Channel News Asia, January 14, 2007
<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world/view/252410/1/.html> at April 23, 2011
191
―Timeline: ETA Campaign‖, BBC News
192
―ETA Declares Halt to Armed Conflict‖, The Guardian, October 20, 2011,
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/20/eta-spain> at May 16, 2012
193
Ibid.

63

of public support conversely weakens terrorist groups, thus contributing to the decline
of a campaign.

State Sponsorship
In some cases, states assist terrorist groups that are active outside of their own territory.
State sponsors of terrorism have radicalised, funded, trained, armed, shared intelligence
and provided sanctuary and training grounds to movements.194 Byman investigates the
role of state sponsorship of terrorism by drawing on case studies of the relationship
between Iran and Hizballah, Syria and Palestinian terrorist groups, Pakistan‘s support of
terrorism in Kashmir and many more. His findings identify various strategic motives
behind state sponsorship. According to Byman there are three general motivations: ―to
advance their international political and strategic position; to further their ideology; and
to bolster their position at home‖.195 Ultimately, it can serve as a proxy- using violence
against other states without being considered an overt act of war.196 Regardless of the
state‘s intentions, this provides a platform for groups to escalate violence as they are
given resources to enable innovation in their strategy and tactics.
Some states serve as an ideal sanctuary to accommodate a terrorist network base
for various reasons. First, the state can turn a blind eye to any terrorist activities and the
terrorists can operate without external scrutiny, while the sovereignty of the state can
prevent counter-terrorism intervention from other states. Second, the terrorist groups
can utilise the given territory as their safe houses, training ground, arms storehouse,
communication centre and for other purposes.197 Third, the states which provide
sanctuary also provide an environment conducive to producing supporters and members
of the organisation. Terrorist groups can maximise this opportunity in penetrating into
society, generating income for operations, and acquiring resources.198 Bin Laden‘s
relocation to Sudan in 1991 following his expulsion from Saudi Arabia demonstrates
the function of a state as a safe haven for facilitating terrorist networks and activities.
During his 5 years sojourn in Sudan, he established training camps, plotted attacks
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against the US Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, generated funding through
establishing front companies and expanded his operative networks.199
The erosion of state support towards terrorist groups may occur due to a number
of reasons: when they are deemed no longer relevant to the state‘s cause or objectives;
when they respond to the pressure from other states; or when the state is no longer able
to continue the support.200 This was evident in Libya‘s expulsion of Palestinian terrorist
Abu Nidal, and ceasing support to Palestinian groups such as the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad. The move against Abu Nidal is said to be a result of Arab and Palestinian
pressure on Libya to put an end to his terrorist activities, which were undermining
diplomatic relations between Egypt and Libya. To this end, an Arab diplomat is quoted
expressing that ―the man‘s [Abu Nidal]‘s time is over… he is becoming useless to all
those who have used him.‖201 The withdrawal of state support effectively dispossessed
the groups of their state-sanctioned ‗safe houses‘, leading to a cessation of training and
other activities. In general, state sponsorship facilitates the escalation of a terrorist
campaign, while lack thereof deprives groups of an important source of strength.

Regional and global terrorist networks
The formation of intricate terrorist networks aid terrorist organisations to advance their
strategy, and to facilitate the escalation of their activities. Organisations take advantage
of globalisation to its fullest extent, as they maximise the use of the global economy,
transportation and communication systems to establish their local and international
network. These include the sharing of strategic intelligence, tactical expertise and
resources. Some groups have intricate financial and logistical networks with other
terrorist groups.
Outside of Northern Ireland, the PIRA has operated primarily in Europe, in
countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Gibraltar.202 However, the group has
expanded and diversified its network abroad by collaborating with FARC. Three PIRA
members were arrested in Colombia in August 2001 and indicted in the following year
for training FARC members in handling explosives and teaching them how to build
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mortars. An April 2002 State Department‘s Office of Counterterrorism report indicated
that between 1998- 2001, up to 15 terrorists from PIRA had entered Colombia and
integrated with other international terrorist groups to advise and train FARC cadres.
This evidence may explain how FARC started to intensify its operations since early
2001, killing more than 400 members of the Colombian security forces within a span of
18 months. FARC demonstrated its preference of using car-bomb and homemade
mortars- both of which were specialised and perfected by the PIRA. Also in August
2002, FARC executed a mortar attack using radio control, aiming at the presidential
palace in Bogota. This incident was considered a technological breakthrough for the
movement, which could possibly demonstrate the collaboration of skills and tactics
between the two groups.
In another example, several European countries and the US froze the assets of
the Al-Aqsa International Foundation in May 2003. This organisation was responsible
in funding Hamas, while recording its expenditures as contributions made to charity.203
Following this, Mohammed Ali Hasan Al-Moayad, representative of Al-Aqsa, was
arrested under the charge of funding Hamas, but also for the provision of financial and
logistical assistants to AQ.204 Israel also reported that the head of the Al-Aqsa
International Foundation office in the Netherlands raised funds for Hizballah through
the collaboration with the group‘s main office based in Germany.205 Increased global
networks may signify a broader source of funding. As these cases illustrate, maintaining
global and regional terrorist networks could possibly enhance tactical skills, as well as
securing different venues of funding and even weapons procurement. All of these
factors generally enable the group to strengthen itself and to shift to the escalation
phase.
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4. Funding
Ample funding and materials are one of the significant elements to escalating and
sustaining a campaign. The level of funding and resources available to the group
influences their choice of strategy and modus operandi. Specifically, this includes the
resources required to build/acquire weapons, provision of logistical and financial
support for members, pending operations, and gaining access to their targets. The more
resources accessible, both the quality and the quantity of violent attacks potentially
increase. In the Guidance for Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorist Financing,
the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering claims that terrorists earn
funding from two sources: states, and ‗revenue-generating‘ activities that include
narcotics trafficking, kidnapping, fraud, extortion, and running legitimate businesses.206
Among many other methods of generating income, some organisations run a legitimate
charity organisation, where some portion of the revenue is used to finance their
activities. For instance, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines was funded by
Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden‘s brother-in-law, who channelled revenue
for the militants through one of the Islamic charities he operated in the Philippines at the
time.207
Basile asserts that AQ is an effective organisation ―that has taken advantage of
the weaknesses in global financial markets to develop a network of financing options
that cannot be easily overcome‖.208 He claims in addition that AQ benefits from
forming alliances with countries like Saudi Arabia, which is unwilling to implement
strict regulations to constrain financing of terrorist organisations. He further explains
the characteristics of its financial strengths:
1. AQ‘s network structure and doctrine appeal to wealthy donors and charity
organisations
2. The movement trains its operatives to develop self-funding strategies to ensure
continuous revenues
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3. It enjoys several financial channels that are not under government regulation
and control, while taking advantage of the Islamic banking and hawala
system, an effective means of financial transaction through cash smuggling209
All of the above strengths have allowed AQ to sustain their funding to execute activities
that transcend borders, and have contributed to the durability of their struggle.
Conversely, lack of funding could impact terrorist activities, including the nature
of attacks. For instance, after the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing, leader of the
attack Ramzi Yousef testified that he was short of funding to purchase ample explosives
to conduct a larger attack. He further claimed that the attacks were planned and
executed in a rush as his cell faced a financial shortage.210 Moreover, the fragmentation
of the Ramzi Yousef cell in the wake of his arrest in 1995 deeply impacted the activities
of the ASG. Because the Yousef-bin Laden connection was an important source of the
movement‘s funding, the absence of a steady revenue from AQ led the ASG to
temporarily abandon its terrorist activities for a few years by 1997.211 Another case is
the Shining Path that took control of the Huallaga Valley‘s coca plantation in the mid1980s as a source to generate income.212 However, falling coca prices in the late 1990s
deprived the movement of its primary foreign exchange source, which coincided with
an observable and marked decline in their violent activities.213 These are a few of the
many compelling cases to illustrate the manner in which funding impacts the
operational trajectory of terrorist movements.214
Certain groups experience transition to criminal behaviour, implying a shift in
focus to acquiring resources, sometimes at the expense of pursuing long term political
goals. Depending on the circumstances, some groups temporarily opt for criminal
activities, or some may encounter a permanent shift. A brief respite in terrorist activities
was observed with the ASG in the Philippines, and most of the narco-terrorist groups in
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Colombia.215 From 2000, ASG shifted its modus operandi from bombings and targeted
executions to taking foreign hostages for ransom.216 The decline in steady revenue from
the AQ, along with the death of the ASG supremo Abdurrazak Janjalani, gradually
shifted the group to perpetrate high profile kidnappings.217 From 2000-2001, the
militants were responsible for 16 deaths and 140 kidnappings, but no acts of religiopolitical motivated terrorist attacks took place.218 The group claimed US$1 million per
hostage for ransom, which further underpinned the shift in their nature from a terrorist
group to that of a criminal one. To this end, a Filipino Muslim journalist is quoted
describing: ―Before they [ASG] were tied to bin Laden, but now no. They are
independent. They get money from kidnappings‖.219 The movement regenerated in
2003 by resuming a spate of attacks and forming an urban assassination squad, the
Fisabillilah. During this period, there were no records of kidnapping cases for
ransom.220
Similarly, when Al Qaeda in Iraq‘s (AQI) support gradually diminished over the
years, the group was desperate in securing funds through kidnappings. As in the case of
the 2008 kidnapping of a Christian Archbishop in Northern Iraq, AQI demanded $3
million ransom for his release.221 Likewise, in the 2011 EU Terrorism Situation and
Trend Report, Europol stated that the PKK/Kongra-Gel is involved in various criminal
activities within Europe such as drug smuggling, human trafficking, facilitation of
illegal immigration, and money laundering to fund their operations.222Groups like the
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have incessantly engaged in hijacking and kidnapping
for income, which allows them to carry out terrorist attacks without having to halt their
campaign due to lack of funding.223Ultimately, different groups will resort to different
methods to acquire their funding. On one hand, some apparently temporarily halt their
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terrorist activities to focus on criminal activities to increase their revenues. On the other
hand, other groups may continually engage in criminal activities while ensuring the
continuity of their terrorist activities without having to halt their campaign.
These incidents illustrate that an increase in revenue sources facilitates the
escalation of a campaign. The level of income can also impact the frequency of attacks
and the use of more or less sophisticated modus operandi. Conversely, lack of funding
leads to the decline of a campaign. However, in certain cases, loss of funding can result
in an escalation of attacks in the short term in order to attract new funders.

Diasporas as a source of income
Diasporas play an equally important role in sustaining terrorist campaigns. Unlike the
locally based supporters and constituencies, the Diasporas are physically distant to the
terrorist activities on the ground. Consequently, their financial and logistical
investments in the campaign tend to be greater than the local population, who risk being
victimised by the terrorists or their opponents.224 For instance, Al-Shabaab in Somalia
heavily depends on Diaspora communities living across Africa, the Middle East and the
West for income. The donations to the militants constitute a small proportion of the
Diaspora remittances back home.225 Through the use of Internet, Al-Shabaab has
managed to call for donations among the Somali Diasporas around the world. In August
2009, the militants managed to collect as much as $40,000 via an online fundraising
forum.226
Another classic example of the Diaspora financial support is the IRA. In the late
1800s, the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB, which later transformed to the Irish
Republican Army) was formed in New York City as an organisation to provide
economic relief to friends and family still residing in Ireland. This eventually
transformed into a financial support base for the Easter Rebellion in 1916.227 Following
this, the Irish Diaspora both in Britain and the US actively engaged themselves in
supporting the IRA and PIRA. The Irish-Americans especially have intervened
periodically with efforts to aid the nationalists with human resources, financial support
224
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and even with arms to sustain the campaign.228Since 9/11 however, the IRA faced a
slump in their funding from the US.229 The incident accelerated the distaste towards
political violence that had been growing among the Irish Diaspora in the US. Hulsman
notes that "the terrorist attacks on the US changed Americans' perspective and got
things rolling, but the IRA's continuing criminal activities have only dug their hole
deeper…They've totally estranged themselves from their American supporters, who had
been bankrolling Sinn Fein for decades."230 Following the 9/11 attacks, in July 2005, the
IRA officially renounced its violent campaign. Hulsman‘s analysis and the
developments of the group suggest that Diaspora communities are one of the robust
income sources for terrorist groups.
The strength of a Diaspora support can facilitate the intensification of violence
and increase the survivability of a movement. Complex overseas networks utilising
Diaspora communities are one of the many sources of funding, material and human
resources for terrorist movements. Further, the intricacy of these support networks
present challenges for government efforts to effectively disrupt the system. Due to its
significant contribution, the loss of Diaspora support could ultimately accelerate the
demise of a group, or a temporary halt in the operations in order to focus on fundraising
activities.

5. Organisational Dynamics
Terrorist organisations generally follow two structures, namely hierarchical and decentralised/network. A group may employ either type or a combination of the two
models.231Hamilton explains that contemporary groups tend to organise themselves in
the network model. This is a loosely affiliated structure that depends more on
ideological intent, rather than any formalised command and control or support
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structure.232In contrast, groups that are associated with a political wing or organisation
tend to follow a hierarchical structure in order to coordinate and facilitate terrorist
violence with political action.233
An effective organisation requires an effective leadership, network and resources.
Leaders are responsible for managing and directing the overall campaign strategy, and
also allocating members to appropriate roles.234 Charismatic terrorist leaders are also
often assisted by a small number of senior cadres who are strongly committed to the
group‘s cause, and thus motivate others to join the cause.235 Although the extent of the
leader‘s role is dependent upon the organisational structure and the presence of
personality cult, they play a pivotal role in determining the dynamics of the campaign.
This is especially evident in the final phases of a campaign, where several groups have
been destroyed or weakened by the capture of their charismatic leader, as in the case of
Peru‘s Shining Path, PKK, and Aum Shinrikyo of Japan.236 Aum Shinrikyo was a
Japanese religious cult founded in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, who claimed that the world
was approaching the apocalypse. Among many of its attempts in employing chemical
and biological weapons, this group was notorious for the 1995 Tokyo subway Sarin gas
attacks, resulting in the death of 12 people and over one thousand injuries.237 However,
after Asahara was arrested in May 1995 (and subsequently sentenced to death), the
group experienced a massive decrease in its membership from 60,000 members
worldwide at its peak, to fewer than one thousand members.238
Organisational structure determines the vulnerability of a movement to
‗decapitation‘, while the group‘s age and size also relate to the impact that removal of
the leader has on organisational functioning. Cronin asserts that among other factors,
the key to whether or not the killing or capture of terrorist leaders is effective in ending
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a campaign depends on the size of the group and the depth of popular support.239
Generally speaking, removing terrorist leaders is regarded as one of the most effective
counterterrorism strategies in weakening a group‘s activity and strength. This
presumption is established under the belief that the charismatic personalities and skills
of leaders are pivotal in generating and sustaining the ideology and direction behind a
terrorist campaign. Depending on the structure of the group and the availability of other
potential leaders, the capture or killing of a leader can be crucial to organisational
decline.
While there are prominent cases where the loss of a charismatic leader has been
effective in weakening the capabilities of a group240, decapitation does not always
necessarily result in organisational collapse. For instance, the Khalistan movement in
India has since re-emerged following the death of its leaders. Babbar Khalsa is one of
the most prominent Sikh militant groups that are campaigning for a separate Sikh state
in the Punjab. Babbar Khalsa was thought to have been completely decimated by 1993
with the demise of its co-founders Sukhdev Singh Babbar and Talwinder Parmar in
1992.241 However, the group allegedly regrouped and revived its activities in the mid2000s, by detonating bombs in New Delhi theatres in May 2005. Following the arrest of
Jagtar Singh Hawara in June 2005 (the leader of the Indian branch of Babbar Khalsa
International), the police arrested other suspects related to the BKI. This prevented
potential additional attacks and assassinations in India.242 Police reports also concluded
that Hawara strengthened the BKI, increasing recruits for non-Sikhs and women,
training suicide cadres, channelling funds from abroad, and procuring explosives and
other weapons.243
Similarly, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of AQI, was mortally wounded by
a US airstrike in June 2006. In the aftermath of Zarqawi‘s death, the group splintered
and de-centralized, creating numerous offshoots such as the Islamic Army of Iraq. 244The
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country recorded a stark rise in attacks by the group and their allies from February 2006
to July 2007.245 High profile attacks in June 2006 recorded just below 100 incidents,
and February 2007 at its peak recorded approximately 240 attacks.246 While AQI may
not account for all of the attacks in Iraq (early 2007 recorded approximately 175 attacks
per day), the organisation is believed to have been responsible for most of the major
suicide bombings in the country.247 One of the most lethal operations conducted by AQI
in the post-Zarqawi era is the series of suicide truck bombings in the Yazidi village in
northern Iraq in August 2007, resulting in approximately 500 deaths.248 The death of
Zarqawi was followed by an increasing number of attacks in Iraq, while it led to the
production of splinter groups and offshoots due to ideological rifts.
Jordan reports that organisational collapse as a result of decapitation was only
effective in 17% of the 298 cases which she examined, and the decapitated groups in
fact exhibited a lower rate of decline than groups that did not have their leaders
eliminated.249 She further concludes that groups driven by religious ideologies are
unlikely to be de-stabilised by the removal of leadership, as their organisational
structure tends to be more decentralised and thus resilient to decapitation.250

Political fronts
Some terrorist movements possess political fronts. As they are the ‗public face‘ of a
movement, they differ significantly from charity groups. Richards argues that this is a
common phenomenon with many terrorist groups, and such relationships influence the
course of their struggle. 251 Examples include the IRA and Sinn Fein, and ETA with
Batasuna and Sortu. Sinn Fein was initially created in 1970 as a political wing of the
IRA, and the party justified the IRA violence to achieve political objectives. Now it has
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established itself as an Irish nationalist political party in Ireland. 252In Spain, the banning
of Batasuna in 2003 led to the birth of a new ETA political front called Sortu, which
renounced violence as a means to pursue their goals of Basque independence.253
The presence of political wings can potentially impact a campaign trajectory as
they represent the movement but function in a different domain to those who perpetrate
violence. Depending on the level of association between the two entities, their
respective activities will influence the operational strategy. When the political wing
exerts influence, this may lead to a declined level of violence of the movement. If on the
other hand the political wing is unable to achieve its objectives in the political arena, the
insurgent group may escalate its violent activities. In essence, the political wing and the
terrorist movement operate interchangeably in pursuit of their goals within their relevant
domains.

Splinter Groups and Rival Militant Groups
Given the significance of the leader and group cohesion in sustaining a campaign,
ideological rifts and rivalry within a movement can de-stabilise organisational harmony.
The loss of a leader in some cases can lead to the creation of splinter groups as in the
case of AQI after the demise of Zarqawi. Destabilisation of group cohesion is a
common trigger factor which catalyses the decline of terrorist activities, and the birth of
splinter groups can also impact upon the campaign.
Intra-group rifts usually occur where disagreements over group strategy arise.
Whilst some retain their patience in a careful strategic planning of their attacks, others
may be driven by impatience and desperation to carry out ‗random‘ acts of violence.
Further, divergence in organisational objectives tend to exist between those who are
―willing to accept a piece of the pie‖254 if a reasonable compromise can be reached
between the state, and to those ‗hardliners‘ who are unwilling to accept anything less
than their proposed terms and conditions.255
For instance, PIRA emerged as a splinter group of the original IRA movement.
Under common ideological ground, the dissident members of the IRA endeavoured to
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serve as the ‗defender‘ of the nationalist Catholic community in Northern Ireland. They
claim the IRA failed to protect the Catholics from Loyalist Protestant aggressors and the
British forces during the Londonderry riots of 1969.256 Since then, it launched an
intense offensive campaign from 1970 to 1972. By 1971, the PIRA initiated 1,756
shootings and 1,515 bombings. In the following year, these numbers drastically
increased and responsibility was claimed for 10,628 shootings and 1,853 bombings.257
The armed struggle of the official IRA meanwhile diminished and the PIRA became
synonymous with the IRA name.258 Splintering can thus create a new campaign, more
violent and radical in nature.
Violence often intensifies when groups focus on eliminating their rivals,
regardless of the ideological or objective disparity. Seeking attention, competing for
resources, and obtaining greater legitimacy and support for their cause in comparison to
other groups can serve as the basis of competition.259 This often leads to intensified
violence and increased attacks. Outperforming rivals can generally fall under two
categories. First, different groups have similar agendas and compete for a monopoly
(e.g. rivalry between the IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army260 and between the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Al-Fatah261). The second is
characterised by organisational rivalry between ideologically opposed groups based on
clashing agendas. For example, the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) was one of the
many leftist loyalist paramilitary groups which strived to keep Ulster under the British
rule. The organisation executed several terrorist attacks in an attempt to defy the IRA
activities from 1969-2001.262 Similarly, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) is a
far-right paramilitary group which initiated a series of attacks against the leftist guerilla
groups and state forces in Colombia. Throughout 1999 to 2004, the AUC was
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responsible for over 76 terrorist attacks, and the lethality rate surpassed the sum of
leftist groups such as FARC and Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN).263
In view of the above, organisational dynamics play an important role in
impacting campaign trajectories. Firstly, political fronts generally substitute terrorist
activities. Increased activities of political fronts are likely to correspond with a decline
in terrorist activities. Conversely, the failure of political fronts in achieving their
objectives would lead terrorist groups to intensify their campaign through renewed acts
of violence. Secondly, we can expect terrorist groups to intensify violence following
organisational splintering, including against rival militant groups. Finally, the removal
or the death of a leader is generally considered to be an effective method in eventually
bringing a terrorist campaign to an end. However, the effectiveness is dependent on
group size, popular support, ideological orientation and the structure of the organisation.

6. Military Interventions
Military action has been both a crucial component and a common response in repressing
terrorist campaigns. Numerous countries such as Israel, the United Kingdom, Turkey,
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Colombia and Peru have been or are currently engaged in
protracted military operations in an attempt to dismantle the terrorist organisations in
their respective countries. Cronin contends that immediate government retaliation after
terrorist attacks is reflexive and occurs for the following reasons. First, overt military
retaliation is a strategic catharsis, and seems ‗fitting‘ as a primary response. Second,
government retaliation addresses domestic pressure for the government to respond to
the terrorist attacks. Third, military response to attacks seems appropriate to pursue
justice against the perpetrators.264
Alexander lists several criteria in assessing the success of the government in
retaliating against terrorist organisations265:

1. Reduction in the number of terrorist incidents
2. Reduction in the number of casualties in terrorist incidents
3. Reduction in the monetary cost inflicted by terrorist incidents
4. Reduction in the size of the terrorist groups operating in a country
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5. Increased number of terrorists killed, captured, and/or convicted
6. Protection of national infrastructure (i.e. transportation, communications,
economic and political institutions, and security installations and units)
7. Preservation of basic national structures and policies (e.g. rule of law,
democracy, and civil rights and liberties)

Although rare, there are a number of historical examples where strong government
campaigns have succeeded in crushing a terrorist group. Successful military operations
can eventually hasten the de-escalation of a campaign as in the case of Russia‘s
Narodnaya Volya. The Tupamaros of Uruguay (an ultra-leftist urban guerrilla group)
was similarly short-lived due to effective counter-insurgency military operations. After
the emergence of the movement in the 1960s and incessant attacks against symbols of
the ‗imperialist regime‘, the Uruguayan army launched operations against the group in
1971. By the end of 1972, the campaign was heavy-handedly crushed.266 It is
logistically difficult for movements to sustain and continue their campaign when
significant numbers of their members and/or leaders are killed or arrested by
government forces or law enforcement agencies. Such instances contribute to
dissuading future would-be members from joining the cause out of fear that they
themselves may encounter such consequences, thus acting as a deterrence strategy.
In other cases military retaliation has been temporarily successful. After nearly
two decades of continuous campaigning by the PKK in the name of Kurdish selfdetermination (1984-1999), the Turkish government‘s response was a tough counter
insurgency campaign involving the Turkish army and its intelligence services.267
Simultaneously, Turkey also pressured the PKK‘s two main sponsors, Iraq and Syria, to
halt the provision of safe havens to group members, and to surrender high-profile
personnel seeking refuge in both countries ( in particular Abdullah Ocalan, the group
leader). The Turkish army engaged in a war against the PKK cadres by repetitively
crossing the Iraqi border to target bases in the Kurdish area. Subsequently, Turkey also
threatened Syria with military action, resulting in the expulsion of Ocalan. After fleeing
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to several countries in search of protection, Ocalan was finally arrested in Kenya and
returned to Turkey in 1999.268
The use of military force temporarily brought the campaign to an end due to the
arrest of Ocalan, marking a respite in PKK activities. Despite the successful government
retaliation until 1999, the threat failed to disappear completely, in part due to the heavyhanded military approach adopted by the Turkish government. The movement spread to
the broader region with the advent of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, as Iraqi Kurds in
northern Iraq allegedly provided sanctuary for PKK members.269 This catalysed the
resurgence of the movement despite successful military operations in the late 1990s.270
This case illustrates that military retaliation and aggressive diplomacy, though
seemingly successful in the immediate aftermath, may not be adequate to eradicate
terrorist campaigns completely in the long run. Beyer also opines that military
intervention as a counter-terrorism tactic serves merely short term goals, but does not
guarantee long term success, because military interventions ―increase the motivationalbasis- as a precondition- to engage in terrorism against the perceived occupational
power.‖271
As with the case of the PKK, military intervention can prove counterproductive
and cause a backlash of violence and subsequent escalation of the struggle. Aggressive
counter-measures can urge terrorist groups to utilise new technologies and other
innovations to sustain their activities.272 Over-reaction by governments is an ideal
source for groups to justify their cause and gain the attention of the international public
with a more provocative strategy.273 The intensified level of violence can potentially
reach a point where terrorist groups become desperate in resorting to extreme forms of
violence.274This produces a vicious violent spiral between the two parties. In 2009, the
Pakistani government launched five major military operations and 596 attacks to crush
the TTP, as opposed to 313 attacks conducted by the security forces in 2008.275 In this
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light, the Pak Institute for Peace Studies argues that the increased attacks against the
militants were a successful strategy as compared to the previous year, as one of the
operations resulted in disruption of the militant infrastructure in the Malakand Division
including 12,866 arrests.276 In the aftermath of the Operation Rah-e-Nijat launched in
June 2009 in South Waziristan, TTP retaliated with an increased number of suicide
attacks in the following months, and broadened their target selection by indiscriminately
attacking more civilians than before.277 As in the Pakistani case, government retaliation
can produce a favourable result in one domain but can provoke a backlash of violence
from the terrorist organisation. In effect, this often results in calls for a hardened
government offensive which is likely to induce a violent spiral of the conflict from both
ends.
The insurgency in Chechnya is another illustrative case in point. The Russian
government launched the second military offensive in Chechnya in October 1999
against the Chechen separatists (also known as the Second Chechen War). By early
2000, the Russian government had captured most of Chechnya and the rebels were
forced to retreat to the mountainous highlands bordering Georgia.278 Despite the retreat,
the rebels responded by executing approximately 300 attacks in the North Caucasus by
the year 2002.279 Other major attacks outside of Chechen territory included the seizure
of the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow on October 23rd, 2002 and the hostage taking of
more than 300 people at a school in Beslan in North Ossetia on September 1st, 2004.280
In this manner, despite the increase in military retaliation since the commencement of
the Second Chechen War and the retreat of the militants to the highlands, the militants
were able to expand their operational capability outside of their existing stronghold.
Moreover, the leader of the movement Shamil Basayev founded a suicide squad known
as the ‗Riyad-us Saliheen Brigade of Martyrs‘ in retaliation to the Grozny missile attack
of October 21st, 1999. The group executed their first suicide attack in June the following
year, and conducted 28 attacks until July 2005.281
As major military operations in Chechnya subsided beginning in 2002, the war
entered a ‗transitional phase‘. The militants re-organised their structure and leadership,
276
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and diverted from their nationalist separatist agenda to a more religiously oriented
ideology. The peak in numbers of suicide attacks were recorded in the years 2003 and
2004.282 There was a pause in suicide attacks in Russia beginning in 2006, although
Doku Umarov (the Chechen separatist leader since then) revived a series of suicide
attacks from 2008.283 According to a report by the Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, incidents of violence rose from 795 in 2008 to 1,100 in 2009. Moreover, the
number of suicide attacks in Chechnya quadrupled in 2009 as compared to the previous
year.284 Although the Russian military officially renounced its counter-terrorism
operation against the rebels in Chechnya in April 2009,285 insurgents have continued to
execute attacks following the cessation of war (e.g. a suicide attack in Ingushetia on
August 17th, 2009 and the bombing of a train from Moscow to St. Petersburg on
November 27th, 2009).286
The Chechen example shows that an upsurge of military operations do not
necessarily result in the outright destruction of terrorist groups, nor the elimination of
terrorist attacks. In fact, organisations can sometimes retaliate with increased lethality
and frequency of attacks, and/or innovation in their modus operandi in order to
overcome military intervention. Although successful counter-terrorism operations can
terminate terrorist campaigns temporarily, it is highly likely to invite a backlash and a
resurgence of violence following a heavy-handed military approach in countering
terrorism. Organisational splitting could also occur as a result, and geographic
displacement of violence is likely as in the case of Chechnya.287 Given the different case
studies of terrorist campaigns around the world, the probability of militarily crushing
terrorist groups is by no means certain. Such interventions are likely to be more
effective when accompanied by other measures and circumstances which weaken the
group.
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Historical experiences thus suggest that the impact of military intervention
varies according to the nature of different organisations among other circumstances.
Generally speaking, campaigns rarely end through military force alone. The success of
interventions is usually temporary, and likely to invite a backlash of violence by the
terrorists. This in turn leads to further escalation of violence.

Foreign Interventions
Third-party interventions in intra-state conflicts area complex phenomenon, and yields
different results depending on the nature of both the conflict and intervention. Thirdparty interventions could be categorised as partisan or non-partisan, and direct or
indirect. External states generally intervene for three different reasons- diffusion,
isolation, or reconciliation.288Reconciliation-type intervention take place on the basis
that it brings an end to the violence associated with underlying issues.289 Third parties
decide to intervene based on their political interest in containing the violence and
ensuring political stability, justified on the grounds of the United Nations‘
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, where a state is deemed unable to protect its
own citizens and manage transnational threats ―that emanate from within their borders‖such as terrorism and transnational organized crimes.290Isolation and suppression are
designed to work against the non-state actor, and to strengthen the forces of the central
government. Conversely, ‗diffusion and encouragement‘ involve an external state
providing partisan support to non-state actors.291The motives behind this type of
intervention are either self-interest or affective. The former include territorial
acquisition; protection of the intervener‘s political, economic, strategic, ideological
interests; and in certain cases, to destabilise the local environment for the intervener‘s
strategic interests.292Affective reasons include justice, humanitarian considerations, and
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ethnic, religious and ideological affinity with the non-state actor.293For the purpose of
this thesis, foreign intervention will be restricted to military operations.
Foreign military involvement can take in many forms apart from a direct,
unilateral military intervention. The deployment of US soldiers to the southern
Philippines in February 2002 was a joint effort between the Philippines government to
crush the ASG. 1,300 US military personnel were sent to the terrorist group‘s
stronghold, Basilan, to assist in Operation Balikatan.294 However, the deployed US
troops were restricted to self-defense and non-combat operations under the Filipino
rules of engagement.295 The US military assistance continued even after the completion
of Operation Balikatan, executing US-Filipino joint military exercises in 2006 which
involved 5,500 US military personnel. The military collaboration between the US and
the Philippines proved successful in weakening the ASG to a certain extent. The US
aerial surveillance and the increased patrolling of the Filipino navy restricted the
group‘s use of sea as their escape route, and the establishment of four new bases on
Basilan greatly limited the group‘s terrestrial activities.296 Further, the operations killed
several leading members, including Khaddafy Janjalani in September 2006, and Abu
Sulaiman in January 2007.297
Regardless of the form of third party intervention, Regan concludes that
interventions tend to prolong the conflict and rarely ends the confrontation between the
non-state actor and the government.298A third-party military intervention can often
backfire and further complicate the campaign. When non-state actors receive tangible
military support, this often induces the government to adopt more repressive measures
against the militants, thus inviting a backlash of violence.299Similarly, the militants‘
target of violence can shift from the government forces to the intervening party and
induce more support to the rebels. The 1982 Lebanon War fits this case. Despite the
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existing ceasefire between Israel and the PLO, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon ordered
the invasion of Southern Lebanon to halt the PLO attacks against Israelis in the area.
The Operation Peace for Galilee put all the PLO members in the area and the Lebanese
citizens under siege.300 This invasion also targeted many Shiite Lebanese and eventually
encouraged the Amal Movement to collaborate with the PLO, a former rival, to fight
against the Israelis seven years later. Moreover, this invasion also bred the foundation in
the creation of Hizballah in 1982, under the support of Iran and Syria.301 As this
portrays, foreign intervention can exacerbate the intensity of violence and/or shift the
target selection of the terrorist movement. In essence, third party interventions can
temporarily halt military confrontation between existing parties, but hostilities are likely
to ensue between the intervening forces and the terrorist organisation. Consequently,
under such circumstances we can expect terrorist target selection to shift from domestic
targets towards the intervening forces.

3.3 Conclusion
The above section demonstrates the role of different variables in moulding the campaign
trajectory of the group, and assist in deducing the patterns of continuity and change in
terrorist organisations. Naturally, some variables hold more relevance than others in the
different stages of the campaign. Further, many of these are undoubtedly intertwined,
and thus pose a challenge in determining the individual impact of the variables.
Nonetheless, the research will attempt to examine the historical impact of the variables
on the evolution of the LTTE campaign, from its birth to demise.
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Chapter 4: Overview of the LTTE movement

The first part of this section will provide the background to the political climate of Sri
Lanka which led to the birth of the LTTE. The subsequent section will briefly introduce
the organisational profile of the LTTE, followed by the general overview of their threedecade long campaign. Though essentially descriptive, this chapter is fundamental to
familiarisation with the subject of the case study prior to examining the impact of the
selected factors.

4.1 Prelude to the Tamil secessionist movement
The LTTE is in no way a product of ‗the spur of the moment‘. History records ethnic
animosity between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, which dates back to the 6th century
BC.302 Anton Balasingham, the LTTE theoretician claim Tamil Eelam as their
traditional homeland in the North and East of Sri Lanka,303while the Sinhalese claim the
rest of the entire island as their historic motherland. The deep-rooted rivalry continued
to persist for twenty-six centuries, as each sought to pursue their own rights and
political boundaries within their self-claimed traditional homeland.
For 450 years, the island nation was ruled by colonial forces namely the
Portuguese, Dutch, and the British, in 1505, 1658, and 1801, respectively.304The British
rulers implemented the ‗divide and rule‘ policy, which favoured the Tamils over the
majority Sinhala population. The British missionaries set up schools in the Northern
Province, which provided the Tamils with an excellent English-style education. This led
to their disproportionate over-representation in the prestigious government sector jobs
and universities.305The Sinhalese perceived their economic and educational

302

Gunaratna, R., War and Peace in Sri Lanka(1987) Kandy: Institute of Fundamental Studies Sri Lanka,
15. Gunaratna notes that the animosity between the two ethnic communities is historical. Great wars were
fought intermittently between the Tamil and Sinhala kings over the supremacy of the kingdoms for
centuries. This long-standing rivalry has been later exploited by the colonial rules in their ‗divide and rule
policy‘ to maintain their imperialist interests until the independence of Sri Lanka in 1948.
303
Although the historic accuracy of original settlement of Sri Lanka is highly contested, Balasingham
claims that the Dravidian Tamils were the original inhabitants of the island nation before the arrival of
Prince Vijaya from Bengal (ancestor of Sinhala race). He further contends that when the Portuguese
colonialists first landed on the island in the beginning of 16 th century, they found two ancient kingdomsthe Tamils in the north-eastern region and the Sinhalese in the south. Balasingham, A., War and Peace:
Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of the Liberation Tigers (2004) Surrey: Fairfax Publishing, 1-2
304
Pape, R. and Feldman, J., Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to
Stop It (2010) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 288
305
Ibid.

85

opportunities deprived due to the preferential treatment of the Tamils, and ―colonialism
thus accentuated both groups‘ ethnic distinctions‖.306
The early campaign of the Tamil resistance was largely restricted to the political
arena. Dating back to 1929, Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan, a respected Tamil political
leader, made attempts to prevent the adoption of political reforms which were enshrined
in the Donoughmore Constitution. He foresaw that the ‗law of large numbers‘ as
outlined in the Constitution would have ultimately posed a threat to the Tamils who
were, by then, referred to as the ‗minorities‘ of the country.307 Various initiatives were
put forth by subsequent Tamil political leaders and activists to safeguard the Tamil
rights over a span of a few decades, based on the fear that the country was slowly
sliding towards Sinhala supremacy and domination. Discriminatory policies against the
Tamils commenced following independence from Britain in February 1948.Democratic
elections placed the government in the hands of Sinhala nationalists who sought to
redress previous discriminations vis-a-vis the Tamil population.
In 1949, a breakaway faction of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, the Illankai
Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) or the Federal Party led by S.J.V Chelvanayakam,
declared ―to work unceasingly for the achievement of a Tamil State within the federal
framework of a united Ceylon, as the only way to ensure that the Tamil-speaking people
in Ceylon could live with honour and self-respect‖.308 Although the Federal Party lost
the General Elections of 1952, their policy statement became the foundation of the
Tamil struggle in Parliament.
The discrimination and the domination of the Sinhalese is said to have actively
began in 1956, as a result of the rising Sinhala Buddhist chauvinist movement which
was also popularly supported by the Sinhalese masses. The S.W.R.D Bandaranaike
regime implemented the Sinhala Only Act, or the recognition of Sinhala as the sole
national language.309 The impact of this Act reached beyond the Civil Service, and also
led to the drastic decline in the numbers of Tamil recruitment in the security forces. 310
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Subsequently, the Federal Party immediately swept the polls in the General Elections of
1956, and it launched a series of Sathyagraha campaign against the government in the
following years. Any sort of democratic and lawful protests by the Tamils were
remunerated with further government oppression.311 Moreover, countless promises and
agreements ensuring basic Tamil rights have been abrogated due to hardliner Sinhala
public pressure. For instance, the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 was
initiated to reduce the inter-communal tension and to address the issues on the Tamil
language, colonisation, autonomy and the status of the up-country Indian Tamils.312
Tensions mounted when the Tamil counterparts pointed out the lack of effort in
implementing the terms of the pact, while the ruling party of the time (the United
National Party) was unable to resist the mounting pressure by their extremist Sinhala
Buddhist constituencies. The UNP finally abrogated the pact on the basis that it
undermined ―the unity of the country and the status of Sinhala as its only official
language‖.313 A similar agreement, also known as the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact,
was signed prior to the 1965 general elections. The UNP agreed to make Tamil the
language of administration in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, and to devolve power
to the District Councils. This again was abrogated in the same manner as the previous
pact.
Further marginalisation of Tamil youths was followed by the Republican
constitution of 1972 which included a standardisation policy with regards to university
admissions, and Buddhism given primary place as the national religion.314 Needless to
say, this reform was realistically perceived by the majority Hindu- Tamil youths as a
grave form of institutional discrimination against them. Tamils were increasingly
discriminated against especially in the fields of education and job recruitment. In the
same year, the Tamil political parties united to form the Tamil United Liberation Front
(TULF). Notwithstanding, any attempts made by the Tamil politicians in the political
front continuously failed due to opposition fuelled by the extremist elements within the
Sinhala community, which also included the Buddhist clergy.315 Communal politics
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gained prominence to win votes, furthering the schism between the two ethnic
communities.
The series of events which unfolded in the post-independence years urged the
Federal Party to adopt a more rigid stance against the Sinhala government. This resulted
in the promulgation of the Vaddukkodai Resolution by Appapillai Amirthalingam on
May 14th, 1976, at the First National Convention of the TULF. This resolution outlined
the various forms of repressive measures adopted by the Sinhalese community, and
ultimately called upon the Tamil youths in particular, to dedicate themselves fully to the
fight for freedom until a sovereign state of a Tamil Eelam is achieved.316 Thangarajah
points out that the ‗victimised‘ Tamil community gave its leadership ―a politically
necessary bargaining position‖317 to demand Tamil regional autonomy and encourage
secession. Amirthalingam and his party garnered much support, and resultantly secured
an overwhelming victory in the parliamentary elections in 1977 and appointed as the
opposition leader in Parliament.318
In 1978, the UNP sought a new beginning in ethnic relations by attempting to
reverse the policies which favoured the Sinhala Buddhist constituencies. The 1978
Constitution incorporated more substantial fundamental rights for the Tamils and also
recognised Tamil as a national language. It also introduced proportional representation
in Parliament, replacing the plurality system which promoted majoritarianism. The third
proposal was that the new district council would give the Tamils considerable autonomy
in the Tamil-majority areas.319 Despite these major reforms which elevated their social
recognition, such provisions have come to very little, mainly because of the pressure
exerted by the Sinhala nationalists in the ruling party. The government ultimately
refused to hold a parliamentary election, thus eliminating any hopes for the Tamils to
gain concessions in the existing constitutional framework.320
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Consequently, the Tamil constituency was no longer interested in integrating
themselves into the Sri Lankan political sphere. Especially for the TULF, such
concessions were deemed futile because it did not discuss federalism or decentralisation
of power. From this point onwards, the Tamil struggle became synonymous to political
devolution, namely control over the territories of the Northern and Eastern Provincesrather than seeking linguistic equality.321 Simultaneously, the Tamil militant groups
commenced covert operations against the security forces using hit and run tactics, as
though they were complimenting the efforts of the Tamil political leadership.322

4.2 The early Tamil militancy
Tamil armed resistance initiated since the 1970s is widely attributed to decades of
discrimination against the Tamils, which was institutionalised by the Sinhalese
dominated government of Sri Lanka in the post-independence era. The failure of
successive Tamil political parties to regain Tamil rights engendered a political climate
which allowed insurgency to flourish over the years. Amidst the growing
unemployment among educated Tamils due to several discriminatory government
policies, Tamil militancy was also influenced by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)
insurrection in the country, which was crushed in 1971.323 Both the JVP and the Tamil
militants were equally frustrated by the growing unemployment in the country. Further,
the rigid caste system within the Tamil community exacerbated youth violence in the
North. Most of the militants belonged to the oppressed lower castes, and were engaged
in murdering of the Tamils from a higher ‗vellala‘ caste. Unemployment was rampant
among those from the lower castes, while a vast majority of the higher caste Tamils
enjoyed their employment opportunities within the Tamil political parties such as the
Tamil United Front (TUF).324 Initially, the TUF endorsed and encouraged the Tamil
youth to instigate a secessionist struggle in the name of a holy war (punitha yutham)
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against the Sinhala state.325 In this manner, Tamil political parties were complicit in
supporting militancy in Sri Lanka in order to exploit violence as a means to pressurise
the Sri Lankan government and to justify their demand for secession.
Although Tamil militancy gathered momentum after 1983, the seeds for an
armed struggle were present from long before. The roots of Tamil militancy can be
traced back to 1969, when a group of Tamil youths headed by Nadarajah Thangavelu
and Selvarajah Yogachandran established the Tamil Liberation Organisation (TLO),
which later morphed into the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO). However,
many of its members later became disillusioned with the group as the leadership failed
to deliver its goals, and deviated to smuggling and other criminal activities.326
Alongside the TLO, the Tamil Youth League (TYL) emerged as part of Tamil student
activism in 1973, and functioned as an affiliate of the TUF (which later transformed into
TULF).327 It later became the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), and Veluppilai Prabhakaran
developed the military wing of the TNT,328 which eventually splintered to become the
LTTE in 1976. Since its inception, the TNT was notorious for its ruthlessness towards
any form of dissent or betrayals against the group.
During the nascent stages of Tamil militancy, there were approximately 34
different outfits active329 (See Appendix 2) immediately prior to or in the aftermath of
the riots in 1983, and many of them were united by overlapping memberships. However,
by the end of the 1970s, only five of them- TELO; Eelam Revolutionary Organisation
of Students (EROS); Eelam People‘s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF);
People‘s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE); and the LTTE- remained
committed to achieving an Eelam through violent means. The security situation in the
North quickly deteriorated from the early 1970s. The militants increasingly engaged
themselves in various criminal activities, including thefts and robberies of banks,
government establishments and local businesses in order to collect funds to carry out
political assassinations.330 Among many others, Prabhakaran robbed a bank in Jaffna on
March 5th, 1976.331 Kuttimani, the leader of TELO, also conducted a successful bank
robbery in Jaffna, stealing Rs. 7.5 million. Militants started to indiscriminately attack
325

Hoole (2001) cited in Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 67
Balasuriya, The Rise and Fall of the LTTE,19
327
Swamy, M.R.N., Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerillas(1994) Colombo: Vijitha Yapa, 26
328
Silva,Sri Lanka Three Decades of Hostilities, 20
329
Ibid, 16
330
Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 68
331
Ibid, 68
326

90

buses, railway carriages and Buddhist temples, and also murdered police officers.
Despite the mass arrests of militants in 1973, by this time they had already exerted
themselves to the extent that any form of dissent against their activities was suppressed
through coercion and threat.332 The maintenance of law and order was severely
undermined as the violent political atmosphere dominated in the North.
In May 1978, the Parliament approved a bill to ban the LTTE and other militant
groups for one year, yet violence increased nonetheless. The TULF had been
strengthening militant activities through covertly assisting fundraising for the LTTE and
other outfits. Moreover, the government was unable to redress the Tamil grievances and
focus its attention on the havoc wrecked in the North because it had exhausted its
resources and attention in crushing the JVP insurgency in the South. The government
campaign against the growing Tamil militancy in the North led to an increased
deployment of security forces, which inevitably led to further repression and human
rights violations against Tamil youths. In response, the government re-enacted the
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in July 1979. This draconian law was initially
implemented to contain the JVP uprising in 1971, which allowed the suspects to be
detained ―without trial for up to 18 months and brought to trial on charges based on
confessions inadmissible under the normal laws of the land‖.333 Given the political
climate of Sri Lanka during this time, the PTA provided the legal framework to
suppress the rising Tamil militancy. However, this law later stirred controversy as it was
exploited to harass the Tamil youths in the context of maintaining law and order.
Within a span of nearly four decades, Sri Lanka witnessed a series of communal
riots island-wide in the years 1956, 1958, 1961, 1974, 1977, 1979, 1981, and 1983.334
The growing alienation of the Tamils in Sri Lanka reached its peak in 1983, which led
to the outburst of the country‘s largest communal riots. This incident came to known as
Black July, which Bandarage rightly opines that it caused ―the conflict to spiral into
civil war‖.335 On July 23rd, 1983, the LTTE ambushed a Sri Lankan Army transport in
Jaffna, killing thirteen Sri Lankan Army soldiers.336 This was in fact a retaliatory action
by the militants, against the Sri Lankan Amy who had been responsible for the death of
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two LTTE cadres and gang-raping a Tamil girl in the North.337 Outraged by the
incident, the Sri Lankan Army indiscriminately killed approximately fifty Tamil
civilians in the area of the ambush. Simultaneously, this incident ignited anti-Tamil
feelings among the Sinhala population, and perpetrated the mass killings of Tamils on
July 25th in Colombo. Hundreds of homes and businesses were indiscriminately burnt
down and looted by Sinhala mobs.338 Further, fifty Tamils who were imprisoned at that
time were murdered by outraged Sinhalese prisoners in the same jail.339 The estimated
number of Tamils killed within the span of a few days ranges between 200 to 2,000
persons.340 Nearly 100,000 Tamils were forced to enter refugee camps, while several
thousands of their homes, shops, factories and other properties were destroyed. A
further 30,000 became unemployed.341 Manor opines that the pogrom was an amalgam
of three types of violence: a) spontaneous attacks on Tamils by Sinhalese motivated by
hatred of the minority and desire of vengeance after the ambush of the soldiers in
Jaffna; b) criminal violence in which the Sinhalese took advantage of the disorder to
loot or ruin personal enemies or business rivals; and c) a more general and carefully
organised campaign to inflict maximum damage to Tamils living in the Sinhalese
majority areas.342 The Black July riots thus took place at the height of social unrest and
communal division, as the country experienced immeasurable damage economically,
politically and morally.
The Tamils were overcome with a sense of helplessness, insecurity, and anger
towards the Sinhalese, which further engendered an environment to encourage Tamil
militants to take up arms for their cause. The aftermath of the pogrom was rather
predictable. Militant groups, including the LTTE, subsequently escalated its offensive
against the security forces and the Sinhala civilians in the North and South, which in
turn invoked government retaliation and further oppression towards the Tamil
population. The Sixth Amendment in the Sri Lankan Constitution was passed in August
1983, which marginalised the main Tamil political parties in Parliament.343 The civil
war in Sri Lanka was therefore an end-product of deliberate political communalisation
initiated by the successive Sinhala governments. The deterioration of the situation over
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the years resulted in the Tamils‘ mounting distrust towards both the government and the
Sinhalese population in general, and simultaneously instilled a sense of conviction
among the militants that a peaceful political solution was no longer viable.

4.3 The Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam
Given the historical background, it is evident that the LTTE emerged as one of many
other militant groups to represent the interests of the ethnic Tamils in Sri Lanka. By
1986, the LTTE emerged as the supreme militant group in the region.344 As the most
ruthless insurgent group, the LTTE annihilated moderate Tamil political leaders and
other Tamil militant groups such as TELO, EROS and EPRLF which simultaneously
existed side by side with the LTTE.345 Besides the hundreds of lives claimed by the
LTTE attacks on national infrastructure and military instillations, this terrorist outfit has
assassinated some of Sri Lanka‘s top leaders and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India
in 1991346, Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993347, and Sri Lankan
presidential candidate Gamini Dissanayake in the following year.348
Over three decades, it has claimed to represent the goals and the hopes of the
entire Sri Lankan Tamil population- both inside and outside of Sri Lanka- in pursuit of
an independent Tamil Eelam (See Fig.4). Within a decade, the organisation amassed an
extensive membership that comprised its land, sea, and air forces. Since its inception,
the LTTE‘s stated goals in addition to their own territory were as follows: 1) A single
party [LTTE‘s] Marxist Eelam nation; 2) That its leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, be
regarded as the sole spokesperson; and 3) That the LTTE is the sole organisation which
represents all Tamils of Sri Lanka. 349 This group never believed in a democratic
system, and pursued their goals through coercion and assassination.350
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Fig. 4 Map of Tamil Eelam as claimed by the LTTE
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Prabhakaran was well known for his charismatic leadership and ruthlessness,
which immensely contributed to the strength and the longevity of the LTTE. As a selftaught guerrilla, it is alleged that he learned the guerrilla tactics from books, magazines
and movies.352 He was born on November 26th, 1954 in Velvettithurai, a village located
in the Jaffna peninsula. Although he received a rudimentary education at a local college,
his political ideology was greatly influenced by Subash Chandra Bose.353 Prabhakaran
carried out his first assassination on Alfred Duraiappah, the mayor of Jaffna and a
staunch supporter of the ruling party, on July 27th, 1975. Despite Duraiappah‘s killing
being the first political murder in the North, the suspects involved were all acquitted,
and none of the fellow Tamil politicians dared to condemn the killing due to fear of
reprisal by the militants.
Perhaps it was the amalgamation of Prabhakaran‘s character and the increasing
rise of Tamil militancy during this era, which led to his justification for killing his way
to a Tamil Eelam:
―I understand the dignity of a life, but our right is much more dignified than life,
our freedom, and our self-respect‖354
351
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The New York Times referred to Prabhakaran as showing a blood-thirstiness in dealing
with his opponents, which had been compared with Pol Pot of Cambodia.355 The
supremo firmly believed that his ruthlessness was effective to develop his reign of
power to achieve a Tamil Eelam, and to prove that the LTTE was invincible enough to
claim the sole representation of the Tamil people. Others claim that he had also
expected to provoke the Sinhalese to attack the Tamils through LTTE atrocities, which
would have further justified the LTTE cause among the population.356

Velupillai Prabhakaran357
One of the qualities which have been attributed to the potency of the LTTE was
its intricate organisational formation (See Fig.5). The group comprised of various wings
under the sole leadership of Prabhakaran. Among many, the main wings include:
Military wing; Sea Tigers; Air Tigers; Political wing; Intelligence/Research wing; Black
Tiger wing; civil administrative wing; and the overseas wing. Among many,
Prabhakaran‘s close associates consisted of SP Thamil Chelvan (leader of the political
wing), Pottu Amman (leader of intelligence wing), Balraj (leader of the military wing),
Sonaram (leader of Prabhakaran‘s bodyguard group), Soosai (head of Sea Tigers), and
Kumaran Pathmanathan (leader of procurement wing).358
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Fig 5. Outline of the LTTE organisational structure
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To date, the LTTE was the only terrorist organisation in the world which could
boast the support of a well trained army, naval fleet and an air wing. Alongside combat
operations, other wings are responsible for different operational areas such as:
propaganda, policing, judiciary, finance, Peace Secretariat and communication.360
Clearly, the various components and the intricacy of the LTTE structure reflect the
LTTE‘s capacity which ran a de-facto state within their claimed territory at one point in
time. During the 1990s, the LTTE developed to the extent that it established its own
police, jail, courts, immigration department, banks and other social services.361
The LTTE possessed a wide range of military equipment, from ―locally
manufactured heavy mortars and rocket-propelled grenades to heavy machine guns and
shoulder-held SAMs obtained from clandestine global arms markets‖.362 The group‘s
elite fighting unit, the Charles Anthony Brigade, was notorious for its discipline and the
skilful adoption of guerrilla, terrorist and conventional methods of warfare.363 The
recruitment of the LTTE cadres was based mostly on conscription, abduction and
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coercion towards the final days of their campaign, whereas the nascent stages of the
outfit saw much voluntary participation of the Tamil youths. Child soldiers were
routinely recruited and used in all capacities, including infantry soldiers, intelligence
officers, trainers for other cadres, medics, combat and administrative support.364 The
LTTE significantly increased the recruitment of child soldiers since October 1987, in
the advent of the LTTE- IPKF War.365 At one point, child soldiers constituted nearly
75% of the LTTE fighting force.366Research shows that the LTTE grew to
approximately 10,000- 30,000 cadres over three decades. Pape and Feldman estimate
that the maximum number of the LTTE cadres were 15,000367 while the Sri Lankan
government estimates that the largest number of LTTE membership was recorded in
2008, with approximately 30,000 cadres.368
The LTTE perfected the use of suicide terrorism and even invented suicide vests
and belts (Human Borne Improvised Explosive Device). In the initial years of its
inception, the Black Tigers (suicide squads) consisted of Tamil youths who volunteered
to become a mahaveer (martyr) to achieve the Tamil Eelam. The Black Tigers was a
product of systematic indoctrination which emphasised the supposed genocide and
discriminations the Tamils were subjected to by the Sinhalese over the years.369 They
were usually recruited among cadres who displayed a greater level of commitment to
the LTTE. The Black Tigers were glorified and the immediate family members of these
‗martyrs‘ were given financial assistant and employment opportunities within the group,
which further encouraged youths to join the cause. After 2002 however, the recruitment
of the Black Tigers were based mostly on coercion and abduction. The LTTE employed
a door-to-door recruitment program in the North and the East, coercing each family to
donate one child to the LTTE force.370

4.4 The Eelam Wars
The 26- year long LTTE campaign is generally divided into four main phases- Eelam
Wars I, II, III, and IV. Each phase is punctuated by a series of events surrounding the
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conflict- usually by ceasefires- and depicts the overall ebb and flow of the movement.
Each Eelam War depicts a general trend of the campaign dynamics. The pre-Eelam War
years mark the birth and formative years of the group from 1976 until July 1983. The
violent campaign against the government forces gained momentum following the Black
July riots in 1983, marking the beginning of Eelam War I. This phase marked an
intensification of violence in comparison to the previous phase. Violence continued
until the June 1989 Premadasa peace talks. Eelam War II (June 1990-December 1994)
reflects a further escalation of the LTTE campaign. This phase witnessed increased
frequency and lethality of attacks, use of sophisticated modus operandi, and widened
target selection. The series of attacks and military confrontation came to an end with the
Kumaratunga-LTTE peace talks. The Third Eelam War (April 1995-Febuary 2002)
witnessed a drastic upsurge in the number of military confrontations with the
government forces. The end of Eelam War III was prompted by the Norwegianbrokered peace talks in February 2002. The final Eelam War commenced in July 2006
with government offensives, and ended with the demise of Prabhakaran in May 2009.
The final three years of the conflict were mostly characterised by a series of military
confrontations, as well as a stark rise in terrorist attacks.
The overall LTTE campaign can be described as an amalgamation of violent and
peaceful periods, where the group displayed a great level of durability, resilience and
technological innovation over the years. The most striking feature of this outfit is that it
possessed the capability to launch conventional warfare, but also simultaneously
employing other terrorist tactics to suit their strategic needs at any given time. The
Tigers also engaged in a series of peace talks with the government, abrogating the truce
when deemed ineffective and unnecessary for their strategic objectives. Capturing the
general trend of the Eelam Wars facilitates the analytical process of examining how and
why the LTTE campaign took its course in the 26-years of war. The following chapters
will explore in detail the role of the different factors in moulding the group‘s lifecycle.
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Chapter 5: The Role of Ideology

This section analyses the role of ideology in moulding the LTTE campaign
dynamics.This variable was operationalised by examining the ideological orientation of
the group and its contribution to providing justification for violence, organisational
cohesion, recruitment, and target selection.
As illustrated in the previous chapter, the historical development and the
political climate of the time had given birth to Tamil separatism. The successive failure
to secure Tamil rights through political means had ultimately driven the centre of focus
from securing Tamil rights to ‗demanding their rights to self-determination‘371 through
an armed struggle. At the time, over thirty other Tamil militant groups had embraced
the same principles. All of these militant groups operated on the basis that the Tamils
have suffered from discrimination by the Sinhala dominated state, which eventually
enforced the legitimacy of an armed resistance against systematic oppression. Nadarajah
and Sriskandarajah underpin this notion by suggesting that the militants violently
resisted against the Sri Lankan government in ―a context of acute ethnic polarization in
the island‘s politics and a sense of victimization among the Tamils‖.372
Van de Voorde states that it is impossible to define the LTTE‘s ideological
beliefs and their political actions in a one-dimensional, simplistic manner. He notes that
the LTTE does not fit in a ―dichotomous revolutionary versus reactionary or left-wing
versus right-wing framework‖.373 Instead, Whittaker rightly sums up the LTTE as an
amalgamation of the ―searing fundamentalism of aggression-hate-fanaticism‖. 374 As a
separatist movement, the LTTE ideology consisted much more than carving out an
independent state in the island nation of Sri Lanka. This was very much reflected in
their goal of creating a single-party nation comprised of ethnic Tamils within Sri Lanka,
while Vellupillai Prabhakaran was to be the sole leader of the people and the state. His
logic behind this ideology was that ―under a one party government Tamil Eelam can
change and develop much faster. In a socialist constitution the needs of the people will
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have priority‖.375 Evidently, the organisation claimed to wage a national liberation
struggle that is deeply embedded in the people, and articulated the wishes and the
aspirations of the general Tamil population.376

5.1 Nascent stages and beyond
Although the Tamil separatist ideology existed since the 1970s, militancy did not gain
momentum until later. To this end, the Black July incident of 1983 was a catalytic event
which reinforced the secessionist ideology among the general Tamil population, and
mobilised mass support for the ‗liberation movement‘ of the different militant groups.
The devastating aftermath of the pogrom became a decisive factor to highlight the
separatist cause, justify violence, and further legitimise the struggle. During the peace
talks which took place in the early years of the war, the LTTE among other Tamil
militant groups clearly stated that they were fighting to resist state terrorism:
…under conditions of national oppression and the intensification of state
terrorism and genocide against our people, the demand for a separate state
became the only logical expression of the oppressed Tamil. Our armed struggle
is the manifestation of that logical expression.377
Further, the LTTE rationalised its armed struggle in the context of self-determination,
and constantly reminded the public of the raison d‘etre of their cause:
Our struggle is for self-determination, for the restoration of our sovereignty in
our homeland. We are not fighting for a division or separation of a country but
rather, we are fighting to uphold the sacred right to live in freedom and dignity.
In this sense, we are freedom fighters, not terrorists.378
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Prabhakaran acknowledged the significance of the 1983 riots as a pivotal event in the
history of Tamil militancy, and specifically to the LTTE. He claimed that the incident
united all the sections of the Tamil masses, and there was massive support for the
LTTE‘s armed liberation.379 Muralitharan, who himself voluntarily joined the LTTE as
a result of the riots, also expressed that this event triggered massive recruitment,
especially University and A-levels students throughout the country.380 Though estimates
vary, the LTTE had merely forty fighters just prior to the 1983 riots.381Following the
riots, the LTTE membership recorded over 3,000 cadres.382Prabhakaran explained that
the Black July incident made these youths realise that violence is the ―only way to
redeem themselves and their society‖.383
The ideology of the LTTE underpins the recruitment in the early stages of their
militancy. The LTTE initially drew most of its membership from Velvetithurai384,
Vadamarachchi, and Point Pedro, which are the major fishing villages of the Northern
segment of the island. The leadership and the majority of the hardcore LTTE cadres are
from the Karaiyar (fisherman) caste, while there were also a significant number of
members from the Vellalar (farmer), Mukkuvar (fisherman), and Koviyar (domestic
servant) castes.385 Given the LTTE‘s Marxist ideological orientation, it is evident how
the youths from lower-middle classes and lower castes were very much attracted to the
idea which Prabhakaran had envisaged in his Tamil Eelam. Moreover, as a secular
group with no religious agenda386, the organisation hardly experienced any rifts due to
religious differences among the members.387 Although majority of the LTTE cadres
were Hindus, Rajasingham suggests that the LTTE undermined Hinduism by side-lining
the religious traditions of the majority.388Former Chief Minister Chandrakanthan also
379

Ibid.
Interview with then Minister of Constitution and National Integration, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan.
Former LTTE leader of Eastern Province-turned-politician, better known by his nom de guerre Col.
Karuna Amman. Ministry of Constitution and National Integration, Colombo, Sri Lanka, April 7, 2009.
381
Joshi, M., ―On Razor‘s Edge: The Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam‖ (1996)Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism, 19:1, 23
382
Pape, R. and Feldman, J., Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to
Stop It (2010) Chicago: Chicago University Press, 291
383
Prabhakaran interview with Anita Pratap, Sunday Magazine
384
Prabhakaran himself is also from Velvetithurai, of a Vellalar caste
385
Samaranayake, ―Political violence in Sri Lanka‖, 111 and Van de Voorde, ―Sri Lankan Terrorism‖,
185
386
Pape and Feldman, Cutting the Fuse,288. They also mention that the group ―pursued a wide-ranging
social agenda to change many traditional Hindu norms‖, 292.
387
Interview with a former LTTE cadre in Southern Sri Lanka, December 23, 2011; and interview with
‗Murali‘ (pseudonym) a LTTE senior member, undisclosed location, Sri Lanka, January 4, 2012.
388
Rajasingham, A., ―Is LTTE Anti-Hindu?‖, The Island, February 15, 2006,
<www.island.lk/2006/02/15/midweek5.html> at April 16, 2011
380

101

underpins this argument, stating that much of the LTTE‘s efforts were dedicated to
minimising the religious disparity within the group. For instance, he revealed that the
primary reason for adopting a ‗nom de guerre‘ for every cadre was to conceal the
religious identity of each individual, by assigning a religion-neutral sounding name.389
Much of the LTTE practices were said to be an amalgamation of Hinduism and
Catholicism. As few key members of the groups were Catholics390 and many Black
Tiger cadres were also of the same faith391, the group thus catered to appeal to the
Hindu and Christian bases of the Tamil population.392 Such practices acted to cement
Tamil Eelamist nationalism among distinct religions within the Tamil community,
which united the people for a single objective of an independent homeland. Not only
was LTTE a militant group to fight against ‗state terrorism‘ and independence, but it
had aimed to eliminate religious difference, castes and social classes to promote
equality among the people.393 This ideology underpinned the recruitment drive in the
initial stages of their struggle, and explains why it had attracted the Tamil youths- of
similar social background and of any religion- to join the cause.394
Organisational cohesion and ideological commitment tend to reinforce one
another. Whittaker observes that the LTTE was strengthened by a ‗fanatical sense of
unity‘ within the group, as they were devoted and united in a ―sense of shared
fate….[to] compete for the honour of a glorious death‖.395 One of the most prominent
features which led to the strength and longevity of the LTTE was the recruits‘ extreme
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level of devotion and the willingness to die for the cause.396The spirit or the cult of
martyrdom was particularly unique to this group and had been the central feature of
LTTE terrorism. Roberts asserts that the discourse of martyrdom is deeply rooted in
Tamil culture, religion and history. Drawing from both historic and contemporary
anecdotes related to martyrdom, Prabhakaran skillfully associated this concept as a
symbol of self-sacrifice for a given cause.397 The extreme devotion further strengthened
the development of the organisation to the extent that it became the dominant Tamil
militant group by 1986.
From suicide bombings to carrying the cyanide capsules around the neck398, the
LTTE cadres perceived their self-sacrifice and martyrdom as a way of legitimising their
actions and ―a rational terminal decision demonstrating a worthy and invincible
cause‖.399 The LTTE had employed various methods of indoctrination, which was
effective in reinforcing the ideological commitment of the members, and boosting the
overall group morale.400 The level of ideological conviction was incomparable to any
other Tamil militant group which existed simultaneously to the LTTE. This
strengthened the unity among the members, and reinforced the raison d‘etre of the
movement during the nascent stages of the outfit. The LTTE demonstrated that ideology
is a critical factor in bringing members together, and it also served as a foundation in
defining and sustaining the struggle.
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5.2 Decline in ideological commitment
Based on the proposition that the ideological commitment of members are integral in
sustaining a campaign, this suggests that conversely, the demise of the group in 2009
can be at least partially attributed to the lack of ideological commitment of the members
at that time. An examination of different conditions is required in order to validate this
contention. The level of ideological commitment- both individually and collectively- is
an abstract concept which is difficult to quantify. However, this can be analysed by
examining the following: dissension within the group, testimonies of former LTTE foot
soldiers and senior members, and increased forced recruitment of members. While these
elements do not directly measure ideological commitment and therefore cannot establish
causality, they nevertheless serve as important indicators of this variable which allow at
least tentative inferences to be drawn.
First, the defection of the LTTE Eastern Commander Col. Karuna Amman with
his 6,000 cohorts in March 2004 was a big blow to the esprit de corps. Although its
impact is discussed in details in Chapter 9 of the thesis, this was the biggest change in
the organisational dynamics of the group. Karuna was clearly disillusioned by the
pursuit of Eelam and the use of violence. He had also lost faith in Prabhakaran‘s
leadership, which prompted him to split from the organisation.401 The split was a blow
to Prabhakaran‘s unchallenged supremacy and to the overall morale of the movement as
they lost a large amount of manpower along with a senior leader who was previously
committed to the cause.
Second, several testimonies from the former LTTE cadres suggest that there was
a decline in the ideological commitment of the members towards the final years of the
war. This can be attributed to several atrocities or ‗blunders‘ committed by the top
leaders of the group. There has been an increasing trend of abduction and forced
recruitment, including the use of child soldiers since 2002. This is one indication that
the LTTE was lacking in the number of voluntary cohorts, and thus had to resort to
forced recruitment in order to replenish its manpower. Many of such cadres were not
strongly committed to the cause per se, as they had a meager understanding of what the
struggle was about and were unaware of the LTTE ideological orientation. For instance,
‗Kumari‘ was abducted by the LTTE on her way to a market in Jaffna, in 1998. She was
forced to serve as an administrative officer to the Sea Tigers Unit until the war ended. 402
401
402
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The cadres serving the female infantry unit tended to be more ideologically committed,
as most of them voluntarily joined the movement. They were treated more favourably
by the top leaders and received more incentives. She revealed that most of her
colleagues in her administrative department were abducted, and thus could not strongly
relate to the LTTE ideology or the cause. They reluctantly served in fear of losing their
lives or to avoid possible reprisal attacks against their family: ―We had no choice‖ she
cried, ―the LTTE destroyed my life.‖
Similarly, ‗Udaya‘ who served in the Sea Tiger Unit from 2007 to 2009 was
coerced to join the movement. When asked of his vision in fighting for an Eelam, he
clearly stated that he had no idea what exactly he was fighting for, and what a Tamil
Eelam would entail if it were realised.403 He was unhappy, but he was jobless and had
no choice but to join the group to protect the lives of his other family members.
Ultimately, he had to carry on by telling himself that whatever he was doing, was
serving good for the Tamil people. Forced recruitment was practiced intermittently
since the early 1990s throughout the North and the East, but skyrocketed after 2002 in
the advent of the ceasefire agreement. In February 2002, the LTTE had a force of nearly
13,400 cadres. However, from 2002 to 2006 (during the ceasefire period), it is reported
that nearly 6,500 people were recruited.404 UNICEF also records that within these years,
there had been 5,956 reported cases of child recruitment.405 By 2009, the full strength of
the LTTE was around 17,900. The extent of coercive recruitment in the final weeks of
the war is illustrated in the following excerpt:
The unwilling fighters were given hurried one-week training in the use of
weapons. Soon this got reduced to three days of training. Towards the very
end, the youngsters were pushed to the war front after merely being told how
to hold the weapon and how to fire!406
Towards the final years of the war, it is logical to assume that those who had
been abducted and forced to go to the frontline would not have had the same level of
ideological conviction, in comparison to the earlier years of LTTE militancy which
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attracted large numbers of voluntary recruitment.407 This suggests that the increasing
numbers of coerced recruitment can translate to an overall decline in the ideological
commitment of the members. The erosion of ideological conviction of the members
leads to the further need to recruit coercively to sustain the campaign and to replenish
manpower, which triggers a vicious cycle. Not only does this process cripple the
internal cohesion of newly recruited members, but it also undermined the morale of the
existing long-time members of the movement, as illustrated below.
Although ‗Murali‘408 voluntarily joined the LTTE in 1983 as a helper and later
served as a linguistic trainer of the group, by 2006 he realised that the LTTE was unable
to win the war. He says that he was also disgusted by the abduction and forced
recruitment which they started after the ceasefire. ‗Sella‘409 was forced to join the LTTE
in 1995, when the LTTE still maintained much of its control in the North, and
reluctantly stayed on until the end of the war. Although he was initially not keen to join
the movement and did not understand what exactly he was fighting for, when asked
what he expected from a Tamil Eelam- if achieved- was land, education and a place
without any Sinhalese presence. He claimed that he had been brainwashed to commit
himself to the LTTE ideology. Nonetheless he lost faith in the group in late 2008 to
early 2009 the moment the group started to entrap the Tamil civilians as a human shield
to protect their top leaders against the government offensives. The atrocities committed
against the constituencies which Prabhakaran claimed to represent, discouraged many
members of the group and led many members to question the sincerity of the LTTE
cause and Prabhakaran.
Third, as a senior member who spent most of his time with the top leaders
including Prabhakaran, Murali also witnessed glaring changes in their lifestyles since
the ceasefire period. Sella observed this during his service in the battalion unit, when he
personally felt disappointed that the leaders were enjoying an extravagant lifestyle. In
the meantime, the low rank militants were forced to undergo training and launch lowintensity attacks during the ceasefire period. He expressed that his colleagues were
equally unhappy with the senior leaders‘ way of life.410 This greatly discouraged many
407
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cadres, of both the senior members and the low-rankers. Disillusionment with the inner
workings and the activities of the group is one factor which may contribute to individual
disengagement from the organisation.411 Once the members hold the perception that the
leaders are not living up to their ideals and expectations, organisational cohesion and
morale can be easily undermined.
While the Tamil constituents in the North and East suffered from displacement,
forced recruitment and constant LTTE reign of terror, Prabhakaran‘s wife and his two
children were sent to live abroad in Europe during the war, while his parents migrated
to Chennai, India.412 In 2006, Prabhakaran‘s family prepared a fancy birthday bash for
their daughter in London, which allegedly came from the funds generated by the Tamil
Diasporas in Europe.413 Reports also reveal that the Sri Lankan forces recovered a
luxury bunker in a jungle inside Mullaitivu, made of concrete bomb-proof roofing
which was also fully air-conditioned. This bunker had been deliberately built among the
houses of the poor villagers of that area.414 Other photos released by the Sri Lankan
Defense Ministry shows palatial houses which were built and occupied by the top
leaders in the final days of the war, while Tamil civilians were taken hostage by the
group as human shields.415 It was perhaps difficult for cadres like Murali to comprehend
why a man who called for a ‗true people‘s war‘ based on justice and equality indulged
himself in a luxurious lifestyle, while his constituents suffered immensely due to the
bloody conflict. ―They [the top leaders] were selfish….if you want to destroy a terrorist
group, give them luxury‖, Murali spoke in hindsight. In a group like the LTTE where
utmost loyalty and commitment towards Prabhakaran constitutes an integral feature of
the LTTE ideology, a loss of faith in their leadership can translate into the loss of faith
in the overall ideology. As the above testimony reveals, the decline of ideological
commitment of the members were also reinforced through the luxurious lifestyle
411
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enjoyed by the LTTE top leaders, which discouraged most of the other LTTE cadres
who started to question their value and role in the struggle for a Tamil Eelam.

5.3 Target selection
The LTTE was heavily influenced by the guerilla strategies of Mao Tse-tung, Che
Guevara and Carlos Marighela. As a group which embraced secessionism based on
‗revolutionary socialism‘, their strategy was based on overthrowing the government
forces through a protracted guerilla warfare.416 Because it laid much emphasis on a
population-oriented struggle, the LTTE saw guerrilla warfare as the hallmark of a ‗true
people‘s war‘ as the only effective means of achieving an independent Tamil Eelam.417
The leader strongly believed that guerilla warfare, based on hit-and-run tactics, were
simply the most effective way of mobilising the population.418 Given the nature of their
strategy, the LTTE‘s target selection should theoretically correlate to their ideology.
Hellmann-Rajanayagam analyses that the group‘s strategy comprised of three stages: (i)
individual terror; (ii) armed confrontation with the symbols of state repression, and
Tamil collaborators; and (iii) armed confrontation with the military forces.419 Based on
this proposition, the subsequent section will examine the nature of the LTTE‘s target
selection over the course of their campaign, and how it relates to their ideology at the
time.
Since the formation of the LTTE in 1976 and until the start of the Eelam War I
in 1983, the organisation mainly targeted Tamil politicians who were working with the
ruling party of the government, and several Tamil police officers who were
investigating the LTTE criminal activities.420 The findings show that the nascent stages
of the campaign do not record any Sinhalese and/or government targets. Surprisingly,
the first attack against a Sinhalese target was not carried out until July 1983, which
marks nearly seven years after the creation of the organisation. This trend indicates that
the LTTE spent the initial years since its inception targeting the Tamils who became a
hindrance to their development and escalation. While their larger aim was to target the
Sri Lankan government forces, the group did not resort to this target until later, as their
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immediate target was based on their short-term goal of expanding and consolidating the
movement.
Throughout the First Eelam War (1983-1990), the organisation drastically
widened their target selection towards the Sinhalese. It is interesting to note that there
are several changes to their strategy and targets around this period. The LTTE carried
out its first indiscriminate attack against civilians in January 1984, exploding a hotel in
the capital city Colombo. In November the same year, the LTTE commenced a series of
massacres targeting Sinhalese civilians in a village located in a predominantly Tamil
area. Moreover, the LTTE carried out its first high casualty attack on May 14th, 1985
which targeted the Sri Maha Bodhi Temple in Anuradhapura. They shot dead 146
people, predominantly Buddhist monks, and injured 85.421 This incident was significant
on many levels. First, the massacre of religious personnel is a symbolic target which
directly correlates to the LTTE‘s anti-Sinhala Buddhist sentiments.422 Second, the high
casualty attack disseminated a strong message to the government and the people of Sri
Lanka about the ruthlessness of the group and their level of determination in achieving
their objectives.
Of the 154 incidents which were carried out during the First Eelam War, only 15
attacks were directed towards the Sri Lankan government and law enforcement
agencies.423 Apart from the occasional assassination of Tamil individuals who were
deemed as a ‗traitor‘ or a threat to the movement, this period recorded a surprisingly
large number of attacks against Sinhalese civilians. The deliberate targeting of Sinhala
civilians achieved two strategic objectives of the LTTE at the time. First, a possible
‗ethnic cleansing‘ of the Sinhalese who lived in the villages which were located in the
areas which the LTTE claimed as a Tamil Eelam territory424; and second, to instill fear
among the government, Sinhalese population and to its Tamil constituencies, and to
demonstrate its capability and determination. Moreover, the frequency of attacks has
increased drastically compared to the pre-1983 era. At this point, the group‘s modus
operandi was still primitive as it relied heavily on shooting, hacking, and torture.
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and landmines were occasionally employed,
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which did not yield high casualties except for the Colombo bus stand blast of April
1987.425
The Second Eelam War displayed a slight shift in the group‘s target selection.
The most notable was the increased targeting of the Muslim community in the Northern
and Eastern provinces. The first attack towards Muslim civilians was carried out in
1985, and until 1989, there were approximately 9 recorded incidents over the span of
five years. However, since the Indian Peace Keeping Force retreated from Sri Lanka,
there was an exponential rise in the number of attacks which targeted Muslims. During
Eelam War II, there were over 30 attacks against the Muslim villages which were,
again, located in the LTTE-claimed Tamil Eelam territory. The total number of deaths
of Muslim civilians during these years exceeded 1780.426 Ethnic cleansing of the
Muslims escalated to the point that on October 22nd, 1990, the LTTE presented an
ultimatum to the Muslims living in the North to vacate their homes, villages and towns.
In doing so, the civilians were ordered to leave all of their valuables behind or face
death, and to leave the region within 48 hours.427
From one aspect, this trend seems to fall out of the LTTE ideology. However,
targeting Muslims was an integral part of the overall LTTE strategy for various reasons.
Chandrakanthan suggests that the LTTE was driven to evict the Muslims from their
lands as a result of a ‗master plan‘ promulgated by the government intelligence agency
in order to destabilise the Tamil-Muslim relations. Initially in the late eighties, there
were several Muslim youths from the East who voluntarily joined the LTTE movement.
However, he recalls that the Sri Lankan army exploited the ethno-religious differences
to their advantage by setting the Muslims up against the LTTE, and gave an impression
that the Muslims were collaborating with the government.428 The government also
created a Muslim community defense force to retaliate against the LTTE. As a result,
some Muslims actually became informants for the government. Tensions mounted as
the militants‘ suspicion towards the Muslim community strengthened, resulting in a
425
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series of reprisal attacks between the two ethnicities.429 Moreover by 1990, the leading
Muslim party, the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC) had been campaigning for an
autonomous region for the Muslims with Muslim-controlled cantons throughout the east
and some areas of the north.430 To the LTTE, this posed a threat to their concept of a
united traditional homeland, and would have potentially undermined their control in
these areas. Chandrakanthan assesses that the mounting mistrust towards the Muslims
had ultimately urged Prabhakaran to order the killing of all Muslim LTTE cadres, and
immediately ordered the eviction of the Muslims in the North.431 To this end, the
eviction and the ethnic cleansing of the Muslims correlated to the LTTE‘s broader
objective of creating a united ‗traditional homeland‘, which the militants foresaw that it
could not have achieved with the Muslim presence in their area of control.
Targeting of the Sinhalese villages and other Tamil individuals continued
intermittently throughout the second Eelam War especially since the LTTE took over
Jaffna in 1990, while simultaneously there was an increase in targeting of military and
police. Further, the lethality of the attacks against these targets has drastically increased.
For instance, June 1990 recorded a horrific incident of the LTTE slaughtering over 600
police officers in different locations throughout the East. Other attacks include the
November 1993 attack on the Pooneryn Naval base which killed over 241 naval
personnel.432 This period is also unique as it witnessed an exponential rise in the number
of political assassinations using suicide attacks, including the assassination of the Indian
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Chennai, India. Other targets include Tamil politicians
and militant leaders, Deputy Defense Minister Ranjan Wijeratne, Lieutenant General
Denzil Kobbekaduwa, Vice Admiral Clancy Fernando, then President of Sri Lanka
Ranasinghe Premadasa, and many more. The high value targets were those who
strongly opposed the LTTE, and simultaneously the symbol of the state or the
government forces. Given the frequency, innovation in the modus operandi, lethality
and the target selection of the attacks, these were all in correlation to the broader LTTE
ideology, and also reflected the escalation of their campaign.
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The Third Eelam War from 1995 to 2002 saw 170 attacks433, an increase in
comparison to the previous phase. Eelam War III starts off with the ‗usual‘ target
selection of Tamil ‗traitors‘, Sinhalese civilians and a rise of attacks against government
installations and forces. There was also a broadening of the target selection during this
period. The outfit attacked a big oil tank near Colombo in October 1995, followed by
the Central Bank bombing in January 31st (killed 91 and injured over 1400), and the
attack on the Colombo World Trade Centre in October 1997. The rise in targeting of
the economic hubs of the country was a deliberate attempt to cripple the government
financially, which they succeeded in doing. The LTTE also launched an attack on the
Temple of Golden Tooth in Kandy, one of the most sacred Buddhist temples in the
country in January 1998. Although this suicide attack did not yield many casualties, the
psychological impact was huge on both the majority Buddhist Sinhalese population in
Sri Lanka, and to the government. Despite the ceasefire between the warring parties
being formally implemented, the LTTE carried out at least 67 recorded incidents which
violated the agreement since February 2002 to end of 2004. The LTTE attack database
(See Appendix 1) indicates that during the ceasefire period, the LTTE drastically
restricted their target selection to members of the rival Tamil militant factions and
Muslim civilians. There was no single attack against the government forces until 2005,
which demonstrates the group‘s initial attempt to adhere to the agreement. From 2006
onwards, the militant group resumed their attack against the state forces.
From March 2004 onwards, the targeting was further restricted to the cadres of
the Karuna faction, a spin-off group of the LTTE. This suggests that since the defection
of Karuna, the LTTE‘s immediate strategy shifted to punishing their biggest traitor.
Looking at the targeting trends of the Third Eelam War, it is possible to deduce that the
LTTE ideology may have played a role to some extent as it aimed for economic and
religious targets to undermine the government economically and psychologically. The
shift to targeting rival Tamil militant groups from 2002 onwards was not so much based
on the separatist ideology, but was rather moulded by the external circumstances
surrounding the group, including the ceasefire and the change in the LTTE
organisational dynamics.
The final phase of the Eelam War records 379 incidents excluding conventional
battles on the ground.434 Within the span of 33 months, this would amount to an average
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of 11.48 attacks per month. This can be attributed to the abrogation of ceasefire and a
resumption of an all out battle between the LTTE and the government forces. There was
a diversity in target selection during this phase, including security forces and both Tamil
and Sinhala civilians. The overall lethality of the attacks was not as high compared to
the previous period, as the LTTE focused more on increasing the frequency of lowintensity attacks. From 2008 onwards, the organisation relied heavily on the use of
suicide attacks, targeting politicians and Tamil refugees in their control zone and
Internally Displaced Persons(IDP) camps. From February 10th to April 25th, 2009, the
group intentionally targeted their own constituency which they claimed to represent whom they forcibly trapped to employ as a human buffer against the Sri Lankan army.
This was a deliberate strategy to threaten the Tamil refugees not to leave the LTTE zone
for government protection.435 Apart from this, the target selection stayed constant and
broad throughout Eelam War IV, and there were no striking changes in their trend. The
increased number of attacks in the short span of time in the final days of the war can be
attributed to the fact that the LTTE was, by this point, desperate in carrying out
indiscriminate attacks just to retaliate against the successful government offensives
which eventually crushed the group in May 2009.
In essence, Hellman-Rajanayagam‘s propositions are confirmed as the LTTE
targeted the Tamil ‗traitors‘ to reinforce their reign of terror, the government forces,
politicians opposed to the LTTE, and Buddhist sites- all of which could be translated as
symbols of state repression. All of these targets correlate to a secessionist, social
revolutionary principle which the LTTE adamantly embraced. However, there is much
more to the group‘s target selection, as it also included a component of ethnic cleansing
of both the Sinhala and Muslim communities. On one hand, attacks against the Tamils
and the Muslims were carried out to affect the constituents‘ behaviour and to exert its
fear to garner support (coerced or otherwise). On the other hand, the indiscriminate
attacks against the Sinhalese civilians were intended to manipulate and undermine the
Sinhala-dominated government, rather than trying to literally wipe out the Sinhala
population from the demographics of Tamil Eelam. The Tigers‘ target selection is not
driven by religious differences,436 but was directed by the strategic objectives of the
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time. The Sinhalese were not attacked because they were Buddhists, but because they
are the majority ethnicity in the country, which in extension represents the Sinhala
dominated government. The Muslims were attacked not because of their religious
orientation but because of the perceived threat they posed to the Tigers. Thus it is
erroneous to suggest that religion was the driving force of target selection.

5.4 Concluding remarks
Overall, the role of ideology in the LTTE campaign confirms existing theories. Ideology
was a crucial factor in providing justification for violence and recruitment in the
formative stages of the group. Prabhakaran effectively capitalised on the separatist
ideology to 1) provide justification for violence and 2) garner public support and induce
recruitment drive. This resultantly provided organisational cohesion for the movement
to shift to the escalation phase. Likewise, several circumstances within the LTTE
contributed to the erosion of the overall ideological commitment of the movement over
time. Mass defection, forced recruitment, and loss of faith in leadership do not directly
challenge the ideology per se. However, the above instances demonstrated that the
combination of instrumental and tactical factors undermined overall group cohesion.
This self-reinforcing cycle of events in turn appears to have led to the gradual erosion of
the members‘ ideological commitment to the LTTE cause, thus marking the decline of
the campaign.
To a large extent, the ideology essentially defined the strategy and thus directed
the target selection of the group. This was especially true during the consolidation
phase, once they had established themselves militarily and among their constituents.
However, it is equally important to acknowledge that the ideology did not necessarily
always direct target selection, especially after the group surpassed its escalation stage.
The role of ideology in shaping the group‘s target selection is dynamic and complex,
which makes it challenging to establish a definite, direct causal relationship.
As seen with the LTTE, after Eelam War II, a large part of their target selection
was influenced by external circumstances surrounding the conflict. Target choices
fluctuated according to other exogenous factors that were not directly relevant to the
‗Buddhists‘ or ‗Muslims‘. Rather, the primary LTTE target- the Sinhalese and the Moors- happened to be
Buddhists and Muslims, respectively.For this reason, the Sri Lankan conflict cannot be categorised as a
‗religious war‘. The Tamil constituents are predominantly Hindus and few Christians, but it is paramount
to remember that the LTTE was largely a ‗secular‘ group and it frequently targeted Hindu and Christian
Tamils for strategic reasons. LTTE attacks were not carried out in the name of a particular religion.
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overall ideology of the group. For instance, once the Muslims emerged as a target in
1990, they were also ideologically vilified by the LTTE, justifying the targeting of this
ethnic group as a part of the overall LTTE ideology. These findings are of course
particular to the LTTE but can also be a point of consideration in analysing other
terrorist groups. The role of ideology in determining the group‘s targets may play a part
in the initial years of the movement. Depending on circumstances, the role of ideology
can change accordingly, and in certain cases, the ideology itself can possibly shift over
time. To this end, the LTTE ideology did not direct the target selection of the group
throughout the duration of their campaign, only during the escalation phase.
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Chapter 6: Ceasefires and Peace Agreements

Throughout the course of the LTTE campaign, the Sri Lankan government and the
militants have attempted for peace on four different occasions. All these attempts
resulted in failure as both sides resumed violence during the ceasefire period. The
upcoming section will provide a brief overview of the political negotiations which took
place during the conflict. This will be followed by an analysis of the impact of the
variable on the LTTE campaign trajectory. Analysis will be based on the following:
LTTE‘s general attitude towards peace talks; military recuperation during ceasefires;
and attacks perpetrated and violations committed during and after peace talks.

6.1 Thimpu Talks
The first peace talks between the two warring parties began in Thimpu, Bhutan in 1985
amidst the growing tensions (following the Black July riots of 1983). On April 10th,
1985, four Tamil militant groups- LTTE, TELO, EROS, and EPRLF437- organised
themselves to form the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF). The newly formed
umbrella organisation of the Tamil militants signed a ‗unitary agreement‘ to reiterate
that they would accept nothing less than a Tamil Eelam as a solution to the ethnic
conflict.438 Although the ENLF was initially reluctant to participate in any political
talks, India had convinced them to go for a negotiated settlement to the rising
militancy.439 The talks began in Thimpu on July 8th, 1985 with the government
delegation, ENLF groups, PLOTE440 and the TULF441 members. The ENLF delegates
were not convinced with the devolution package as outlined in the All Party Conference
(APC) meeting the year before, and demanded more power devolution and selfdetermination. In rejecting the government‘s proposals, the Tamil delegates proposed
the Thimpu Principles442, which consisted of four basic demands that claimed to satisfy
the Tamil population in Sri Lanka:
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Recognition of Tamils as a distinct nationality;



Recognition of a Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka and the right to selfdetermination;



The merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces; and



The guaranteeing of the right of full citizenship of all Tamils living in Sri Lanka

In addition to the above, the LTTE put forward several other demands of its own443:
a. The grant of an Interim Administration, enveloping the Northern and the
Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka;
b. The evacuation of the Security Forces from established camps occupied
by them claiming that the locations are those belonging to the Tamils,
and
c. Grant of a Sea Lane for the exclusive use of Sea Tigers
Although the militants claimed that these proposals were to be implemented within the
framework of a ‗unitary‘ system, these were perceived by the Sinhalese as the first step
towards Tamil secessionism.444 The government vehemently rejected the Thimpu
Principles, suggesting devolution of power based on the Provincial Council system
instead. The negotiations did not progress any further when the Tamil delegation
walked out of the conference in August 1985, accusing the government of violating the
ceasefire to prepare for war.445

6.2 Premadasa- LTTE Talks
On April 12th 1989, President Ranasinghe Premadasa declared a unilateral ceasefire.
This move had two underlying intentions for his political gain: First, to crush the
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) insurgents uprising in the South by temporarily
bringing the confrontation with the LTTE to a halt; and second, to urge the withdrawal
of the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) that were stationed in the country as per the
Indo-Lanka Accords.446 Premadasa offered the LTTE a peace package which included
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amnesty and rehabilitation to encourage the militants to abandon violence.447 Initially,
the LTTE adamantly refused to accept the offer, claiming that the ceasefire cannot take
place until and unless the IPKF was out of the country.448 Informal talks between the
two parties commenced in April, where the expulsion of the IPKF dominated the
talks.449 The ceasefire was officially formalised in June 1989, and the parties formed an
‗alliance‘ to fight against their common enemy, the IPKF. Although their joint offensive
was successful in driving out the IPKF from Sri Lanka by March 1990, the political
negotiations between the two did not prove to be successful. In the aftermath of the
IPKF withdrawal, the LTTE immediately broke off talks with the government and
resumed violence on a massive scale, on the basis of Premadasa‘s refusal to deliver their
demands450:


The repeal of the sixth amendment to the Constitution (anti-secessionist clause);



The dissolution of the North East Provincial Councils to hold fresh elections,
enabling the LTTE‘s political proxy to contest

Subsequently, the Eelam War II erupted in June 1990 with the massacre of 600 police
officers in the East.
6.3 Kumaratunga- LTTE Talks
Following the victory of People‘s Alliance (PA) headed by Chandrika Kumaratunga in
the general elections in August 1994, she immediately initiated the peace talks through
direct negotiations with the LTTE. In fact, this policy had been an integral part of her
manifesto during the elections campaign in which she stated that she was prepared to
invite the LTTE for unconditional talks, and that she is ―willing to expand the Northern
Province to include Tamil areas in the east and make a single unit. I [Kumaratunga] will
redefine the eastern province and devolve more power‖.451 The militants responded to
her stance favourably, and gestured their willingness by releasing several police officers
who were under their custody since 1990.452 The first round of peace talks commenced
in October the same year, and the second round of peace talks took place in January
1995. During the latter round, the government offered Rs.40 billion (approx. US $300
447
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million) for rehabilitation and development in the conflict zone, as a reward if the
ceasefire were to be formalised.453 The two parties signed an official Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) later that month. This marked the first formal cession of
hostilities since violence resumed in 1990. Kumaratunga was elected president in
November 1994. However, discord between the parties surfaced at the third round of
talks. While the government initiated comprehensive talks on the substantive political
issues, the LTTE wished to tackle this through a step-by-step approach.454 At one point
in time, Kumaratunga also considered inviting French mediation to overlook the peace
process, which the LTTE vehemently rejected.455 Despite several concessions made by
the government in order to push the militants to progress in the talks, the latter instead
rejected the negotiations and presented an ultimatum. In a letter to President
Kumaratunga dated March 16th, 1995, Prabhakaran indicated that the following
demands had to be met in order to proceed with the peace talks456:


Removal of economic embargo



Freedom of movement in north-eastern waters



Removal of restrictions on fishing



Removal of the Pooneryn army camp



Free movement of armed LTTE cadres in the Eastern Province

President Kumaratunga responded with a detailed agenda of the next round of peace
talks which were to be held in May. She was unable to accept the notion of a unified
north and east (as per the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987), nor could she accept the claim
that the LTTE was the sole representative of the Tamils. She was also adamant that the
LTTE disarm prior to any negotiations.457 Prabhakaran responded negatively, accusing
the government of consolidating its military capability during the ceasefire, and
asserting that the government had failed to capitulate to the demands presented in the
ultimatum. In August 1995, Kumaratunga presented a proposal for the ‗devolution
package‘, which provided substantive autonomy for the Tamil areas in the North and
the East.458 The devolution package did not receive the support of the opposition, and
453
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the LTTE discarded the federal solution as envisaged in Kumaratunga‘s proposals. A
series of LTTE attacks resumed, marking the start of Eelam War III.

6.4 2002 Ceasefire Agreement
In 1998, the Sri Lankan government had invited the Norwegian government to mediate
the negotiations. Proceeding with the peace talks required alleviating suspicion and
hostility on both sides through third party facilitation.459 As a result, the year 2000
marked a development in the peace process between the two parties, whereby the LTTE
declared a unilateral cease-fire from December that year to January 2001, and extended
the terms for another three months.460 This was again abrogated by the militants soon
after, when they executed an attack on the Katunayake International Airport in July
2001. Following the victory of the UNP (opposition party) in the elections later that
year, Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe signed a ceasefire agreement (CFA) with
the LTTE in February 2002.461
The CFA was welcomed by both the Sri Lankan population and the international
community, while the Sri Lankan government realised that it had to resort to a political
process as a solution to the unwinnable war.462 The peace talks focused on three broad
issues: (1) de-escalation and normalisation, (2) immediate humanitarian aid and
rehabilitation in the North and the East, and (3) political matters.463 The Norwegians
facilitated six rounds of peace talks within a span of one year, which were held in
Thailand, Norway, Germany and Japan.464 The international community was heavily
involved as a part of the CFA, where a major aid conference was held in Tokyo in June
2003. The participants consisted of 51 countries and 22 international organisations to
overlook the peace process.465 The participants also pledged to aid Sri Lanka in excess
of US $4.5 billion which were to be provided accordingly to the progress of the peace
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process, in order to urge full compliance with the CFA by both parties.466 The Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)- consisting of representatives from several Nordic
countries- was also established as a mechanism to scrutinise the progress of the peace
process. The Sri Lankan government put forward proposals in July 2003 to set up a
provisional administrative structure for the North and the East, based on the terms as
outlined in the MoU of 2002.467
Despite these efforts, the LTTE rejected the government proposals and put
forward its own proposals in November 2003 for an Interim Self-Governing Authority
(ISGA) as a condition for re-entering the talks. The ISGA proposals were intended to
set up an interim administration. Although the LTTE claimed that the ISGA was an
instrument devoted to relief, reconstruction, rehabilitation and other humanitarian
concerns of their constituents, the proposed system would have created the militants‘
own armed forces, navy, administration, powers to levy and collect tax, and judiciary
and control over all eight district in the North and the East.468 The proposed terms also
embodied politico-military dimensions, which ultimately provided for a separate
sovereign state in the north and the east of Sri Lanka, rather than autonomy.469 The
ISGA essentially provided absolute power to the militants, where the terms outlined in
the proposals were a mere extension to the Thimpu Principles which were tabled 18
years ago. Lakshman Kadirgamar, the Foreign Minister who was later assassinated by
the LTTE, stated that ―the ISGA proposals laid the legal foundation for a future,
separate, sovereign state…. [the ISGA] violates the constitution‖.470 The government
rejected the ISGA, which led to the stalemate in the talks. In response, Kumaratunga
called off the negotiations and dissolved the parliament in February 2004 to announce
fresh elections.471 This move severely destabilised the peace process. Mahinda
Rajapaksa‘s victory in the Presidential elections in 2005 changed the trajectory of the
political negotiations. Despite that the CFA violations had surpassed 3,471 cases from
466
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2002-Feb 2006,472 Rajapaksa resumed the peace process in February 2006. Even then
the peace talks did not yield any desired outcome, and the LTTE found excuses against
the ongoing peace process to legitimise the increasing frequency of their attacks. Such
circumstances directed Rajapaksa to officially declare an abrogation of the CFA on
January 16th, 2008. This marked the resumption of the final Eelam War.

6.5 Analytical discussion
There are key trends which characterise the rounds of peace talks that took place during
the LTTE campaign. Over the decades, the government terms and conditions have
evolved over time within a certain boundary, whereas the LTTE never evolved its
fundamental stance beyond the Thimpu Principles. On the one hand, the government
proposals varied according to the circumstances, although it never allowed anything
beyond autonomy (a legitimate position of a sovereign state). For instance, the Thimpu
talks involved several other Tamil militant groups. By the time the 2002 CFA took
place, the government bypassed other non-LTTE Tamil members and chose to negotiate
directly with the LTTE, thereby accepting the LTTE as the sole representative of the
Tamils.473 Furthermore, the government accommodated the LTTE in several ways, such
as ‗abdication of territory‘, not requiring the militants to disarm and not banning
forcible recruitment of children during the ceasefire.474 The difference in the
government approach can be mainly attributed to the diverging policies of the
administration of the time. Prior to the 2002 CFA, the Kumaratunga regime for instance
based its strategy on ―war-for-peace‖, where her plan was to isolate the LTTE from the
Tamils through military force, and weaken the militants to bring them to the negotiating
table.475 The issues concerned were immediately put on the negotiation table. In
contrast, the United National Front led by Wickramasinghe viewed the LTTE as equal
partners, and prioritised on confidence building and giving much leniency and
concessions to the militants as a starting point to successful negotiations.476 All in all,
the government viewed the negotiations not as a platform to actually solve the ethnic
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problem, but rather to weaken the LTTE and to urge them to abandon its secessionist
agenda.477
On the other hand, the LTTE‘s general approach to the peace talks remained
constant throughout: ―to enter ceasefires and peace processes when it suited it, gain as
much as possible, and leave when it wanted‖.478 Mendis notes that the militants have
used the peace process to secure three objectives: to advance the political cause of the
Tamil people and lighten their economic burden, increase its own power as a monolithic
organisation, and to take further steps towards the ultimate goal of an independent
Tamil Eelam.479 In this manner, the peace talks were used as a tool to further both the
LTTE‘s short-term and long-term goals. Balasuriya goes to the extent of asserting that
the LTTE was never genuinely interested in ending the war, and Prabhakaran believed
in a brutal administration in the North and the East as a military leader. Further, he
explains that some senior LTTE leaders like Dr. Anton Balasingham were interested in
a negotiated settlement, but the supremo never allowed it, resulting in the failure of the
peace talks on each occasion.480The aim of this chapter is not to assess why the LTTE
pursued negotiations and how the peace talks collapsed. Analyses of such sort have
already been addressed by several scholars.481 Rather, this research sheds light
specifically on the impact of the ceasefires and peace agreements on the LTTE
campaign trajectory.

6.6 Military recuperation
Since the early stages of the war, Prabhakaran clearly stated his stance on negotiations
and peace talks. When asked whether the peace process would lead to a permanent
solution to the ethnic problem, he replied:
I am of the opinion that the round table conferences will not bring about a
permanent settlement to the Tamil issue…The Sinhala leaders never made a sincere

477

Mendis, ―Sri Lanka‖, 176
Edirippullige cited in Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 186
479
Mendis, ―Sri Lanka‖, 176
480
Balasuriya, The Rise and Fall of the LTTE,156
481
For a critical assessment of the series of peace talks and the reasons for its failure, refer to the Report
of the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission; Wickramasiri, U and Kelegama, T.,
―Government of Sri Lanka-LTTE Negotiations‖ in De Silva, K.M.(ed.), Violent Conflict, Terrorism &
Nation Building(2009) Homagama, Sri Lanka: Karunaratne & Sons; Rupesinghe, Negotiating Peace in
Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures & Lessons; Ganguly, ―Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict‖ ; Höglund, and Svensson,
―The peace process in Sri Lanka‖; Shastri, A., ―Ending Ethnic Civil War: The Peace Process in Sri
Lanka‖ (2009)Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 47: 1
478

123

attempt to resolve the Tamil issue. The present negotiations will also meet the same
fate... Hence nothing substantial will emerge from this conference.482
Prabhakaran‘s reply inferred that from the outset, he did not have faith in the political
negotiations as a solution. During the Thimpu talks, while the government restricted its
forces to barracks for three months, the LTTE exploited this opportunity to mine the
roads leading out of these army camps and to build bunkers to barricade them.483 The
LTTE also eliminated rival militant groups, namely the EPRLF and TELO. The
militants also purchased additional M-16s, AK-47s and Rocket Propelled Grenades
(RPGs).484 Shortly after the breakdown of the talks, the LTTE used their strengthened
capabilities to take control over the Jaffna Peninsula. The Defense Ministry also
indicates that the LTTE established its international shipping network in 1986 through
the contacts which they built during the talks.485
Prior to the official Premadasa-LTTE talks (June 1898-June 1990), the
government allegedly offered the LTTE cash and weapons to fight against the IPKF, as
the government transferred a shipment of arms and equipment to the LTTE at a camp in
Weli Oya in July 1989.486 Moreover, the government released convicted LTTE terrorists
under custody and closed down several strategic army camps in the North at the behest
of the LTTE.487 The provision of support to fight against the Indian troops was also
used to achieve another objective of the LTTE. Upon the withdrawal of the IPKF, the
militants used this opportunity and the weapons provided to wipe out rival militant
groups yet again, to which the President ‗turned a blind eye‘.488 The LTTE used the
fourteen month ceasefire during the talks to recuperate their military capability,
recruited and trained new cadres, built up supplies and constructed bunkers. Later, the
LTTE turned the same guns which Premadasa provided, on the government.489
Prabhakaran abrogated the ceasefire on June 11th, 1990 by ordering the slaughter of 600
police officers in the East.490 When the LTTE entered talks with the Kumaratunga
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administration, it formed four new Infantry and Support Arms Regiments namely
Anbarasi (anti-aircraft), Malathi (female infantry regiment), Kittu (artillery regiment),
and Victor (anti-tank regiment). They simultaneously purchased large amounts of
artillery guns, anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons and explosives from Eastern Europe
and East Asian countries.491 Ceasefire violations continued, and among many, they
conducted a suicide operation in November 1994, killing the opposition presidential
candidate Gamini Dissanayake during the negotiations.
Bullion asserts that the LTTE entered into talks whenever they were
experiencing a stalemate in the battlefield.492When the LTTE entered into a ceasefire in
2002, the group was left in control of much of the North and the East (except for the
Northern most city of Jaffna, which remained in the hands of the government). Other
external circumstances including the political change in the Sri Lankan government
(which was in favour of negotiations with the militants)493 and the 9/11 attacks in the
US shifted the international political climate towards denouncing terrorism494 and urged
the LTTE to enter negotiations in 2002. Mendis further contends that the militants
always tried to use the peace process to secure their militaristic stance in the armed
struggle, and saw it as an opportunity to reinforce its strength, recuperate, and to rest.495
Col. Karuna Amman revealed that when he went to Oslo in 2002 as a member of the
491
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LTTE delegation for the peace talks, Prabhakaran ordered him ―not to agree to any
solution, but to drag the talks for five more years pretending to be interested in peace, so
that he could raise funds, recruit cadres, buy arms and fight back‖.496 This quote
underpins what Uyangoda describes as the ‗hidden agenda theory‘, which suggests that
the LTTE has always acted politically with military objectives in mind, and their
decisions to enter the negotiations have been dictated by an ulterior motive to advance
their hidden military agenda.497 The LTTE appears to have opted for peace talks with a
different intention than that of pursuing genuine peace, while it suspended such talks as
it desired as a pressure tactic to demand more concessions from the government.
During all of the peace talks, the LTTE was intransigent, refusing to deviate
from its principal objective of a Tamil Eelam. The series of ceasefires implemented over
the years were rife with loopholes and weaknesses- providing an opportunity to
encourage the militants to recuperate. Firstly, the ceasefire agreements never enforced
the LTTE to disarm, and neither did it become a condition to enter the talks. Regardless
of the intended outcome, this factor gave an impression that possessing arms during
ceasefire was justified, hence indirectly legitimising and encouraging the acquisition of
more weapons. During the Kumaratunga talks, the ceasefire did not require the LTTE to
dismantle any of its own camps, and did not allow the civilians or the security forces to
enter the LTTE control without its permission.498 The terms of the 2002 CFA
encouraged the LTTE to continue their activities. It did not ban forcible recruitment,
and it failed to specify mechanisms to monitor other human rights violations. Moreover,
the agreement acceded to the LTTE‘s right to control the north and east, and formalised
an official partition of LTTE and the government controlled areas (Fig. 6).499 Unarmed
LTTE cadres were allowed to freely move in the territory under government control,
while the government was not permitted to enter the LTTE controlled areas.500 Such
lenient conditions not only gave the LTTE the legitimacy over their territory, but it also
undermined the authority of the government by giving the impression that they were
ready to make myriad compromises to ensure the commitment of the LTTE to the peace
talks.
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Further, the creation of a Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (PTOMS) in June 2005 in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 further gave
legitimacy to the LTTE. The function of this mechanism was essentially to facilitate the
delivery of relief, reconstruction and development of the tsunami-affected districts of
Ampara, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu and Trincomalee.501The LTTE was
in control of less than 15 percent of the tsunami-affected coastal belt at that time, and
thus the arrangement would have provided the LTTE with a greater leverage in the
political and security issues over the area as a result.

Fig. 6 Map of Sri Lanka as of 2005
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Critics point out that the lack of impartiality of the Norwegian mediators
facilitated the LTTE‘s misuse of the peace talks to their own strategic advantage.
Firstly, the 2002 MoU and the CFA were both drafted by the Norwegian counterpart in
consultation with Dr. Anton Balasingham, the LTTE ideologue, and excluding the Sri
Lankan government.503 Second, reports allege that Norway helped the LTTE to
establish relations with Eritrea, allowing the militants to procure weapons and
equipment legally using Eritrean end-user certificates and other documents to procure
arms from China and smuggle them into the island in several consignments.504 Norway
also allegedly promised the LTTE to help them develop ocean resources including oil
exploration and fisheries.505 In addition to providing funds to the Sri Lankan
government and local NGO‘s, the Norwegian foreign ministry also funded US$900,000
to the Peace Secretariat of the LTTE, and another US$2.3 million to the Tamil
Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), an LTTE front group in 2007.506 Resultantly, the
Norwegian mediation gave the LTTE a status equal to that of the government in various
ways.507 Further, despite that the LTTE committed most of the ceasefire violations
during the years, the Norwegians and the SLMM in particular, refrained from criticising
the militants in fear of ‗de-stabilising‘ the peace process.508 In fact, the SLMM was not
established in the LTTE controlled areas of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi, allowing the
militants to freely engage in any activities without scrutiny.509 President Kumaratunga
requested the head of SLMM to leave Sri Lanka after she discovered that he had
provided military intelligence to the militants that allowed an LTTE smuggling vessel to
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escape capture by the Sri Lankan navy.510 White observes that the Norwegians were
responsible in giving the Tigers more of what they wanted, and treated the militants as a
political force that supposedly represented the Tamil people.511 All of the
aforementioned elements effectively moulded LTTE‘s assumption that the peace talks
were a platform to further their demands towards an Eelam while buying time to
recuperate.
Jayasekara notes that the 2002 CFA provided an impetus for the LTTE to
achieve two objectives: the procurement of new weaponry and reinventing its
international image.512 In April 2002, Prabhakaran held a press conference after over a
decade, to express his satisfaction over the development of the peace talks initiated
earlier in the year. While he pledged his sincere commitment to the negotiations, he also
inferred that they were not ready to abandon the quest for Eelam.513 Despite his
commitment to the ceasefire, Prabhakaran‘s speech and actions suggested otherwise. As
Balasuriya contends, the LTTE‘s participation in peace negotiations was defined by the
group‘s commitment to a parallel process of state-building primarily by military
means.514The group managed to acquire a large quantity of personal weapons, mines,
artillery guns, aircraft, missiles and explosives (See Appendix 3). They successfully
procured weapons from abroad, and unloaded them to Mullaitivu using its sea
routes.515The most notable achievement during this period was the procurement of
aircrafts and the acquisition of the aviation capabilities. The LTTE built its aviation
capabilities and obtained vital support from technical specialists and aeronautical
engineers from pro-LTTE Diaspora who often visited Sri Lanka under the pretext of a
holiday.516 The group also sent some of its cadres abroad for flight training.517 The
510
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LTTE thus became the first insurgent group in the world to possess an air force wing,
which was all achieved during the ceasefire period.
In addition to revamping the weapons technology, the cadres were also trained
and prepared for war continuously. ‗Vignesh‘ witnessed his colleagues in the infantry
unit building a number of bunkers518, and Murali was transferred to the LTTE
intelligence wing in 2003 to work in an ‗intelligence college‘ in Killinochchi until 2007.
There, he taught Sinhalese language to LTTE agents to conduct espionage for future
attacks.519 News reports also allege that a group of Japanese experts arrived in Wanni
after the tsunami in late 2004, and trained the LTTE cadres on launching
submersibles.520 Around the same time period, it is reported that several Ukranian
experts were training the Sea Tiger cadres in underwater fighting skills.521 When
hostilities mounted between the government and the LTTE, the militants turned to the
Air Tigers, which had been revamped during the ceasefire period. They deployed their
air force actively from March 2007 to February 2009 in nine major air raids.522
In terms of finances, the 9/11 attacks resulted in the proscription of the LTTE
and its front organisations in several countries. Resultantly, the militants actively
engaged in reviving and restructuring their international network in order to revamp
their funding to circumvent the laws. In July 2003, the group‘s international
Iranamadu (northern Sri Lanka) which was fully paved and completed by September 2004. The air force
spotted another construction of a paved runway at Mulliyawalai in the north, which was completed
sometime between 2006 to October 2007. In 2008, it has been confirmed by the government forces that
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coordination centre convened a general meeting of the leaders from the overseas
branches, and guided them on how to re-organise the international network, and to urge
extortion of funds from the Diaspora communities to prepare for the final war.523 The
LTTE also resorted to other sources – its local constituencies- to secure its funding in
order to continue revamping their weapons procurement during the ceasefire. A large
portion of their income depended on internal taxation, levies and tolls. The militants
taxed 5-25% on all goods which went to the North or the East, and the LTTE traffic
police issued speeding tickets to those who drove over the limit.524 Liquors and
cigarettes sold in the LTTE area incurred a 30-35% tax.525 This amounted to an income
of nearly Rs. 10 million (approx. US$75,000) per day.526 Vignesh was a former cadre
who was forcibly recruited in 2006 to work as a bus conductor of the Tiger Transport
Board (TTB) operated by the LTTE in its controlled areas. He reveals that the militants
drastically increased the bus ticket price in the wake of the tsunami in order to collect
more internal taxation.527 Moreover, the organisation misappropriated the funds it
received for the post-tsunami development from overseas, to develop its military
infrastructures in the North and East. The collected funds were channelled through the
TRO, and transferred to its newly and illegally established bank- ―North and East
Development Bank‖ based in Killinochchi, for weapons procurement.528
Despite their operational victory in several battles that took place between 20002001, the LTTE lost a great amount of their manpower as a result.529The statistics of
recruitment during the 2002 ceasefire have been mentioned earlier in Chapter 5.530 Most
of the cadres were recruited forcibly, as by this time, the militants did not enjoy popular
support to encourage adequate voluntary enlistment and thus had to target women and
children to replenish their ranks. In fact, the greatest number of ceasefire violation
complaints was related to child recruitment and abduction of adults.531 The LTTE was
notorious for using intimidation and threats to pressure the Tamils in the North and the
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East to contribute at least one child from each family. When families refused, the
children were either abducted or the family had to face retribution from the militants.532
Human Rights Watch observes that the situation was so intense that in 2002, more than
50% of children did not go to school in Trincomalee, while most parents kept their
children at home out of fear of abduction on their way to school.533 Re-recruitment also
sky-rocketed by June 2004 as the LTTE forces in Wanni launched a forceful campaign
in the east to re-recruit the defected cohorts of the Karuna faction.534 A United Nations
Children‘s Fund (UNICEF) officer identified two main reasons behind this drive: first,
the LTTE wanted to reassert their control of the East, and second, they needed to
replenish the troops after losing a large amount of their manpower due to defection.535
Under the 2002 CFA, the LTTE was allowed to open political offices in
government-controlled areas, in which the government encouraged the militants to
engage in political activities to transform itself to a political group rather than an armed
force.536 Notwithstanding the arrangements, the LTTE exploited this as a platform of
recruitment537, espionage, arms procurement, and intimidation of local citizens.538 Also,
Prabhakaran inaugurated the headquarters of the Tamil Eelam Police in Kilinochchi in
September 2003.539

6.7 Return to violence
Given the level of military recuperation that the LTTE had undergone during the peace
talks, it is natural to assume that their intention during this time was to resume violence.
In fact, the militants returned to violence, not because their political grievances were not
met, but because they opted for the peace talks in the first place with an intention to
resume violence in the future. The failure to redress their political grievances is partially
true in justifying their resumption of war, as the terms in the peace talks did not provide
them with a Tamil Eelam or anything near to what they sought. The ISGA was the
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closest to that from their ultimate objective, and it was denounced outright by the
government.
Despite the formation of the ENLF in April 1985 prior to the Thimpu Talks, the
LTTE continued to attack mainly Sinhala villages and massacred 146 Buddhist monks
at the Sri Maha Bodhi Temple in Anuradhapura.540 During the Premadasa talks, the
group concentrated on eliminating the members of rival Tamil groups, notably the
assassination of the TULF leader Appappillai Amirthalingam (July 1989), T
Ganeshalingam of EPRLF (January 1990), and Sam Thambimuttu also from the EPRLF
(May 1990).541 The LTTE did not carry out a large number of attacks during the
Kumaratunga talks, but it carried out two suicide attacks against a naval vessel killing
22 in July 1995, and in a separate incident, killed the Chief Minister of the Western
Province in the following month. Between February 2002 and May 2007, the LTTE was
responsible for 3,830 ceasefire violations and the government for 351, as reported by
the SLMM.542 The militants engaged in a wide range of violent activities, and violations
included forced recruitment of children and adults, torture, and assassinations. Although
it is impossible to illustrate all of the ceasefire violations conducted by the LTTE, the
following section will provide a brief overview of the different types of violations
which took place throughout the ceasefire. Although the CFA was formally abrogated
on January 16th 2008, it was effectively void by July 2006 due to the stark rise in LTTE
attacks. The chart below (Fig. 7) illustrates the nature and the number of complaints
made against the LTTE during the ceasefire period. The incidents were recorded by the
SLMM.
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Fig 7. Record of complaints made against the LTTE during the ceasefire period (February 2002- April
543

2007)

Hoglund observes that three types of violence were prominent during the 2002
ceasefire: 1. between the LTTE and the government; 2. within the LTTE; and 3.
between the LTTE and other Tamil militant groups.544 Since the CFA, there were a few
incidents of direct confrontation between the government forces and the LTTE, while
overall, this did not escalate to the extent that it resulted in a major clash or renewed
fighting between the parties. For instance, in July 2002 a Sri Lankan army officer was
shot dead in a buffer zone between the government-held and LTTE-controlled areas in
Jaffna peninsula, yet the government did not conduct any reprisal attack. Another
example includes an incident in October 2002, when the LTTE held several soldiers
hostage after the police arrested two militants carrying arms in government-held
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areas.545 The group also assassinated Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in August
2005, and sought safe haven in the LTTE- controlled areas after the murder and escaped
with impunity.546 Further, the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense indicates that the
militants also assassinated 24 Sri Lankan intelligence agents during this period.547
Violence within the LTTE continued throughout the ceasefire period.
Organisational splitting also occurred during the peace talks in March 2004, and this
slightly shifted the course of the LTTE‘s campaign trajectory. In the immediate
aftermath of the split, the LTTE increased its frequency of attacks and concentrated its
target selection towards the Karuna faction.548 Although his defection cannot be entirely
attributed to the peace talks, it is possible to assume that the period may have catalysed
the split. The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) contends that the
CFA had the ―salutary effect of keeping a terrorist group such as the LTTE at the
negotiating table for a considerable period leading to the surfacing of internal
differences within the movement, which may have lain dormant had they continued to
be in active combat.‖549 Karuna‘s revolt did not impact the course of the ceasefire per
se, as both the government and the Norwegians viewed the split as an internal matter of
the LTTE, and refused to negotiate a separate ceasefire with the Karuna faction.550
The final category describes the LTTE‘s violence against other Tamil militant
groups. Members of other Tamil groups such as the Eelam People‘s Democratic Party
(EPDP), EPRLF, and PLOTE disarmed themselves in accordance to the ceasefire terms,
while the LTTE exploited this situation to specifically target them. According to the
Human Rights Watch, attacks against rival Tamil groups increased in May and June
2003, after the LTTE suspended its participation in the negotiation process.
Assassination of rival Tamil political activists skyrocketed in 2004, especially after the
defection of Karuna.551 Over 200 political activists from rival Tamil groups were killed
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between 2002 and mid-January 2006.552 The EPDP claimed that since the ceasefire was
implemented, 125 of their members were murdered by the LTTE553, and there was even
a murder attempt on the leader of the group, Douglas Devananda in July 2004.554
The LTTE also disrupted the 2004 general elections. 2,303 violent incidents
took place, mostly within the Eastern province, and five people were killed in election
related violence.555 The LTTE did not allow candidates from other political parties other
than the allies of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA)556 to campaign in its territory, and
the political activists from other parties (Tamil candidate from the UNP Batticaloa
district and EPDP officer) were murdered.557 Local election monitors were also
attacked, and the militants created a political climate of fear and intimidation to
discourage a smooth electoral process in the North and the East. Their intimidation
tactics were effective to the extent that of the 89,000 registered voters in the Kilinochchi
electorate alone, only one person cast a vote. Further, the 400,000 registered voters in
the Northern Province were prevented from voting.558
By 2005, the LTTE had committed numerous violations, which could almost be
translated as an act of provocation to resume the war. The number of LTTE attacks
drastically increased since Rajapaksa assumed Presidency. Although targeting of rival
Tamil groups continued, there were an increasing number of assassinations of armed
forces and police officers since 2005 onwards and also a massacre of Sinhala civilians.
Towards 2007, the frequency of attacks against the security forces gradually
increased.559 Several high profile assassinations were recorded during these years
including Kethesh Loganathan, the Deputy Secretary General of the Secretariat for
Coordinating the Peace Process (August 2006), and a suicide attack on the Army
Commander Lt. Gen Sarath Fonseka in April 2006. Unlike the former president
Kumaratunga who merely responded to Kadirgamar‘s assassination, the newly elected
Mahinda Rajapaksa responded by bombing the LTTE Sampur camp and shelling the
LTTE controlled area in Trincomalee.560 This was the first major attack conducted by
the Sri Lankan forces since the inception of the CFA in 2002, and the militants
552
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responded with an assassination attempt of the Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa
in the following months. Finally, the closure of the Mavil Aru sluice gate in July
2006561 marked a point of no return in the LTTE‘s campaign, as it provoked a military
intervention and an all out battle between the two parties.

6.8 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated that the LTTE primarily exploited ceasefires as an
opportunity to strategically recuperate and strengthen its military capacity for the
forthcoming battle. Moreover, the terms of the ceasefire and the conditions surrounding
the peace talks engendered an environment conducive for the LTTE to recuperate and to
return to violence. Throughout the four rounds of peace talks, the group showed no
signs of genuine commitment.
The conflict in Sri Lanka had gone through several attempts at achieving a
lasting peace process over the years. Despite the involvement of several ‗co-chair‘
countries to back the 2002 CFA, a negotiated settlement to the protracted conflict never
bore fruit due to the LTTE‘s intransigence as well as the government‘s reluctance to
provide full-fledged autonomy to the adversary. Given that Prabhakaran never had faith
in the peace talks, he always intended to return to violence after the ceasefires to
achieve his goals. Saravanamuttu states that Prabhakaran was not familiar with
democracy and had no faith in such a system- for him an armed struggle was the only
answer to achieving an Eelam. Further, Prabhakaran‘s obsession with the use of force
served the group‘s short term purpose of bringing the government to the negotiation
table by putting it in a vulnerable position.562 In hindsight, the militants were naïve for
expecting that they could use the ceasefire as a precursor to make a de-facto state in the
North and the East under their control through negotiations (as reflected in the
ISGA).563
The LTTE never completely abandoned its violent activities throughout the
ceasefire, although it temporarily de-escalated the frequency of attacks and somewhat
shifted its target selection. The organisation did escalate violence against government
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forces following the abrogation of ceasefires, given that its rigid demands were not met
and that it was allowed to recuperate in strength. The militants turned their back on the
peace process, which provided a justification to the government to opt for an all-out
military offensive in the final Eelam War. Had the Tigers kept themselves genuinely
engaged in the peace process, the Sri Lankan government would not have had the
opportunity to pursue a total military offensive.
In accordance with the historical experience of other terrorist organisations, the
Tigers also split on one occasion during the 2002 CFA. It is pertinent to note that the
splintering was not driven by differences in opinion regarding the peace talks, as is it
with some terrorist groups. Interestingly, the root cause of the split lied in a longstanding internal rift which surfaced most likely due to the respite of attacks.
As with many terrorist organisations, this case also demonstrates that peace talks
do not guarantee militants to enter into the mainstream political process- even if that is
the intended function of ceasefires. Many terrorist groups may genuinely use this
platform to abandon violence once and for all, and take alternative steps to achieve their
goals. While ceasefires are normally intended to shift terrorist campaigns toward deescalation and eventually demise, this did not prove to be the case with the LTTE. In
fact, ceasefires were the ‗calm before the storm‘ throughout the LTTE campaign. The
peace talks prevented an all out battle against government forces and temporarily shifted
the LTTE to its de-escalation phase, but overall it served as a precursor to the reescalation of the LTTE campaign.
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Chapter 7: Public support, Terrorist Networks and External Supporters

This chapter will examine the impact of local support, state sponsorship and
international networks on the LTTE campaign. The section follows a similar structure to
the previous chapter, by providing a brief overview of the variable followed by an
analytical discussion. One of the caveats inherent in this theme is that public support,
state sponsorship and international networks are unquantifiable for empirical
examination. For the purpose of this study, the impact of public support on the LTTE
campaign will be examined through the factors which directly or indirectly infer to the
level of public support. These include the following: recruitment; propaganda
mechanism; coercive and non-coercive methods of garnering support; treatment towards
constituencies; organisational dissention; and nature and frequency of attacks.

7.1 Public Support
Public support has been an integral element which contributed to the longevity of the
LTTE campaign. The LTTE enjoyed public support from two different domains: the
local Tamil constituents whom they claimed to have represented, and the Tamil
Diaspora community which dispersed around the world. Throughout the 26 year-long
war, the organisation experienced a series of ebb and flow in support at the different
phases of its lifecycle. The impact of Diaspora support will be dealt with separately in
the next chapter due to its prominent role in the LTTE fundraising. However, this
chapter will touch upon the role of Diasporas in providing political support to the Eelam
cause.

7.1.1 Rise in public support (1983-2002)
The nascent stages of the campaign witnessed mass support of the LTTE. As illustrated
in Chapter 5, Tamil militancy and the secessionist ideology was embraced at a grass
root level, and the LTTE ideology especially appealed to a large number of youths who
were motivated to participate in the struggle in the wake of the Black July riots of 1983.
The LTTE ideologue Anton Balasingham explains that the LTTE became an avenue for
Tamils in resisting and protesting against the repressive Sinhala state, while the Tamil
political parties failed to offer any concrete political venues where the youths‘
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frustration could be vocalised.564 The organisation had no difficulties finding recruits, as
those who did not flee the country as Diasporas voluntarily joined the movement
following the atrocities committed against them.565 Moreover, many youths were
inspired by the military training provided by India in Tamil Nadu.566 By mid-1987, the
movement had developed to 3,000 to 4,000 full-time cadres.567
‗Murali‘ observed that during the time where several Tamil militant groups
simultaneously existed, the LTTE drew most attraction among the youths for two main
reasons. First, the initial years of the LTTE placed focus on rapport-building among the
cadres, which attracted more recruits; second, the organisation was highly disciplined
and simple unlike the Eelam People‘s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF).568
Anita Pratap, in an interview with Prabhakaran in 1984 asked the supremo whether he
was alone in the struggle. He confidently responded, ―I am not alone. I lead a powerful
national movement and a wide section of the Tamil masses support me.‖569 From the
outset, the leader grasped the magnitude of public support rendered to him and his
campaign. The political climate of the time strongly endorsed secessionism, which
further contributed to galvanising popular support to the movement.
Since the early days of the movement, it grew from ―a small underground
guerrilla organisation into a national liberation army‖.570 At its peak, the LTTE boasted
a military force of 20,000 cadres in 2003.571 Contrary to common beliefs however,
public support did not necessarily equate to voluntary and popular acceptance of the
group. In fact, even from its early stages the militants relied heavily on intimidation as a
tactic to coercively galvanise support to assert its power over the constituents. The New
York Times once reported that Prabhakaran established a rule of terror in Jaffna through
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executing Tamil ‗traitors‘.572 As soon as the LTTE recruitment skyrocketed,
Prabhakaran also strategically shifted his focus on eliminating rivals by mid-1980s.573
For instance, by early August 1986, he killed the leader of the Tamil Eelam Liberation
Organisation (TELO) and 300 of its cadres,574 and by the end of the year the militants
nearly eliminated the EPRLF.575 The elimination of Tamil rivals and dissidents had
allowed the LTTE to gain its reputation as a brutal and ruthless group, coercing people
to submit to the militants. To this end, Bloom provides an opposing account which
challenges the popularity of the LTTE, asserting that the rural poor were ambivalent and
the general Tamils did not genuinely support the LTTE, although they may have been
passively supportive to the objectives of the group if not its methods576: ―Civilians who
had been targeted by the government forces had little choice but to support the
LTTE‖.577 Chandrakanthan underpins Bloom‘s statement. He recollects that in the late
1980s to 1991, the common perceptions of the LTTE in the East was not good as it was
notorious in killing many Tamil youths.578 However by 1991, the Eastern Tamils had no
choice but to support the LTTE as the only remaining militant group which supposedly
fought for the Tamil people. The populace vested all of their hope to the LTTE, that
during this time 3,000 Tamil youths from the East voluntarily went to Wanni (northern
Sri Lanka) to join the LTTE.579 ‗Sella‘ recalls that the militants exercised the ‗one-childper-family‘ forced recruitment policy in Mannar (north-western Sri Lanka), from as
early as 1995, and thus the whole region had no choice but to support the LTTE to some
degree.580
In addition to the intimidation tactics, the LTTE ran an intricate propaganda
machinery both locally and internationally to ensure that their support was consolidated
throughout the campaign. Local propaganda incurred several methods. Many, if not
most Tamils living in the North and the East have never encountered Sinhalese people
apart from the police and army officers, and the LTTE exploited this situation to their
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advantage for propaganda purposes.581 The LTTE cadres of the political wing were
assigned a ‗door-to-door‘ mission to go around each house in their village, and to
disseminate propaganda materials and distorted facts against the Sinhalese. The
information focussed heavily on the LTTE cause and the atrocities committed by the Sri
Lankan government forces against the Tamil population.582 ‗Aloysius‘ recalls that the
LTTE cadres visited his school to play the LTTE propaganda CD during lunch
intervals, and on Saturdays, the school teachers would call upon the students to
assemble to school and show more LTTE propaganda materials to the students.583
Aloysius proved to be a successful product of the LTTE propaganda scheme. He claims
that before joining the LTTE, he held great respect to the group as freedom fighters, and
after watching the videos, he was determined to join them to take revenge against the
‗Sinhalese Army‘, and voluntarily wanted to help the LTTE cause.584
Through various methods, the LTTE had set up a deep and wide propaganda
system within each village under their control. The LTTE had entrenched into the
livelihoods of the local population to the extent that it naturally encouraged people to
join the movement, even if they were indifferent or passive sympathisers to the cause.
For instance, ‗Nagalingam‘ recalls his youth in Mullaitivu, where he had Sinhala
neighbours and got along with them very well before the civil war erupted in the
country. However, as soon as the LTTE started to exert influence among the Tamil
constituents in the region, Nagalingam felt he had to join the LTTE even if he had
nothing personal against the Sinhalese.585 It was the political climate of the time which
forced him to join the movement. He says that less than 50% of the Tamil in his region
actively supported the LTTE, and the rest became passive supporters out of fear.586
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The establishment of a de-facto state further enabled the militants consolidate
local public support. By 1995, the LTTE was in control of almost one-third of the Sri
Lankan state, and the group membership reached at least 10,000 cohorts.587 The group
established its own civil administration and taxation system, and promulgated their own
version of the ―code of law‖, along with establishing a police force, judicial system, and
an immigration system.588 The continuous development of a de-facto state589 required a
significant amount of community acceptance, and this signified that the LTTE was able
to exert its power over the people, coerced or otherwise. This was also a method to
project itself as the sole representatives of the Tamils, as an alternative to the Sri Lankan
government. For those who did not have faith in the Sinhala-dominated regime, the
LTTE was the ‗lesser evil‘.
To this end, the militants enforced a method of ‗social entrapment‘, which
virtually imprisoned the constituents to the LTTE-controlled area and prevented them
from fleeing to the government-controlled areas.590 This strategy enhanced the potential
recruitment source and also prevented intelligence leakage to the government forces.
Lilija observed that the entrapment of constituencies implied that the militants were no
longer in need of the constituents‘ attitudinal support or popular identification with their
cause. Rather, what the LTTE sought was the behavioural support, which was the act of
compliance, regardless of the popularity or the legitimacy of the movement.591 Tamil
youths preferred shifting to Colombo for better job opportunities, rather than remaining
in the LTTE controlled areas and working for the LTTE administration in Kilinochchi,
the capital of the de-facto state. Brun observes that this unwillingness to work for the
LTTE was an indication of distancing themselves from the movement, and the
scepticism towards the cause itself. 592
The militants attempted to also maintain support in a non-coercive manner. In
her research, Flanigan asserts that the LTTE provided non-profit service to its
587
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constituencies as a platform to display the government‘s incapacity to serve the people.
As a result this garnered trust and political support of the people, as well as establishing
the movement‘s legitimacy as a governing authority.593 The LTTE maintained several
orphanages to accommodate children who lost their parents in the war, and then later
recruited them to join the movement.594 Even when the militants had territorial control
over the North and East, the government provided limited aid and social services to the
LTTE-controlled areas. The militants worked to weaken and destroy other Tamil civil
society organisations, and disrupt other NGO operations in their territory.595 To this end,
the group ensured that government aids and projects seemingly came from the LTTE
itself, in order to strategically project their authority and legitimacy over their
constituencies.596 ‗Wignesh‘ explains that the LTTE took over the government hospitals
and transport systems, and forcibly ‗converted‘ them into an LTTE-run enterprise with
taxation. Moreover, he also witnessed that the foreign NGOs597 based in the LTTEcontrolled areas were prohibited from directly interacting with the local Tamil civilians,
and it was only possible through the local government agents appointed by the LTTE.598
To induce more active participation and recruitment from the community
members, the LTTE also provided special services and compensation to ‗martyrs‘
family members. The LTTE annually inaugurated the Great Hero‘s Day in November to
revere the ‗martyrs‘ who have died for Eelam.599 Funds that were supplied from the
World Bank and other organisations for development projects of the war-affected area
were instead misappropriated and diverted to create the ―Heroes‘ Villages‖ for the
families of the LTTE cadres killed in action.600 Moreover, Hoggs notes that child
soldiers were encouraged to join through preferential treatment, including the provision
593
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of special status and exemption from paying LTTE taxes.601 For instance, those who
came from a poor family were able to appeal to the top leader to have the group send
Rs.6,000 (Approx. US$45) directly to the cadre‘s family.602 The families of the cadres
who were killed in action received a maximum of Rs.6,000, and in the event where
three children from the same family joins the LTTE and killed in action, the remaining
family members were given a house in the Wanni area.603 Such incentives lured those
who were poor or displaced.
In addition to the local level, the LTTE did not neglect its global propaganda to
sustain the support from Sri Lankan Tamils residing abroad. Since the early 1990s, the
organisation maintained a number of television and radio stations, websites, and
printing presses in several European countries that hosted a large number of the Tamil
Diaspora community.604 These propaganda machineries were directed to advocate the
LTTE ideology and encourage funds for the militants back home. Oftentimes, the LTTE
front groups exploited cultural and political events to instil a common cause among the
Diaspora population to induce radicalisation and ensure support.605 They used coercion,
intimidation and mobilisation based on ‗exile nationalism‘.606 The LTTE also
established links with several independent media networks to influence their reporting
towards being more sympathetic to the LTTE.607 Tekwani opines that the LTTE was
among the first terrorist groups to adapt new media technologies for propaganda,
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especially through the use of Internet to reach out to the Tamil Diasporas.608 The
Internet represented a virtual Tamil Eelam in cyberspace, which provided a platform for
people to discuss and share their insights and activities in supporting the LTTE.609
Moreover, the Internet served as an essential medium for the Diasporas to access news
of the progress in the campaign back in Sri Lanka.610 The news disseminated through
these websites was solely controlled by the LTTE, feeding information which was
supportive of the group.611
The organisation has also established several schools around Europe since 1995,
also known as the Thamilcholai, in the pretext of teaching Tamil language and culture
to the second and third generation Tamil Diaspora children. Presently, there are 350
schools with approximately 20,000 Tamil students.612 However, reports indicate that
this education system was mainly used as a platform to indoctrinate the children with
pro-LTTE ideologies, while providing a cover for organised fundraising. 90% of these
schools were directly administered by the LTTE,613 and the rest by the LTTE front
organisations such as Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) and World Tamil
Forum (WTF).614 Children attending the school were also often forced to participate in
protests and propaganda campaigns of the LTTE in their respective host countries.615
During the war, the LTTE further exploited the Thamilcholai schools to generate money
to fund their wars, and several schools made arrangements for its students to undergo
military training in the Wanni during 2004-2007.616 In this manner, the militants
established an intricate method of sustained propaganda abroad which ensured to
transcend generations.
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7.1.2 Decline in support (2002-2009)
From an organisation that exhibited discipline with robust military capability and
considerable public support and membership, over the years it transformed into an
organisation in dire desperation that resorted to abducting children as young as 12 years
old for its survival. The decline in LTTE‘s public support can be attributed to many
factors.
The militants increasingly relied on coercive tactics and intimidation, especially
after 2002. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the LTTE heavily depended on forced
recruitment and child abduction after the advent of the 2002 CFA, due to the immense
loss in manpower after the confrontation with the government in 2000-2001. Battle
explains that militants that employ increased levels of coercion are generally
uninterested in identifying themselves with constituents, thereby leading to reduced
popular perceptions of legitimacy of the movement.617 Brun notes that in her interviews
conducted during the 2002 ceasefire, many Tamil youths were unwilling to develop
close connections with the LTTE because they anticipated that the resumption of war
would put their families into a vulnerable position and coerced recruitment.618
The Indian Ocean Tsunami which hit the country in December 2004 proved to
be one of the turning points in the trajectory of the LTTE public support. In the
aftermath of the Tsunami which mostly affected the LTTE-controlled areas, the LTTE
refused financial aid from any group that did not funnel the donations through the Tamil
Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), and refused assistance from the government and the
military. 619 This was to ensure that the government forces and other international
groups would not undermine the legitimacy and the efficiency of the LTTE as the
guardian of the people. Beardsley and McQuinn assert that by this point in time, the
projected reputation as the sole guardian of the Tamils was not intended for the benefit
of the local Tamils, but it was rather directed towards the Diaspora community which
continued to provide resources and political leverage in support of the LTTE. Also as
mentioned in the previous chapter, a large amount of the Tsunami donation was
misappropriated to recuperate the military capability of the group, rather than for re-
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construction purposes.620 For instance, VIGIL intelligence report in 2006 revealed that
the TRO collected Rs.56.3 million (approx. US$ 425,000) to construct 639 housing
units in the North and the East, but the entire sum of money has been withdrawn by the
LTTE, while only 100 houses were built.621 Furthermore, a University Teachers for
Human Rights (UTHR) report indicates that the LTTE entered the refugee camps to
forcibly recruit children who were displaced due to the Tsunami.622
The defection of Col. Karuna Amman with his Eastern cadres in 2004 was
another catalytic event which contributed to the massive loss in public support. Due to
the longstanding rift between the Northern and the Eastern Tamils, naturally the Eastern
Tamils maintained their loyalty towards Karuna even after his defection, rather than
siding with Prabhakaran‘s cohorts in Wanni. Because Karuna‘s defection led to the loss
of perceived legitimacy of the LTTE, the militants were unable to convince their
Eastern constituents into providing manpower to fight against the government forces.
Amidst the intensifying confrontation in the East in Eelam War IV (July 2006 -May
2009), people were trapped and the LTTE was unable to provide them adequate
protection, thus further losing popular support.623
The militants‘ coercive tactics reached their peak in 2009.624During the
intensifying military confrontations during the final months of the Eelam War IV, the
LTTE refused the Tamil civilians to flee the conflict zone. Those who attempted to flee
were shot, while the rest were taken as hostages and exploited them as human buffers
against the government forces. Civilians were also forced to dig trenches for the
militants, which in effect placed them at a vulnerable position because it blurred the
distinction between civilians and combatants.625The United Nations also reports that the
LTTE fired artillery at IDPs626, and sent suicide cadres targeting the same in their
camps.
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7.1.3 Analytical discussion
Upon observing the general patterns of the public support towards the movement, there
is a clear indication that the LTTE enjoyed increasing public support since the outbreak
of the Black July riots in 1983 until the implementation of the 2002 CFA. In the earlier
days, the LTTE was able to count on more behavioural support, but it was not
necessarily always a voluntary one. There would likely have been slight peaks and
troughs with the level of public support, but it generally remained constant for nearly
two decades along with the use of coercion. The number of recruited cadres and the
establishment of a de-facto state after 1990 are solid indications of the support the
LTTE received over the years. Moreover, the rise and consolidation of public support
paralleled with the frequency of attacks. Eelam War I (1983-1990) witnessed a total of
26 attacks in the span of seven years, whereas Second Eelam War (June 1990- January
1995) marked 192 attacks in the span of less than five years. 627 This amounts to 38.4
attacks on average per year. Further, Eelam War III (April 1995- June 2006) witnessed
495 attacks, which amounts to almost 45 attacks on average per year. During Eelam
War II and III, not only did the number of attacks increase, but the nature of attacks and
target selection also varied significantly. Eelam War II witnessed a drastic increase in
attacks against Muslim civilians, and a continued but an increasing targeting of
Sinhalese civilians and government forces. A number of high-profile political
assassinations were recorded during this period. The outfit employed an amalgamation
of various modus operandi, from the use of high impact IEDs, guns, landmines, to
primordial weapons. The third Eelam War witnessed a wider target selection, which
focussed on economic targets and the defected Karuna group. This implies that the
LTTE was steadily escalating and expanding its operations, which indirectly reflects the
stability and growing strength of the outfit.
Moreover, the peak in the number of LTTE victories in all-out confrontations
against the government forces is recorded during Eelam War III.628 This can be possibly
attributed to the fact that by the onset of Eelam War III, the LTTE had already
strengthened itself and established their de-facto state. Territorial control is not only an
indication of growing power, but it also provides a strategic advantage to the militants
who are more familiar with the terrain and have a strong support base and intelligence
network within their area of control. These factors would have facilitated the LTTE to
627
628

Appendix 1 LTTE Attack Database
See Appendix 6, ―List of Major Sri Lankan Forces and LTTE Military Operations (1985-2009)‖

149

win over eight major battles from 1996-2000. Although there are no decisive elements
to establish the causal relationship between public support and escalation of the
campaign, the general trends between the two appear to correlate.
In contrast, several events which culminated since the 9/11 attacks in 2001 led to
the decline in public support, which proved to be fatal for the LTTE in the long run.
Since the 2002 CFA, the LTTE shifted its strategy and tactics based on coercion. Battle
describes that with the passage of time, the LTTE‘s reliance on the local population for
funding, weapon procurement and campaign legitimacy significantly decreased and they
increasingly turned towards the Diaspora for logistical and moral support.629 Because
the militants became more reliant on the Diasporas for their influx of resources,
resultantly the LTTE became more detached from local grievances and thus had to
resort to greater degrees of coercion to galvanise membership to replenish the loss of
manpower.630 This led to a vicious cycle of further losing local support and legitimacy,
and a shift in the LTTE‘s strategic objectives from redressing the plight of the local
constituencies to maintaining Diaspora support to sustain an influx of financial
resources to support its local campaign.
The LTTE case demonstrates that on the one hand, public support seems
important for the escalation of a group. But on the other hand, it seems to become less
necessary once military capabilities have reached a certain level. After the militants hit
their peak of escalation towards the end of Eelam War III, their strategic objectives
disregarded the support from the local constituents, and rather focused on their military
recuperation. Eelam War IV marked the decline in their campaign as they lost a
significant amount of local support, and relied heavily on external sources for survival.
The highest frequency of attacks in Eelam War IV631 should not be misinterpreted as the
highest point in public support. As described in the earlier chapter, the LTTE was
successful in forcibly replenishing its cadres and recuperating its military capabilities
during the 2002 CFA. At the same time, the LTTE detached itself from the local
constituents by committing atrocities towards them. The alienation from the population
allowed the LTTE to execute their first suicide bomb attack against their own people on
629
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February 10th, 2009 in the IDP camp in Mullaitivu District.632 This attack was followed
by three other incidents attacking the Tamil refugees in the North, in February and
April.633 Given these circumstances, it would be inaccurate to attribute the increased
frequency of attacks to a high level of public support. Rather, the group drastically
increased its attacks (in general and towards its own constituents) because it intended to
coercively garner support through intimidation. The need to resort to this tactic at this
stage in their campaign underpins that the group had shifted to the decline phase by
then.

7.1.4 Conclusion
Existing theories on terrorism clearly indicate that public support often makes a
substantial contribution to campaign dynamics. While robust public support facilitates a
shift to the escalation phase, the lack thereof leads to the de-escalation phase. Although
the picture is complex and coercion has clearly played a role throughout the LTTE‘s
lifespan, the group‘s history largely confirms the existing theories. The increase in
public support correlated to the escalation of the campaign towards the end of the Third
Eelam War. Likewise, the erosion in public support around the 2002 ceasefire period
correlates to the downfall of the group. In fact, the stark increase in attacks in the final
Eelam War aimed to garner constituent support through coercive means, which is
further indication that the campaign was declining. In conclusion, the drastic loss in
local public support contributed to the demise of the group in 2009.

7.2 State sponsorship
Throughout the campaign, the largest state sponsor to the LTTE was India until 1987.
Several domestic and geopolitical conditions compelled India to support the Tamil
militancy in Sri Lanka, beginning in the late 1970s. India‘s decision was largely driven
by the fear of losing strategic advantage in regional politics.634 Following the Black July
incident in 1983, India became an active base for the Tamil militants to grow in number
and strengthen their operational capability.635 The LTTE-India nexus dates back to
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1972, during the nascent stages of the Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka.636 Indian support
was not limited to the LTTE, but extended to several other Tamil militant groups which
operated in Sri Lanka during the 1970s. Initially, Tamil Nadu637 served as a sanctuary
for the criminally active Tamil youths to evade arrest from the Sri Lankan police. From
there, the sanctuary in India gradually evolved as the LTTE developed strong links with
a number of political groups based in Tamil Nadu. The most notable political groups
which openly supported the LTTE were the Dravida Kazhagam (DK), Kamraj Congress
(KC), and Pure Tamil Movement (PTM).638
The first training camp for the Sri Lankan Tamil militants in Tamil Nadu was
inaugurated in 1982, and rose to 32 camps in the region within the span of a year.639 The
Central Government of India was not directly involved with assisting the Tamil
militants until after the 1983 pogrom. In the aftermath of the Black July riots, the State
Government of Tamil Nadu (GTN) and its Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran
continued to support secessionism in Sri Lanka. They provided funds to the militants to
run refugee camps, militant training camps and to procure weapons. Several training
camps were opened after July 1983 in Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, New Delhi and
elsewhere to train the Tamil militants.640 The LTTE had their camps in Salem and
Madurai.641
Prabhakaran held strategic interest to expand the sanctuary in Tamil Nadu for
recruitment and training, as it avoided scrutiny from Sri Lankan authorities and he
understood that he could rely on the GTN for assistance. With the help of GTN
politicians, he opened safe houses in Sirumalai, Pollachi, and Mettur, where the cadres
were trained to use walkie-talkies and handle arms from as early as 1982.642 To this end,
Prabhakaran has been quoted speaking to the former First Secretary in the Indian High
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Commission in Colombo: ―I love India. I worship the previous Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi. I respect your present PM. I can never do anything which harms India.‖643
At a public meeting in Bombay on September 15th, 1983, Indian Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi categorically denied the allegations of assisting the Tamil militants,
explaining that ―we have never interfered with the internal developments of any country
in the past and we will not do so now‖.644 Amidst the continuous denial of the Indian
government, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indian intelligence agency,
was responsible for recruitment, providing training and weapons to the militants.645 The
first batch of 50-60 LTTE militants were trained in Dehra Dun, North India, in 1984.646
In total, ten to twelve batches of LTTE cadres were trained in India.647 By mid- 1987,the
RAW had trained an estimated 1,200 Tamil militants,648 and the selected members of
EROS, LTTE, EPRLF, and Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF)
were also given special training in diving and underwater sabotage.649 Prior to the
signing of the Indo-Lanka Accords in 1987, the GTN provided a grant of US$2.5
million to the militants.650
In the early stages of the campaign, the LTTE mainly targeted Tamil civilians
through shootings, and most of their criminal activities were limited to robbery and
extortion for fundraising.651 However, there is a gradual change in the modus operandi
of the outfit since 1984, as they started to employ IEDs and landmines as a frequent
tactic especially against the Sri Lankan government forces.652 This trend correlates to
the time RAW started training the Tamil militants on a massive scale on Indian soil.
Although the LTTE attacked the Sinhala civilians through primordial methods such as
hacking, executions, and torturing with machetes, attacks against the government forces
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or public transportation system were carried out with high-impact explosives. In 1985,
the LTTE successfully launched its military operation against the government forces in
Kokkilai, involving more than 100 cadres raiding the camp, and killing over 100
soldiers.653 A few months later, the organisation also successfully launched their first
Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) suicide attack against a military
base in Nelliady, Jaffna, killing 19 soldiers.654 In this manner, the LTTE steadily
intensified the frequency and the modus operandi of attacks since its inception. This
could be attributed to the sanctuary it held in India, which facilitated their operational
escalation.
Although India was a benefactor to the Tamil militants since the early 1970s,
1987 witnessed a dramatic turn of events when India agreed to intervene in the civil war
in Sri Lanka. This decision was based on India‘s realisation that the secessionist
movement in Sri Lanka might inspire a similar movement in Tamil Nadu.655 Although
the Central Government of India withdrew its support in the wake of the LTTE-IPKF
war in 1987, the GTN independently continued to assist the LTTE amidst the war
against the IPKF.656The LTTE maintained a substantial presence in India until the IPKF
retreated from Sri Lanka. Even during the intensifying war against the IPKF, the LTTE
managed different operational sectors in India657, and continued to exploit RAW to
obtain arms and logistical support until 1988.658 The movement also kept its office in
Madras running until 1988659, and converted Madras and nine other Tamil Nadu
districts into centres for war supplies.660 The LTTE operations in Jaffna were
coordinated by 30-40 hardcore cadres based in Tamil Nadu.661 The organisation used
small workshops in Tamil Nadu to manufacture guerrilla uniforms and grenades. The
logistical base in the area was connected with Jaffna and other contacts around the
world in real-time through intricate communication networks to control shipping and
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smuggling operations.662 Although RAW continued to train the militants well after the
dispatch of the IPKF in Sri Lanka, it gradually withdrew its support when the
movement‘s campaign intensified in the late 1980s, and when the LTTE formed an
increasing number of alliances with other separatist groups in Tamil Nadu.663 India shut
down the overt LTTE network in October 1988.664 In Tamil Nadu, most of the
mainstream political parties withdrew their official support towards the militants
following the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.665 Further,
New Delhi heightened their coastal surveillance system to prevent the LTTE from
illegal smuggling of weapons and other goods.666 India, a former ally, finally banned the
LTTE in 1992.667

7.2.1 Analytical Discussion
Despite losing India as a benefactor, the LTTE was operationally not entirely weakened.
This is reflected in the nature and the frequency of their attacks. In fact, the LTTE‘s
longevity can be attributed to the fact that they were not entirely dependent on their
benefactor. The group built their own territorial control, networks and fundraising
avenues (discussed in details in the following section). Although the LTTE jeopardised
their relationship with India since waging a war against the IPKF, it did not significantly
alter their campaign trajectory. In fact, the LTTE continued to shift to the escalation
phase of their lifecycle, even after the withdrawal of Indian state support.
Nieto suggest that despite the proscription of the LTTE, Tamil chief ministers in
India continued to provide the militants with supplies and other forms of support
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throughout the 1990s.668 However, this element alone cannot contribute to the
increasing strength of the LTTE. While relying on India in the initial years, the group
simultaneously developed its own training facilities in the North and East of Sri Lanka,
and established international networks for fundraising and arms procurement. In an
interview held in June 1986, Prabhakaran expressed: ―India‘s support is important to us,
we also have a right to self-determination. We don‘t think Rajiv [Gandhi] will ask us to
pack our bags. But then, if we are asked to go we will have to go. Our homeland is
always waiting for us with open arms‖.669 This suggests that Prabhakaran was prepared
to lose his benefactor in the course of time. Because the Tigers had simultaneously
strengthened itself by establishing its independent training base, fundraising, arms
procurement and propaganda network, the militants‘ operational capabilities were not
severely undermined despite the withdrawal of Indian state support in the wake of the
Indian intervention. In 1986, the LTTE established the ―Munitions Factory‖ which
produced mortars, grenades, and landmines and repaired small arms.670 Moreover, the
LTTE frequently obtained their weapons through looting or stealing when it attacked
military installations,671 where the Small Arms Survey indicates that 60 – 70% of the
LTTE‘s arsenal comprised of those stolen from the Sri Lankan government forces.672
The LTTE campaign escalated as Eelam War II commenced. In the span of four
years, the LTTE was accountable for over 124 attacks against a wide range of targets
using an amalgamation of modus operandi, ranging from sharp knives to human-borne
IEDs (HBIED). The overall casualties from the attacks increased compared to Eelam
War I. In the Second Eelam War, the government forces and the LTTE fought a number
of battles. One of the many notable confrontations included the Battle of Kokavil in
June 1990, when the militants launched a three-day siege of an army camp, killing 72
soldiers.673 11 suicide attacks were recorded, including the assassination of Rajiv
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Gandhi and President Ranasinghe Premadasa following the withdrawal of Indian
sponsorship of the Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka.
Nonetheless, it is pertinent to note that India‘s position towards the LTTE
hardened significantly following Rajiv Gandhi‘s assassination. In his book, Gokhale
reveals the Indian role in defeating the Tigers in the final phase of the war. Although
India publicly refused to give Sri Lanka any offensive weapons, he writes that New
Delhi had a ‗hidden hand‘ in defeating the LTTE. India ‗encouraged‘ President
Rajapakse to annihilate the militants before the summer of 2009 when the former was
expected to hold general elections. India gave Sri Lanka Mi-17 helicopters, as well as
offshore patrol vessels and low-flying detection radars. India also provided intelligence
in locating and destroying several floating warehouses owned by the Tigers, and both
the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard frequently sent out their ships to patrol the Palk
Strait and the Gulf of Mannar. 674 Therefore, while the loss of Indian sponsorship
resulted in little impact upon the escalation of the LTTE campaign following the
withdrawal of IPKF, the role of India in defeating the Tigers in their de-escalation stage
must be acknowledged.

7.2.2 Conclusion
The anticipated impact of state sponsorship shows a high level of relevance in the
LTTE‘s case. India‘s material support and provision of sanctuary was not limited to
strengthening the Tigers‘ military capabilities. It also served as a moral boost for the
militants to operationalise their secessionist activities, as it assured them of a robust
support base in fighting against the Sri Lankan state apparatus. However, the loss of
state support as a precursor to the decline in terrorist activities was not confirmed here.
The withdrawal of Indian sponsorship did not seemingly yield much immediate impact
on the movement, apart from the fact that it lost its sanctuary and material support in
India. The proscription of the group in the aftermath of the Gandhi assassination merely
limited the activities of the LTTE in India, but did not undermine the group‘s
operational capabilities as a whole, as evidenced by the increase in operations in
subsequent wars. Unlike some terrorist organisations that face respite in their campaign
due to a loss of state sponsorship and therefore are urged to shift their sanctuary to
another location, the LTTE‘s experience proved otherwise.
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7.3 Regional and global terrorist networks
The LTTE was known for its intricate and dynamic international terrorist network,
which unquestionably contributed to the resilience of the movement. A 1995 US State
Department report stated that the organisation maintained a significant overseas support
structure for fundraising, arms procurement and propaganda.675 Over the years, the
movement established several links with other terrorist groups and set up its own
international shipping network to procure weaponry. In addition to this, they managed a
vast Diaspora community, who were responsible for propaganda and political lobbying
in pursuit of a Tamil Eelam. This section will illustrate the LTTE‘s regional and global
networks.
In 1979, the LTTE dispatched 16 cadres to Lebanon for 3 months of training
with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO).676 Until late 1986, Prabhakaran did
not wish to antagonise his relationship with India given its status as the LTTE‘s
benefactor. At the same time however, the supremo looked for other options to
strengthen their capability.677 His priority of sponsorship and partnership was based on
those who would best advance mutual interests for military, political, economic or
diplomatic gain.678 Throughout South Asia, the LTTE established relationships with
Sikh insurgents and Kashmiri Mujahideen.679Evidence also suggests that the LTTE
received training for global positioning systems in Sudan and political training from
South Africa‘s African National Congress in the mid-1990s.680 Chattopadhyaya alleges
that the LTTE also had connections with the Baader-Meinhoff Gang, and the IRA.681
The LTTE also established links with insurgent groups based in Assam, Manipur and
Naga to facilitate gun shipments through Bangladeshi ports.682 Although the LTTE is
notorious for perfecting the use of suicide terrorism, Sprinzak observes that the
movement resorted to the use of this tactic following the success it witnessed with the
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Hizballah attacks against the US and French barracks in Beirut in 1983.683 The LTTE
later established ties with the Kurdistan Worker‘s Party (PKK), where the former
trained the latter in techniques to inflict maximum damage in suicide operations.
Further, the militants purchased Stinger missiles from the PKK.684 The LTTE also
helped train the members of Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group
from the Philippines, and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) members from Indonesia in the 1990s.685
In addition to maintaining links with other movements for training purposes, the
LTTE also established a global weapons procurement network instead of merely relying
on India for arms provision. Since the early 1980s, the international shipping network
was overlooked by Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP), who managed a highly secretive
network in several countries.686 Since 1987, weapon procurement activities stemmed
from several regions in the world, from countries like China, North Korea, Cambodia,
Thailand, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Burma, Afghanistan, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Lebanon, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.687According to a former RAW
agent, one of the earliest procurement deals made by Pathmanathan dated back to 1984,
with an Australian counterpart.688 By 1985-1986, he purchased ships that would be used
for commercial purposes and gun-running.689 Commercial use of the fleets (which
accounted to less than 5% of shipping time) were directed at generating revenue, such
as transporting fertilisers, timber, flour, rice paddy, sugar, and cement.690
The ―KP Department‖ operated a fleet of deep-sea vessels also known as the
‗Sea Pigeons‘, which were registered in Panama, Honduras, and Liberia.691 The fall of
the Soviet Union in 1991 gave the LTTE the access to Eastern European countries
abundant with state-of-the-art weapons such as anti-personnel landmines and surface-toair-missiles (SAMs).692 Ukraine and Bulgaria were two common destinations for the
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LTTE to purchase weapons,693 while the militants also approached corrupt military
officers in Thailand and Burma.694 There were also several LTTE gun-running rings
based in Thailand to smuggle weapons back to the militants.695 After the LTTE lost its
semi-covert naval base in Tamil Nadu, it established a permanent naval base in Twante,
an island off Myanmar, until 1995. Since then, Phuket, Thailand served as the backup
base. Most of the LTTE‘s shipping activity was carried out in South East Asia.696
The LTTE‘s global network was not limited to links with other terrorist
movements and weapons procurement, but also consisted of its vast international offices
and front groups which were actively engaged in fundraising, arms acquisition and
political activities. While these three core activities overlap to a certain extent,
operationally, they remain separate.697 The role of Tamil Diasporas in financing the
militants back home will be discussed in the following chapter, but it is pertinent to
illustrate here the significance of the propaganda and political lobby of the Diaspora
community in their respective host countries. The LTTE‘s establishment of an intricate
global network included the active participation of the Diaspora communities that are
dispersed in over 50 countries around the world, including the United Kingdom, USA,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland,
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland.698
Although the waves of Tamil migration date back to 1948, the largest exodus of
the Tamil population was following the Black July riots in 1983, where 450,000 to
500,000 people left for Tamil Nadu and for various Western countries to seek refuge.699
Traditionally, the UK has been the hub of LTTE political activism700, and the LTTE
expanded to other parts of Europe including London, Paris, and Scandinavian countries
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since 1983.701 The militants infiltrated the Diaspora communities and manipulated them
in order to establish a quasi-diplomatic structure that supported the LTTE activities
domestically and internationally. By 1988, the militants had their offices in at least 54
countries worldwide.702 In North America, the core LTTE activities were centered in
Toronto and New Jersey.703 Through these international offices run by the pro-LTTE
Diaspora communities, the militants pursued and justified their cause with foreign
governments and international organisations.
Over the years, the LTTE established 400 front organisations globally.704
Among many, the active front groups include the World Tamil Movement of Canada;
World Tamil Association; Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils; Australasian
Federation of Tamil Associations; the Swiss Federation of Tamil Associations; The
Illankai Tamil Sangam in the US; Tamil Coordinating Committee in Norway; and the
Intentional Federation of Tamils in the UK.705 The Tamil Youth Organisation has 12
branches around the world in the UK, EU, Asia, the US, and Australia,706 for which
they also sent some of their Tamil youths for military training in Wanni during the
ceasefire in 2002.707 These front groups functioned as a platform to internationalise the
LTTE cause. First, they attracted several non-governmental organisations (NGO) to
assist the LTTE struggle in the name of humanitarianism.708 Affiliating themselves with
international NGOs allowed the LTTE to frame their cause on a humanitarian basis,
thereby legitimising their claim for a Tamil Eelam. Gunaratna claims that the LTTE was
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in possession of a ‗Geneva account‘ since the 1980s, which was specifically used to
‗bribe‘ or lobby the human rights organisations to their favour.709
The LTTE has also been successful in garnering political support from several
countries since the 1980s and 1990s through the political advocacy of the Tamil
Diasporas. For instance, from as early as 1983 a World Tamil Eelam Conference was
organized in New York, which established a lobbying body, the ‗Tamil Eelam
Liberation Council‘.710 The political activism of the Diasporas mostly included political
protests and rallies in their respective host countries against the ‗oppressive‘ regime
back home, and was non-violent in nature.711 Especially since 2002, the LTTE front
organisations coerced the Tamils to attend political rallies.712 As large numbers of
Tamils obtained citizenships and permanent residency, the Diasporas gained leverage in
the politics of the host countries. While India banned the LTTE in as early as 1992, and
the US in 1997, Canada did not proscribe the militants until 2006, partly due to the
effective political advocacy of the LTTE front organisations active in Canada.713 In the
US, the pro-LTTE Diaspora groups have supported the election campaigns of certain
politicians to win their sympathy for the LTTE cause714, and in countries like Canada
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and the UK, the concentration of large numbers of Tamils provide incentive for some
politicians to engage with the pro-LTTE elements in the Diaspora to win a large number
of electoral votes.715 The Diaspora‘s political activism in some countries ensured that
the plight of the Tamils in Sri Lanka remains on the agenda of the host country‘s
foreign policy, and they have been successful in promoting state support for issues
relating to human rights abuses by the government of Sri Lanka.716 For instance, some
suggest that the reason Norway opted to facilitate the peace process in 2002 was due to
the large presence of Tamils in the country.717 Moreover, the Norwegian police have not
intervened to stop threats and extortion of members of the Tamil Diasporas, and turned
a blind eye to the pro-LTTE elements from attacking anti-LTTE political meetings.718
The pro-LTTE Diasporas also successfully lobbied the South African government to
halt selling weapons to the Sri Lankan government.719
Interestingly, the Diasporas were equally influential in shaping the LTTE
campaign trajectory by urging the militants to accept the ceasefire agreement in 2002.
Since the political climate towards terrorism drastically shifted in the aftermath of the
9/11 attacks, the Diasporas became rather nervous about the human rights abuses and
the atrocities committed by the LTTE, which would have jeopardised the claim of the
militants as bona fide ‗freedom fighters‘ driven by self-determination to fight against
the oppressive Sinhalese state. Many members of the Diaspora were discouraged from
supporting the LTTE in the changing climate.720 To this end, the ―the LTTE leadership
was probably compelled to protect the interests of the Tamil Diaspora abroad by
opening up a political front in Sri Lanka‖.721 Further, those who were coerced to
provide donations to the LTTE ―were able to exploit the greater global enforcement and
monitoring of anti-terrorism measures… to avoid paying the LTTE- imposed taxes‖.722
These factors also encouraged the LTTE to participate in the peace talks of 2002.Given
the significance of the Diasporas an integral element in the LTTE campaign (financially
rights violations and actively called for international intervention in Sri Lanka. The same coordinator was
reported as an approved fund solicitor for Senator Hilary Clinton‘s presidential campaign.
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and politically), the militants could not have ignored the wishes of their overseas
contingent.723
During the final phase of the war from January 2009 onwards, the pro-LTTE
segment of the Diasporas launched intensive political lobbying against their respective
governments - in hope of an international intervention to halt the alleged genocide of the
Tamil civilians at the hands of the government forces, and more importantly, to rescue
the Tigers. Kadirgamar asserts that by this point in time, the political activism of the
Diasporas proved futile, as the ―[the Western government‘s] engagement with the Tamil
Diaspora has only become an extension of the diplomatic and rhetorical tools that
[W]estern officials have been, so far, willing to use to pressure the government of Sri
Lanka on certain humanitarian and human rights concerns‖.724Further, the Tamil
Diasporas were ―deluded by the possibilities of advocacy and international intervention
and have not sufficiently understood the interests of the [W]est and the politics of
current international order.‖725 The potency of the Diaspora‘s political activism seemed
to wear off in the wake of the changing political climate towards terrorism. The
international initiatives in cracking down on terrorism gradually hampered the LTTE
efforts in generating revenue from the vast Tamil Diasporas residing abroad, and
severely weakened the links with other insurgent groups around the world.726

7.3.1Analytical Discussion
The LTTE‘s intricate international network enhanced their operational capabilities
through the exchange of modus operandi, and to obtain sophisticated weaponry. This
can be verified by the fact that despite the withdrawal of Indian state support in the late
1980s, it did not hamper the movement‘s activities. The escalation of the LTTE
campaign, despite losing its state sponsor, can be attributed to the global links which the
group independently established to be self-sufficient in their operational development,
without having to rely on a sole benefactor. The robust shipping network sustained the
arms procurement of the group, which enabled them to continuously execute lethal and
innovative attacks against their adversary. The lack of coordination of different
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government agencies and the exploitation of legal loopholes in different countries727 are
not the only reasons why the LTTE was successful in building their global network. The
political advocacy initiated by the Diaspora communities around the world enabled the
movement to tactfully advance their agenda at an international level, and to
systematically propagate their cause. This prolonged the group‘s survival in several
ways. First, it allowed for the LTTE to raise funds abroad, coerced or otherwise,
without scrutiny of the host governments. Second, in addition to the ineffectiveness of
the Sri Lankan government to tackle the internationalisation of the Tamil separatist
agenda, the pressure from the Tamil Diasporas led host governments to develop an
attitude of tolerance and leniency towards political activities of the Diasporas. Such
conditions enabled the LTTE to infiltrate and build a robust global network. This has
effectively allowed the movement to raise funds in one location, procure weapons from
another, operate from a different location, and ultimately continue fighting on Sri
Lankan soil.728
The level of the Tamil Diaspora‘s support rendered to the LTTE would have
ebbed and flowed throughout the campaign. The anti-LTTE camp within the Diaspora
communities were oppressed and coerced to contribute to the cause, but similar to the
local Tamil constituents, the Diasporas generally never had faith in the Sri Lankan
government and thus refrained from shifting away from the LTTE, which was
considered the lesser evil.729 The role which the Tamil Diasporas assumed in the LTTE
campaign in turn empowered them to the extent that they were able to yield a certain
impact on the campaign trajectory. The fact that the LTTE entered into the 2002 CFA in
consideration of the Diasporas, is a prominent example. In fact, Jayasekara contends
that Prabhakaran, until the moment of his death, had faith in the Diaspora‘s political
efforts to urge the Western countries to intervene and save him.730 Conversely, in the
post-9/11 and post-2002 CFA era the pro-LTTE segments of the Diaspora lost their
political legitimacy, which severely hindered their advocacy efforts. In fact, the
proscription of the LTTE is a strong indicator of the non-Tamil Diaspora view of the
movement.731 The new political climate engendered a space for an alternative voice for
727
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the anti-LTTE segments of the Diaspora community, and self-immolation and hunger
protests no longer directed the host governments in the LTTE‘s favour.

7.4 Concluding remarks
Overall, the assumption that ample public and state support allows the escalation and
the sustenance of a campaign holds true with the LTTE. In the initial years, the LTTE
enjoyed a great level of the Indian state support and the local public support, which
enabled them to escalate and expand the campaign. The organisation also established
ties with other militant groups around the world for military training and exchange of
expertise, and Prabhakaran also initiated the creation of an international shipping
network to ensure a steady arms procurement system. The Tamil Diaspora communities
further internationalised the Tigers‘ agenda, and assisted the militants on the logistic
and political fronts. The LTTE also relied heavily on coercive tactics to consolidate
their support, which enabled them to establish a de-facto state since 1990. However, as
the international political atmosphere shifted in the event of the 9/11 attacks, the group
became increasingly reliant on the Diaspora‘s material and political support for its
survival. The militants gradually lost their legitimacy and local support following 2002,
which severely undermined their military strength and organisational morale, catalysing
its demise in 2009.
Had the LTTE limited itself to rely on India for its military capability and
funding, the movement would have met its demise at an earlier stage in the campaign.
Although it would be reductionist to identify the LTTE‘s international network as the
sole variable which enabled the escalation of the LTTE campaign over time, it is
possible to conclude that this element was an integral contribution to the intensification,
sustenance, and the longevity of the overall campaign. Likewise, terrorist groups
without or with a limited global network would theoretically be prone to a shorter
lifecycle, as the loss of a benefactor and shortage of revenue, weaponry and external
political support would destabilise and potentially weaken the campaign altogether.
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Chapter 8: Funding

Since the inception of the group in 1976, the LTTE engaged in various criminal
activities and established a system to ensure a constant source of income. As a result,
the militants were able to escalate and sustain their campaign without having to halt
their activities due to lack of funding. In fact, the organisation had an uninterrupted
influx of revenue even in the final months of the war. The LTTE possessed one of the
largest estimated incomes among terrorist groups around the world. According to the Sri
Lankan Ministry of Defense, the LTTE is estimated to have raised US$50-75 million
annually between 1993-2002,732 while Janes Intelligence estimates that the group raised
US$200-300 million annually from 2002 to 2008.733 According to Gunaratna,
approximately 90% of the revenue generated overseas was earmarked for the weapons
procurement budget, while the remaining 10% was used to support operations and
administration of international offices around the world.734 Further, different sources
indicate various estimates which are sometimes contradictory to one another. This
reinforces that this is a particularly difficult variable to investigate.
The following section will examine the relationship between the evolution of the
LTTE fundraising mechanism and the progress of the group‘s campaign. The
contribution of the Tamil expatriate communities will be discussed separately in the
chapter due to its unique nature. It is pertinent to note that due to the intricate and covert
nature of this variable, and due to the lack of reliable data, the exact figures are difficult
to obtain for the purpose of this study. Therefore, the analysis is based on the sources
and methods of fundraising vis-a-vis the development of the LTTE campaign trajectory
as well as developments of the Sri Lankan conflict over time.

8.1 The early years
In the initial years of the campaign, the rebels resorted to bank robbery735 and extortion
as the primary tactic. Prabhakaran was particular about targeting state-owned banks as
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opposed to private banks, as ―the Sri Lankan government, which collected taxes from
all the people, neglected the Tamil areas in national development schemes. Therefore, it
is not immoral to rob the government to finance the Tamil liberation struggle.‖736
Further, the organisation occasionally practiced extortion from wealthy families in each
village.
In addition to the fundraising efforts on the domestic front, the LTTE actively
engaged in criminal activities internationally since the early years, which continued
until the final days of the campaign. Although it is impossible to list all of their
activities in detail, the following illustrates a brief overview. According to the US
Department of State, the militants were smuggling heroin since the early to mid1980s.737 The LTTE‘s international narcotics network had expanded to Western Europe
by 1984,738 and established links with drug dealers and criminal syndicates in different
countries.739 For instance, the group allegedly distributed heroin in Canada, France,
Italy, Poland, and Switzerland, while the major shipments of heroin and opium routed to
and from India, Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand and Sri Lanka.740 The Royal Mounted
Canadian Police (RCMP) claimed that a portion of the US$1 billion drug market in
Montreal was controlled by Sri Lankans connected to the LTTE.741 Chalk quotes a
senior Sri Lankan diplomat who asserted that ―collection of money from Tamil
expatriate sources is insignificant compared to money from narcotics‖.742 Most of the
funds raised through drug trafficking were diverted to arms procurement.743 In fact, the
drug running business has been facilitated through the intricate international arms
736
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procurement network which the militants established over the years.744 Many of the
shipping routes pass directly through or in close proximity to most of the major drug
producing and transit centres around Southeast Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.745
Human smuggling was another source of revenue, where estimates suggest that
the militants earned between US$ 18,000 to $32,000 per journey from transporting an
illegal migrant to the West.746 The earliest known case of LTTE human trafficking was
recorded in 1986, when 155 Tamils were smuggled into Canada.747 This continued into
the post-Cold War era, as their smuggling operations expanded to France, Italy, Turkey,
the Netherlands, and several African countries. In recent years, Southeast Asia has been
the most popular transit point for smuggling people to the West.748 For instance, MV
Cosmo (a small vessel with a Sri Lankan crew) was seized in November 2005 in
Thailand, and 49 Sri Lankans were arrested. Of those arrested, some were to be
dispatched to Europe or Australia, where they have allegedly paid a sum of
approximately US$10,000 to their agents, from which the agents have paid
approximately US$2,500 to the LTTE.749 Arms smuggling, money laundering, credit
card fraud and counterfeit currency trading were also commonplace,750 which escalated
and continued well into Eelam War IV. For example, in Norway, 16 LTTE operatives
were arrested in May 2007 for credit card fraud, gathering as much as US$890,000.751

8.2De-facto state and beyond
Despite the loss of Indian sponsorship and following the withdrawal of the Indian
Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lankan soil in 1990, the LTTE gathered
momentum in their campaign and expanded their control through violence and coercion.
The creation of a de-facto state allowed the organisation to effectively utilise its
territorial control to its advantage in order to generate funds. Firstly, the LTTE founded
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its own ‗Financial Wing‘ to overlook the domestic financial activities of the group.752
Most of the revenue was collected through trading and taxation. The Financial Wing
consisted of seven divisions: Cheran (wholesale and retail of rice); Wanniyan
(government contract-based business in the areas of communication, computers,
engineering, and construction work); Cholan (management of rice mill factories);
Ilavenil (trading of fuel, bronze, hardware items and motorcycles); Pandiyan
(management of public transport); Manidham (grocery, pottery, and vegetables); and
Thamil Madhi (Gold, jewellery and Arrack liquor trading).753 For instance, 90% of the
gold business in Wanni was run by the Thamil Madhi. The group also owned its own
liquor factory, where the products were solely for the consumption of local civilians,
sold with a tax of 30-35%.754 Other methods of domestic fundraising included the
following: taxation of goods that were imported from Colombo to LTTE-controlled
areas; sales tax on goods sold by merchants; household tax in LTTE areas; protection
money paid by businessmen; and penalties for Tamils who evaded payment for any of
the above.755 Additionally, those who left the LTTE controlled areas had to pay a few
hundred dollars for an ‗exit permit‘ issued by the group under their pseudo-immigration
system.756 Tax was also applied to individuals who sold their private land or properties
in the LTTE-controlled areas. ‗Kumar‘ recalls of accounts where individuals selling
property, in order to avoid paying tax, demanded that the buyer purchase the property
solely in cash, or in small instalments to avoid detection of transaction from the
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LTTE.757 The LTTE collected nearly Rs.4 to 5 million (approx. US$30,000-40,000) per
month through these methods. 758
As the militants gained territorial control beginning in the early 1990s, they also
captured many of the local banks located in Wanni and converted them into the ―Bank
of Tamil Eelam‖ in 1994759, with the head office located in Kilinochchi.760 The world‘s
only rebel-held bank was responsible for managing the savings of the local
constituencies and funds generated by the LTTE financial wing, and to remit salary to
the cadres every month.761 Moreover, 8% of the salary remitted into the bank account of
an employer of an LTTE-run company is directed into the Employee Trust Fund
(another LTTE- run institution).762 In this way, the LTTE ensured that the funds were
circulated within its own system to generate more revenue. The bank was in full
operation for years until the government forces captured Kilinochchi in January 2009.763
By the time the campaign shifted to the Second Eelam War in June 1990, the
LTTE was able to gather ample financial resources to establish and maintain a
conventional military with sophisticated equipment to engage in an all-out confrontation
with the Sri Lankan government forces. Uninterrupted funding enabled the militants to
establish their very own naval wing by converting fishing boats with grenades, into a
formidable naval force with logistic craft, attack craft, suicide boats, scuba diving
equipment and advanced satellite communications systems.764 Since 1995, the militants
gradually started to acquire anti-aircraft guns, radars and other air defence systems to
counter the Sri Lankan air force.765 The newly established Sea Tigers wing was also
engaged in sea piracy from 1997 to 2001, including hijacking and looting international
as well as local shipments and vessels, often killing the crews on-board.766 As
previously mentioned, the LTTE‘s shipping network for arms procurement were also
757
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interchangeably used as a commercial shipping network, which was engaged in
legitimate business most of the time.767 Money raised through both illegal and
legitimate means was converted through money laundering to purchase weapons. The
group invested their funds in businesses, stocks and real estate,768 and also allegedly
laundered funds through German and Singaporean banks.769

8.3Diaspora funding
Chalk observes that since the militants lost effective control of the Jaffna peninsula in
late 1995, estimates suggest that as much as 80 to 90% of the group‘s funding derived
from overseas activities.770 Indeed, a large part of the LTTE revenue was generated
from the Tamil Diaspora community abroad, especially from Europe, the US and
Canada. In addition to providing political support to the LTTE campaign abroad, the
Tamil Diasporas constituted an integral element in the terrorist campaign through
providing incessant financial and material assistance. The general consensus among
scholars and practitioners771 is that the Diasporas were a critical lifeline and an
economic backbone for the LTTE on the ground. Chalk assesses that Tamil expatriates
provided the two ingredients necessary for any insurgent campaign- international
political legitimacy and finances- and ―formed the basis of a highly effective
international support structure upon which to anchor the group‘s actual on-ground war
effort in Sri Lanka‖.772 In the Heroes Day Speech in 2007, Prabhakaran delineated the
contribution of the Diasporas in the LTTE campaign:
I wish to express my love and gratitude to you [Tamil Diasporas] for your past
participation in the building of our nation, bringing together your abundant
intellectual, material, monetary and many other resources in the service of our
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nation and ask that you stand with us in the coming years of our freedom
struggle.773

According to Chalk, as of 2008 there were around 600,000 to 800,000 Tamil
Diasporas dispersed worldwide (see Fig. 8 below).774Although the Tamil militants
attempted to gradually expand their networks outside of Sri Lanka since the late 1970s,
the group was unable to effectively raise money abroad until the Black July riots of
1983.775 However, the post-1983 Tamil expatriates had various motivations for
contributing to the LTTE. Many of the first generation expatriates who fled the country
in the aftermath of the 1983 pogrom had strong faith in the LTTE cause to seek
‗justice‘, as they were the first-hand victims of the ethnic crisis and thus perceived the
LTTE to be the messiah of the Tamils in Sri Lanka.776 This segment within the Diaspora
communities was often overcome with a sense of guilt for having physically fled the
conflict, while their relatives and brethren suffered on the ground. The ‗guilt
conscience‘ was largely neutralised through providing material assistance to the outfit
back home.777 The LTTE manipulated and exploited the ‗long-distance nationalism‘
embraced by the Tamil expatriate communities worldwide. In some cases, the LTTE
exploited individuals who were illegal migrants or asylum seekers by collecting funds
by force in return for ‗protection‘ or other assistance from the militants.778 Munasinghe
assesses that by 1991, 90% of the Tamil expatriates supported the LTTE,779 coerced or
otherwise.
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Germany 60,000

Australia53,000

Switzerland40,000

Canada320,000

France- 100,000

India- 150,000
United
Kingdom300,000

Fig. 8 Sri Lankan-Tamil Diasporas around the world
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The international fundraising activities were overseen by the LTTE International
Secretariat, which stipulated targets and deadlines for fundraising and propaganda
activities. The management of the assets and finances collected abroad were under the
scrutiny of the LTTE‘s Financial Wing, as all of the overseas operations had to be
sanctioned by Kilinochchi.781 From the outset to 1998, the LTTE was able to collect
US$24-36 million from the Diasporas alone, and this number increased annually.782 The
LTTE focused its revenue collection on Tamil communities residing in North America
or Europe, which mostly host relatively well-off, middle class expatriates.
The role of the Diasporas and the LTTE‘s international operations deserve much
attention in order to comprehend the significance of Diaspora funding within the
framework of the LTTE campaign. Jayasekara broadly categorises the international
LTTE revenue collection in four phases.783 The first generation method is characterised
by collections from individuals and businesses, event-based fundraising, and criminal
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activities. The second generation methods consists of use of front organisations, return
on investments and business ventures, collection from Thamilcholai schools (see
Chapter 7), and informal remittance systems/ hawala. The third generation method is
the management of Hindu temples and running subscription satellite televisions, and
finally, the fourth generation is characterised by the fixed income generation methods
and the registration of the Tamil Diasporas.
The LTTE raised funds through various creative and innovative methods, and
evolved over the years. In the first generation method, few individuals among the Tamil
expatriates were happily and willingly providing funds to the cause. Donation was given
on a voluntary basis, and this was known as the ‗Standing Order‘ system. Apart from
the international criminal activities, voluntary donation was one of the early methods of
collecting revenue from abroad. Jeyaraj points out that the revenue collected through
this particular method was usually spent on administering the LTTE overseas offices,
and was not used for arm procurements, nor sent back to the militants in Sri Lanka. 784
For instance, one California-based Tamil physician allegedly provided as much as
US$100,000 at a time, and provided funds on an ad-hoc basis whenever requested by
the LTTE. His total contributions in the 1990s were said to amount to US$4 million.785
Another individual, Raj Rajaratnam was notorious for being the world‘s richest Sri
Lankan Tamil, who was arrested and convicted in 2001 for securities fraud in one of the
biggest insider-trading cases in the US, and also for allegedly funding the LTTE. Vanity
Fair exposed how he urged the Diaspora members to support the LTTE at a gala event
in 1992, and donated at least US$ 1 million in recognition of the LTTE victory in the
Battle of Elephant Pass in 2000.786 Further, his tax and bank records confirmed that in
2003, he donated US$5.05 million to his family foundation, which then channelled
US$5 million to the TRO. In June 2004, he gave another $1 million directly to the
TRO.787
Over time, the mode of revenue collection evolved from regular door-to-door
visits to automatic debits from bank accounts and fundraising at public functions.788
Since the 1990s, the LTTE offices abroad set up a computerised system to keep track of
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the revenue. As technology developed, revenue collection was then converted to an
automatic direct debit from bank accounts on a monthly basis.789 The second generation
method included the annual general collection, or the ‗taxation‘ method. This method
targeted the general Tamil Diasporas members, and thus required a certain level of
intimidation. The LTTE operatives and their front organisations often sought
contributions directly through door-to-door visits.790 Generally, the operatives allegedly
demanded that the Tamil expatriates contribute 20% of their income to the Tiger
cause.791 This collection drive was conducted on an ongoing basis throughout the
year.792 In the UK, annual family donations amount to $600,793 while in France it was as
high as $2728, and businesses were required to donate US$8,185 per year.794 Estimates
suggest that the Tamils living in the UK raised £250,000 (approx. US$393,000) per
month.795 The Canadian Security Intelligence Services (CSIS) estimate that US$1.9
million were being collected annually to fund the Tigers, and a separate report by CSIS
also estimates that up to US$979,000 was being collected per month.796 The apparent
discrepancies, despite some of them coming from the same source, show the complex
and covert nature of terrorist fundraising. Even countries like Switzerland, which hosts
a relatively small number of Sri Lankan Tamils (approx. 25,000), allegedly collected
US$ 8 million a year, mostly from poor asylum seekers, until recent years.797 This was
achieved through intimidation, where the Swiss-Tamils were coerced to donate US$40
to $80 each per month.798 Palitha Kohona, then Permanent Secretary to the Sri Lankan
Foreign Affairs, confirmed that 20 to 30% of LTTE funds raised internationally came
from Australia.799 The accuracy of these different estimates is difficult to tell (for
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example, it is somewhat circumspect that more money was raised in Switzerland than
the UK). Nevertheless they give an idea of the scale of the LTTE‘s financing operations
around the world, and once again highlight the covert nature and the challenges in
understanding terrorist fundraising.
The Thamilcholai schools in Europe were also exploited as a platform to
generate revenue. Each student paid a tuition fee of 8 to 13 Euros per month (approx.
US$ 10 to $16), and the schools also organised several events for fundraising.800 A large
portion of the funds raised were donated to the World Tamil Forum, TRO or Tamil
Youth Organisation (TYO), which then channelled the revenue directly to the militants
in Sri Lanka.801 Another example is the ‗White Pigeon‘, an LTTE-run charity
organisation based in the UK which allegedly transferred approximately £500,000 from
its account with the National Westminster Bank to an account with the Bumiputhra
Commerce Bank in Kuala Lumpur. This account was owned by the World Tamil Relief
Fund, which then channelled the funds for weapons procurement.802 Taxpayers‘ funds
from different host countries were also siphoned to fund the militants. For instance,
since 1995, three charitable organisations in the UK (created by the LTTE) along with
the Tamil Housing Association raised over £8 million. Most of the funds were collected
as grants from local and central government because of their legitimacy as a registered
charitable body.803
Another technique was known as the ―special collection‖, which secured a large
sum of funds in a short period of time, and was particularly useful for weapons
procurement.804 Ardent supporters of the LTTE in each country who had a good credit
with banks would obtain loans in their own name and transfer the money to the local
LTTE agent. In most cases, they used their line of credit or put up their houses on
mortgage to obtain the loans. The interests incurred with the loans were covered by the
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funds collected through the ‗Standing Order‘ method as noted earlier, while the loan
itself was also paid off gradually through the revenue raised by general collection.805
The LTTE also generated revenue through investing in legitimate businesses and
commercial holdings run by the expatriate communities. Jeyaraj assesses that the
militants also resorted to these methods, as reliance on voluntary contributions alone
were unsteady in the long run.806 This process translated to an ‗ownership by proxy‘,
where the Tigers provided the initial capital start-up costs for the business, then splitting
the profits generated in the venture with the owner. Through this method, the LTTE
established businesses in gold and jewellery trading, wholesale commodity freight and
distribution, and local Tamil communication centres and transportation services.807 The
group also invested in stocks, financial markets and real estate, as well as petrol pumps,
restaurants and grocery shops.808 Fair notes that throughout the mid to late 1990s, the
LTTE raised US$650,000 in Switzerland; approx. US$972,000 in Canada; and
US$385,000 in the UK on a monthly basis through legitimate businesses run in the
respective countries,809 in addition to other fundraising means among the Diaspora
communities.
The development from the first to the second generation method reflects the
evolution of the role and the characteristics of the Tamil Diaspora since 1983. While the
Diasporas were still new to host countries in the formative years of the war, the LTTE
remained relatively dependent on criminal activities, local revenue, and coercive
methods. Over time, the Diasporas gained momentum. They were able to understand
and manipulate the laws of the respective host countries, which enabled them to
progress to the second phase of fundraising. The use of front organisations translated to
the creation of a structured collection mechanism.810 As the LTTE steadily escalated its
activities worldwide, the revenue collection mechanism also became more innovative,
intricate, and systematic as the LTTE entrenched into the lives of the Tamil expatriates
abroad. Those who were openly against the LTTE or any attempt to evade paying the
‗war tax‘ incurred the risk of being ostracised within the Diaspora Tamil society, or
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were subject to physical and psychological torture.811 For instance, an LTTE associate
reportedly owned a farmhouse outside of Paris where abducted Tamil expatriates were
taken to be tortured and ransomed.812 Threats were also extended to their relatives living
in Tiger-controlled areas back in Sri Lanka.813
Since the late 1990s, the LTTE revenue collection method evolved to its third
phase. Siphoning funds from Diaspora donations given to NGOs and charity
organisations around the world was commonplace (and these were created by the LTTE
in the name of financing Tamil social services, development and rehabilitation of the
Tamils in the North and East). The Hindu temples and public events including annual
Maaveraar Naal (Heroes‘ Day) celebrations were exploited as a venue of collecting
funds, and also as a platform to monitor the financial information of individuals.814 In
2001, the National Post reported that at the Richmond Hill temple youths were also seen
selling LTTE flags, photos, propaganda DVDs and CD‘s related to the organisation and
Prabhakaran.815 A newspaper article revealed that two Hindu temples in Richmond Hill
and Mississauga in Canada were fined in June 2012 for sending CAN$118,000 and
CAN$85,000 respectively, to the TRO in 2005 and 2006 under the pretext of Tsunami
funds.816 In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the implementation of the 2002 CFA,
the LTTE operatives abroad attempted to avoid legal scrutiny and thus focused on the
Hindu temples and commercial activities as an alternative source. Jayasekara opines that
this progression was also symbolic, as the group vested considerable faith in their
international fundraising efforts by then. As a result, the organisation was able to earn
the most income in the third phase,817 as reflected in the figures provided earlier by the
Sri Lankan Defense Ministry and Janes Intelligence.

8.4 2002 ceasefire and beyond
On the domestic front, the LTTE continued to generate funds within their own de-facto
state, even after the onset of the 2002 ceasefire agreement. As mentioned in the previous

811

Funding the Final War, Human Rights Watch, 14. For more on LTTE intimidation tactics towards
Diaspora communities, refer to Funding the Final War, 14-20
812
Solomon and Tan, Feeding the Tigers,19
813
Thompson, The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 7 and Wijewardana, How LTTE Lost the Eelam
War, 238
814
Funding the Final War, Human Rights Watch, 21-24
815
Canadian Temple Fined For Sending LTTE Money, Colombo Gazette, June 5, 2012
<http://colombogazette.com/canadian-temples-fined-for-sending-ltte-money/>at June 21, 2012
816
Ibid.
817
Ibid.

179

chapter, the group also siphoned tsunami funds, foreign aids, and taxed international
NGOs for operating in their territory. The international fundraising efforts, however,
were affected. While various fundraising methods continued until the end of the war,
the proscription of the outfit and CFA marked a shift from the third generation method
to the fourth. From this timeframe onwards, the group adopted a different approach to
ensure a stable and organised income from the Diasporas. As noted, the proscription of
the LTTE in the West did have some effect, but at the same time, the organisation was
able to circumvent the proscription, and the fundraising continued.818 Given that any
activities pertaining to the group- including financial assistance- were prohibited by
law, one would assume that it would have significantly reduced the group‘s revenue. A
significant number of arrests were made internationally to curb the fundraising and
weapons procurement activities, along with the acquisition of assets,819 which in theory
should have hampered fundraising efforts. Bloom states that the LTTE funding ran dry
because of the legal restrictions placed on the Diasporas, and thus the LTTE had to turn
to their local constituencies in the LTTE-administrated areas for revenue collection
through taxation, extortion, tolls and transport levies.820 Jayasekara points out that the
proscription severely undermined the revenue collection in the EU and Canada.821
However, a former LTTE operative in the UK claimed that the 2001 ban hardly changed
anything, as the group was able to circumvent the laws to continue their revenue
collection, and maintained their relative control over the Tamil population in the UK.822
For example, the LTTE used to hold two annual events, even after the proscription of
the group. In November 2005, nearly 5000 Sri Lankan Tamils gathered at the Wembley
Arena to commemorate Prabhakaran‘s 50th birthday, with an entrance fee of £35 per
person.823 No arrests were made for organising this event.

818

The LTTE has been proscribed by India, the US, UK, Canada, and the EU in 1992, 1997, 2001, 2006,
2006, respectively. Solomon and Tan, Feeding the Tigers,16
819
For instance, in April 2007, the French authorities arrested 17 LTTE suspects. Among the arrested was
Nadarajah Mathinthiran, the leader of the LTTE branch in France, and Thuraisamy Jeyamorthy, who in
charge of fundraising. A few weeks later, the senior operative of the LTTE in New York, Karunakaran
Kandasamy, was arrested by the FBI. On May 1, 2007, three LTTE supporters in charge of the pro-LTTE
newspaper Eela Murasu, were arrested during raids in Melbourne and Sydney. The TRO was clamped
down in the US in November 2007, and Canada added the LTTE front organisation the World Tamil
Movement to its list of banned organisation in June 2008. Mayilvaganan, M. ―Is it Endgame for LTTE?‖
(2009)Strategic Analysis, 33: 1, 32
820
Bloom, M. ―Ethnic conflict, state terror and suicide bombing in Sri Lanka‖ (2003)Civil Wars, 6: 1, 55
821
Jayasekara, ―Cornered Tigers‖
822
Ruhfus, J., People & Power: Tiger Tax, (2007), Documentary Film, Al Jazeera Productions
823
Wijewardana, How LTTE Lost the Eelam War, 239

180

Despite the LTTE‘s ability to sustain income amidst its proscription, there was a
drastic increase in coercive methods to collect funds from the Diaspora communities
since the implementation of the 2002 CFA. The reasons were twofold. First, the
proscription of the group allowed anti-LTTE dissidents to surface.824 Many Tamil
expatriates declined to provide funds to the group for fear of legal action,825 while those
who had always been opposed to the movement were given a space to express and
justify their aversion towards supporting the militants. The rise of an ‗alternative voice‘,
such as the creation of the Tamil Democratic Congress in the UK,826 threatened the
authority and the legitimacy of the LTTE as the sole representatives of the Tamils.
Resultantly, the LTTE increased its intimidation tactics to maintain its superiority
amidst the growing dissent. Second, and more importantly, the LTTE was preparing for
the ‗final war‘ and thus needed financial assistance. The fundraising effort intensified in
late 2004 among the Tamil expatriate communities around the world, as violence
escalated in Sri Lanka.827 For example, the LTTE operatives in the UK are known to
have engaged in intimidation and extortion of funds since at least November 2005.828
The method of intimidation varied, ranging from door-to-door collection chanting,
(―This is the final war, we need to buy anti-aircraft missiles‖), to death threats over the
telephone,829 and abductions of relatives in Sri Lanka for ransom830 if payments were
not made. This proved effective in collecting £2000 to £100,000 per individual in some
cases.831
By 2005, the LTTE-front offices abroad employed the use of Personal
Identification Numbers (PIN) to track individuals and their donation records, which
were forwarded to the LTTE headquarters in Kilinochchi.832 This mechanism enabled
the centralisation of information in order to monitor the expatriates even during their
visit to the LTTE- controlled areas in Sri Lanka during the CFA. Upon arrival, the
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Tamil Diaspora member surrendered his/her passport or personal information to the
local LTTE offices, and checked for any outstanding ‗tax‘. They were also ‗taxed‘ the
equivalent of 1 USD/CDN/Euro per day during their stay in the de-facto state. The
expatriates were not allowed to leave the territory until arrears were cleared.833
Furthermore, the British Tamil Association (allegedly an LTTE-front organisation)
demanded individuals to pay monthly. Those who complied were issued a special Tamil
Eelam Identification Card, which were to be presented upon entering the LTTEcontrolled area in Sri Lanka as a proof of having fulfilled one‘s duty as a Tamil
expatriate.834
The fixed income method and the registration of Tamil expatriates as mentioned
above enabled the efficient monitoring of revenue in preparation for the final war.
Jayasekara assesses that the final phase of fundraising operations was a method to
ensure a stable flow of income to allocate necessary budgets to run the de-facto regime
during the ceasefire.835 Therefore, the increased coercion to contribute to the ‗final war‘
did not seemingly translate to the deterioration of the fundraising effort itself. The PIN
and the Eelam identification card was a system created to restructure the fundraising
mechanism and to monitor the funds for a smooth administration of the LTTEcontrolled territory back home. In hindsight, this also reflected the strategic views of the
militants at this stage of their campaign.

8.5 Analytical Discussion
The first to third generation fundraising methods are seemingly moulded by the
circumstances and capacity of the Diasporas in raising funds in their respective host
countries. However, the evolution of the international revenue-generating mechanism
was also influenced by the developments of the LTTE campaign on Sri Lankan soil.
This seems to hold true especially since the 2002 CFA. Several scholars assert that the
level of income fluctuated depending on the progress of the battle back home. Fair notes
that after military setbacks and defeat of the LTTE, donations from the Diasporas
typically declined. Conversely, when the militants were militarily successful, voluntary
donations increased,836 as in the case of Raj Rajaratnam. Similarly, the Tamil
expatriates tended to donate generously when the militants were actively engaged in
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warfare, and less so during ceasefires.837 Therefore, the continuation of LTTE hostilities
was justified to ensure the supply of international contributions, and also explains why
an increase in coercive fundraising was observed during the 2002 CFA. The
interdependency of the two elements produced a synergetic effect in the LTTE
campaign, where funding and escalation of violence reinforced one another. Further,
this pattern largely correlates to the public support variable. As the level of Diaspora
funding increased over time, the militants strengthened their ties and dependency
towards the expatriates in order to extract more revenue to provide for the campaign. As
the LTTE‘s ties to the Diasporas increased, the organisation‘s reliance on the local
constituencies for funding and legitimacy simultaneously decreased.838
Despite occasional dissent against the movement, the LTTE still managed to
garner support and sympathy to a large extent vis-à-vis the Sri Lankan government,
which also encouraged the Tamil expatriates to make more contributions to the
campaign. For instance, Kumar recalls that several charity events were organised in his
community in New South Wales, Australia to assist the hospitals back in Northern Sri
Lanka.839 He observed that these fundraisers were not an overtly LTTE-run event, but
people understood that even if their donations were channelled to the outfit, it would
have been spent minimally on the local Tamils back home. This was considered more
worthwhile than donating money directly to the Sri Lankan government, which would
not have spent a single cent on their brethren.840 Although this view may be a partial
representation of a segment within the vast Diaspora community, it nonetheless
illustrates the magnitude of distrust among the Tamil expatriates towards the Sri Lankan
government. The LTTE possessed an upper-hand over the Sri Lankan government in
this respect, which they have manipulated and exploited to their strategic advantage.
Therefore with the case of the LTTE, it is clear that the global Tamil expatriates served
as an integral apparatus in sustaining and escalating the campaign.
As discussed in Chapter 6, the militants strongly intended to resume the war in
the near future, while strengthening their territorial control and administration through
ensuring stable income. Funds generated during this period were spent in various
manners, in addition to weapons procurement. In November 2004, the LTTE displayed
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their newly acquired aircraft, and had built an airfield by 2005841 to operationalise their
air force wing. Reports also indicate that at one point in time, the LTTE attempted to
acquire nuclear weapons and technology.842 Although not successful in the latter case,
the group‘s ambition towards technological innovation and more advanced modus
operandi was clearly an indication that it was financially capable of pursuing these
objectives, and it possessed the intention to resume the final war. In September 2006,
six people were arrested and indicted in the US for attempting to procure US$3 million
worth of weapons, including Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) for the LTTE.US officials
confiscated US$700,000 from the procurement group, and charged the individuals with
money laundering and for aiding a terrorist organisation.843 Further, funds earned from
the Diasporas were also used to mount protracted and expensive legal defences of
militants abroad.844 For instance, the LTTE hired a top US law firm run by Ramsey
Clark, a former Attorney General in the Lyndon Johnson administration, to fight against
the US proscription of the LTTE in 1997 as a terrorist organisation. Although the
LTTE‘s overseas chapter failed in this effort, it demonstrated the financial and political
capacity to access the ―highest echelons of the US legal establishment- no mean feat for
a jungle-based insurgent force located on the other side of the world‖.845 During the
ceasefire in 2002, Norwegian government officials allegedly accepted bribes from the
militants in return for information, passports, weapons, and services to the LTTE.846
Despite the intricate revenue collection mechanism and intimidating measures to secure
funding for the ‗final war‘, the LTTE nonetheless faced its demise in 2009.
The escalation of the LTTE campaign over the years draws a parallel to the
evolution of the fundraising mechanism. The formative years of the group‘s income
generation was characterised by local and simple means, while the gradual
strengthening of the group opened up other venues of income through engaging in more
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international criminal activities. As the revenue generation methods became more
sophisticated and thus ensured a robust flow of income, the militants were able to
escalate their campaign. It was during Eelam War II (from 1990 to 1995) that the
organisation strengthened itself militarily and financially. The group was able to
administer a de-facto state, engage in several conventional battles against the Sri
Lankan Armed Forces, and conduct numerous high- level assassinations using a variety
of modus operandi. After the IPKF withdrawal, the creation of a de-facto state not only
showed the increasing military capability of the group, but also a new source of steady
income for the militants. Around the same time, the income from the Diaspora also
gained momentum through the first and second generation methods to fund the LTTE
war chest. The amalgamation of both domestic and international fundraising efforts
enabled the LTTE to escalate their campaign through to the Third Eelam War (1996 to
the 2002 CFA).
The proscription of the LTTE in the West and the CFA implemented in 2002 did
not yield much impact to the fundraising on the domestic front, while it significantly
altered its course at the international level. The international LTTE operatives had to
circumvent the laws to avoid legal scrutiny over terrorist financing, and the method of
revenue collection also became more coercive and systematic to ensure an uninterrupted
flow of income. As the local material and moral support weakened during the ceasefire,
the militants‘ reliance on the Diasporas for funding dramatically increased in order to
launch their final war. During the 2002 CFA and Eelam War IV (2006 to 2009) it is the
military developments on Sri Lankan soil which affected the Diaspora fundraising
method, rather than the reverse. Therefore, although funding allows the escalation and
the sustenance of a campaign, developments within a terrorist campaign can
significantly mould the ebb and flow of terrorist financing.
On the contrary, the theoretical assumption that lack of funds prompts the deescalation of the campaign cannot be confirmed with the LTTE for two reasons. First,
there are no records or figures claiming that the LTTE ever faced a lack of funding
during the final phase of the war. Indeed, the researcher does not have access to the
LTTE‘s financial records (and it is unlikely all transactions were recorded) so their true
funding levels are difficult to gauge. Although Jayasekara claims that the fourth
generation fundraising method did not yield anticipated results in terms of the revenue
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target,847 it still does not support that the LTTE‘s funds had dried up and thus led to the
demise of the group.
Second, even if the local fundraising mechanism had been paralysed due to the
loss of LTTE‘s territorial control since 2007, the international fundraising efforts would
not necessarily have been directly affected by the loss of LTTE territorial control in Sri
Lankan soil. Although several arrests have been made globally in breach of supporting
the LTTE after its proscription, the group‘s fundraising mechanism was too complex for
this to disrupt their revenue altogether within a short span of time. The earlier section
mentioned several cases of LTTE‘s arms procurement and political lobbying activities
following the 2002 CFA, despite the clampdown on fundraising in Western states. Even
after the end of the war, the Sri Lankan government strived to retrieve the LTTE assets
dispersed worldwide,848 and certain elements within the expatriate communities were in
dispute over the remaining assets.849 In fact, the LTTE fundraising activities are
operating to date through both illegal and legal means. For instance, the remnants of the
Tigers drastically increased the people-smuggling business by bringing Sri Lankan
boatpeople to Australia.850Other forms of fundraising include the Maaveerar Naal
events.851More importantly, legitimate businesses, Thamilcholai schools, and Hindu
temples operate to date, without being subject to legal clampdown.
Given the intricate revenue generating methods and the substantial assets of the
group, it is erroneous to attribute the decline of the LTTE campaign since 2007 to the
lack of financial resources. Several other conditions- such as loss of public support and
legitimacy, effective government counter-insurgency operations (discussed in Chapter
10), and the defection of Karuna- would have played a greater role in explaining the
shift in the LTTE campaign trajectory and its eventual demise.

847

Interview with Shanaka Jayasekara, Lecturer at Center for Policing, Intelligence, and Counter
Terrorism (at the time of interview), Macquarie University, Australia, May 15, 2012
848
―SL Taking Steps to Acquire LTTE Assets‖, One India News, December 9, 2009
<http://news.oneindia.in/2009/12/09/sl-taking-steps-to-acquire-ltte-assets.html>at June 29, 2012
849
Ethirajan, A., ―Tamil Rebels Face Doubtful Future‖, BBC News, November 17 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8347242.stm>at June 29, 2012
850
Jayawardana, S. and Wamanan, A., ―Cracking Sri Lanka‘s human smuggling code‖, The Nation, July
22, 2013, <http://www.nation.lk/edition/fine/item/8448-cracking-sri-lanka%E2%80%99s-humansmuggling-code.html> at September 21, 2013
851
―Maaveerar Naal London‖, Colombo Telegraph, November 29, 2012,
<https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/maaveerar-naal-great-heroes-day-london/> at September
21, 2013

186

8.6 Conclusion
In conclusion, the importance of funding in escalating and sustaining a campaign is
confirmed with the LTTE. This section revealed that an increase of revenue sources
facilitated the escalation of the Tigers‘ campaign. However, the hypothetical assumption
that lack of funding leads to the decline of a campaign cannot be verified with the LTTE
because their funding did not dry up and yet they still met their demise. This confirms
that of course lack of funding is not the only reason for the decline of terrorism
campaigns.
While some terrorist groups face a respite in their campaign temporarily or shift
their base in the aftermath of their expulsion from certain countries, the LTTE was able
to continue its activities without having to shift to either option. Instead, the militants
were able to strengthen themselves by other means, demonstrating the self-sufficiency
of the organisation. The group was provided with ample revenue from abroad to the
extent that the loss of territorial control since 2007 had relatively little effect on their
overall assets. Therefore, terrorist groups like the LTTE with a robust and stable income
are prone to a longer lifespan as compared to those who are dependent on a limited
source of income, or engage in revenue collection on an ad hoc basis. Whereas certain
outfits face a shift or a respite in their campaign in the event of revenue shortage, the
LTTE‘s continuous income consequently allowed the group to escalate and sustain their
campaign for 33 years. Thus, the de-escalation of the campaign and the eventual demise
of the group cannot have been attributed to a lack of funds.

187

Chapter 9: Organisational Dynamics

Although the basic organisational structure of the LTTE remained constant throughout
their three decade-long campaign, it experienced a fluctuation in the organisational
dynamics over the years. This chapter examines the changes in organisational dynamics
and assesses their effect throughout the campaign. Two key issues will be addressed:
the role of political proxies and the impact of organisational splits.852 The impact of the
two elements on the LTTE campaign trajectory will be assessed by examining the
nature and frequency of terrorist attacks relative to the political activities of the Tigers
proxy and mass defections, respectively.

9.1 LTTE political fronts
In the initial years of the armed struggle, the LTTE joined with several other Tamil
militant groups in order to participate in political negotiations with the concerned
parties. As described in Chapter 6, in April 1984 the LTTE joined the Eelam National
Liberation Front (ENLF), which later participated as one of the parties of the Thimpu
Talks in 1985. However, the ENLF reiterated that their sole objective was to achieve an
Eelam through an armed struggle, which ultimately led to the collapse of those talks.
Following the failed joint venture with the other militant groups, the Tigers
established their own political party, the People‘s Front of Liberation Tigers (PFLT) in
1989. Founded and led by Gopalaswamy Mahendraraja alias Mahattaya- the deputy
leader of the LTTE- this party was created in accordance with the ceasefire with
Premadasa in 1989.853 The party was to contest for the North-Eastern Provincial
Council (NPEC) elections as envisaged in the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987.854 The PFLT
provided political legitimacy as a genuine democratic party although it was an obvious
political proxy of the LTTE (the party emblem also featured the Tiger symbol). As a
legitimate entity, the party negotiated with the government to present conditions for the
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forthcoming NPEC elections.855 The PFLT‘s manifesto which was revealed in 1990
included the following priorities/ demands856:
1) Dissolve the ‗undemocratically‘ elected NPEC and urge the government to hold
fresh elections;
2) Urge government to repeal the sixth amendment to the constitution (antisecessionist clause);
3) Call for unity of Muslims and Tamils to fight to win their rights, protect their
homelands and improve their economic conditions;
4) Prevent Sinhala colonisation in the Tamil homeland in the North and East;
5) Prohibition of the Sri Lankan security forces from involvement in law and order
functions in the North and East;
6) Grant political rights to Tamils of Indian origin (up-country/ ‗estate‘ Tamils);
7) Lift emergency regulations currently in place in the North East.
Mahattaya had also demanded that Premadasa cease all Sri Lankan army patrols in the
Eastern Province, that all the army camps situated near schools and places of worship in
Tamil areas be removed, and that the army camps in the North and East should not
exceed one or two per district.857
Despite efforts to set up a political proxy to increase the legitimacy of the
separatist movement, the negotiations between the warring parties were short lived. The
LTTE unilaterally abrogated the ceasefire in 1990 on the basis that the government
failed to dissolve the NPEC, which was virtually controlled by the Eelam People‘s
Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). The anti-secessionist clause was also retained.
Since the collapse of the peace talks, the PFLT had virtually lost its raison d‘etre as a
democratic entity. The University Teachers for Human Rights Jaffna (UTHRJ) report
indicates that there was no separation between the military wings of the LTTE and the
political wing. Following the withdrawal of the IPKF troops from the southern sector of
the Eastern province, the LTTE recaptured control in that area and banned the Sri Lanka
Muslim Congress (SLMC), the mainstream Muslim political party in the country. The
Tigers instead pressurised the leading Muslim leaders to join the PFLT, and any protests
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against this move were met with intimidation and violence.858 Moreover, the PFLT was
allegedly at the forefront of the massive expulsion of Muslims from the North in
October 1990.859 In this way, the role of PLFT as a democratic entity was short-lived, as
the intention of establishing the political party was flawed and spurious from the outset.
Mahattaya‘s mismanagement had also contributed to the undermining of the
political party. Adele Balasingham, the wife of the LTTE ideologue Anton Balasingham,
writes that instead of adhering to the constitutional procedures, Mahattaya had assumed
an autocratic style and appointed his henchmen to important positions in the party
according to his wishes.860 Resultantly, his actions weakened the democratic nature of
the political process. Adele further notes that the PFLT eventually became a corrupt
institution which promoted the interests of a few individuals who were loyal to
Mahattaya. This further fuelled public resentment towards the party, compelling the
LTTE to dissolve the organisation in 1992 or risk further alienation from its
constituents.861 Mahattaya was ousted from both the party leadership and its position as
the deputy leader of the LTTE, and Yogaratnam Yogi succeeded him.862
Although the PFLT was politically defunct since the collapse of the Premadasa
talks, it still registered with the Commissioner of Elections in 1998.863 It was inactive
prior and subsequent to its registration; nonetheless, the PFLT eventually contested in
the Eastern Provincial Council elections in May 2008, ending in defeat. According to
the Sri Lankan Elections Secretariat, the political parties are required to submit a report
on their annual accounts and conventions to the Elections Commissioner. The PFLT had
failed to adhere to these requirements for years and ultimately lost their official
registration as a political party in February 2012.864
The connection between the LTTE and its political proxy is quite
straightforward. Given the background and the development of the PFLT, it is evident
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that the party was a superficial entity to give the impression that the militants were
genuinely interested in joining the political process. Their manifesto clearly echoed the
1976 Vaddukkodai Resolution (see Chapter 4) and the Thimpu Principles of 1985 (see
Chapter 6), and additionally addressed several issues which arose in the Indo-Lanka
Accords of 1987. Although the party was created during the peace talks with Premadasa,
the Tigers‘ attacks continued throughout the ceasefire period. Therefore, the inception
of the PFLT hardly impacted the LTTE‘s activities. This can be attributed to the fact
that the function of the party was not really intended to strengthen the political activities
of the group, but was rather created as a formality during the peace talks. Chapter 6
outlined how the Tigers capitalised on the negotiations with Premadasa to prepare
themselves militarily to resume violence following the peace talks. Furthermore, the
PFLT apparently engaged in intimidation tactics, thus failing to divorce from its parentorganisation. Although there is no solid evidence which confirms explicit engagement
in violence, the aforementioned UTHRJ reports suggest there had been a certain level of
involvement of the PFLT.865
Because the activities and the functions of the PFLT remained ambiguous (and
also because their demands remained strong and somewhat unrealistic), the political
activities failed to yield any desired outcome as outlined in their manifesto. The
mismanagement of the party also contributed to its dysfunction and the party remained
dormant until it contested for the Eastern Provincial Council elections in 2008. This
move was sudden, yet strategic. The elections took place less than a year after the
military defeat of the Tigers by the Sri Lankan forces in the Eastern theatre in 2007.
Contesting in this election was an opportune occasion for the LTTE to retain and assert
some influence in the region after the militants had been ousted the year before.866
Furthermore, it would have been especially critical for the PFLT to participate because
the LTTE breakaway Karuna faction- the Thamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) also contested in the elections under the governing United People‘s Freedom Alliance
(UPFA) banner. Amidst fears of election violence due to factional rivalry, the elections
concluded peacefully with the TMVP winning most of the seats.867 Since the defeat in
the provincial elections, the PFLT once again remained dormant until their official
registration was repealed in 2012. In this way, political proxies did not serve the LTTE
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in any substantial manner, as the group only kept faith in an armed struggle in pursuit of
their goals.

9.1.1 Tamil National Alliance
It is pertinent to note here that the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which is commonly
misinterpreted as the political proxy of the LTTE, is not in fact a creation of this
organisation. The TNA- a conglomeration of TULF, EPRLF, TELO, and All Ceylon
Tamil Congress (ACTC) - was formed in October 2001 in support of the ruling United
National Party in the parliamentary elections.868 The significance of the LTTE-TNA
nexus lies in the fact that the TNA obtained the approval and the implicit support of the
LTTE. It had accepted and endorsed the Tigers as ‗sole representatives‘ of the Tamils in
negotiation with the government, while in return the LTTE guaranteed that it would not
assassinate Tamil politicians among the opposition.869 Against this backdrop, the LTTE
was allegedly responsible for the violence and rigging during the elections in the North
and East in order to secure votes for their ‗puppet party‘. The TNA secured 15
parliamentary seats in the elections due to the proportional representation system, and
the LTTE for the first time in history had ―something akin to a political wing with seats
in parliament‖.870 This undoubtedly strengthened the Tigers‘ political bargaining power
via a wider constitutional platform. This proved effective especially at the negotiating
table in the 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA), as the TNA demanded that the Norwegian
peace delegation negotiate to lift the ban on the LTTE in Sri Lanka immediately to
facilitate the commencement of peace talks.871
The LTTE continued to successfully exploit the TNA to maneuver the course of
the 2002 CFA and the two entities became more intertwined. Although senior TNA
parliamentarian Joseph Pararajasingham is quoted saying that the ―TNA MPs do not
dance to the tunes of the LTTE‖,872 the reality seems to depict otherwise. Because the
TNA had fully endorsed the LTTE‘s Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA)
proposals in 2003, Pararajasingham urged President Kumaratunga to stand by her
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statements that talks would commence with the LTTE on the basis of the ISGA without
imposing new conditions.873 This was underpinned in June 2004, where in a separate
interview he asserted:
There are two matters that I want to focus on right now. First is the mandate that
was given to the TNA by the Tamil community in the north and east. It is no
secret that almost 95 percent of the Tamil electorate in the north east endorsed
the LTTE's claim that it is the sole representative of the Tamil community in the
north and east…Secondly, the people also endorsed that the talks should only be
with the LTTE based on the ISGA proposals...If the peace process is to continue,
the government and the President should seriously consider the LTTE proposals
as a basis for talks.874

Additionally, the LTTE was continually directing the TNA with tasks on their
behalf. For instance, the LTTE political wing leader Thamilchelvan advised the TNA
parliamentarians that the party should carry out a political campaign to ensure that the
LTTE‘s position as a sole representative of the Tamils was not jeopardised due to the
defection of Karuna in March 2004.875 On a different occasion Thamilchelvan directed
the TNA to strengthen relations with the new Indian government in order to seek
support for the ISGA proposals.876

9.1.2 Analytical Discussion
Existing theories suggest that terrorist groups and political fronts operate
interchangeably in different realms to further their cause. A rise in increased political
activity hypothetically results in diminished terrorist violence, while an increase in
violence leads to a decrease in political activities of the front groups. This inverse
correlation is based on the logic that if the militants were committed to peace, they
would decelerate or halt their violent campaign whilst simultaneously increasing
political activity in order to exhibit peaceful intentions and to create a positive climate
for peace talks. Conversely, a rise in terrorist violence infers that militants prefer
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violence rather than pursuing political activities. However, this assumption was not
confirmed with the LTTE because the relationship between the LTTE and the TNA was
not clear cut. More importantly, the level of violence did not necessarily decrease
because of increased activity of the political wing.
When the TNA was formed on October 20th, 2001 the LTTE conducted 10
attacks from that date until December 2001. While attacks temporarily decreased in
2002 (most probably due to the onset of peace talks), the number of attacks were still on
the rise in 2003 (24 attacks) and 2004 (34 attacks).877 These were the years which the
LTTE proposed the ISGA and when the TNA politically bargained for the
implementation of the ISGA proposals, respectively. During the years from 2002-2004,
the Tigers‘ target selection was mostly against members of rival groups (EPDP, EPRLF,
PLOTE, and members of Karuna Faction) and former deserters and dissidents.
Although there were occasional attacks against the security forces as well as Sinhala
and Muslim civilians, the number of such incidents was relatively less than targeting
rival members. The tactics used during this period was mainly shooting and execution.
No high intensity attacks were carried out.
The TNA continued to remain active in the political arena, but the number of
Tigers attacks witnessed a sharp increase from 2005 (152 attacks) onwards, and peaking
in 2006 (234 attacks).878 Throughout these two years, the LTTE continued to attack the
same targets in the preceding years (employing similar modus operandi), but 2006
witnessed a drastic increase in suicide and high-intensity attacks against government
naval installations (reasons are discussed in the following chapter).Thus, the increased
political activity of the TNA since its inception did not correlate with the decrease in
LTTE terrorist activities, as indicated in Fig. 9 below.
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The nature of the TNA-LTTE nexus was complex. Although the TNA currently
endorses a federal system based on democratic means in a united Sri Lanka879, their
political stance had been quite different during the LTTE campaign. Jeyaraj accurately
describes that ―contrary to popular belief, the TNA at the beginning was not a Tiger
creation. It was formed independently with cautious indirect backing by the LTTE.
Thereafter the LTTE took it over and controlled it‖.880 Whether or not the TNA was an
official political proxy of the LTTE remains a subjective issue. However, it is possible
to deduce that the LTTE successfully hijacked a political party in order to exert their
political leverage against the Sri Lankan government to bring the concerned parties to
the negotiating table. The Tigers continued to exploit the party as a mouthpiece during
the ceasefire period. Although the LTTE substantially decreased its violent activities
during the ceasefire, it was established in Chapter 6 that the militants intended to return
to violence in the near future, and that they recuperated militarily while exerting
themselves politically through the TNA. There was an overall decrease in violence
during ceasefires in any case and a correlation cannot be established in this particular
case. The political parties were merely a superficial entity to give the impression that
the militants were genuinely interested in joining the political process. Indeed, the
political efforts of the LTTE remained weak as Prabhakaran was not able to effectively
879
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balance the activities of the political front to further their cause. As evident throughout
the study, violence remained to be the primary method of operation for the LTTE.

9.2 LTTE splinter groups and rival organisations
Since its inception, the LTTE experienced dissension and splintering of varying levels
of severity. The first major split from the group was led by Uma Maheshwaran, who
later formed the People‘s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) in 1980.881
In January 1982 clashes between the LTTE and PLOTE commenced in Jaffna, while
May witnessed a shoot-out between the two chiefs in Madras.882 After several clashes
between Prabhakaran and Maheshwaran in Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu, the latter was
subsequently gunned down on July 16th, 1989.883
As described in Chapter 4, more than 30 militant groups were active in the
country in the initial stages of the Tamil militancy, whereas only 5 groups remained
prominent by the mid-1980s.884 Apart from targeting the security forces and Sinhalese
civilians, much of the LTTE‘s focus had been on eliminating rival militant groups to
assert its superiority over others.885Although in an interview in 1984 Prabhakaran stated
that he was in favour of unifying the Tamil militant groups under one umbrella to fight
for Eelam, reality reflected otherwise.886 The chief had never been satisfied in joining
the ENLF, and offered minimal commitment to the organisation as he believed that the
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LTTE alone could defeat the Sri Lankan security forces.887 During this era, TELO had
more prominence in terms of popularity and membership, and could have matched the
LTTE‘s firepower. In April 1986, clashes between the LTTE and TELO significantly
increased. On April 29th, hundreds of LTTE cadres launched a surprise attack on the
TELO military camps in the North and across Jaffna peninsula, shelling mortars and
rocket propelled grenades.888 The intra- group clashes at that time were a new
phenomenon and thus a shock to the Tamil civilians. While most protested against the
killings, the LTTE warned people against helping or harbouring the TELO recruits. 889
The Tigers gunned down the TELO leader Sri Sabaratnam on May 7th, 1986, marking
the defeat of the most powerful militant group after the LTTE. This was a major turning
point in the trajectory of Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka.
Following the decimation of the TELO leadership, the LTTE continued to hunt
down the TELO remnants, took complete command of the Jaffna peninsula,890 and went
on to target the EPRLF in December the same year.891In April 1987, the LTTE carried
out a reprisal attack for an attempt on the life of Kittu, one of the senior Jaffna
commanders. The Tigers rounded up 65 suspected members of the EPRLF and TELO
and gunned them down in public places.892As for the reason behind targeting both
TELO and EPRLF, the LTTE claimed that the former was a criminal group that
harassed people and robbed them, and that it was acting as the agent of Indian
imperialism.893 The EPRLF seemed to take on the challenge by the LTTE, while the
EROS and Tamil Eelam Army (TEA) accepted the LTTE‘s dominance.894
Samaranayake estimates that more than 300 members of TELO, PLOTE, and EPRLF
were murdered in the spate of attacks. Over the years, this campaign extended to India,
France, Germany, Britain and Canada.895 The mass elimination of other rival Tamil
militants during this time pushed the remaining militants underground, thus enabling
Prabhakaran to promote the group as the sole representative of the Tamil people.
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Even after gaining a dominant position, the targeting of rival groups continued
throughout the four Eelam Wars, although the intensity substantially declined after 1986.
The LTTE also engaged in intra-ethnic killings during the Indian intervention
period (details discussed in the following chapter). Immediately following the signing
of the Indo-Lanka peace accords, the LTTE killed nearly 150 militants from EPRLF,
PLOTE and TELO.896 Among the many incidents in 1987 were the assassination of 20
PLOTE members in September and another 24 in November; the assassination of a
TULF organiser on March 28th, 1988; and an attack on the EPRLF and TELO camps in
November 1989, killing 22. In January 1990 the Tigers gunned down Ganeshalingam,
an EPRLF member and a former provincial minister of the NEPC.897
The most notable and symbolic intra-ethnic assassination which took place
during this phase is the gunning down of the TULF chief Appappillai Amirthalingam
and a human rights activist, Rajani Thiranagama, in July and September 1989,
respectively. As noted previously in the thesis, Amirthalingam was the pioneer
politician who advocated the concept of Tamil secessionism and militancy from as early
as the 1970s. Regardless, the LTTE turned their guns against him because
Amirthalingam was in favour of the devolution system as outlined in the Accords. This
assassination projected the true colours of the outfit, as they did not spare anyone- even
their ‗godfather‘- who opposed them in any way. Dr. Thiranagama was a former LTTE
member who later defected and defied the Tigers. As a human rights activist and an
academic, she exposed and strongly criticised the atrocities and the genocidal tendencies
of the LTTE, which led to her death.898 The killing of the two personas disseminated a
strong message to the world that the Tigers would not tolerate any dissent.Following the
withdrawal of the Indian troops, it sought to eliminate the EPRLF leadership in Madras.
Even during the 2002 ceasefire period, the Tigers kidnapped, tortured and
murdered members belonging to rival Tamil groups such as the Eelam People‘s
Democratic Party and EPRLF who had surrendered their arms in accordance with the
CFA.899
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9.2.1 Defection of Karuna Amman and the TMVP
The defection of the LTTE Eastern Commander Col. Karuna Amman with his cohorts
in March 2004 was a significant blow to the esprit de corps. Not only did this move
undermine Prabhakaran‘s unchallenged supremacy, but it also posed severe strategic
and tactical implications to the survival of the LTTE. His defection can be attributed to
several factors. First, when Karuna had earned a place in the LTTE delegations at the
peace talks held in Oslo, he had backed the concept of finding a federal solution to the
conflict. Prabhakaran was infuriated by this move, as he had not been consulted and he
did not wish to settle for anything less than an Eelam.900The opportunities afforded to
visit different countries during the rounds of peace talks had been a wake-up call to the
Colonel whose life had been previously been confined to the jungles of Sri Lanka. This
is clearly when Karuna had given up on Eelam, and realised the futility of a continued
armed struggle:
I pointed out to him [Prabhakaran] that the world is no longer tolerant of any
violent activity and therefore no matter how many soldiers we kill and how
many victories we earn, the LTTE would never be regarded as a liberation
movement. We will always be branded as terrorists, no matter what we do.901
Second, Karuna‘s patience hit its limit when he was denied the recognition
which he believed he and his cohorts in the East deserved.902 Chandrakanthan confirms
that the traditional composition of the LTTE hierarchy had been that the cadres from the
East were only given combat roles, whereas the Northern Tamils hardly sacrificed their
men in battle.903 They were instead responsible for mostly administrative, political and
financial positions. For a long time, this disparity was deemed discriminatory by the
general Eastern Tamil population. This sentiment came to light and was further
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reinforced during the peace process, because Prabhakaran had ordered 1000 Eastern
cadres to shift to Wanni (the northern area) for recuperation and training of the
militants.904 The Eastern cadres resisted as they wished to stay in their hometown during
the ceasefire. As a result, Karuna wrote a letter in 2004 requesting the LTTE supremo to
refrain from sending his men to Wanni, and also asked for more finances, intelligence,
police and administrative powers to the East.905Moreover, the letter had alleged that the
Northern commanders enjoyed a life of luxury by misappropriating the foreign funding
directed towards socio-economic development, while the Eastern cadres continued to be
confined to the security duties away from their home.906 The explicit defiance expressed
in the letter was an unprecedented event since the inception of the LTTE. Karuna had
represented the voice of the Eastern cadres on their behalf, who felt oppressed and
discriminated by their Northern counterparts. Unsurprisingly, Prabhakaran denied
Karuna‘s request and refused to settle these issues through any dialogue.907As
Bandarage describes, Karuna ―invoked the deeply held resentment of Eastern Tamils
towards the Northern Tamils who had long dominated over them and spoke for
them‖.908The chain of events had dictated the fate of Karuna‘s defection from the group
which he loyally served for 20 years.909
Prabhakaran immediately dismissed Karuna from the post of military
commander in the East on March 6th, 2004 accusing him of ―acting traitorously to the
Tamil people and to the Tamil Eelam national leadership‖.910 The LTTE chief placed
those suspected of being Karuna loyalists serving in the Wanni area under strict
surveillance.911 The same day, Prabhakaran imposed a death sentence on Karuna and his
loyalists and dispatched killer squads to track the Karuna faction, resulting in several
armed clashes.912 On April 11th, Karuna took his deputy Pillayan (now known as
Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan) and 36 other members and left the East to form a
separate paramilitary group to fight against the LTTE and to recapture their Eastern land
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from the Tigers‘ grip.913 At the time of defection, Karuna had 6000 militants working
directly under him.914 The ‗Colonel‘ gradually returned his cohorts back home and on
July 5th, 2004 formed a new political party with Pillayan called the Thamil Makkal
Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) and joined the political process.915 Karuna‘s revolt further
destabilised the CFA process and greatly undermined the legitimacy of the LTTE as a
liberation organisation representative of Tamil aspirations. Given Prabhakaran‘s nature,
it was clearly a matter of time before he sought revenge against Karuna‘s revolt.
By early April 2004, the confrontation between the two entities commenced, for
which both the SLMM and the Sri Lankan government turned a blind eye. Despite
efforts to patch up the animosity initially, Prabhakaran initiated the attacks against the
Karuna faction by sending his Wanni cohorts to the Verugal River in the East, killing 73
of Karuna‘s cadres and their supporters.916 Since then, clashes between the Tigers and
the Karuna faction skyrocketed.917The subsequent internal warfare weakened the
remainder of the LTTE and substantially reduced recruitment from the Eastern
Province. According to the US Department of State human rights report for 2008, the
Karuna faction used a network of informants in the East to discover and eliminate
suspected LTTE operatives and sympathisers, and their base of operation was also
extended to Colombo, as well as the East.918
The LTTE increasingly launched attacks in Trincomalee area in the East,
targeting both the security forces and the Karuna faction.919 Karuna had anticipated
destroying Prabhakaran‘s capacity to hold on to the Batticaloa-Ampara coastal lowlands
in the event the LTTE invaded the East. Therefore Karuna concentrated his attacks on
the LTTE infrastructure and stockpiles of weapons in order to weaken the ability of
Wanni troops to retain their control over the East.920 The North-East factional dispute
continued for months, which consisted mainly of low-intensity, ‗random‘ hit-and-run
913
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killings from both sides. The LTTE captured numerous followers of Karuna and reenlisted them as slaves of LTTE labour camps in the north, while some were tortured
and murdered. July 2004 witnessed an upsurge of violence, where those in the higher
rank of the Karuna faction were executed publically- as with the case of Balasundaram
Sritharan and Thillaiampalan Sudharmarajan in Illapadichenai on July 9th, 2004.921 On
September 22nd 2004, the Tigers killed Karuna‘s brother Vinayagamoorthy
Sivanesadurai alias ‗Reggie‘ and two other men in a shooting incident.922 The intraethnic killings came to a temporary halt in the wake of the tsunami in December 2004,
severely destroying the eastern part of the island. However, tensions once again erupted
from March 2005. The Tigers did not spare Karuna loyalists such as Cristin Selvapillai,
who was assassinated in March 2005.923 The targeting of Karuna faction members
slumped significantly after September 2005, though attacks continued intermittently. In
the wake of increasing tensions, Karuna fled Batticaloa with the help from a
parliamentarian of a ruling party, and the military intelligence provided protection.924
While the LTTE launched attacks against the Karuna faction, it simultaneously
continued the campaign to eliminate other Tamil militant groups. The most notable
attack is the murder attempt of the Eelam People‘s Democratic Party (EPDP- an
offshoot of the ENLF) chief Douglas Devananda in July 2004 using a suicide bomber,
which killed 11 people.925 Since the defection of Karuna in March 2004 until the
commencement of Eelam War IV in July 2006, the Tigers launched at least 56 attacks
against the rival militant groups (including EPDP, PLOTE, EPRLF, TELO) and LTTE
deserters, in addition to targeting members of the Karuna faction.926 Many of the attacks
targeted the EPDP in particular, because Devananda was an overt anti-LTTE activist
who actively cooperated with Karuna.927

9.2.2 Analytical discussion
It is evident that a large part of LTTE activities focused on eliminating the rival militant
groups. Although the LTTE database does not present an exhaustive list of every single
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attack on the Tamil militants, the earlier chapters occasionally illustrate the magnitude
of intra-Tamil rivalry since the mid-1980s. Since the group consolidated itself, it
embarked on a mission to fight for superiority, especially against the four other militant
groups. First it targeted PLOTE, the splinter group of the LTTE to ‗teach them a lesson‘.
Following the collapse of the ENLF in 1984, the group subsequently shifted its target to
TELO in 1986, the most popular organisation of the time. Having decimated the TELO
leadership, the Tigers then shifted their target to the EPRLF and wiping out the
remaining low rank cadres of other groups during the Indian intervention. In essence,
the intra-ethnic violence in the early years of the campaign was defined by the LTTE‘s
strategic objective to outdo rival militant groups and to achieve its superiority as a sole
representative of the Tamil constituents. This fell in line with the organisation‘s
ideology (see Chapter 5), and was a crucial component of their strategy of the time (in
addition of course to launching attacks against the Sri Lankan security forces and
Sinhala civilians). Targeting rival militant groups continued sporadically throughout the
LTTE campaign and thus remained a priority for the LTTE to maintain its superiority
among the Tamil population both domestically and internationally.
As noted above, Karuna‘s defection was one of the crucial turning points in the
organisational history of the LTTE. Although attacks against other Tamil militant
groups never ceased even after the LTTE acquired its status as the most dominant group
circa 1986, the period following the split of Karuna once again witnessed a resurgence
in intra-ethnic violence. This development could be attributed to the fact that in the
advent of Karuna‘s split, Prabhakaran saw this as an opportunity to send a strong
message to the international and domestic audience that the LTTE would do anything
maintain its position as the sole representative of the Tamils. Because the split had
undermined the legitimacy of the LTTE, this incident potentially provided fertile
ground for other Tamil militant groups to emerge and assume power in the wake of
organisational instability within the LTTE. Moreover, the rise of other Tamil militant
groups during this period could have impacted the trajectory of the CFA and
destabilised the process to Prabhakaran‘s disadvantage. In any case, the LTTE‘s
bargaining position in the negotiations was jeopardised to a great extent because Karuna
had insisted to recognise his faction as a separate entity from the Tigers. To this end, the
Tigers engaged in intra-ethnic killings to achieve their immediate strategic objective of
‗saving face‘, asserting their superiority, and retaining legitimacy at the negotiating
table.
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It is pertinent to note that although defection and dissents were commonplace in
the past, the scale of Karuna‘s split was unprecedented in terms of seniority of the
defector and the loss of human resources. Peiris contends that Karuna, unlike the other
‗traitors‘ such as Mahattaya, was not within Prabhakaran‘s grasp. Karuna commanded
the loyalty of a large segment of LTTE cadres, and the Colonel‘s combat skills were
extraordinary. The Karuna faction had a far superior knowledge of the terrain in their
home ground in the East, which would have been an added advantage to the group had
Prabhakaran waged a war against them from Wanni. More importantly, Karuna had
considerable popular support in his area of control.928 Karuna returned land forcibly
captured by the LTTE to the former owners, closed down LTTE police stations and law
courts, further stirring public support in the East.929 The impact of Karuna‘s revolt
extended overseas, causing sharp divisions in the Tamil Diaspora movement. Athas
reports that in France, Canada, and Switzerland, leaflets critical of Prabhakaran were
distributed.930 The impact of the split significantly placed LTTE‘s survival at stake. As
already noted, the fact that the defection also occurred during the ceasefire period
further complicated the situation for all concerned parties.
9.2.3 The Karuna Faction and the Eastern War
The impact of Karuna‘s breakaway was not limited to the shift in the Tigers‘ target
selection, but also undermined the survival of the organisation. In the wake of the
intensifying government operations from July 2006 (start of Eelam War IV), the
security forces extended their operation to completely liberate the East from the grip of
LTTE control from January 2007. The operation lasted nearly six months, successfully
capturing the Eastern Province in July (see following chapter). Behind the military
success in the East was the TMVP. Although the Sri Lankan army initially denied its
collaboration with the Karuna faction931, it was later revealed that the TMVP had in fact
cooperated with the government to defeat the LTTE in the East.
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Since its inception, the main objective of the TMVP was to eliminate the
Northern LTTE cadres and to terminate the LTTE influence in the East.932
Chandrakanthan revealed that the government had realised the strategic advantage of
exploiting the TMVP to fight against a common enemy in the Eastern theatre, and thus
provided the paramilitary group with weapons and a training base. From as early as
2005, the TMVP built their first camp in Madu Oya (government controlled area) to
train its cadres. The government allegedly provided protection, intelligence and military
training to the TMVP recruits.933 In every major battle that was conducted against the
LTTE in the East since 2007, the TMVP cadres were always placed in the front line of
defense, followed by the foot soldiers of the army.934 The Karuna faction also provided
accurate intelligence and on-the-ground reconnaissance for the Sri Lankan military
forces, which further strengthened the counter-insurgency operations against the
LTTE.935 Karuna also engaged with non-LTTE Tamil groups such as the EPDP,
PLOTE and EPRLF to work against the LTTE through sharing intelligence with the
armed forces.936 Because the Tiger cadres from the North were not familiar with the
Eastern terrain all these years, this had become an Achilles‘ heel for the LTTE, for
which the army exploited strategically with the assistance of the TMVP. Once the East
fell to the armed forces, the LTTE failed to recapture its former stronghold, mainly
because it lacked the human resources to engage in military operations.937
All in all, Karuna‘s dissension served to be a grave strategic and operational loss
to the LTTE. As Swmay rightly states, ―what the LTTE had contemptuously dismissed
as a ‗one man problem‘ finally turned into a fireball that eventually consumed
Prabhakaran and his once formidable army.‖938 The breakaway undermined the morale
of the LTTE, which directly impacted the ideological conviction of the cadres and the
organisational cohesion (see Chapter 5). Jalal opines that the formation of the TMVP
and Karuna later being appointed as Sri Lanka‘s minister for national integration added
to his image of legitimacy, which further marginalised the LTTE among the Tamil

932

Interview with Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan
Country Advice Sri Lanka- Karuna Group, 1
934
Interview with Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan
935
Jalal, M., Think Like a Guerrilla: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Sri Lanka,The Harvard Kennedy
School Review, 2011<http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k74756&pageid=icb.page414668>at
November 22, 2012
936
Mayilvaganan, M., ―Is it Endgame for LTTE?‖ (2009)Strategic Analysis, 33: 1, 31
937
Swamy, The Tigers Vanquished, xlii
938
Ibid.
933

205

population.939 Furthermore, the lethal collaboration of the Karuna group and the
government forces sharply destabilised the operational capability of the Tigers in the
East. Needless to state, Karuna‘s vast knowledge and intelligence on the LTTE was a
valuable asset to the government, which led to the military victory against the LTTE in
the East after more than a decade.
9.3 Conclusion
Existing theories suggested that terrorist groups and political fronts operate
interchangeably in different areas to further their cause. A rise in increased political
activity theoretically results in a decrease of terrorist violence, while an increase in
violence leads to a decrease in political activities of the front groups. To this end, this
proposition was not confirmed in this case because the relationship between the LTTE
and its political proxy differed from time to time. The PFLT failed to divorce itself from
the violent LTTE activities, and was short-lived. The LTTE-TNA nexus was more
complex. The level of violence did not necessarily decrease because of increased
activity of the political wing. Because the LTTE appeared to increase political activities
during ceasefires and peace talks, it is difficult to confirm whether increased political
activities led to the decrease of violence as a result. There was an overall decrease in
violence during ceasefires, but violence continued on a lower-scale in any case. The
political parties were merely a superficial entity to give the impression that the militants
were genuinely interested in joining the political process. As evident throughout the
study, violence remained to be the primary method of operation for the LTTE.
Conversely, the Tigers conformed to existing assumptions regarding the
targeting of rival militant groups. Moreover, there was a clear upsurge of violence
against the splinter groups following its defection. The pattern of the LTTE intra-ethnic
killings was broadly characterised by three distinct features. First, the Tigers never
tolerated any dissension. Second, the elimination of rival Tamil militants constituted an
integral part of the Tigers campaign. It was a rational and long-term strategy which in
itself experienced an ebb and flow in the intensity and frequency of attacks. Third, intraethnic killings intensified especially during ceasefire periods, given that the political
environment of the time implicitly allowed the LTTE to engage in such violence.
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Chapter 10: Military Intervention

Throughout the conflict, the Sri Lankan state has predominantly relied on military
means to crush the adversary. The belligerents engaged in numerous all-out
confrontations against each other from 1987 onwards (see Appendix 4 for the map of
Sri Lanka and Appendix 5 for the list of major military confrontations between the
belligerents). In the nearly three decade long war, both counterparts have experienced
peaks and troughs in their armed campaign until the Sri Lankan armed forces
successfully crushed the LTTE in May 2009. The conflict also witnessed a unilateral
foreign intervention on one occasion. Unlike third party involvement through mediated
negotiations (i.e. Norway), India deployed its peacekeeping force in Sri Lanka from the
years 1987-1990. This section will present an overview of the military interventions
which took place from Eelam War I to IV, including the Indian intervention. This will
be followed by an assessment of how the variable in question influenced the Tigers‘
operational capability and the overall campaign trajectory. The impact of Prabhakaran‘s
death on the LTTE lifecycle will be also discussed in this chapter, as it was an end
result of the military intervention.
There are several points to bear in mind while addressing these issues. First,
operational capability itself is a broad term which incorporates several different aspects
including the amount and variety of weaponry, group membership, knowledge of terrain,
espionage skills, frequency, nature and the outcome of terrorist attacks. Second,
accurate statistics are not available which indicate the LTTE‘s operational capability,
nor are many other aspects quantifiable for empirical examination. Third, it is highly
unlikely that the LTTE faced a large-scale shortage of arms, given that they maintained
a robust international arms procurement network, and they also managed to capture
large hauls of weapons from raiding the government army camps and through sea
piracy.940
For the purpose of this study therefore, the impact of military intervention on the
LTTE will be assessed primarily by observing the nature and frequency of attacks
subsequent to government operations. Further, the study will take into account any
possible changes in the internal dynamics and activities of the organisation. Although
this process does not necessarily establish a definite causal relationship between the
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impact of military intervention and the campaign dynamics of the group, it will
nonetheless explore them in as much depth as the available data allow.

10.1 Eelam War I
In the initial years of the Tamil militancy, the Sri Lankan state attempted to curb the
growing violence by strengthening policing powers through legal means. In July 1978,
the government proscribed the Tamil militants, banning any sort of separatist movement
in the country. In the following year, the government enacted a Prevention of Terrorism
Act, which gave the police force extensive powers to arrest, detain and try the suspects
without jury.941 As mentioned in Chapter 4, these legislative measures were ineffective
in curbing the rising militancy. Balasuriya contends that by 1980s, the Sri Lankan
government was left with no choice but to deploy the army in order to combat the
militancy, as the police force alone were unable to quell the growing violence.942
The LTTE attacks against military installations dated back to the early 1980s,
including ambushes (e.g. the attack which triggered the Black July incident in 1983), as
well as murders and robberies. Militarily and socio-politically, the group had
established itself by the start of Eelam War I. In September 1984, the Voice of Tigers
broadcast that the ―LTTE [had] announced that it was switching from ‗our tactic of hit
and run to a sustained guerrilla campaign‘ and urged other ‗liberation groups to join us
as comrades-in-arms to fight our common enemy and defend our people‘.‖943As their
reinforcements gradually started to shift from Vavuniya and Mannar into Jaffna, the
Tigers warned of an imminent military attack on Jaffna.944
Against this backdrop, the LTTE launched its first major offensive against the
Sri Lankan army barracks in Kokkilai, Mullaitivu District on February 13th, 1985, which
erupted into a five-hour battle. As more than 100 cadres took part in the operation,
Swamy assesses that ―for the first time since the ethnic conflict turned into a full-scale
confrontation after July 1983, the Sri Lankans realised how sophisticated the enemy
was‖.945 According to the items recovered following the raid, each cadre was equipped
with night vision glasses, AK-47 and M-16 rifles and three RPGs.946 By this point,
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policing alone would not have sufficiently quelled the growing militancy and violence
in the country. The Time magazine issued in August 1984 cited that the strength of the
Sri Lankan army in 1984 was merely 12,000. By the end of 1986 however, this number
increased to approximately 25,000-30,000.947
Five months later, the Sri Lankan government initiated the Thimpu Talks (see
Chapter 6) and restricted Sri Lankan forces to their barracks for three months during the
negotiations. During this period, the LTTE took the opportunity to ―mine all roads
leading out of these camps and build up concrete bunkers to barricade them‖.948 The
negotiation was short-lived as the militants walked out of the process. Hostilities
continued in the country following the failure of the Thimpu talks and in February 1986,
which arguably left the Sri Lankan state no choice but to pursue military means to end
the conflict.
Since the failure of the Thimpu talks, the government increased its weapons
procurement, while the LTTE increased its recruitment from among the most
impoverished families.949 Furthermore, since 1986 onwards the militants began to
recruit women into their fighting units, and children for their Black Tiger squad.950 By
then the LTTE was in full control of the Jaffna peninsula and started to establish their
own administrative system in their stronghold, while the Sri Lankan security forces
launched several operations against the Tamil militants in the first three months of
1987.951 In the wake of the growing influence of the LTTE, Prabhakaran also returned
to Sri Lanka from his sojourn in Madras, Tamil Nadu.952 The Indian pressure mounted
against the Sri Lankan government, leading to a brief declaration of ceasefire in April
that year. The LTTE nonetheless continued to launch several attacks against civilians,
and the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Ramachandran gifted Rs. 40 million to the militants
in support of their violent activities.953
In the wake of rising hostilities, the National Security Minister Lalith
Athulathmudali sought to push the Tigers into negotiations by applying military
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force.954 The Sri Lankan government launched Operation Vadamarachchi on May 26th,
1987 in order to recapture the LTTE- controlled Jaffna peninsula.955 The capture of
Vadamarachchi and Velvettiturai (Prabhakaran‘s hometown) was a strategic victory for
the security forces, as it severely restrained the militants‘ access to Tamil Nadu, and
enabled the army to recapture the whole of the Jaffna peninsula. Although the militants
retreated from Vadamarachchi, they continued their retaliation on a smaller scale, such
as ambushing and land-mining soldiers.956 The armed forces were on the brink of
capturing Prabhakaran until India intervened by airdropping 25 tons of relief supplies
on June 4th in Jaffna, which abruptly terminated the government operations.957 Although
the pause in operations was also intended to halt the LTTE campaign, the militants
launched their first successful vehicle-borne suicide attack in the Nelliady army base in
Jaffna, leaving 19 soldiers dead.958

10.2 Indian intervention (1987-1990)
Chapter 7discussed how the Central Government of India was responsible for arming,
training, and financing the Sri Lankan Tamil militants since the late 1970s. Because a
variety of literature has been produced on the role of India in the Sri Lankan conflict,
including the backdrop to the deployment of the peacekeeping forces and beyond,959
this section will lay more emphasis on the transformation of the LTTE campaign in the
aftermath of the arrival of the Indian troops on Sri Lankan soil.

10.2.1 Understanding the Indian intervention
Since the late 1970s, India adopted a dual strategy towards Sri Lanka: 1) a militantsupportive strategy (as discussed in Chapter 7); and 2) a mediation strategy between the
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militants and the Jayewardene administration.960New Delhi had its own geo-strategic
concerns over the internal affairs of Sri Lanka.961
Although India was involved in providing logistical and financial assistance to
the Tamil militants since the 1970s, India openly intervened in the Sri Lankan situation
following the Black July riots. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent External Affairs
Minister Narasimha Rao to Sri Lanka to examine the situation in late July, and Gandhi
subsequently offered Jayewardene to mediate and to bring together the belligerent
parties to the negotiating table for a political solution.962 Jayawardene reluctantly
accepted India‘s role as a mediator while India entrusted Gopalaswamy Parthasarathy to
liaise between the counterparts. His shuttle diplomacy and an Indira-Jayewardene
summit talk in November 1983 achieved two things: facilitating the TULF‘s
participation in the proposed All-Party Conference (APC) on the ethnic issue, and the
―Parthasarathy formula‖ or the devolution plan.963 Nonetheless, India‘s dual strategy
towards Sri Lanka became unmanageable over the years with the failure of the APC
conference and the Thimpu Talks. Moreover, New Delhi was unable to discourage the
Tamil militant activities conducted from its soil against the island nation.
With the prevailing situation in Sri Lanka and India‘s inability to convince the
Tamil militant groups to opt for a political solution, India was urged to take on a
different strategy. The intensifying violence in the island-nation (especially in the
advent of Operation Vadamarachchi) produced more than 43,000 Tamil refugees which
were being housed in 75 camps across Tamil Nadu, and another 100,000 more waiting
outside the camps.964 It was in the interest of India to halt the government offensive in
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Vadamarachchi.965The Indian military intervention in Sri Lanka marked its beginning in
June 1987 with the launch of Operation Poomalai. On the brink of LTTE defeat, the
Indian Air Force airdropped food parcels and medicine to Jaffna on June 3rd 1987. India
justified this move as humanitarian assistance over the plight of the Tamil brethren,
though Jeyaraj expresses that this exercise was nothing more than a power projection of
the Indians, intended to drive home a lesson to Colombo.966 Colombo interpreted the
surprise airdrop as a breach of sovereignty and a direct move of support towards the
militants.967 The military operations in Vadamarachchi had been thwarted because of
the Indian airdrop, and the Indian government sought to end the conflict through
political means. Colombo and New Delhi commenced correspondence with the intent of
bringing a political solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka. This led to the signing of the
Indo-Lanka Peace Accord on July 29th, 1987 by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
and Jayewardene of Sri Lanka.

10.2.2 Indo-Lanka peace accords
The stated objective of the Accord was to nurture the traditional friendship between
India and Sri Lanka, and to resolve the ethnic problem of the island nation.968The peace
Accord was significant in many ways. First, the Sri Lankan government made a number
of concessions to Tamil demands, similar to that of the proposed terms in the Thimpu
Principles of 1985. The terms of the Accord focused on the creation of a power-sharing
or a devolution system through establishing Provincial Councils and merging the North
and East Provinces on a temporary basis (subject to later referendum).969 Moreover,
several efforts were taken to uplift the recognition of the Tamils through providing an
official status for the Tamil language (and English as a link language), which was later
enacted as the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka.970 Such steps were
965
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intended to address general Tamil grievances. Second, as part of the Accord, India
agreed to deploy its peacekeeping force on the pretext of establishing normalcy and
order in the North and East of Sri Lanka, and to end their assistance to the Tamil
militants.971 India had agreed to undertake the disarming of the Tamil militants in case
they failed to do so themselves.972
Third, the negotiations between the two countries and the drafting of the Accord
ironically excluded the participation of Tamil militants, despite being one of the main
actors in the Sri Lankan conflict.973 Kalansooriya opines that Prabhakaran initially
refused the Accord on the basis that it did not provide the LTTE with an Eelam, and that
he was extremely apprehensive of the Indian Accord from the outset.974Meanwhile, the
signing of the Accord served to be strategically useful for Jayewardene to shift military
forces to the south to repress the ultra-leftist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) uprising.

10.2.3 The Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF)
As 7000 Indian troops arrived in Jaffna on July 30th 1987, their immediate task was to
disarm the Tamil militants.975 At its peak, there were around 100,000 Indian soldiers in
the country in 1989.976 The IPKF was to monitor the disarmament of the groups which
was to be implemented within 72 hours of signing the agreement, while the Sri Lankan
security forces were to be confined to barracks.977 The LTTE had been caught in a
dilemma with regards to the arrival of Indian forces, which was reflected in
Prabhakaran‘s speech delivered on August 5th, 1987:
The Tamil struggle has reached a turning point today. This had been brought
about by the factors beyond the LTTE‘s control…Were we not to hand over our
weapons, we would be put in the calamitous circumstances of clashing with the
971
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Indian army. We do not want this. We love India. There is no question of our
deploying our arms against the Indian soldiers. But let me make it clear to you
here, beyond any doubt, I will continue to fight for the objective of winning the
State of Tamil Eelam. If we are to be without arms, we will search for
alternative ways.978
Two crucial elements can be attributed to the chief‘s dilemma towards the Indian
involvement. First, the moral sense of indebtedness towards the Indian government was
strong and second, the risks incurred in attacking against the Indian forces were critical.
Chapter 7 described the Indian sponsorship in the initial years to the LTTE movement,
and Prabhakaran also made a brief sojourn in India from mid-1981 to 1982,979 and again
in 1983.980 This support was indispensable in the early days of the LTTE in
consolidating their growth. It is likely that Prabhakaran acknowledged the Indian
assistance in their campaign and refrained from jeopardising the relationship with their
patron. Although the LTTE was initially reluctant to disarm, it made a token surrender
of some obsolete arms to the IPKF on August 6th, leading to a temporary ceasefire and
apparent disarmament of the militants.981
Prabhakaran initially attempted to articulate his dissatisfaction towards India
through non-violent means in order to win the local Tamil support against the Indian
presence.982 The supremo appointed a university student from Jaffna to commence a
hunger strike, and demanded what the Indians had promised.983 Despite the Indian
proposal to give the LTTE seven out of 12 seats and the chairmanship of the interim
administration984, the hunger strike continued until it resulted in the death of the Tamil
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youth. Prabhakaran exploited the popular anger over his death in order to rouse antiIndian sentiments among the Tamil population. Proposals regarding the North-East
Provincial Councils (NPEC) which favoured the LTTE were met with immense
opposition from the other Tamil militant groups, while any other conditions that
favoured them angered the LTTE. Jayewardene was also unaccommodating to the
LTTE demands regarding the appointment of the Chief Administrator of the NPEC, and
the LTTE and the government accused each other of breaching the conditions of the
accord. In this way, by October 1987 several conditions produced a fertile ground for
the LTTE to express its frustration towards India by launching a war against the IPKF.
The IPKF had no option but to retaliate.

10.3 The LTTE-IPKF war
Indeed, the direct Indian political and military intervention seemingly halted an all-out
military confrontation between the warring parties. Not only was the Sri Lankan
government forced to end the offensive in Vadamarachchi, but the Tamil militants were
also required to surrender their arms as part of the Indo-Lanka Accords. The LTTE,
although reluctant to disarm, was pressured into doing so in order to preserve its
relationship vis-à-vis India. Prabhakaran‘s refusal to disarm was underpinned by two
factors: First, he was concerned about the personal safety of the cadres from potential
attack by the Sri Lankan security forces. Second, he anticipated that should the terms of
the agreement fail to be realised, it would have been impossible for the militants to
recuperate their military capability again from scratch.985 Therefore, Prabhakaran‘s
immediate priority was protecting the security apparatus of the organisation which he
had built over the years, rather than trusting the fate of the Accord or India. The LTTE
quickly reneged and failed to disarm completely. Kodikara opines that India‘s failure to
end the conflict in Sri Lanka and a surrender of weapons by the LTTE strengthened the
Tigers relative to the other militant groups.986
Throughout the Indian intervention period (July 1987-March 1990), the LTTE
continued its ethnic cleansing of Sinhalese and some Muslim civilians, recording over
51 incidents987- for which the IPKF turned a blind eye. The victims of the ethnic
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cleansing of the East were mostly Sinhala refugees who were recently resettled back to
their homes after being displaced in the initial phases of the war. As discussed in the
previous chapter, the Tigers also significantly increased its attacks against the other
Tamil militant groups immediately after the signing of the Accord, alleging them to be
treated favourably by the Indian Peacekeeping Force.988 The LTTE threatened all the
Tamils who supported the Accord, as well as any dissidents.
Gradually, the LTTE also started to launch guerrilla attacks against the Indian
troops. On October 6th 1987, the Tigers brutally assassinated 6 Indian soldiers, which
led to an outbreak of an all-out confrontation with the IPKF.989 In retaliation, the IPKF
launched attacks against the media centres of the LTTE in Jaffna from 7th-11th
October.990 Reports also indicated the exchange of fire between the Indian army and the
LTTE on October 9th, and that the Indian forces had arrested more than 130 armed
militants. Later, the LTTE attacked a post of the Madras regiment at Tellipalai, and also
ambushed a Central Reserve Police convoy in the area, killing four.991 Clearly, these
developments undermined the legitimacy of the Accords. Following India‘s joint
declaration with Sri Lanka that the LTTE would no longer be accommodated, the IPKF
launched an all-out offensive against the LTTE on October 10thover the control of the
North and East.992 In a bid to completely disarm the Tigers and occupy their territory of
control, the Indian forces launched Operation Pawan against the LTTE to capture the
Jaffna peninsula. In defence, approximately 75% of the LTTE militants were armed
with AK47s and G3 automatic rifles, light and medium machine guns, mortars and
rocket launchers.993
Although the Indian forces successfully captured Jaffna, the cost was huge.
Nearly 75-100 percent of the population was driven out from the peninsula, and massive
human rights abuses by the Indian troops were recorded. Violations included gang
raping of Tamil women, disappearances, torture, and extra-judicial killings during
house-to-house searches. The devastation caused by Operation Pawan provided a
justification for the LTTE to increase its attacks against the IPKF. In November 1987,
Prabhakaran issued a statement accusing the IPKF of engaging in a full-scaled battle
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against the group, and claimed that the ―IPKF has lost its status as an instrument of
peace but has assumed the role of a repressive invasion army, typically eliminating both
the Tamil freedom fighters and innocent civilians‖.994
The LTTE frustration continued to mount, and remained intransigent to the
Indian request to disarm. Consequently, the LTTE redirected its attacks as a means of
rejecting the peace Accord and the presence of the Indian forces, and concentrated on
driving away the intervening party. Furthermore, the Tigers were able to reassert
themselves and emerge as the righteous protector and the sole representative of the
Tamil population, stirring wider public support. During this period, thousands of Tamils
were killed and much of the Jaffna peninsula was destroyed, which ultimately forced the
LTTE to retreat to the jungle.995
The Tigers‘ violence increased especially in the East, targeting Sinhalese and
Muslims.996 The Tigers were strongly opposed to the devolution plan as it was
intransigent regarding the Eelam dream. The provision of provincial autonomy under
Tamil dominance did not prove sufficient for Prabhakaran, and within a year of the
IPKF deployment, he concluded that the Indian presence was the biggest hindrance to
achieve an Eelam. In March 1989, the Tigers accused the Indian troops of massacring
300 civilians in their renewed offensive, and in retaliation it claimed to have killed 57
Indian soldiers and 11 Sri Lankan army personnel.997
Following the North-Eastern Provincial elections998 and the increasing IPKFLTTE clashes, the Indian government helped to create a paramilitary group called the
Tamil National Army (TNA, an amalgam of EPRLF, ENDLF, and TELO) in order to
fight against the LTTE.999 As tension and violence mounted in the country, the situation
worsened for the Tigers to fight against both the IPKF and the TNA. Against this
backdrop, Prabhakaran forged a controversial security partnership with the new Sri
Lankan President Premadasa, who also wanted to evict the Indian troops from the island
for his own political interests.1000As Pape and Feldman rightly assert, the pressure from
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the nationalist Sinhalese population to remove the Indian military provided an ideal
platform for the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE to find a common cause and to
retaliate against the IPKF.1001 Premadasa willingly and covertly delivered weapons to
the militants, as well as providing accommodation at a Special Task Force camp during
their battle against the Indian troops1002 and funded them with Rs.75 million.1003 The
Tigers simultaneously fought against the TNA, for which the Sri Lankan Air Force
provided basic logistics (transportation of LTTE cadres) to facilitate the battle.1004
Chapter 6 outlined the negotiation process and the conditions exchanged between the
Tigers and Premadasa which formalised in April 1989. India refused to acknowledge
the proposed ceasefire because they were not consulted, and it also refused to comply
with Premadasa‘s request that the Indian troops leave Sri Lanka by July 29th, 1989.
Rajiv Gandhi lost his position in office in December the same year. His
successor, V.P Singh declared that the IPKF would be withdrawn from Sri Lanka by
March 1990 due to the deteriorating security situation in the country,1005 as well as
mounting pressure from critics in both India and Sri Lanka. Figures suggest that in the
three years of IPKF deployment, India spent over US$1.25 billion1006 and left 1,255
Indian defence personnel dead.1007 The IPKF had killed 2,592 Tamil militants.1008
As Indian troops withdrew, the LTTE swiftly moved in to fill the vacuum before
the Sri Lankan security forces returned to secure their posts. The LTTE seized the
weapons left behind by the IPKF.1009 The militants immediately abrogated the ceasefire
and continued their killing spree. The LTTE resumed its attacks against the Sri Lankan
government where over 600 Sinhala and Muslim police officers were slaughtered in the
Eastern province of the country on June 11th 1990.1010Within weeks, the LTTE had
captured almost the entire Jaffna peninsula and most parts of Killinochchi, Vavuniya,
Mullaitivu and Mannar districts in the North.1011The LTTE continued to engage in intra1001
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ethnic killings especially targeting the EPRLF. The LTTE assassinated George, the
leader of the EPRLF, and Vasudeva, a senior leader of the PLOTE. However, the Tigers
campaign to eliminate the rival militant groups extended to Tamil Nadu. On June 17th,
1990 the LTTE murdered 14 top EPRLF leaders in Chennai, including its secretary
general Padmanabha, Kirubakaran and Yogasangari.1012 The Tigers‘ target selection of
the EPRLF was underpinned by the fact that the latter had been a staunch supporter of
the Indo-Lanka Accord, and that it had been coordinating closely with the Indian
intelligence services (Research and Analysis Wing).1013
The militants also launched the battle of Kokavil against the Sri Lankan security
forces at the same time. The frequency of attacks increased and the target selection
remained broad and consistent (see Chapter 5). In addition to the inter-ethnic killings,
the organisation assassinated Ranjan Wijeratne, Minister of Defense in March 1991.
This act was likely motivated by LTTE‘s grudge against Wijeratne, who exploited the
LTTE to fight against the IPKF, and then turning on them in the aftermath of the
withdrawal of the troops. On May 21st, 1991 Rajiv Gandhi was murdered and on May
1st, 1993 President Premadasa paid the price for dealing with the LTTE. The
organisation intensified its campaign in the post-Indian intervention period, as it
launched more lethal attacks, strengthened its international network and funding
mechanism, established a de-facto state, and launched more conventional offensives
against the Sri Lankan security forces.

10.4 Indian Intervention: an analysis
In his book, J.N. Dixit reflected that India under-estimated Prabhakaran‘s ―passionate,
even obsessive commitment to the cause of Tamil Eelam… his tactical cleverness and
his resilience in adversity‖.1014 Indeed, it is pertinent to critically analyse and understand
the conditions which brought the LTTE to turn its guns against the Indian troops. This
can be attributed to the transformation of the perception and the role of India in the short
span of less than three years, and the way in which the LTTE strategically exploited the
changing situation as it occurred.
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Prabhakaran was apprehensive with the Accord from the outset as he perceived
it had been implemented for India‘s strategic interests over the welfare of the ethnic
conflict in Sri Lanka. It has been mentioned earlier that the Tigers chief reluctantly
accepted the Accord, and he had always been intransigent over the creation of an Eelam.
At the same time however, it is also clear that he wanted to prevent an all-out
confrontation with the Indian forces due to the strategic importance of India at that time
for the Tamil separatist movement. Saravanamuttu suggests that the LTTE was
unamenable to control as it was a group that was obsessed with achieving Eelam solely
through military force.1015Prabhakaran had always known that India would hinder the
LTTE from achieving its objective, and by the time the IPKF intervened militarily, the
supremo‘s view of India drastically changed from that of a friend to an oppressor.
During her brief stint as an LTTE militant, De Soyza describes how the senior members
of the LTTE were angered by the fact that the Sri Lankan government and the IPKF
tried to sideline LTTE from the negotiation process, and thus felt that even the Indians
were waging war against the LTTE.1016
Although the LTTE was apprehensive of the arrival of the Indian troops, the
general public initially welcomed and supported the IPKF presence. Many hoped that
they would finally bring peace to the island,1017 and regarded the mighty conventional
force as a hero with grand weapons.1018‗Aloysius‘ recalls of his experience with the
Indian soldiers as a child, the troops would distribute roti (Indian bread) to local
children, which garnered huge popularity among the people.1019 However, as the LTTE
became increasingly perturbed by the Indian presence, the militants strategically
launched a propaganda operation against the IPKF in order to discourage the masses
from trusting the Indians. As a result, the group saw a heightened recruitment for the
organisation during this time in order to fight against the Indian forces.1020 To add insult
to injury, the atrocities committed by the IPKF towards the local civilians1021 further
catalysed the people‘s aversion towards the Indian presence. The LTTE gradually and
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successfully waged a campaign against the Indians which stirred much support from the
Sinhala nationalists and the local Tamils.The LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham
opined that the Indian intervention was a diplomatic disaster, explicitly stating that it
―failed to resolve the Tamil ethnic conflict, but rather made the issue more complex and
left the Tamil freedom movement to continue to fight a lonely and bitter struggle
against a callous enemy‖.1022
De Silva rightly opines that the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka is a unique case,
where the mediator ―took on the role of combatant, and the presumed guardian of an
ethnic minority waged an eventually unsuccessful military campaign against the
principal political group of that minority and its military wing, which India and
Tamilnadu had helped to build‖.1023 Because the non-violent approach (hunger strike)
failed at the initial stages, Prabhakaran then shifted his anti-India strategy to engaging
guerilla type attacks against the IPKF because he was aware that the Indian troops were
incapable of fighting counter-insurgency warfare.1024The supremo‘s concern for their
international reputation, including India, had eroded because he understood that the
IPKF and the Indian intervention posed an imminent threat to the survival of the
organisation. The fall of Jaffna in Operation Pawan became a setback.1025 The loss of
the LTTE stronghold undermined the supremo‘s capabilities and confidence, which
bolstered his determination to fight against the IPKF and drive them out of the country
at any cost. By this point, Prabhakaran felt betrayed by India on many levels. It was
clear that the IPKF‘s initial objectives have transformed over time as they were
determined to disarm and marginalise the LTTE. He also discovered that New Delhi
was responsible in providing arms and safe havens near the Indian army camp to other
Tamil groups (i.e. EPRLF, TELO, and ENDLF) to fight against the LTTE.1026 Rajiv
Gandhi had been adamantly opposed to the LTTE and the Eelam,1027 and indeed, his reelection would have meant the possible re-deployment of the IPKF on Sri Lankan soil.
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In essence, the risk of future IPKF instalment far outweighed the potential deterioration
of Indo-LTTE relations and international condemnation.
The assassination proved to be one of the biggest strategic blunders committed
by the LTTE, which severely undermined their position both in India and internationally.
They had ultimately projected themselves as a ruthless and potent terrorist organisation.
New Delhi proscribed the Tigers in 1992.1028Since then, India scaled down its active
and overt involvement in Sri Lanka, and had adopted a passive posture in dealing with
the ethnic conflict in the neighbourhood.1029However, it has also been noted in the
earlier chapters that the loss of India‘s official sponsorship did not inhibit the LTTE
from intensifying its campaign and developing its military capabilities. During the
1990s, the Tamil Nadu ministers continued to provide assistance to the group.1030
Moreover, the group established itself independently as well, by significantly expanding
its international network and de-facto state. The LTTE campaign continued to escalate
into Eelam War II following the withdrawal of the IPKF.

10.5 Eelam War II
Much of Eelam War II‘s military operations involved a series of offensives and counteroffensives to capture the strategic locations around Jaffna peninsula. Soon after the
withdrawal of the Indian troops, the LTTE resumed its attacks against the government
forces and civilians, while it also launched the Kokavil offensive in 1990. The raid was
successful, and the group took control of Kilinochchi also in the same year, as soon as
the security forces withdrew their garrisons after the departure of the Indian force.1031
Operation Charles Anthony in July 1991 and the subsequent major operations over
Elephant Pass was a sign of strategic significance for the belligerents. Although the Sri
Lankan forces were able to capture some territory from the LTTE, Eelam War II was
marked by a series of withdrawals by the army due to its inability to sustain the
captured territory in the North. During this period, the LTTE maintained control over
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most of the Jaffna peninsula and the Wanni region and started to develop the function of
a de-facto state.
The gradual development of the LTTE de-facto state and the expanding
territorial control stirred government paranoia, which led to the setting up of an army
base with a navy detachment in Pooneryn circa 1990. In September 1993, the security
forces launched Operation Yal Devi in order to destroy the boat landing points and
facilities used by the LTTE in Kilali area.1032 Although 3000 men from the security
forces initially pushed into the peninsula from their base in Elephant Pass (a strategic
location which joined Jaffna peninsula to the mainland island) capturing Kilali
temporarily, they were unable to retain the captured territory.1033The week-long
operation failed to yield expected results, nor did it prevent the militants from retaliating
six weeks later. The LTTE increasingly exploited the prevailing security lapse of the
government during this phase, as the group overran the Pooneryn Sri Lanka army base
in November 1993, which killed over 600 army personnel and ended in LTTE
victory.1034 The LTTE claimed that the objective of this assault was to halt the
government attacks on the Kilali crossing, which they successfully achieved, as well as
capturing a large amount of weaponry from the army base.1035 Swamy notes that one
third of the Sri Lankan navy was virtually destroyed by the militants in 1993.1036
Following the major LTTE raid, late 1994 witnessed an overall stalemate between the
warring parties.
Amidst the military impasse, Chandrika Kumaratunga was sworn in as a
President in November 1994. Prior to the presidential elections, the Parliament was
divided between the opposing approaches to tackle the conflict in Sri Lanka: the United
National Party (UNP) asserted a hard-line position to crush the LTTE, while
Kumaratunga favoured negotiations with the militants.1037 A month before the elections,
the LTTE sent a suicide cadre to assassinate the UNP presidential candidate, which
inevitably urged Kumaratunga to settle for negotiations with the LTTE in January 1995.
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10.6 Eelam War III
Eelam War III is again characterised by a series of offensives and counter-offensives to
capture and re-capture strategic locations, routes and territories. After the LTTE
unilaterally abrogated the ceasefire in April 1995, the government forces launched
Operation Riviresa in October 1995 in an attempt to retake Jaffna. The government
continued to launch a series of offensives in January 1996 to capture the whole of the
peninsula from LTTE control. Consequently, the LTTE was virtually driven out of the
Jaffna peninsula by April the same year. The military defeat was a blow to the militants,
as Jaffna was the heartland of the de-facto state and a pool for recruits.1038 Large
numbers of civilians were displaced during this period, while some segment of the
population followed the LTTE towards Kilinochchi1039 (where the LTTE transferred
their headquarters in the aftermath of the military defeat). Since then, the LTTE fought
predominantly in two theatres: the East, and the North (Wanni and the jungles in the
Jaffna peninsula).At the same time, the group shifted its fighting theatre to the South
and Colombo in a spate of suicide bombings and political assassinations.
Since Riviresa, the LTTE successfully captured and re-captured territories as
compared to the Sri Lankan forces. Launched by the security forces in May1997 for a
period of two years, Operation Jayasikurui aimed to open a land supply route from
Vavuniya to Jaffna through the LTTE- controlled area. In retaliation, the LTTE
recruited thousands of youths from the East through Col. Karuna Amman, to fight in
Wanni against the security forces.1040 The group also significantly increased its weapons
import.1041 During this long battle, the LTTE captured Vavuniya and Kilinochchi, which
virtually resulted in LTTE victory and the army failed to retaliate or re-capture the
territory from the militants. In the North, the militants launched a series of offensives
which ended in their victory. The most notable is the Operation Unceasing Waves in
July 1996 to capture Mullaitivu, where nearly 1600 soldiers were said to have been
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killed by the LTTE.1042 After the raid, the militants escaped with US$ 70 million worth
of military equipment.1043 Bandarage notes that successful LTTE operationsled to a
breakdown in army discipline and there were increasing random reprisals against the
Tamil population.1044
Other offensives include the Thandikulam-Omanthai offensive in June 1997,
Operation Unceasing Waves II in September 1998 to capture Kilinochchi, Operation
Unceasing Waves III in November 1999 to capture Oddusuddan. This resulted in the
LTTE gaining control of over 1,000 square kilometers of territory and heavy casualties
for the Sri Lankan army.1045 This was followed by the battle for Elephant Pass and A9
highway in April 2000, when the LTTE took over a crucial military base in Elephant
Pass. During this battle, nearly 10,000 security forces were withdrawn, while 30,000
others were bottled up in the Jaffna Peninsula without access to the land route.1046 With
the seizure of Elephant Pass, the militants finally took control of the entry point into the
Jaffna peninsula, and with Kilali, they gained access to the Northern shore of the lagoon,
which would have facilitated the supply of goods to their bases in Wanni.1047 In the
Eastern theatre, there was a general stalemate between the two sides, although the
security forces temporarily captured Batticaloa district in Operation Rivi Kirana in
January 1996.1048 The militants successfully overran an army base located in Batticaloa
in March the following year.1049 Balasuriya notes that the East was a ‗sideshow‘ for the
war in the North and therefore served a strategic purpose.1050 However by the end of
2001, both parties were once again locked in a stalemate, which was followed by the
signing of the CFA in February 2002.
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10.7 Eelam War IV
The final phase of the conflict saw 33 months of sustained and bloody struggle from
both counterparts.1051The Eelam War IV was launched in three main stages: Mavil Aru
to the liberation of the East; the capture of Kilinochchi; and cornering and crushing the
LTTE around Mullaitivu.1052On November 17th, 2005 Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected
as the President, succeeding Chandrika Kumaratunga. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the
CFA was virtually in shambles by 2005 as the militants drastically increased their
attacks on many fronts in order to provoke government retaliation, and the government
was also accused of violating the terms of the CFA. Even prior to the official abrogation
of the CFA in January 2008, the LTTE launched a large scale naval offensive against
the Sri Lankan navy off the coast in Point Pedro. 15 Sea Tiger boats, including suicide
boats, attacked a naval vessel which transported 710 soldiers. It is reported that 50
militants were killed and 17 soldiers were missing in action.1053
After countless provocations by the LTTE to resume an all-out war, the Sri
Lankan government finally launched a massive military operation, to which the security
forces refer to as Operation Liberation, or the ―Humanitarian Operation‖, in response to
the LTTE shutting down the Mavil Aru sluice gate. The disruption of water flow in an
attempt to take control of the area in the East affected the livelihood over 20,000
villagers.1054 Peaceful efforts by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) has failed,
which compelled the government to launch a military intervention to open the sluice
gate on July 28th, 2006.
While the Mavil Aru operation was in progress, the LTTE attacked Mutur and
areas around the Trincomalee harbour in August, which was the main logistics base for
the transport of supplies to Jaffna for civilians and the security forces.1055 Trincomalee
South fell to the hands of the security forces, and August 10th marked the re-opening of
the Mavil Aru sluice gates. In the wake of the army victory, the militants attempted to
divert the operation theatre from the East to the Jaffna peninsula.1056 Although the group
partially succeeded in the series of simultaneous operations, the security forces launched
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a successful counter attack in re-capturing and consolidating the territory by
establishing Forward Defense Lines (FDL). Having lost Trincomalee, the LTTE
drastically increased their Sea Tiger activities to attack against the naval forces, and
conducted their attack from Sampur instead. Fierce battle continued for nearly two
months until Sampur fell to the security forces in September 2006.1057 This was a heavy
loss for the LTTE, given that Sampur had been their strategic base in the East for nine
years.1058
From January 2007 onwards, the Sri Lankan forces extended their operation to
liberate the East from LTTE control, starting from Vakarai, Thoppigala, and
Trincomalee North. The Eastern Province fell to the hands of the Sri Lankan
government by July 10th, 2007.1059The military victory of the security forces pushed the
LTTE to the North.1060While the government troops concentrated their battle in the
Eastern theatre, they also pursued operations in the Wanni theatre from March 2007.
Prior to the operations, the LTTE controlled an area of 6,792 square kilometers,1061from
which the army was able to gradually capture territory. The LTTE significantly relied
on the Air Tigers wing to conduct aerial bombings against the government air bases and
security establishment, while the Sri Lankan air force also employed its air power with
the increased appearance of Kfir jets and MIG 27s.1062 One of the greatest blows to the
militants was the bombing of a secret LTTE hideout in Kilinochchi on November 2nd,
2007, that killed the group‘s political leader S.P Thamil Chelvam.1063 This incident
significantly undermined the LTTE both morally and politically. In January 2008, the
Sri Lankan government officially withdrew from the ceasefire, which had by then only
existed on paper in the past two years. By November 2008, the security forces advanced
to Kilinochchi, the LTTE‘s administrative hub.
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10.8 The final offensive and the death of Prabhakaran
The LTTE de facto capital Kilinochchi fell to the government forces in January 2009.
Since then, the downfall of the LTTE sharply accelerated as the government forces
continued to advance without respite. By April 2009, many of the LTTE senior leaders
were pushed into a small strip of land in the Puthukudiyiruppu area. Other surviving
cadres were also pushed into the No-Fire Zone (NFZ) which was set aside for civilians
who were fleeing the scene.1064The militants started to forcibly create a human shield
with the civilians in order to block the security forces to advance to
Puthukudiyiruppu.1065Almost 140,000 Tamil civilians were caught in the battle between
the two sides.1066On May 16th, nearly 20,000 civilians reportedly flew to the
government-controlled territory, while another 30,000 waited to cross over.1067
The army advanced at a rapid pace and this time the Tigers were unable to
launch counter-attacks because unlike in the past, the army did not offer any respite to
the beleaguered Tigers after a major military victory.1068 The final battle began on May
17 after the security forces cornered the remaining LTTE cadres into a small strip
around the Nandikaadal lagoon in Mullaitivu. In the wake of the intensifying battle,
Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP, the chief of the LTTE‘s International Affairs Branch and
the chief arms procurer for the outfit) made an appeal to the international community to
immediately take action to save the Tamil civilians caught in the war zone, and to
protect the cadres and people themselves up to the military.1069 His efforts extended to
visiting the top officials in the UN and urging them to implement a rescue plan to get
the senior Tigers leaders out from danger.1070
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In the final offensive which lasted 22 hours on the night of May 18th into the
morning of the 19th,1071 at least 18 senior Tiger leaders were killed including Soosai
(Sea Tigers chief), Nadesan (political leader), Pulidevan (Peace Secretary), and Illango
(leader of LTTE Police).1072 According to Reddy, most of the leaders appeared to have
died either of gunshot wounds or in suicide blasts triggered by the cadre. Only a few
appeared to have swallowed the cyanide capsule.1073 Prabhakaran had always instructed
his cadres that in the event of his death, he did not want even his dead body to be
captured by the security forces. In the end however, he died from gunshot wounds.
Meanwhile, the bodies of his wife and daughter and son were later found about 600
meters away from Prabhakaran‘s body. The body of his eldest son (who was deputy to
the intelligence chief Pottu Amman) was found elsewhere earlier.1074 In the aftermath of
the recovery of the bodies, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Fonseka subsequently
announced to the world:
A few hours ago on Tuesday morning [May 19], our ground troops confirmed
that they have recovered the dead body of the world‘s most ruthless terrorist
leader. I make this disclosure with responsibility and pleasure as millions of Sri
Lankans as well as the army would be the most delighted at this news.1075
During the final three and a half years of the government operation, 6,000 armed
forces were killed in action.1076 The authoritative figures of the LTTE cadres and
civilians deaths in the final phases of the battle have not been declared.1077 The current
estimates are extremely ambiguous, ranging from 8,000 to 10,000 deaths1078, while the
UN estimates up to 40,000 deaths.10791080
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10.9 Analytical discussion
The series of armed confrontations in the Sri Lankan conflict demonstrate that the
belligerents experienced several peaks and troughs in their military campaign. Since the
gradual emergence of Tamil militancy, the Sri Lankan state came to a realisation that
political and legal means alone were insufficient to contain the growing threat. For years,
the counter-terrorism tactics adopted by the law enforcement agencies and the security
forces failed to address the evolving nature and capabilities of the LTTE. In some
occasions, there were other external factors which hindered the military defeat of the
group at an earlier stage of the conflict.
Two striking trends are evident following government military interventions.
First, the LTTE opted for negotiations whenever it experienced a military stalemate.
Second, the group tended to rely extensively on other modus operandi (i.e. suicide
attacks) in alternative theatres of war when it faced the brink of defeat. Although it is
difficult to determine whether every government operation definitely crippled the
LTTE‘s operational capabilities, certain changes in the organisation‘s strategic choices
are revealing.
As discussed in Chapter 5, most of the LTTE attacks in Eelam War I targeted
Sinhalese civilians in the North and East, while there were only a few incidents which
targeted the security forces. The Kokkilai offensive in 1985 was significant in
projecting the LTTE‘s military capability and force. It was the very first large-scale
military operation carried out by the group that previously relied on small scale attacks
and hit-and-run tactics. Also, the recovered weapons on the site were another indicator
of the group‘s military strength back then. The Kokkilai raid was a wake-up call to the
Sri Lankan forces as to the nature and the operational capability of their adversary. The
LTTE‘s first suicide attack was carried out immediately after Operation Vadamarachchi.
Although the LTTE was on the brink of defeat by the government forces, the Indian
intervention during this period temporarily halted the momentum of government
operations. As soon as the Vadamarachchi battle was put to an end in June 1987, the
LTTE responded with its first suicide attack at the Nelliady army camp in Jaffna the
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following month.1081 The success of the group‘s suicide attack was not only
unprecedented in the history of the Sri Lankan conflict, but also encouraged the
strategic use of this tactic by the LTTE in the later years of the war.
Despite the deployment of the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF), the LTTE
still continued its attacks without any respite (refer to earlier section on the Indian
Intervention). Although there is a decline in the number of attacks from 1988 (see Fig.
9), from July 1987 to the ceasefire in June 1989 the LTTE carried out 75 attacks,
targeting Sinhala and Muslim civilians, rival Tamil militants, moderate Tamil
politicians and activists, and Indian forces as well as Sri Lankan security personnelalthough the modus operandi were basic (e.g. shooting and beheading).1082As mentioned
earlier, the LTTE was also engaged in a war against the IPKF from October 1987 to
March 1990. On another front, the group managed to pursue its other strategic objective
of ethnic cleansing from their claimed area of territory. The group also carried out
several high profile assassinations during the ceasefire, the most notable being the
gunning down of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) President Appappillai
Amirthalingam in Colombo on July 13th, 1989.1083
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The sharp decline in the number of attacks in 1989 does not necessarily translate
to a crippled military capability of the Tigers. Overall, the military intervention in
Eelam War I did not undermine the LTTE‘s operational capability for several reasons.
First and foremost, the government carried out only one major offensive which brought
the militants to the brink of defeat, which was avoided by the Indian intervention.
Second, during the initial years of the First Eelam War the LTTE would have still
enjoyed Indian state support, providing them with arms and finance to sustain their
campaign against the government.
In hindsight, the IPKF intervention did not weaken the military capability of the
LTTE to a great extent. This contention is supported by several factors. To recapitulate,
the Tigers refused to disarm since the outset of the Indian intervention. The outfit had
received ample arms and logistical support from the Premadasa regime in July 1989 to
fight off the Indians. The militants also seized weapons which were left behind by the
IPKF for which they also kept their share for future use. The Tamil Nadu politicians
continued to provide logistical assistance while the LTTE simultaneously expanded its
international network. Despite losing several thousand cadres during the LTTE-IPKF
wars, this did not deter the LTTE from expanding its operational strength and
conducting attacks. The aforesaid elements would have assisted the LTTE to maintain
its operational capability, which was reflected in the continuation of their attacks
elsewhere during the Indian intervention period. It would thus be accurate to conclude
that the continuation of attacks in the post-IPKF period was not a backlash of violence,
but rather a sign of consistency on the part of the LTTE, despite the verge of demise in
1987 and the Indian involvement.
The second Eelam War started off with the ruthless slaughtering of 600 police
officers in the East. It is evident that the LTTE was not weakened by the IPKF. The
LTTE utilised the fourteen month ceasefire to recuperate their military capability,
recruiting and training new cadres and constructing bunkers. Thus the LTTE would
have been fully equipped by the time it launched the Kokavil offensive in June 1990,
which resulted in their victory. It is also during this period that the LTTE carried out its
war on multiple fronts in different parts of the island. First, it continued the ethnic
cleansing of Sinhala and Muslim civilians from the North and the East, as well as
targeting security installations. The group also expanded its operational area elsewhere,
where it targeted key political and security personnel. For instance, the Sri Lankan
Defense Minister Ranjan Wijeratne was killed by a Black Tiger suicide attack in March
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1991 in Colombo,1084 and two months later the same squad assassinated the Indian
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Tamil Nadu.1085 On June 22nd 1991, the LTTE also
detonated a suicide vehicle bomb, which destroyed the headquarters of the Sri Lankan
government‘s Joint Operations Command in Colombo.1086
The loss of strategic Elephant Pass against the government forces in Operation
Balavegaya I and II in 1991 and 1992 respectively undermined the group‘s overall
capability, however only temporarily, after which they were able to recuperate
immediately. Initially, the group significantly decreased its attacks during and in the
immediate aftermath of the military interventions from July 1991 to July 1992, which
saw only 18 attacks in the span of a year (see Fig. 10). However, the militants made a
significant strategic and tactical shift to compensate their loss of the Elephant Pass, by
carrying out three successful high profile assassinations in the South. From August 1992
to December 1994, the group conducted only 22 attacks around the country, which is
seemingly low in frequency. However, all three of the attacks carried out in Colombo
were suicide bombings, which successfully assassinated high profile politicians and
security personnel- Vice Admiral Clancy Fernando on November 16th, 1992, President
Ranasinghe Premadasa on May 1st, 1993, and Opposition party candidate Gamini
Dissanayake on October 24th, 1994.1087
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LTTE Terrorist Attacks: Eelam War II
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Fig.11. LTTE attacks in Eelam War II

Strategically, the use of suicide attacks during this period presented three
advantages for the organisation. First, the group was able to display the capability to
carry out high profile assassination through this particular method, furthermore outside
of their stronghold. Second, suicide attacks were an effective alternative to break
through a military stalemate between the two warring parties in late 1994. Third, the
assassination of Gamini Dissanayake (a staunch supporter of a military solution to the
Sri Lankan conflict) prior to the presidential elections laid fertile ground for the
militants to pursue negotiations with Kumaratunga as soon as she assumed Presidency
in 1994. Therefore, the successful military interventions by the security forces in 1991
and 1992 significantly reduced operational capability of the group in terms of the
frequency of attacks in the immediate aftermath. However, by examining the bigger
picture it becomes evident that suicide attacks became a crucial tactic for the group to
compensate for the losses of the battles in the North, and to manoeuvre the government
to the group‘s demand to go for a ceasefire when they deemed it necessary for military
recuperation.
During Eelam War III, violence escalated to the extent that it hastened the
militarisation of the entire society and the destruction of the different ethnic
communities in the North and East.1088 As shown in Figure 11, the number of attacks
carried out by the LTTE remained fairly constant. Throughout the Operation Riviresa
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and until July 1996, the group did not conduct any attacks in the Jaffna district, which
directly correlates to their major defeat and the loss of control of their former stronghold.
With the passage of time, the group widened its target by attacking economic
infrastructure and drastically increasing high profile assassinations in the South. For
instance, the group attacked an oil tanker in Kolonnawa, the suburb of Colombo, on
October 20th, 1995.1089 In January 1996, the militants carried out a high-intensity
vehicle-bourne suicide attack targeting the Central Bank killing 91 people,1090 targeted
foreign cargo ships in 1997 and attacked the World Trade Centre in Colombo in
October the same year.1091 Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Riviresa operation until
the signing of the ceasefire in 2002, the LTTE assassinated four senior security force
officers (e.g. Navy Commander Cecil Tissera in December 1997), seven senior rival
militant members, and ten prominent politicians (e.g. Neelan Thiruchelvam of TULF in
July 1999 and Deputy Defense Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte in March
2000).1092Economic targets and high profile assassination became part of the strategy to
undermine the security forces, instil fear and to demoralise the population and the
government.
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LTTE Terrorist Attacks: Eelam War III
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Fig.12. LTTE attacks in Eelam War III

Also, Eelam War III witnessed an overall rise in the number of suicide attacks
(except for 1997 which only recorded one attack). From 1995-2001, the LTTE
conducted 50 suicide attacks in total.1093 This trend parallels with the increasing number
of military confrontation with the government forces, especially after losing Jaffna.
Additionally, the Black Tigers concentrated attacks mostly on the security forces
(especially the naval forces) during this period. Both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan navy
obtained most of their supplies through Tamil Nadu in India, and thus it was crucial for
the LTTE to interdict and disrupt the resupply and the reinforcement of the government
naval capabilities.1094 This indicates that the militants were more concerned about
containing and restricting the operational capabilities of the government forces, as well
as complementing their military capabilities through the use of suicide attacks around
the country. Therefore, the series of military interventions in Eelam War III hardly
undermined the operational capability of the group despite the fact that it lost Jaffna as
its stronghold. The Tigers still managed to engage in numerous military confrontations
against the government forces, as well as conduct terrorist attacks outside of the
battleground. The stark rise in suicide attacks, high profile assassinations and a broader
spectrum of target selection was an indication of backlash of violence by the militants.
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The period from February 2002 to July 2006 witnessed over 320 attacks despite the
ongoing ceasefire agreement.1095 Among many other factors, one of the reasons the
LTTE opted for negotiations in 2002 was to recuperate its operational capability which
was affected by the continuous fighting against the government in the North and the
East during Eelam War III. The militants recuperated their manpower and operational
capability during the peace process. It also exploited the ceasefire to eliminate rival
militant groups. The frequency of attacks escalated on an annual basis during the
ceasefire period. For instance, the year 2002 marked 9 attacks, 2003 marked 24, 2004
marked 34.1096 A drastic increase of attacks were witnessed in 2005 marking 152 in total,
and January to July 2006 marked 102 attacks.1097 Interestingly, the stark rise of attacks
coincided with the election of the new ‗hawkish‘ president Mahinda Rajapaksa in
November 2005. Slowly but surely, the LTTE was rebuilding its operational capability
that was lost in the previous Eelam War, and by the time it was ready the rebels
increased their attacks against the state to provoke the government forces to resume the
war.
The LTTE‘s final war witnessed a sharp rise in terrorist attacks until the outfit
was militarily defeated in May 2009, as shown in Fig. 12. Eelam War IV started off
with Operation Liberation and ten major battles followed suit. During this phase, the
LTTE was unable to gain victory and the organisation that was once thought invincible
gradually lost its territorial control and operational capability. After the armed forces
commenced the first major operation in the eastern theatre in July 2007 and drove out
the LTTE within a year, the rebels retaliated through launching attacks against security
installations and law enforcement personnel. While the LTTE continued to lose against
the military on the battleground, it started to shift its terrorist attacks elsewhere out of
the fighting theatre and also increased the frequency of attacks. For example, From July
to December 2006, the LTTE conducted 132 attacks, and while the group lost the
control in the East in 2007, that year recorded 142 attacks.1098However from 2008, the
group lost control of Northwest and Kilinochchi and conducted 71 attacks, and finally
in the short span of five months in 2009, the group managed to launch 34 attacks. This
is a clear indication that the group lost its operational capacity as a conventional
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fighting force despite its recuperation during the ceasefire period, and the number of
attacks reached its peak in 2007.

LTTE Terrorist Attacks: Eelam War IV
(July 2006 - May 2009)
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Fig.13. LTTE attacks in Eelam War IV

Despite the decrease in the frequency of terrorist attacks from 2008, from 2006
onwards, the data reveals that the LTTE employed more suicide bombings. The lethality
of the suicide attacks also reached its peak in 2007, which recorded approximately 169
deaths in that year alone (See Appendix 6).1099Further, from July 2006 to May 2009
alone, 35 suicide attacks mainly targeted the naval installations.1100 This target selection
can be attributed to the increasing effectiveness of the naval forces since 2006. Prior to
2004, the Sri Lankan navy was not substantially effective as it lacked strength in the
blue waters, while some assessed that the LTTE Sea Tigers were much more effective
as a conventional naval force.1101 However, since 2006 onwards the Sri Lankan navy
reinforced and revamped its strategy and operational tactics to counter the LTTE from
the naval front. This led to the effective inhibition of the arms procurement network as
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well as their drug and human smuggling activities, which severely undermined the
LTTE‘s operational capability.1102
The LTTE simultaneously displayed its air power for the first time during this
period. As the outfit built its Air Tiger Wing during the 2002 ceasefire, they launched
their first airstrike in March 2007 by dropping bombs to the Sri Lankan air force base in
Katunayake, which killed 3 people. Again on April 27th the same year, the Air Tigers
struck an army base in Jaffna and few days later struck an oil tank in the suburbs of
Colombo. The final aerial attack was seen in August 2008, when the group targeted the
naval base in Trincomalee. Although the overall casualties were low, this was a
significant show of aerial capability of a terrorist group, and the targets were against
security installations and an economic symbol. Apart from the aerial attacks, the group
continuously targeted various politicians and religious figures who spoke out against the
LTTE (e.g. the assassination attempt of the Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse in
December 2006, assassination of Rev. Selliah Kurukkal in February 2007 and Ven.
Nandarathana Thera in May 2007).
The final Eelam war presented another striking trend in the LTTE‘s target selection,
which was not prominent previously. Towards the end of the war, the LTTE gradually
lost its territory and thus desperately attempted to contain the Tamil civilians to their
side from escaping to the government controlled areas. From February 2009, the
militants actively attacked their own constituencies to discourage the people from
leaving the militants, as well as forcibly making human shields out of the civilians to
protect the militants themselves. On February 10th 2009, the LTTE launched a suicide
attack within the premises of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp in Mullativu,
killing 28 people and injuring 90.1103A few days later the group attacked a bus carrying
refugees, and on April 25th, they sent a suicide cadre to kill the Tamil civilians trapped
in the NFZ in Puttumatalan, Mullaitivu District.1104 Targeting of the Tamil civilians at
this point in the conflict holds significance because it is an indication of the LTTE‘s
desperation in two ways. First, forcibly containing the civilians from fleeing the LTTE
area is an evident lack of public support and the lack of trust the people had in the
organisation. Secondly, the fact that the LTTE had to resort to the coercive use of
1102
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human shield to protect themselves from the advancing security forces signify that the
militants clearly lacked the operational capacity to retaliate by that point in time.
Based on the development of Eelam War IV, it is clear that the frequency of
attacks including suicide bombings increased, in addition to a widened range of target
selection. Although these are seemingly a sign of robust operational capability of an
organisation, it indicates otherwise with the case of the LTTE. As the militants were
unable to retaliate against the series of military interventions on the battleground, their
strategy was to shift their fighting elsewhere in the country in order to compensate for
the defeat in confrontations with the security forces. This shift is an example of
displacement as a result of target-hardening (i.e. when protection of one target improves,
terrorists will attack alternative, less fortified targets).1105 The increased attacks and a
wider target selection indicated desperation, as their strategy shifted to launching as
many indiscriminate and destructive attacks as possible to demoralise the government
and the people. Thus the fourth Eelam War demonstrated that the backlash of violence
did not necessarily reflect the operational strength of the group. The LTTE intensified
its violent attacks to a greater level, out of sheer desperation to demonstrate their
apparent strength against the adversary. Despite the Tigers efforts, the government
forces successfully crushed the campaign in the final Eelam War.

10.11 The winning strategy of the state
Although this study does not focus on Sri Lanka‘s counter-insurgency strategy against
the militants, it is pertinent to provide a brief description of the government‘s winning
strategy in crushing the LTTE campaign in the final Eelam War.In addition to the
weakening of the LTTE, other changes within the Sri Lankan tri-forces strengthened
their capability to militarily defeat the outfit. During Eelam War I to III, the successive
army commanders were merely familiar with fighting conventional warfare against the
militants who employed both guerilla and conventional tactics. Previously, the
weakness of the security forces were as follows: 1) the army usually captured territory
1105
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by bulk targeting, and was unable to hold on to the captured territory; 2) the army was
unable to respond to the LTTE‘s guerilla tactics; 3) the naval forces were not
substantially effective, as they lacked ‗blue-water‘ naval capacity, were unable to curtail
the Tigers‘ international arms procurement network and the LTTE Sea Tigers displayed
strategic superiority over the state naval forces, and; 4) there was a lack of
intelligence.1106
The ceasefire period witnessed a drastic revamp of the security forces. As soon
as Rajapakse assumed Presidency, he appointed tried and tested commanders,1107 and
drastically expanded the recruitment of the armed forces.1108The then Army
Commander Gen. Sarath Fonseka initiated various strategic, operational and tactical
reforms within the Rules of Engagement.1109 First, the Army revised its offensive tactics
by changing its fighting base from the main road to the jungle.1110 Second, the armed
forces trained and employed the Special Infantry Orientation Team (SIOT) in a different
manner, which came as a surprise to the LTTE.1111Gen. Wijetilleke also notes that since
2004, the armed forces focused on crippling the leadership instead of targeting the
LTTE foot soldiers and took isolated targets to widen the fighting fronts.
Reconnaissance techniques also improved through the use of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAV) and through the use of more reliable and real-time information through
human intelligence.1112 The forces also improved the joint command system to
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effectively coordinate between the navy, air and ground forces, and increased the
training of the Home Guards.1113
The role of the Sri Lankan Navy was paramount in weakening the Tigers. Prior to
2004, the Sri Lankan navy had not been effective.1114 However, from2006 onwards the
Sri Lankan navy reinforced and revamped its strategy and operational tactics to counter
the LTTE. The navy adopted the small-boat concept to counter the suicide attacks of the
Sea Tigers in the coastal areas. Furthermore, they enhanced their espionage to locate the
LTTE‘s floating warehouse vessels in the high seas, and deployed offshore patrol
vessels (OPV) to destroy them.1115This led to the effective inhibition of the arms
procurement network as well as their drug and human smuggling activities, which
severely undermined the LTTE‘s operational capability.1116 As Fish rightly describes,
―bringing the conflict to a conclusion after 30 years war would not have been possible
without the Sri Lanka Navy‖.1117
Changes in the tri-forces alone would not have led to the victory of the security
forces. Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse,1118Wijewardana, Gen. Jayasuriya, and
Gen. Wijetilleke all acknowledged that the political leadership under President Mahinda
Rajapakse was a critical element which led to the defeat of the LTTE. The successive
leaders prior to Rajapakse lacked the will to eliminate the LTTE militarily, while
Rajapakse was willing to defeat the Tamil Tigers by force (regardless of costs in human
lives),1119 and resisted the international pressure which fell upon him during the final
phase of the war. Moreover, the government promulgated a national level strategy of
combating the militants and de-centralised the decision making process so that the
individual forces were able to make decisions without waiting for political orders from
the top.1120 Sri Lanka‘s defense budget increased annually,1121 which enabled the
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government to procure heavy weapons which were far superior to that of the LTTE.
The role of China and Pakistan‘s military assistance was also indispensible in
strengthening the Sri Lankan forces, as well as the provision of intelligence support
from India.1122
10.10 Prabhakaran’s death: an analysis
Decades of military confrontation between the belligerents was brought to an end with
the death of Prabhakaran in May 2009. Because existing theories purport that the
removal of the leader generally instigates the decline of a campaign, it is tempting to
uncritically accept that Prabhakaran‘s death yielded the same effect on the LTTE.
However, the reality is more complex than this. Given the overall development of the
campaign prior to and in the immediate aftermath of the demise of Prabhakaran, the
death of the LTTE leader should be viewed more as confirmation of the group‘s
(current) demise rather than the cause.
By examining the overall picture of the LTTE campaign in hindsight, it was not
the death of the supremo which prompted the de-escalation of the group and its demise.
Rather, an accurate assessment would be that the de-escalation of the group had already
occurred prior to the decimation of the leader, and that the death of Prabhakaran marked
the demise of the LTTE military campaign. Military interventions were successful in
crushing the campaign largely because the Tigers had faced its downfall by the time
fourth Eelam War commenced. This particular organisation demonstrates an apparently
straightforward case where no further terrorist attacks have (yet) been carried out
following the death of the chief. Based on the haul of weaponry that has been
discovered during and after the conclusion of the war,1123 it was not that the LTTE was
left with no ammunition to conduct reprisal attacks. However, several conditions have
prevailed which have disabled the LTTE from re-organising and reviving itself
following the removal of the leader.
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The previous chapters in the study have demonstrated how the LTTE had been
weakened on various fronts especially after the end of Eelam War III. It had arguably
reached the de-escalation phase by the fourth Eelam War. This sounds rather ironic,
given that the Tigers were not short of cash or military capability when they resumed
war against the government in 2006. The recuperation of military equipment,
recruitment of cadres and the creation of the aerial wing during the ceasefire of the
group seemingly projected the group‘s strength and will to wage a long-term all-out
confrontation against the armed forces. However, by the time the group resumed
violence in the wake of Eelam War IV the Tigers lacked several crucial elements that
were required to sustain a robust campaign.
To recapitulate, the LTTE had significantly lost public support during the 2002
ceasefire period and towards the resumption of the final war. Due to lack of voluntary
recruitment (a stark contrast from the 1980s and 1990s), the militants rigorously
engaged in coerced recruitment of children and adults. As the group‘s reliance on the
local population for funding, arms procurement and campaign legitimacy decreased, it
instead turned towards the Diaspora for logistical and moral support (see Chapter 7 and
8).Furthermore, the group had lost the ideological and moral conviction of the cadres
(see Chapter 5). As if to add insult to injury, the breakaway of Karuna in 2004 was a
huge blow to the legitimacy, manpower, public support, and organisational cohesion of
the LTTE. The amalgamation of the said factors produced a synergetic effect which
destabilised the separatist movement both externally and internally on a massive scale.
In addition to the above, there were two other prominent factors which
underpinned that the LTTE campaign had shifted to the de-escalation phase prior to the
demise of Prabhakaran. First, the political activities of the Diaspora drastically
increased towards the final stages of the campaign. As mentioned earlier in the study,
from January 2009 onwards, the pro-LTTE segment of the Diasporas launched a series
of protests and political lobbying against their respective governments in order to urge
international intervention to halt the alleged genocide of the Tamil civilians and to
rescue the Tigers. Although most protests were of a peaceful nature, a few extreme
cases also occurred, for instance the self-immolation of a Tamil man in front of the
United Nations office in Geneva in February 2009.1124 The string of protests- although

1124

―Murugathasan Immolated In Front of the UN in Geneva In Protests of Tamil Sufferings‖, Lanka
Newspapers, February 13, 2009 <http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2009/2/39361_space.html>at
November 24, 2012

244

intended to speak out against continuous government offensives- also implied that the
LTTE was on the brink of military defeat. This would have stirred the Diaspora
community to take political action to bring halt to the government offensive. Moreover,
the fact that Prabhakaran had expected the Tamil expatriates to intervene to rescue
him1125 suggests that the supremo himself had understood that his campaign was facing
an imminent defeat.
The second indication is that the militants drastically increased the frequency of
non-conventional attacks as Eelam War IV progressed. The analytical discussion
presented in this chapter underpins this contention. For the Tigers, the stark rise in the
number of attacks, the over-reliance on suicide attacks and the range of target selection
in the final phase of the war indicated that the campaign had hit the de-escalation stage.
Moreover, for the first time in the history of the LTTE campaign, the group
continuously lost control of their territory at a rapid pace and failed to recapture the land
from the armed forces in the final Eelam War. Just a few weeks before the decimation
of Prabhakaran, Ashok Mehta- a security analyst in New Delhi and former General
Officer Commanding in the IPKF- expressed that the conventional force of the LTTE
has finished and that the ―fighting that you still see [by the LTTE], one of its purposes is
to buy time to relocate cadres and weapon, and to hope that the international agencies
such as the United Nations and India in particular can force some kind of ceasefire and
they can get a more honourable exit from this war and that‘s why you see this last-ditch
stand.‖1126 Despite the ample weaponry it regained during the ceasefire, the Tigers lost
the overall operational capability required to retaliate against the government because of
other factors.
Since the death of Prabhakaran and the declaration of the military victory of the
Sri Lankan government forces, the island nation did not witness a single terrorist attack.
This, by default, indicated that the LTTE had been militarily defeated and that it marked
an end in their 33-long campaign. Following the announcement of a military victory,
KP on May 19th immediately issued a statement denying Prabhakaran‘s death and
confirming that he was still alive and safe. He further reiterated that ―He [Prabhakaran]
will continue to lead the quest for dignity and freedom for the Tamil people.‖1127 The
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See chapter 7
―Analysis: Endgame In Sri Lanka‖, Al- Jazeera News, April 23,
2009<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2009/04/200942372918753499.html>at November 24, 2012
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LTTE propaganda was a symbolic instance which projected the importance of
Prabhakaran being alive as a part of legitimising the struggle. This in extension implied
that the death of Prabhakaran literally and symbolically signified the demise of the
LTTE campaign.

10.11 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated the impacts of both foreign and domestic military
interventions on the LTTE campaign trajectory. With regards to foreign intervention,
existing theories suggest that this factor would temporarily halt the confrontation
between warring parties, and terrorist attacks would soon resume against the intervening
party. This proposition was confirmed with the Tigers‘ campaign. The Indian
intervention was one of the most crucial episodes in the history of the conflict, as it
triggered a tremendous shift in the course of the LTTE campaign. Although there was a
very brief respite in violence, this was only a halt in a confrontation between the LTTE
and the Sri Lankan security forces, and did not translate to a complete abandoning of
violence on the ground. The LTTE‘s target selection widened to include the Indian
troops, while the group continued the targeting of rival militant groups and ethnic
cleansing of the civilians elsewhere. The withdrawal of the Indian troops did not result
in a respite in the violence either. In fact, the Second Eelam war swiftly resumed, and
the LTTE further intensified its military campaign following the retreat of the Indians.
With regard to government military interventions, the existing theories suggest
that crushing terrorist groups solely through military means has a low chance of success.
In fact, historical experiences indicate that any subsequent halt or decline in terrorist
violence is usually temporary, and the campaign is likely to witness a backlash of
violence and intensification of attacks. However, the effect of military intervention was
more complex in the case of the LTTE, as it yielded different results depending on the
Eelam Wars. Frequency of terrorist attacks increased after successful military
operations, which conformed to historical patterns of terrorist campaigns. The backlash
of violence was one of the primary methods for the LTTE to retaliate against the
government interventions, in order to compensate for its military inferiority as a
conventional force on the battlefield. This pattern was observed during Eelam War II
and III. However, the LTTE met its demise in the fourth Eelam War, despite
intensifying attacks following military confrontations. This outcome suggests that the
backlash of violence does not necessarily reflect the operational strength of the group.
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Groups may still engage in violence even when facing their downfall. In fact, militants
are likely to intensify violence during the de-escalation phase, out of sheer desperation
to demonstrate their apparent strength against the adversary.
Given that the LTTE survived three Eelam wars prior to its defeat (despite
experiencing ebb and flow in their campaign at different times), the outright defeat in
Eelam War IV seems to be of an unusual nature. The organisation that possessed
formidable land, air and sea forces had a strategic advantage in military confrontations
over the security forces, as the group had a far superior knowledge of their own terrain.
Moreover, the group relied on night-firing strategy, which was considered extremely
effective until the beginning of Eelam War IV, and the Sea Tiger operations were also
deadly, causing considerable casualties among the naval forces.1128The demise of the
campaign at the fourth Eelam War thus reinforces that the militants were, in general,
weak by the time they resumed the final war. The decline of the campaign, as well as
the improvements in the security forces enabled a military victory over the
militants.1129In contrary to the conventional assumptions that military force rarely ends
a terrorist campaign, the LTTE case demonstrated otherwise. The Tigers‘ campaign was
militarily defeated and as a result the organisation was entirely crippled.
Furthermore, the assumption that the removal of the leader ends the movement
was not confirmed with the Tamil Tigers. It is sometimes assumed that killing or
capturing the leader of a terrorist organisation will effectively bring about the end of the
group. However, this is rather simplistic. In the case of the LTTE, the leader‘s demise
came at a time where the campaign was already on the decline; therefore, his death
along with the demise of other senior leaders was both catalytic and an end in itself.
Prabhakaran‘s death has likely contributed to the inability of the group to recover from
this military defeat, and thus it was the ‗final nail in the coffin‘ for the LTTE.
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Interview with the Army Commander of Sri Lanka (at the time of interview), Lt. Gen. Jagath
Jayasuriya, Army Headquarters, Colombo, Sri Lanka,November 16,2011
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Although the LTTE was militarily defeated, there are allegations that the final phase of the war has
been a source of considerable controversy. The UN report on accountability in Sri Lanka was published in
March 2011, which outlined a series of ‗credible‘ allegations of war crimes against both the Sri Lankan
government and the LTTE in the final phases of the war. The most notable allegations against the
government included mass civilian casualties, shelling of the no-fire zones and extra-judicial killings of
prisoners of war. Against this backdrop, it is possible to attribute the success of the security forces to the
heavy-handed military approach it took in vanquishing the Tigers. The military operations resulted in a
pyrrhic victory. For more on the allegations against the Sri Lankan government, refer to: ―Sri Lanka ‗war
crimes‘: Main allegations‖, BBC News, June 17, 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia13158916> at February 28, 2013

247

Whether the separatist ideology lingers among the Tamil community both
domestically and abroad in the post-war era is a different question. Given that terrorist
attacks have completely halted after the decimation of the leader, it is possible to
assume that the armed LTTE campaign has come to an end in Sri Lanka (at least as far
as that organisation is concerned). Because the organisation maintained an extremely
strong hierarchy where no real power-sharing structure existed under absolute
dictatorship of Prabhakaran, the removal of the leader immediately crippled the survival
of the campaign. Karuna Amman clearly expressed that the leader was solely to blame
for the demise of the LTTE because he did not heed anybody‘s advice and acted on his
own accord.1130 This also underpins the fact that the supremo had never considered
appointing a successor. Moreover, most of the other senior leaders were also eliminated
during the final offensive, which further hindered the chances and the capabilities of the
organisation to regroup, revive, and continue the struggle.
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―Prabhakaran to Blame for LTTE‘s Demise, Says Karuna‖,Sify News, December 14, 2010
<http://www.sify.com/news/prabhakaran-to-blame-for-ltte-s-demise-says-karuna-news-internationalkmonEohdjed.html>at November 25, 2012
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Chapter 11: Conclusion

This study began by identifying the research questions and providing the backdrop to
the topic of research (chapters 1-2). Chapter 3 presented the six key factors which
commonly influence terrorist campaigns by extrapolating from the experiences of past
and ongoing groups around the world. While chapter 4 illustrated the overview of the
Sri Lankan conflict and the organisational description of the LTTE, chapters 5-10 were
dedicated to testing the variables identified in chapter 3 to the case of the Tamil Tigers.
Here the summary of the research outcomes is presented. This section brings together
the separate findings of each variable to paint a single coherent picture of the LTTE
lifecycle. The chapter will conclude with implications for future research. Appendix 7
presents the summary of findings, and Appendix 8 illustrates the number of LTTE
terrorist attacks throughout their campaign.

11.1 Summary of findings
Overall, the role of ideology in the LTTE campaign confirmed existing theories, albeit
with important caveats in some cases. The following section summarises the impact of
each factor on the LTTE campaign.

1. Role of Ideology
Ideology was a crucial factor in providing justification for violence in the formative
stages of the group. The secessionist ideology appealed to the masses, and contributed
to the upsurge of recruitment. Propaganda and coercive measures further attracted more
public support and enhanced group morale for the campaign to escalate. The level of
ideological conviction was unprecedented and exceptional in comparison to all of the
Tamil militant groups which existed at the time. The LTTE demonstrated that this factor
is a critical in bringing members together, and also serves as a foundation in defining
and escalating the struggle.
Given the role of ideology in the formatives stages of a campaign, we expected
that the erosion of ideological commitment in turn leads to the downfall of the group.
The increased numbers of forcible recruitment especially after 2002 translated to an
overall decline in the ideological commitment of both the new and existing members.
Karuna‘s defection in 2004 severely undermined the group morale. Furthermore, the
luxurious lifestyle enjoyed by the senior LTTE commanders greatly discouraged
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members from other echelons of the outfit, who started to question their value and role
in the struggle for a Tamil Eelam. In a group like the LTTE where utmost loyalty and
commitment towards Prabhakaran constituted an integral feature of the LTTE ideology,
a loss of faith in their leadership translated into the loss of faith in the overall ideology.
The combination of instrumental and tactical factors in turn appeared to have led to the
gradual erosion of the members‘ ideological commitment to the cause, thus marking the
decline of the campaign.
The LTTE‘s target selection was defined by their ideology in the formative years.
However, ideology was not the sole determinant of target selection, especially after the
group surpassed its escalation stage. For the most part, the targets were selected based
on the strategic objectives of the time. Targeting rival Tamil militant groups and
‗traitors‘ were a part of a larger strategic objective of reinforcing organisational
superiority, and also a reflection of Prabhakaran‘s character as he was unable to tolerate
dissent under any circumstances. Here, the LTTE behavior slightly deviated from
anticipated results as the group‘s target choices fluctuated according to other exogenous
factors that were not directly relevant to the overall ideology of the group. In some
cases, ideology adapted to circumstances and shifted over time.

2. Ceasefires and Peace Agreements
Ceasefires and peace agreement yield disparate impacts depending on the movement.
While ceasefires are ideally intended to shift terrorist campaigns toward de-escalation
and eventual demise, some terrorist groups experience factional splintering or exploit
the opportunity for military recuperation. The LTTE campaign in fact witnessed both
outcomes. The peace talks were exploited to achieve their short term goals (military
recuperation and elimination of rival Tamil groups) with the intention of resuming war
in the near future. For the LTTE, it was clear that Prabhakaran never had faith in
political negotiations since the outset, as he held a firm belief that violence was the only
solution to the secessionist struggle. On every occasion it obtained (Thimpu talks,
Premadasa-LTTE talks, Kumaratunga-LTTE talks, and the 2002 ceasefire agreement),
the LTTE recuperated militarily and prepared for the resumption of war. During the
ceasefires, the LTTE violence did not come to a complete halt, as they continued to
target the government forces and other Tamil militant groups. In essence, the peace
talks prevented an all out battle against the government forces and temporarily shifted
the LTTE to its de-escalation phase. But overall it served as a precursor to the re250

escalation of the LTTE campaign. As expected, the militants also experienced a mass
defection of Col. Karuna Amman during this period, in March 2004.

3. Local support, State sponsorship and International Networks
Like most terrorist movements, the LTTE presented a solid case where public support
was vital in legitimising, escalating, and sustaining the campaign. Since the Black July
riots of 1983, the LTTE enjoyed steady popular support until 2002. Along with
voluntary recruitment and mass support, the organisation garnered constituent support
through intimidation tactics and coercion. The Tigers proactively sought and sustained
public support by running intricate propaganda machinery both locally and
internationally. It secured human resources domestically and obtained financial,
political and moral support from abroad. The rise and consolidation of public support
paralleled with the increased frequency of attacks over time, as well as the widening
target selection- hence reflecting the group‘s operational capability.
As existing theories suggested, the de-escalation phase of the LTTE campaign
witnessed the decline of popular support. Despite the wide support the LTTE enjoyed
since the early stages of their campaign, the group witnessed gradual erosion in support
since 2002, especially on the domestic front. The LTTE shifted its strategy and tactics
based on coercion, while it increasingly turned towards the Diaspora for logistical and
moral support. After the militants hit their peak of escalation towards the end of Eelam
War III, their strategic objectives disregarded the support from the local constituents,
and focused on military recuperation. Eelam War IV marked the decline in their
campaign as they lost a significant amount of local support, and relied heavily on
external sources for survival.
The impact of state sponsorship on a terrorist campaign was also confirmed with
the LTTE. The Indian sponsorship was especially crucial in the Tigers‘ formative
stages. Following the Black July incident in 1983, India became an active base for the
Tamil militants to grow in number and strengthen their operational capability. Since
1984 onwards, the militants gradually increased the number of attacks and widened
their modus operandi to include more sophisticated attacks employing Improvised
Explosive Devises (IED) and landmines. However, contrary to the theoretical
assumptions, the withdrawal of Indian sponsorship did not seemingly yield much
immediate impact on the movement- apart from the fact that the group lost its sanctuary
and material support in India. The proscription of the group in the aftermath of the
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Gandhi assassination merely limited the activities of the LTTE in India, but did not
undermine the group‘s operational capabilities as a whole. This was demonstrated by
the increase in operations and attacks in subsequent wars.The escalation of the LTTE
campaign, despite losing a state sponsor, can be attributed to the group‘s self-sufficient
nature. Without relying on a sole benefactor, the movement simultaneously established
several links with other terrorist groups and set up its own international shipping
network to procure armaments. This underscored the impact of regional and
international networks in strengthening the group‘s operational capabilities.

4. Funding
Existing theories purported that an increased level of funding allows the escalation of
violence through the use of a more sophisticated modus operandi and an increased
frequency of attacks. Naturally, the lack thereof, should lead to the decline of a
campaign. The initial part of this hypothesis was applicable to the LTTE, as the constant
influx of revenue allowed the group to escalate and sustain the campaign. Over the
years, the LTTE secured its revenue sources through various channels. The escalation of
the LTTE campaign drew a parallel to the evolution of the fundraising mechanism. As
the revenue generation methods became more sophisticated and thus ensured a robust
flow of income, the militants were able to intensify violence. The amalgamation of both
domestic and international fundraising efforts enabled the LTTE to escalate their
campaign through to the Third Eelam War (1995 to the 2002 CFA). Consequently, the
assumption that a relative lack of funds leads to the decline of a campaign is not
applicable to the analysis of the LTTE. Evidence suggested that the Tigers still retained
ample revenue until the end of the campaign. Put simply, lack of financial resources was
not the likely determinant of the organisation‘s downfall.

5. Organisational dynamics
Existing theories suggested that terrorist groups and political fronts operate
interchangeably in different areas to further their cause. A rise in increased political
activity theoretically results in a decrease of terrorist violence, while an increase in
violence leads to a decrease in political activities of the front groups. To this end, this
proposition was not confirmed in this case because the relationship between the LTTE
and its political proxy was not clear cut. More importantly, the level of violence did not
necessarily decrease because of increased activity of the political wing. Because the
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LTTE appeared to increase political activities during ceasefires and peace talks, it is
difficult to confirm whether increased political activities led to the decrease of violence
as a result. There was an overall decrease in violence during ceasefires, but violence
continued on a lower-scale in any case. The political parties were merely a superficial
entity to give the impression that the militants were genuinely interested in joining the
political process. As evident throughout the study, violence remained to be the primary
method of operation for the LTTE. Conversely, the LTTE confirmed the assumption
that violence intensifies upon targeting rival militant groups and splinter groups. The
intra-ethnic violence was underpinned by the LTTE‘s long term strategic objective to
achieve superiority as the sole representative of the Tamil constituents and defy dissent.

6. Military interventions
The impact of foreign interventions on the Tigers‘ campaign was in line with the
anticipated outcome. The arrival of the IPKF did indeed temporarily halt the violence
between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government, but the militants still
continued to engage in violent attacks towards different targets. Moreover, the LTTE‘s
resentment against the IPKF magnified over time, resulting in the engagement of
conflict with a new adversary: the Indian forces. Despite the shift in the target selection,
the LTTE simultaneously continued to attack domestic targets, but on a lesser scale. The
eventual withdrawal of the Indian troops did not result in a respite in the violence either.
In fact, the Second Eelam war swiftly resumed, and the LTTE further intensified its
military campaign following the retreat of the Indians.
Unlike foreign interventions, it is a challenge to make a generalised conclusion on
the impact of domestic military interventions on the LTTE campaign. Existing theories
suggest that campaigns rarely end through military force alone. The success of
interventions is usually temporary, and likely to invite a backlash of violence. However,
the impact of the military interventions painted a complex picture in this case. The
outcome of government offensives was inconsistent in every phase of the war,
depending on the circumstances of the organisation and other external factors.
Frequency of terrorist attacks increased after successful military operations, which
conformed to traditional patterns of terrorist campaigns. The backlash of violence was
one of the primary methods for the LTTE to retaliate against the government
interventions, in order to compensate for its military inferiority as a conventional force
on the battlefield. However, the LTTE met its demise in the fourth Eelam War, despite
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intensifying attacks following military confrontations. Military interventions were
unsuccessful in crushing the movement in the past Eelam Wars because the militants
possessed several other strengths which defied government operations. However,
military intervention proved successful in the final Eelam War, because by then the
LTTE had hit the de-escalation phase. The combination of the LTTE‘s downfall and
effective counter-terrorism operations were successful in ultimately bringing the
campaign to an end in 2009. Thus, this case study defied the traditional understanding
that military force rarely vanquishes terrorist campaigns.1131
Finally, the hypothesis that the removal or the death of the leader causes the
demise of the organisation did not hold true with the LTTE. In hindsight, it was not the
death of the leader which prompted the de-escalation of the group and its demise.
Rather, the de-escalation of the group had already occurred prior to the decimation of
the leader, and that the death of Prabhakaran marked the demise of the LTTE military
campaign. The organisation lacked several crucial elements by the time it resumed
Eelam War IV: voluntary recruitment, local support (funding, material and moral), and
ideological and moral conviction of LTTE cadres. The defection of Karuna‘s group also
served to be a huge blow to the organisation. The amalgamation of the said factors
produced a synergetic effect which destabilised the movement both externally and
internally on a massive scale. Since the death of Prabhakaran, the island nation did not
witness a single terrorist attack. This, by default, indicated that the LTTE had been
militarily defeated and marked an end to their 33 year-long campaign.
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Again, the success of military interventions depends on the level of indiscriminate and heavy force
employed to crush terrorism.
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11.2 The lifecycle of the LTTE campaign

Fig. 14 The LTTE campaign

The graph above (Fig. 14) indicates a general overview of the LTTE lifecycle based on
the research findings. The overall developments of the four Eelam wars by and large
were aligned with the four identified phases of the terrorist lifecycle. Since its inception
in 1976, the LTTE gradually escalated its campaign from the First Eelam War onwards.
When it entered the Second Eelam War, the outfit established a de-facto state and
increased the number of attacks and activities. The Third Eelam War was the peak in the
Tigers‘ strength, as it witnessed a large number of attacks, widened target selection, and
engaged in the greatest number of conventional military battles against the government
forces. Towards the end of the Eelam War III, the militants were weakened
operationally. Although the LTTE prepared for the resumption of war during the 2002
ceasefire by recuperating militarily, the organisation had already hit its de-escalation
phase by the time it entered the final Eelam War, resulting in its demise in 2009. The
subsequent section provides an overview of the four phases of the LTTE campaign
according to the theoretical terrorist lifecycle.

Emergence
The birth of the LTTE campaign was underpinned by various factors. As existing
literature on terrorist lifecycle hypothesise, we witnessed three crucial elements in the
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emergence of a violent campaign: ideology, public support and recruitment, and a
robust leadership. The Tamil secessionist ideology existed prior to the birth of the
LTTE. Although Prabhakaran established himself as the sole leader of the organisation,
the activities of the group and membership were generally limited to bank robberies and
low-profile assassination in the nascent years (with an exception being the assassination
of Jaffna Mayor Alfred Duraiappah in July 1975). Concentrated public support towards
the LTTE was minimal because several militant groups existed simultaneously in the
1970s. Overall, the LTTE as a militant organisation did not gain momentum until after
July 1983.
Escalation
The escalation phase of the LTTE campaign lasted for nearly twenty years. Most of the
developments during this phase were in accordance with theoretical assumptions
outlined in Chapter 3. First, several features prevalent at the emergence phase were
dramatically strengthened at this stage- namely the role of ideology, leadership, and
increase in public support and membership. The Black July riots of 1983 reinforced the
separatist ideology, thus enabling the group to justify their cause and the use of violence
to achieve self-determination. Overall support for the struggle was embraced widely at
the grassroots level, resulting in an upsurge of recruitment of Tamil youths. Gradually
the militants engaged in various coercive tactics to garner support both locally and
internationally.
More importantly, Prabhakaran played a critical role in consolidating the
organisational cohesion. The cult of martyrdom and Prabhakaran‘s charismatic and
‗demi-god like character‘1132 reinforced the ideological conviction of the members.
Moreover, Prabhakaran‘s intransigence (to achieve nothing less than an Eelam) and
megalomania contributed significantly in ensuring discipline and the rigid hierarchy. It
was precisely these elements which enabled the LTTE to escalate its activities and
achieve its position as the most dominant and ruthless militant group by 1986.
Second, the escalation phase commonly witnesses new developments in
comparison to the previous stage. The Tigers‘ campaign confirmed this proposition.
This study revealed how the LTTE gradually widened its revenue sources through both
domestic and international arenas. Moreover, the LTTE‘s operational capabilities were
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Interview with the Army Commander of Sri Lanka (at the time of interview), Lt. Gen. Jagath
Jayasuriya, Army Headquarters, Colombo, Sri Lanka,November 16 2011
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strengthened exponentially. As expected, the militants increased their terrorist activities
by increasing the frequency and the lethality of attacks. Target selection widened along
with the use of a variety of modus operandi. The level of tactical and strategic
innovation exhibited by the group was unprecedented, most notably through the use of
suicide terrorism. The Tigers‘ military strength was also demonstrated through their
conventional land, sea and air forces which engaged in many conventional military
battles against the security forces. This feature was rare in comparison to most terrorist
and insurgent groups that predominantly engage in hit-and-run tactics. Further, the
amalgamation of hit-and-run tactics and conventional attacks was functional in
escalating the LTTE campaign.
As existing theories suggest, the escalation of a terrorist campaign invites
military interventions from government forces and/or foreign forces. The LTTE
confirmed this presumption, where the security forces launched their first major
counter-terrorism operation in 1987. Foreign intervention by the Indian Peacekeeping
Forces soon followed. Several military interventions throughout the LTTE lifespan by
and large invited a backlash of violence, resulting in an increased frequency of terrorist
attacks and a destructive campaign. Finally, as anticipated, the Tigers also engaged in
attacks against rival militant groups. Since the Black July riots until circa 1986, the
organisation focused on eliminating Tamil militant groups in order to achieve
superiority. In fact, this remained to be one of the main strategic objectives of the group
in throughout the campaign.

De-escalation
Existing literature suggest that the de-escalation stage of a campaign is characterised by
various elements such as 1) disillusionment of cause among members; 2) decline in the
numbers of military confrontations and/or decrease in terrorist attacks; 3) organisational
splitting; 4) erosion of public support and membership; 5) loss of territory, if any.
Overall, most of these features were present within the LTTE campaign with one
exception. The organisation had already shifted to the de-escalation phase by the time it
entered into the ceasefire in 2002. Chapter 5 revealed how the militants gradually lost
public support through forced recruitment, as well as an increase in intimidation and the
use of coercive tactics against their constituents. As the campaign shifted to the deescalation stage, the militants ironically tilted towards the Diaspora community for
moral and political support. The LTTE‘s detachment from the local constituents further
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contributed to the erosion domestic public support. Organisational cohesion was also
weakened through Karuna‘s defection in 2004 and by an overall decrease in ideological
commitment of the members. The erosion of group morale led to the further need to
recruit coercively to sustain the movement and to replenish manpower, which triggered
a vicious cycle. Finally, the LTTE gradually lost territorial control since 2007.
While theoretical assumptions suggest that the de-escalation phase will witness
an overall decline in the frequency and lethality of attacks, the LTTE case demonstrated
otherwise. Despite hitting its downfall, the organisation increasingly perpetrated
terrorist attacks during the final Eelam War in comparison to the previous Eelam Wars.
In hindsight, the Tigers‘ backlash of violence towards the end of the campaign signified
decline in the overall group strength and operational capability.

Demise
The demise of a campaign signifies the complete abandonment of violence. Since the
LTTE was militarily defeated on May 18th, 2009, no single terrorist attacks took place
in the country. To recapitulate, Cronin1133 proposed several reasons that contribute to
the demise of a group: (1) capture or killing of the group‘s leader, (2) entry of the group
into a legitimate political process, (3) achievement of the group‘s aims, (4) implosion or
loss of the group‘s public support, (5) defeat and elimination by brute force, and (6)
transition from terrorism into other forms of violence. This research revealed that the
LTTE campaign experienced three of these conditions: the killing of the leader, loss of
group‘s public support, defeat and elimination by brute force. However, given that the
LTTE had lost public support during the de-escalation stage (well before the resumption
of Eelam War IV), this factor would have assumed a lesser role in ending the struggle.
Rather, the successful elimination of the militants by brute force, followed by
Prabhakaran‘s death contributed substantially to the demise of the LTTE campaign.
In hindsight, Prabhakaran‘s refusal to move away from the maximalist goal
(secession) and the use of violence to pursue his objective resulted in LTTE‘s strategic
inflexibility. With the changes in the surrounding political environment following the
end of Eelam War III, Prabhakaran failed to adapt accordingly. His refusal to accept
nothing less than an Eelam resulted in several strategic blunders. These include the
failure to enter peace talks with genuine intentions, failure to appoint a successor,
1133
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coercive recruitment and detachment from local constituencies, and over-reliance on the
Diaspora communities. The amalgamation of these factors destabilised the movement as
a whole and shifted the LTTE campaign to the de-escalation stage by the time it entered
Eelam War IV. Had Prabhakaran been slightly more sensitive to the changing political
environment and less of a megalomaniac following the escalation and the peak of the
LTTE campaign, both Prabhakaran and his Eelam campaign may have met a different
fate than that of May 2009.Rigidity of the goal, the means, and the extreme hierarchal
structure of the LTTE ultimately made the group susceptible to demise.

11.3 Theoretical Implications
Overall, this research demonstrates that the traditional patterns of a terrorist lifecycle are
applicable in explaining the Tamil Tigers‘ campaign. The findings of this case study
reinforce the following in particular:
1) The emergence of a movement is generally underpinned by ideology, public
support, and mobilisation through robust leadership. These elements reinforce each
other, and the absence of any single factor significantly reduces the likelihood of a
terrorist campaign emerging.
2) Territorial control allows the organisation to escalate its campaign for a
longer period of time. To begin with, in the case of the LTTE it allowed them to gather
further strength by acquiring military capability. This was an added advantage for the
militants as it provided them with a deep knowledge of the terrain and provided space
for military training. The familiarity of the terrain is naturally a strategic advantage in
conducting battles against the security forces. Second, civilians living in the de-facto
state were subjected to more LTTE propaganda and activities. Thus solid control over
territory further facilitated the garnering of constituent support, coerced or otherwise
(including provision of administrative and welfare services). Furthermore, Sri Lanka‘s
geography (especially difficult jungle terrain) contributed to the longevity of the LTTE
to a certain extent. Sri Lanka as an island nation and LTTE‘s territorial control allowed
the militants to develop naval capabilities (the Sea Tigers). All of the said factors yield a
synergetic effect in facilitating the group to escalate and sustain their struggle.
3) The function of the Diaspora community simply as a source of funding and
political support is an understatement. The Diaspora-militant nexus is much more
complex, and mutually reinforcing. The impact of Diaspora support is largely
influenced by the development of conflict at home. Similarly, militants‘ reliance on the
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Diaspora fluctuates according to the campaign trajectory. The complex relationship
between the Diasporas and the militants were evident with the LTTE. Put simply, the
Diaspora support is not necessarily unilateral and it does not operate independently
from the realities on the ground.
4) Several factors that are prevalent during the de-escalation phase are heavily
interrelated, and mutually reinforce each other in catalysing the downfall of a group. For
instance, the Tigers‘ experience demonstrated that disillusionment with the cause
among members catalysed organisational splitting, while erosion of public support in
turn depleted ideological commitment of the members. Together these elements can
produce a vicious cycle that catalyses the de-escalation of a campaign.
5) Capitalising on organisational splintering could be an effective counterterrorism strategy. Indeed, the effectiveness of this method is likely to depend on the
motivations and the strategic objectives of the off-shoot group. During the 2002
ceasefire period, the Sri Lankan government capitalised on the organisational rift
between Prabhakaran and Karuna. Following Karuna‘s defection and given his motive
to undermine the LTTE, the government tactfully extracted vital intelligence on the
militants to promulgate appropriate counter-terrorism strategies.
6)Sri Lanka‘s unique geographical location played a critical role in the final
demise of the LTTE. Being an island, the Sri Lanka Navy was able to successfully
cordon off the entire sea-coast (discussed in Chapter 10). Not only did this restrict the
group‘s arms procurement, but it also restricted the militants‘ option to retreat to a safer
place or to another country. Had Sri Lanka been a landlocked country like Afghanistan,
or shared porous borders as with the case of Pakistan or Turkey, the LTTE campaign
may well have continued. The cordoning off of the entire sea-coast was thus important
in determining the fate of the LTTE in its final phases. In this context, the role of
geography and terrain on a terrorist campaign is also a potential variable of interest that
can be incorporated in future research.
Several aspects of the LTTE were also unique, deviating somewhat from
theoretical predictions:
1) Target selection fluctuates according to other exogenous factors that are not
directly relevant to the overall ideology of the group. With the LTTE, the ideology
adapted to circumstances and shifted over time.
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2) The loss of external sponsorship is unlikely to affect organisations that are by
and large self-sufficient. This proposition is especially applicable to groups that possess
a territorial stronghold and with a robust international network.
3) Terrorist movements with ample assets can still face demise when other
relevant factors come into effect.
4) The de-escalation phase may witness a stark rise in terrorist attacks. For a
group facing its downfall, the most immediate interest would be to project their
perceived strength and public support (coerced or otherwise) in order to ensure survival.
5) The function of political proxies depends on the organisational strategy.
While some groups employ their political fronts as a substitute for terrorist activities,
other groups will continue to perpetrate violence in parallel with increased political
activities.
6) It has been argued that the outcome of military interventions is often
temporary and invites a backlash of violence. Only a few cases in history demonstrated
the successful use of force in eliminating a terrorist campaign.1134 As seen in the case
study, military operations were successful in crushing the campaign because the
organisation had hit its downfall by the time the final offensive was launched. In
essence, the use of force alone did not end the campaign. Military defeat of a terrorist
campaign is more likely under the following conditions combined: 1) the group is
facing an overall decline in the campaign; 2) there are tactical and strategic
improvements in the security forces; and 3) the desired outcome of the military
operations is a pyrrhic victory.
7) The death of a leader, though significant, does not necessarily catalyse the
demise of the group by itself. If an organisation is substantially weakened, the death of
the leader will in fact simply mark the demise of the campaign. The likelihood of regrouping and reviving the campaign is minimal when key figures in such organisations
perish and when there is a lack of public support for the movement. Moreover, the
LTTE case reinforced that a campaign is more susceptible to seemingly lasting demise
when the organisation utilises a centralised and hierarchical structure led by a
charismatic megalomaniac.

1134
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11.4 Concluding remarks and implications for future research
Because this study dealt with a highly complex topic over a number of decades, and
despite the best efforts to cover as many incidents and major developments of the
conflict as possible, it is inevitable that there is both missing and/or conflicting data.
Having acknowledged such limitations in the research, the group displayed a clear shift
in phases from its emergence to demise, although there was some ebb and flow during
the course of the campaign. Overall, the emergence phase marked the pre-Eelam War
years (1976-1983); the escalation phase marked the first Eelam War to immediately
before the 2002 CFA; de-escalation marked the onset of the 2002 CFA, and finally, the
demise of the group was synonymous with the death of Prabhakaran. In hindsight, this
research confirmed that existing theories of terrorist lifecycles were useful for
conceptualising, analysing and understanding the LTTE campaign. Findings which
deviated from the traditional patterns of terrorist lifecycles help to refine the existing
theories.
It is pertinent to note that the six variables that were selected for this research are
not necessarily exhaustive. Whilst they represent the primary variables of interest
identified in existing literature, other variables might be incorporated and explored to
expand the scope of the research. Furthermore, conducting comparative analysis to
other terrorism cases could provide additional insights, which is another possibility for
future research. Looking beyond the research design, the military defeat of the LTTE
has not fully neutralised the ideological front. The failure to redress the root cause of the
ethnic conflict can indeed provide a fertile ground for terrorism to revive in the island
nation. The future trajectory of the post-war reconciliation process in the country is
likely to impact the resurgence of terrorism in the long run. The possibility for future
research is thus to assess the potential conditions for a revival of violence in Sri Lanka.
Based on how the LTTE campaign ended, will we witness a resurgence of violence, and
if so, how might the renewed campaign differ from the previous one?
Existing theories on resurgence and revival of terrorism can direct the research
trajectory. Cronin notes that one of the ‗dangers‘ of killing the leader of a terrorist group
is that his/her death could backfire, and result in increased publicity for the group‘s
cause and create a martyr who attracts more recruits. For example, many Palestinian
youths were eager to join Hamas or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad following the deaths of
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senior leaders.1135 However, this trend was not observed with the LTTE because the
organisation was dismantled and most of the senior leaders have perished in the war.
Local support for the LTTE had diminished significantly towards and following the
conclusion of the war, thus minimising the likelihood of immediate resurgence of
violence. Additionally, Cronin explains that if the source of popular mobilisation
continues to exist, brutal repression of terrorism will be short-lived and even
counterproductive.1136 Her findings suggest that force used in an indiscriminate way
against groups that have substantial public support for the ideology ―shoves the threat
either underground or to other regions‖.1137Although the LTTE has been dismantled
within Sri Lanka, there is a shift in the threat landscape from the domestic to the
international sphere. Several developments within the Tamil Diaspora suggest that a
small segment of the population is persistent on continuing the legacy and the ideology
of the LTTE in different manifestations in the post-war context.1138
To this end, the possibilities for a renewed terrorist campaign cannot be
dismissed altogether. Currently, the conditions are rife to reinforce the Tamil separatist
ideologies (grievances) if capitalised effectively. However, the ideology needs to be
mobilised through a robust leadership (as suggested in existing theories). Because
Prabhakaran‘s demi-God like character is still freshly embedded into the minds of most
pro-LTTE elements, the potential successor of Prabhakaran is likely to face a challenge
in ‗outdoing‘ Prabhakaran as a leader. If not, he/she is likely to take on a completely
new approach in establishing his/her leadership to mobilise the movement. There is no
guarantee that the successor will be any better than the predecessor.1139 This will then
affect the level of recruitment and the sort of public/external state support it can
engender. Consequently, these elements will mould the organisational structure and the
organisational dynamics. The organisational behaviour, strategic and tactical preference
1135
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of the new outfit may completely divorce from the past. Perhaps, the new face of
terrorism that could potentially confront Sri Lanka in the future will take on a separate
path from that of Prabhakaran‘s Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam.
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Appendix 1: LTTE Terrorist Attack Database

Year

1

1975

Place

Target

July 27th

Ponnalai,
Jaffna District

Alfred Duraiappah (Mayor of
Jaffna)

2

1976
1976

March 5th
May 5th

3

1977

February 14th

4

1977

5

6

8

9

1978

1978

1978

1978

Ethnicity
of Target

Date

Puttur, Jaffna
District

Tamil

Deaths

Injured

1

Modus
Operandi

Sources

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/publication/idr/vol
_17(2)/sp_sinha.htm

Robbery

http://www.sangam.org/
Sabaratnam/Pirapaharan
Chap9.htm

People's Bank
Creation of the LTTE

N/A

Mavadipuram,
Jaffna District

PC Karunandhi

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.sangam.org/a
rticles/view/?id=28

May 18th

Inuvil, Jaffna
District

Police Officers- Both by the
name of Shanmuganathan

Tamil

2

Shooting

http://www.sangam.org/a
rticles/view/?id=28

January 27th

Charles Place,
Colombo

M. Canagaratnam (Former
MP Pottuvil)

Shooting

Swamy, N., Tigers of
Lanka: From Boys to
Guerillas, p.36

April 7th

Murunkan,
Mannar
District

Inspector Bastianpillai, SubInspector Perampalan (plus
chauffeur)

Shooting

Swamy, N., Tigers of
Lanka: From Boys to
Guerillas, p.37

June

Velvettiturai,
Jaffna District

?

Dissanayake, TDSA,
War or Peace in Sri
Lanka, p.35

4
Robberies

Dissanayake, TDSA,
War or Peace in Sri
Lanka, p.35

Tamil

Inspector Kumaru

Tamil

Tamil

July
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1

3

1

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1978

1978

1978

1978

1978

1979

1979

September

CTB Bus

Arson

Dissanayake, TDSA,
War or Peace in Sri
Lanka, p.35
Dissanayake, TDSA,
War or Peace in Sri
Lanka, p.36

?

Point Pedro,
Jaffna District

School Teacher's salary

Robbery

September 7th

Colombo,
Western
Province

Air Ceylon AVERO 748 from
Kankesanturai to Ratmalana

IED
Explosion

Kopai Multi-Purpose CoOperative Society

?

December 5th

Nallur, Jaffna
District

March

Kilinocchi,
Northern
Province

Bus

Jaffna District

S. A. Emmanuel of
Chankanai, Thaadi
Thangarajah of Kondavil, A.
Krishnagol of Velvettiturai, T.
Poopalasingham of
Chunnakam and A. Sivarajah
of Thondamannar

?

Police Constable Kingsley
Perera & Satchithanadan

Tamil &
Sinhala
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Tamil

2

5

1

http://www.sangam.org/a
rticles/view/?id=28

Robbery

Dissanayake, TDSA,
War or Peace in Sri
Lanka, p.36

Shooting

Dissanayake, TDSA,
War or Peace in Sri
Lanka, p.36

Robbery

Dissanayake, TDSA,
War or Peace in Sri
Lanka, p.36

Execution

Dissanayake, TDSA,
War or Peace in Sri
Lanka, p.36

17

1979

?

Jaffna District

18

1981

May 24th

19

1982

May 27th

?
Jaffna, Jaffna
District

January 19th

Vavuniya
district

February 18th

Point Pedro,
Jaffna District

March

Kilinocchi,
Northern
Province

July 23rd

Jaffna, Jaffna
District

20

21

22

23

1983

1983

1983

1983

24

1983

August 12th

Jaffna District

25

1983

August 14th

?

PC Gnanasambandan, PC
Sivanesan, Inspector
Guruswamy, S. Swarnarajah
and his wife

Tamil

5

Execution

Dissanayake, TDSA,
War or Peace in Sri
Lanka, p.36

A. Thiyagarajah, UNP MP
Vadukkodai

Tamil

1

Shooting

Police Officers

Tamil

2

Shooting

http://www.tamilsydney.
com/content/view/1990/3
7/
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.347

Shooting

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html

Shooting

Swamy, N., Tigers of
Lanka: From Boys to
Guerillas, p.85

Ambush

Swamy, N., Tigers of
Lanka: From Boys to
Guerillas, p.85

Ambush

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/3090111.st
m

KT Pulendran (UNP
organizer, Vavuniya)

Tamil

Police inspector & Driver

Sinhala

2 Army vehicles

1

2

N/A

Sri Lankan Soldiers

Sinhala

A.J. Rajasooriar (UNP
organizer, Jaffna)
Oberoi Thevan (TELA
Leader)
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5

13

Tamil

1

Shooting

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html
http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DB23Df04.html

26

1983

September 1st

Batticaloa,
Eastern
Province

Oberoi Hotel

Mala Ramachandran (UNP
organizer, Batticaloa)

Tamil

27

1984

January 24th

Colombo,
Western
Province

28

1984

August 2nd

Madras
Airport, India

Madras International Aiport

29

1984

August 4th

Valvetiturai
Coast,

August 5th

Mullaitivu,
Northern
Province

30

1984

1

IED
Explosion

http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DC16Df02.html

1

6

24

SL Navy Boat

6

Attack

http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DC16Df02.html

Police Station

?

2

Attack

http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DC16Df02.html

SL Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

6

Police Officers

?

2

Landmine/
IED
IED
Explosion

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.349
http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DC16Df02.html

9

4

Landmine/
IED
Submachin
e guns,
Rifles &
grenades
Submachin
e guns,
Rifles &
grenades

http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DC16Df02.html

1984

August 11th

32

1984

September 1st

1984

September 9th

Kokilai,
Mullaitivu
District

SL Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

1984

November
11th

Mullaitivu,
Northern
Province

Dollar Farm Village

Sinhala

33

Several
others

1984

November
30th

Mullaitivu,
Northern
Province

Kent Farm Village

Sinhala

29

Several
others

35

http://www.lankapuvath.l
k/index.php/morenews/ltte-attrocities

?
Indians &
Sri
Lankans
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

31

34

IED
Explosion

Several
others

Mannar,
Northern
Province
Thikkam, Point
Pedro District

33

Shooting

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html
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http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1984

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1984

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

1984

1984

1985

1985

1985

1985

1985

1985

December 1st

Kokilai and
Nayaru,
Mannar
District

Kokkilai & Nayaru Fishing
Village

Sinhala

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

4

Shooting

http://www.nytimes.com/
1985/01/01/world/around
-the-world-rebels-in-srilanka-shoot-four-astraitors.html

39

Landmine/
IED

http://www.nowpublic.co
m/world/sri-lanka-armyremind-history-0

11

13

December
31st

Batticaloa,
Eastern
Province

Tamils that 'betrayed cause'

January 19th

MurukandiKokavil Train
Station

Yal Devi Train- Army
Soldiers and Civilians

February 24th

?

S. Gnanachandiram (ExDistrict Judge of Point Pedro
and GA of Mullaitivu)

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html

April 22nd

Mullaitivu,
Northern
Province

SLA Soldiers

?

1

?

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.351

May 5th

Wilpattu,
Northwestern
Province

Wilpattu Village

Sinhala

18

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1985

May 14th

Anuradhapura,
Anuradhapura
District

Shooting

http://www.time.com/tim
e/magazine/article/0,917
1,957036,00.html

Shooting

http://www.lankapuwath.
lk/index.php?option=co
m_content&view=catego
ry&layout=blog&id=51
&Itemid=80

May 14th

Wilpattu,
Northwestern
Province

Tamil

Sinhala

Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi Temple

Wilpattu Forest Reserve

Sinhala

Sinhala
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146

18

28

85

44

1985

May 30th

45

1985

June 4th

46

47

48

49

50

51

1985

1985

1985

1985

1985

1985

Mihindupura
& Dehiwatta,
Trincomalee
Dehiwatta,
Trincomalee

Villages

Sinhala

5

Dehiwatta Village

Sinhala

15

June 11th

Dehiwatta,
Trincomalee

Sinhala civilians

June 26th

Jaffna, Jaffna
District

C.E. Anandarajah (Principal
of St. John's College, Jaffna)

August 2nd

Somawathiya
National Park,
Polonnaruwa
District

Sinhala

Somawathie Chaitiya
Sanctuary

Tamil

Sinhala

August 14th

Aranthalawa,
Ampara
District

August 17th

Madhu,
Mannar,
Northern
Province

Madhu Village

Sinhala

August 18th

Namalwatta,
Trincomalee
District

Namalwatta Village

Sinhala

Aranthalawa village

Sinhala

308

13

1

3

7

6

Shooting
Sharp
Weapons

http://www.sangam.org/a
rticles/view2/?uid=991
http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1985

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Shooting

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Torture &
Execution

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

?

http://www.news.lk/inde
x.php?option=com_conte
nt&task=view&id=1515
6&Itemid=44

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1985

52

1985

August 22nd

53

1985

September 3rd

?
Jaffna, Jaffna
District

November 7th

Namalwatta,
Trincomalee
District

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

1985

1985

1985

1986

1986

1986

1986

P. Thambipillai (President of
Citizen's Committee,
Oddusudan)

Tamil

1

Shooting

TULF members

Tamil

2

Shooting

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.353

Namalwatta Village

Sinhala

10

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1985

Execution

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

19

?

http://www.sonakar.com/
2011/07/terrorismagainst-muslims-by-theltte/

Executionswords and
small arms

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1986

Landmine/
IED

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.351

IED
Explosion

http://news.bbc.co.uk/ont
hisday/hi/dates/stories/m
ay/3/newsid_2481000/24
81291.stm

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1986

December
20th

Mannar,
Northern
Province

Jan-December

Kaththankudy,
Eastern
Province

February 2nd

Kantale,
Trincomalee
District

Kantale Village

Sinhala

19

February 19th

Allai-Kantalai
Road, Eastern
Province

Refugees from Serunuwara
and Dehiwatta village

Sinhala

36

May 3rd

Katunayake
International
Airport

Air Lanka Flight UL 512

Internation
al

21

May 5th

Kinniya,
Trincomalee
District

Kinniya Village

Muslim

4

Pilgrims

Sinhala

Civilians

Muslim
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6

20

41

61

1986

May 6th

62

1986

May 6th

63

1986

May 25th

64

1986

May 29th

65

66

67

68

1986

1986

1986

1986

Colombo,
Western
Province
Beetle
Plantation,
Jaffna District
Mahadivulwew
a,
Anuradhapura
District
Colombo,
Western
Province

May 31st

Palatopur,
Mutur-Seruvila
Road
Veyangoda
station,
Western
Province

June 2nd

Trincomalee
3rd Mile Post,
Trincomalee
District

May 29th

June 4th

Andankulam,
Northern
Province

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Central Telegraph Office
Sri Sabarathnam (TELO
Leader)

12

100+

IED
Explosion

http://www.atimes.com/a
times/South_Asia/DI14D
f01.html

Tamil

1

20

Elephant House- Ceylon Cold
Stores

Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

9

18

VBIED

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2009/06/10/fea09.asp

SL Army-3rd battalion of the
Ceylon Light Infantry

Sinhala

29

Several
others

Landmine/
IED

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2009/06/10/fea09.asp

Train

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

40

IED
Explosion

http://articles.latimes.co
m/1986-06-01/news/mn8833_1_sri-lanka

Firearms,
swords &
knives

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1986

Torture &
Execution

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Mahadivulwewa Village

Civilians living in 3rd Mile
Post

Sinhala

Andankulam Village

Sinhala
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12

10

17-20

Shooting
Firearms,
swords,
clubs &
knives

http://www.time.com/tim
e/magazine/article/0,917
1,961421-1,00.html

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1986

69

70

71

72

1986

1986

1986

1986

June 11th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

Civilian Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

70

June 21st

Wilgamwehara
Village,
Trincomalee
District

Wilgamvehara Village

Sinhala

9

June 25th

SittaruKantalai,
Eastern
Province

2 public buses & Jeep

Sinhala

17

July 8th

Monkey
Bridge,
Trincomalee
District

Mollipothana Village

Civilian Trucks

73

1986

July 9th

Mollipothana,
Trincomalee
District

74

1986

July 9th

Trincomalee
District

Monkey Bridge Village

VBIED

VBIED

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1986
http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=8h8qAAA
AIBAJ&sjid=aioEAAA
AIBAJ&pg=1818,83529
0&dq=joint+operations+
command+sri+lanka&hl
=en

15

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Sinhala

16

Swords,
Machetes
and Clubs

Sinhala

17

Torture &
Execution

Sinhala
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75

Sharp
Weapons

http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=T_pNAA
AAIBAJ&sjid=eIsDAA
AAIBAJ&pg=3710,1524
350&dq=joint+operation
s+command+sri+lanka&
hl=en

50+

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1986
http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=u0cpAAA
AIBAJ&sjid=G2gFAAA
AIBAJ&pg=1166,17648
30&dq=joint+operations
+command+sri+lanka&h
l=en

75

1986

July 13th

Pavakkulam,
Trincomalee
District

76

1986

July 13th

Vavuniya
district

July 19th

Beruvil &
Welgamwehar
a, Trincomalee
District

77

78

79

80

1986

1986

1986

1986

July 19th

Medirigiriya,
Polonnaruwa
District

July 22nd

Mammaduwa,
Vavuniya
District

July 24th

Medawachchiy
a, North
Central
Province

Pavakkulam Village

Predomina
ntly Tamil

11

Shooting

Civilian Bus

?

25

VBIED or
Landmine

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument
http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=z6lEAAA
AIBAJ&sjid=KrYMAA
AAIBAJ&pg=5573,1537
808&dq=joint+operation
s+command+sri+lanka&
hl=en

17

Sharp
Weapons,
clubs and
small arms

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1986

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Beruvil & Welgamwehara
Village

Sinhala

Sinhala civilians

Sinhala

5

12

Civilian Bus

Sinhala

32

20

VBIED

Civilian Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

31

67

VBIED

312

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument
http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=xO5UAA
AAIBAJ&sjid=epIDAA
AAIBAJ&pg=5308,2268
454&dq=joint+operation
s+command+sri+lanka&
hl=en

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

1986

1986

July 24th

Mahanagapura,
Ampara
District,
Eastern
Province

Damana Village

September 3rd

Mannar,
Northern
Province

Mannar Bridge

Sinhala

9

13

?

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

IED
Explosion

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.353

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

1986

September
17th

Kantalai,
Trincomalee
District

1986

September
17th

Wadigawewa,
Trincomalee
District

Wadigawewa Village

1986

September
26th

?

Kathiramalai ("Sarvodhaya"
NGO Leader)

Tamil

1

?

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html

1986

December
17th

Morawewa,
Trincomalee
District

SLA soldiers, police officer &
Home Guards

?

7

Shooting

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.353

Jan-December

Kaththankudy,
Eastern
Province

Shooting

http://www.sonakar.com/
2011/07/terrorismagainst-muslims-by-theltte/

IED
Explosion

http://articles.latimes.co
m/1987-01-19/news/mn3998_1_tamilnewspapers

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1987

1986

88

1987

January 18th

89

1987

February 4th

Badulla
District
Manthottam,
Mannar
District

No.4 Sugar Corporation

Mix

Sinhala

Civilians

Muslim

Civilian Bus

10

12

10

5
Majority
Sinhala

Manthottam Village

313

8

39

90

1987

February 7th

17

Landmine/
IED

March 25th

Serunuwara Village

Sinhala

25-27

Shooting

April 17th

Habarana,
Trincomalee
District

Civilian Bus with Civilians
and security personnel

Majority
Sinhala

122

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/ne
w.asp?fname=20080210
_02

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

VBIED

http://www.defence.lk/ne
w.asp?fname=20080210
_02

Attack

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.364

Shooting

http://defence.lk/LTTE/a
tro.asp?id=1987

Swords,
knives, &
Machine
Guns

http://www.sundayobser
ver.lk/2007/06/03/main_
Editorial.asp

1987

April 20th

Jayanthipura ,
Polonnaruwa
District

95

1987

April 21st

96

1987

April 22nd

97

1987

May 29th

Colombo,
Western
Province
Kankesanthura
i, Jaffna
District
Kadawathmad
u,
Polonnaruwa
District

June 2nd

Aranthalawa,
Ampara
District

98

1987

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1987

Sinhala

92

1987

27

Sri Lankan Soldiers

March 7th

94

Sinhala

Awaranthalaw
a, Vavuniya
Serunuwara,
Horowpathana

1987

1987

Aranthalawa village

Swords,
Machetes
and Clubs

http://www.asiantribune.
com/news/2010/07/11/ba
n-ki-moon-ensure-ltteatrocities-areinvestigated-first
http://defence.lk/LTTE/a
tro.asp?id=1987

91

93

Aranthalawa,
Ampara
District

Jayanthipura Village

Sinhala

SL Army Base

Majority
Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Kadawathmadu Village

Sinhala

Pettah Central Bus Stand

Bus carrying Samanera monks
& Mentor Ven. Hegoda
Indrasara Nayaka

314

Sinhala

44

15

110

298

14

7

33

5

99

1987

June 11th

100

1987

June 11th

101

1987

June 11th

102

1987

June 12st

103

1987

July 5th

104

1987

July 29th

105

1987

106

1987

107

1987

September
15th
September
22nd

October 6th

Veppankulam,
Vavuniya
District

Morawewa,
Trincomalee
District
Point Pedro,
Jaffna District

Godapotha,
Polonnaruwa
District
Nelliady Army
Camp, Jaffna
District
Thoppur,
Eastern
Province

?
Vavuniya
district

Batticaloa,
Eastern
Province

Civilian passenger coach

Muslim

16

Civilian Bus

Sinhala
Sinhala &
Tamil

34

Soldiers & Civilians

Godapotha Village

Sinhala

13

9

Nelliady SLA Camp

Sinhala

19

Thoppur Village

Muslim

9

Several
others

Landmine/
IED

8

VBIED
Landmine/
IED

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

6

31

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2009/07/01/fea10.asp
http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=SsMhAA
AAIBAJ&sjid=3p8FAA
AAIBAJ&pg=6034,2007
15&dq=joint+operations
+command+sri+lanka&h
l=en
http://www.dailynews.lk/
2009/07/01/fea10.asp

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.nationalsecur
ity.lk/fullnews.php?id=3
251

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1987

Vignarajah, Assistant
Government Agent for
Sammanthurai

Tamil

1

?

PLOTE Members

Tamil

20

?

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.367

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Batticaloa Town

Sinhala

315

18

6

108

109

110

111

112

1987

1987

1987

1987

1987

Sharp
weapons

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1987

IED
Explosion

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

30

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

2

Claymore
mine

http://www.sangam.org/
PIRABAKARAN/Part46
.htm

?

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1987

Swords,
Machetes
and Small
arms

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1987

Tharavi Village

Sinhala

25

October 6th

Sagarapura,
Batticaloa
District

Sagarapura Village

Sinhala

27

October 6th

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

October 7th

PottuvilMonoragala
Road, Ampara
District

Civilian Bus

Sinhala

?

Sumith Silva, Coordinating
Officer of STF &
Anthonimuttu, Government
Agent Batticaloa

Sinhala &
Tamil

October 8th

1987

October 8th

114

1987

October 10th

?
Ganthalawa,
Kantalai
District

October 15th

Allai- Kantalai
Road,
Trincomalee
District

1987

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1987

October 6th

113

115

Swords,
Machetes
and Small
arms

Tharavi,
Batticaloa
District

Passanger Train

Sinhala

40

S.S Jeganathan, Assistant GA
Batticaloa

Tamil

1

Ganthalawa Village

Sinhala

9

Allai-Kantalai Village

Sinhala

316

6

14

3

116

117

118

1987

1987

1987

October 16th

Pulimodai,
Trincomalee
District

October 19th

Kalkudah,
Batticaloa
District

November 9th

119

1987

November
11th

120

1987

November
12th

1987

December
14th

121

122

1987

123

1987

124

1987

December
15th
December
16th
December
19th

Maradana,
Colombo
District

Civilian Bus

Sinhala

Private Bus

Tamil

8 to 11

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

40

Landmine/
IED

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

VBIED

Manila Standard,
November 10th, 1987
http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=jmcVAA
AAIBAJ&sjid=agsEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=6556,6708
47&dq=maradana+bomb
+blast&hl=en

24

Private Bus

Mix

32

Fisherman

Sinhala

14

Shooting

Van with Tamils and PLOTE
members

Tamil

24

?

Kalkudah,
Batticaloa
District
Cheddikulam,
Vavuniya
District

?

M.E Kandasamy, Principal of
Palugamam Maha Vidyalaya

Tamil

Devalagodalla,
Kantalai
District
Eastern
Province

Devalagodalla Village
Civilians

Sinhala
Muslim &
Sinhala

?

Civilian

?

317

100+

1

?

7

Small arms
& Sharp
weapons

10

Shooting
Abduction

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html
http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1987
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.369
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.369

1987

December
22nd

Morawewa,
Trincomalee
District

1987

December
31st

Mahadivulwew
a, Trincomalee
District

1987

December
31st

Kathankadu,
Batticaloa
District

128

1987

December
30th to
January 8th

129

1988

130

1988

125

126

127

Morawewa Fisherman village

Mahadivulwewa Village

Sinhala

Sinhala

Kathankadu Village

Muslim

6

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1987

8

Small arms
& Sharp
weapons

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1987

Small arms
& Sharp
weapons

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1987

?

http://www.sonakar.com/
2011/07/terrorismagainst-muslims-by-theltte/

30

Civilians

Muslim

84

January 1st

Kaththankudy,
Eastern
Province
Karuniyankula
ma,
Trincomalee
District

Karuniyankulama Village

Sinhala

3

January 10th

?

TELO Members

Tamil

3

S. Siththamparanathan,
principal, Wigneswara
Vidyalaya

SL Soldiers

131

1988

January 13th

Trincomalee
District

132

1988

February 1st

Trincomalee
District

133

1988

February 2nd

134

1988

February 5th

Bogamuyaya,
Ampara
District
Cheddikulam,
Vavuniya
District

Tamil
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

2

1

13

Bogamuyaya Village

Sinhala

11

PLOTE Members

Tamil

15

318

9

7

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1988
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.369

?

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html

Landmine/
IED

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.369

Small arms
& Sharp
weapons

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1988

?

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.370

?

135

1988

March 2nd

136

1988

March 5th

137

1988

March 5th

138

139

140

141

1988

1988

1988

1988

Morawewa,
Trincomalee
District
Sittaru,
Kantalai
District
Trincomalee
District

March 8th

?

March 11th

Suhadagama,
Anuradhapura
District

March 14th

Peniketiyawa,
Trincomalee
District

March 14th

Galmitiyawa,
Trincomalee
District

142

1988

March 15th

143

1988

March 17th

144

1988

March 22nd

Kivulkade,
Trincomalee
District
Deegawapiya,
Ampara
Village
Pudukkulam,
Vavuniya
District

March 22nd

Medawachchik
ulam,
Vavuniya

145

1988

3

Small arms
& Sharp
weapons

http://www.island.lk/200
1/03/19/editoria.html

10

Swords,
Machetes
& Rifles
IED
Explosion

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1988
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.370

1

?

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html

19

Grenades
& Small
arms

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

3

?

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

2

Chopping
&
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1988

Morawewa Village

Sinhala

Sittaru Village

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

24

Civilian Bus

Sinhala

27

S Vijayanandan, District
Secretary, Ceylon Communist
Party

Civilian Bus

Tamil

?

Civilian Bus

?

Galmitiyawa Village

Sinhala

15

28

12

9

Kivulkade Village

Sinhala

7

Deegawapiya Village

Sinhala

13

9

Pudukkulam Village

Sinhlala

4

3

Chopping
&
Execution
Chopping
&
Execution
Chopping
&
Execution

3

Chopping
&
Execution

Medawachchikulam Village

319

Sinhala

9

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1988
http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1988
http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1988
http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1988

District

146

147

148

149

1988

1988

1988

1988

March 28th

Kalmunai,
Ampara Distict

March 29th

Wewalketiya,
Anuradhapura
District

Velmurugu Master, TULF
Organizer

Tamil

Civilian Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

March 31st

Sainthamaruth
u, Ampara
District

April 2nd

Kilinochchi,
Kilinochchi
District

Meegaswewa Village

9

IED
Explosion

http://www.sinhaya.com/
Sinhaya.com/Massacres_
by_LTTE.html

Chopping
&
Execution

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Shooting

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.371

Chopping
&
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1988

Attack

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.371

Shooting

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.371

?

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

Sainthamaruthu Village

17

ENDLF Stronghold

Tamil

2

150

1988

April 8th

151

1988

April 14th

Northwest
Coastal Village

SLA Soldiers

152

1988

April 22nd

Katunayake
Air Force Base

SL Air Force Base

April 30th

Awarathalawa,
Vavuniya
District

1988

?

Muslim &
Tamil

Meegaswewa,
Anuradhapura
District

153

1

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html

Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Public civilian bus

?

320

14

1

14

7

6

10

4

5

154

1988

May 1st

155

1988

May 12th

156

1988

June 16th

Sittaru,
Kantalai
District
Trincomalee
District
Batticaloa
District

July 9th

Irattapeliyakul
am, Vavuniya
District

157

1988

159

1988

July 28th

160

1988

August 10th

Trincomalee
Town,
Trincomalee
District
Ethawetunuwe
wa, Manal Aru
(Weli Oya)
District
Central Camp,
Ampara
District

August 16th

Trincomalee
Town,
Trincomalee
District

August 25th

Marawila,
Polonnaruwa
District

158

161

162

1988

1988

1988

July 21st

Public civilian bus

Mix

26

IPKF Soldiers

Indians

6

Landmine/
IED
Landmine/
IED

IPKF Soldiers

Indians

7

?

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.371
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.372

10

Ambush

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

15

IED
Explosion

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

1

Chopping
&
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1988

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1988

IED
Explosion

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Beheading,
Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1988

Public civilian bus

?

Bandula Hotel

?

2

5

Ethawetunuwewa Village

Sinhala

16

Central Camp Village

?

11

Trincomalee Town Centre

Mix

Marawila Village

Sinhala

321

9

11

19

163

164

165

166

167

1988

1988

1988

September
10th

16th Colony,
Central Camp,
Ampara
District

16th Colony, Central Camp
Village

Sinhala

7

5

October 10th

Mahakongaska
da,
Madavachchiy
a District

Mahakongaskada Village

Sinhala

44

4

October 27th

Tennamarachc
hi, Jaffna
District

Raj Shankar, President of
Citizen's Committee

1988

November
14th

1988

December
12th

168

1989

January 17th

169

1989

February 2nd

170

1989

February 11th

171

1989

February 11th

Peniketiyawa,
Trincomalee
District
Sumedagama,
Trincomalee
District
Maha
Irambaikulam,
Vavuniya
District
Bogamuyaya,
Ampara
District
Dutuwewa,
Polonnaruwa
District
Sinhapura,
Weli Oya
District

Tamil

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1988
http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=3YhQAA
AAIBAJ&sjid=rRIEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=2231,2444
528&dq=joint+operation
s+command+sri+lanka&
hl=en

?

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

4

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1988

7

Mutilation
&
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1989

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1989

1

Sinhala civilians

Sinhala

28

Sumedagama Village

Sinhala

7

Maha Irambaikulam Village

Sinhala

9

Bogamuyaya Village

Sinhala

11

Dutuwewa Village

Sinhala

37

5

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1989

Sinhapura Village

Sinhala

6

7

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1989

322

172

1989

February 27th

Borawewa,
Polonnaruwa
District

173

1989

March 7th

Batticaloa
District

Sanbandamoorthy, Ex TULF
Chairman, Batticaloa

Tamil

1

174

1989

April 5th

Wanni District

IPKF Soldiers

Indians

15

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

175

1989

April 13th

176

1989

May 1st

177

1989

May 21st

Jaffna District
Vavuniya
district

June 28th

Kopay, Jaffna
District

178

179

180

1989

1989

1989

Borawewa Village

Sinhala

38

3

Torture &
Execution

?
Landmine/
IED and
battle

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1989
http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul28.htm
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.376

Civilian

?

51

M Panchalingam, GA Jaffna

Tamil

1

Shooting

PLOTE Base

Tamil

40

Attack

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml
http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=VN0xAA
AAIBAJ&sjid=A5ADA
AAAIBAJ&pg=1909,23
5773&dq=panchalingam
&hl=en
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.377

?

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html

K Pulendran

Tamil

43

1

VBIED

July 13th

Colombo,
Western
Province

Appappillai Amirthalingam
(Leader of TULF) and
Vettivelu Yogeshwaran
(TULF MP)

Tamil

2

1

Shooting

http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=eOseAAA
AIBAJ&sjid=o84EAAA
AIBAJ&pg=5210,36815
03&dq=amirthalingam&
hl=en

August 17th

Mannar,
Northern
Province

IPKF Base

Indians

24

11

Attack

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.379

323

181

Nochchikulam,
Vavuniya
District

1989

August 17th

182

1989

September
21st

183

1989

November 5th

Thirunelvely,
Jaffna District
Ampara,
Ampara
District

Jan-December

Kaththankudy,
Eastern
Province

Civilians

Muslim

?

T Ganeshalingam - EPRLF
Former Provincial Minister for
North & East

Tamil

184

185

1989

1990

January 28th

186

1990

January 29th

187

1990

March 29th

?
Jaffna Coast,
Jaffna District

May 7th

Colombo,
Western
Province

188

1990

189

1990

May 30th

190

1990

June 7th

Mihindupura
& Dehiwatta,
Trincomalee
District
Thandikulam,
Vavuniya

Civilian

?

8

4

IED
Explosion

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

Dr. Rajani Thiranagama - HR
activist & academic

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.sundayobser
ver.lk/2009/05/31/tri06.a
sp

EPRLF & TELO Camps

Tamil

22

Attack

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.381

10

?

http://www.sonakar.com/
2011/07/terrorismagainst-muslims-by-theltte/

1

?

www.defence.lk/pps/LT
TEAttrocities.pps

Civilians

Muslim

Fisherman

Indian

9

Abudction

http://www.sonakar.com/
2011/07/terrorismagainst-muslims-by-theltte/
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.383
http://story.torontotelegr
aph.com/index.php/ct/9/c
id/2411cd3571b4f088/id/
314153/cs/1/

?

Sam Thambimuttu (MP
EPRLF)

Tamil

2

Shooting

Villages

Sinhala

5

Slaughter

Army Personnel

Sinhala

1

324

9

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990
http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DF15Df01.html

District

191

1990

June 10th

192

1990

June 11th

193

1990

June 11th

194

1990

June 11th

195

1990

June 11th

Batticaloa,
Eastern
Province
Batticaloa,
Vellaveli,
Kalmunai,
Valachenai,
Kalawnchikudi
, Samanthurai,
Eravur and
Akkaraipattu,
in Eastern
Province.
Kankesanthura
i, Valvetiturai,
Point Pedro,
Kilinochchi,
Vavuniya and
Murunkan ,
Northern
Province
Vallavadi,
Ampara
District &
Kalwanchikudi
, & Kalmunai
Kalmunai,
Ampara Distict
Kalmunai,
Ampara Distict

Police Station

Tamil

Abduction

http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DF15Df01.html

Police Stations

Mix,
predomina
ntly
Sinhala &
Muslims

600+

Robbery,
Abduction
and
shooting

http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DF15Df01.html

SL Army Detachment

?

5

Attack

SL Army Convoy

Sinhala

10

Attack

Police Stations

?

8

Attack

325

http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DF15Df01.html
http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DF15Df01.html
http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DF15Df01.html

196

197

198

199

200

201

202

1990

1990

1990

1990

1990

1990

1990

June 12th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

Civilian Train

June 13th

Mullaitivu,
Northern
Province

Abduction

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.385

Police Station

Abduction

http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DF15Df01.html

June 13th

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province

Police Station

Robbery

http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DF15Df01.html

June 14th

Maankulam &
Oduchchudan,
Northern
Province

Police Stations

Attack

http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DF15Df01.html

June 14th

Jaffna District

Jaffna Fort & Northern
Security Forces Headquarters,
the Military Complex at
Palaly

Attack

http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DF15Df01.html

June 14th

Kilinocchi &
Talaimannar,
Northern
Province

SL Army Convoy

Attack

http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DF15Df01.html

June 15th

Elephant Pass,
Jaffna District
and Mud Cove,
Trincomalee
District

Attack

http://www.lankanewspa
pers.com/news/2011/6/6
7843.html

Sinhala

Sinhala

Police Stations

326

7

203

1990

June 15th

204

1990

June 17th

205

1990

June 19th

206

1990

July 10th

Elephant Pass,
Muttur,
Kinniya,
Kiran,
Kaluwanchiku
dy, and the
central camps
at Amparai and
Talaimannar,
Mannar district

Madras, India
Jaffna, Jaffna
District

Kokkavil,
Mullaitivu
District

Army Camps

Attack

K Patmanabah (EPRLF
Secretary General) V
Yogasangari (MP), P
Kirubakaran, (former finance
minister of the defunct NorthEast Provincial Government)
and 10 others

Tamil

15

Jaffna Fort

Sinhala

41

Army Camps

Sinhala

327

72

AK-47
assault
rifles and
hand
grenades
Attack &
Seige
Mortar,
Rocket
propelled
grenades,
machine
guns and
small amrs
fires &
bulldozers

http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DF15Df01.html

http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DF15Df01.html
http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DF15Df01.html
http://www.atimes.com/i
nd-pak/DF15Df01.html
&
http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=uINlAAA
AIBAJ&sjid=iJ4NAAA
AIBAJ&pg=940,339167
9&dq=ltte&hl=en

207

1990

July 12th

Kurukkalmada
m, Batticaloa
District

208

1990

July 12th

209

1990

July 13th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province
Kaththankudy,
Eastern
Province

210

1990

July 15th

?

211

212

213

214

215

1990

1990

1990

1990

1990

July 24th

Batticaloa,
Ampara
District

72

Attack

http://www.sonakar.com/
2011/07/terrorismagainst-muslims-by-theltte/

Naval Vessel

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

6

Suicide
VBIEDBlack Sea
Tigers

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/database/data_suicide_k
illings.htm

Mosque

Muslim

76

?

K Kanagaratnam

Tamil

1

?

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.387
www.defence.lk/pps/LT
TEAttrocities.pps

?

http://www.nytimes.com/
1990/08/05/world/tamilskill-110-muslims-at-2sri-lankanmosques.html?scp=1&sq
=&st=nyt

8

Execute &
Hanging

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument
http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

Civilians on Lorry

Muslim

Mosque

Muslim

4

July 23rd

Weerachcholai
, Ampara
District

July 24th

Aralangawila,
Polonnaruwa
District

Aralangawila Village

Sinhala

8

Chopping
&
Execution

July 25th

Meeyankulama
, Polonnaruwa
District

Meeyankulama Village

Sinhala

8

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

July 25th

Wanela,
Trincomalee
District

Wanela Village

Sinhala

9

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

Civilians

Muslim

328

216

1990

July 26th

Thamannawa,
Anuradhapura
District

Thamannawa Village

Sinhala

19

3

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990
http://www.nytimes.com/
1990/08/05/world/tamilskill-110-muslims-at-2sri-lankanmosques.html?scp=1&sq
=&st=nyt

217

1990

July 29th

218

1990

July 30th

Samanthurai,
Ampara
District
Akkaraipattu,
Ampara
District

July 30th

Kovilladi,
Trincomalee
District

Kovilladi Village

Tamil

10

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

July 31st

Podankady,
Trincomalee
District

Podankady Village

Sinhala

11

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

219

220

1990

1990

221

1990

August 3rd

222

1990

August 5th

223

1990

August 6th

224

1990

August 7th

Kaththankudy,
Eastern
Province
Mulliyankadu,
Ampara
District
Ampara,
Ampara
District
Bandaraduwa,
Ampara
District

Mosque

Muslim

10

Akkaraipattu Village

Muslim

14

Shooting
Chopping
&
Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

Meera Jumma and Hussaniya
mosques

Muslim

110147

Shooting

http://www.nytimes.com/
1990/08/05/world/tamilskill-110-muslims-at-2sri-lankanmosques.html?scp=1&sq
=&st=nyt

Mulliyankadu Village

Muslim

17

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

Ampara Village

Muslim

34

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

Bandaraduwa Village

Sinhala

32

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

329

4

225

1990

August 8th

226

1990

August 8th

Meegaswewa,
Anuradhapura
District
Nawagamuwa,
Vavuniya
District

227

1990

August 11th

228

1990

August 12th

Eravur,
Batticaloa
District
Weerachcholai
, Ampara
District

August 13th

Polmoddai,
Mullaitivu
District

229

1990

230

1990

August 13th

231

1990

August 13th

Muttur,
Trincomalee
District
Awaranthalaw
a, Vavuniya
District

232

1990

September

233

1990

September 9th

Batticaloa
Lagoon,
Batticaloa
District
Uhana,
Ampara
District

1990

September
13th

Ponanai,
Anuradhapura
District

234

Civilian Bus

?

26

7

Attack

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

Nawagamuwa Village

Sinhala

7

4

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

Saddam Hussein Village,
Ponnaikadu Village &
Klwaichannai Village

Muslim

173

20+

Torture &
Execution
(Beheadin
g and
Chopping)

Weerachcholai Village

Muslim

4

10

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

Private Lorry

?

14

Ambush

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

Gangi Fishing Village

Muslim

6

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

Awaranthalawa Village

Muslim

10

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

Execution
&
Shooting

http://www.sonakar.com/
2011/07/terrorismagainst-muslims-by-theltte/

2

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

1

Abduction,
Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

Fisherman

Muslim

18

Farmers in tractor

Muslim

7

Ponani Village

Muslim

330

7

3

1990

September
19th

Vellamunai,
Puttalam
District

Vellamunai Fishing Village

Mix

23

2

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

1990

September
21st

Puthukkudiyiru
ppu, Mullaitivu
District

Puthukkudiyiruppu Village

Muslim

15

11

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

237

1990

September
24th

Gajabapura Village

Sinhala

4

Live Burial

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

238

1990

September
30th

Maha Oya Village

Mix

9

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

239

1990

October 1st

Peruwalthalawa Village

Sinhala

9

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

235

236

Gajabapura,
Mullaitivu
District
Maha Oya,
Ampara
District
Peruwalthalaw
a, Ampara
district

240

1990

October 2nd

241

1990

October 11th

Wahalkada,
Anuradhapura
District
Arugam Bay,
Ampara
District

October 23rd

Kokabe,
Anuradhapura
District

Octobrt 23rd

Thanthirimale,
Anuradhapura
District

Civilians

Sinhala

10

October 25th

Paranamadawa
chchiya,
Mullaitivu
District

Paranamadawachchiya
District

Sinhala

4

October 27th

Thanthirimale,
Anuradhapura
District

Thanthirimale Village

Sinhala

5

242

243

244

245

1990

1990

1990

1990

3

Wahalkada Village

Sinhala

4

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

Arugam Bay Village

Muslim

9

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

Kokabe Village

Sinhala

10

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

Torture &
Execution

http://www.tamilaranga
m.net/document/srilanka
n_gov/gov001.pdf

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

331

2

246

247

1990

1990

October 29th

Olukulam,
Batticaloa
District

Olukulam Village

Muslim

3

November 1st

Helambawewa,
Mullaitivu
District

Helambawewa Village

Sinhala

10

4

SLA Army Base

Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SF Commander Brig.
Wijeratne and Police Chief
SSP Wijesekara

248

1990

November 3rd

249

1990

November
23rd

Bandara
kumbukkwewa
, Anuradhapura
District
Mankulam,
Vavuniya
District

250

1990

December
18th

251

1991

January 23rd

252

1991

February 6th

253

1991

February 17th

AnuradhapuraTrincomalee
Road,
Trincomalee
District
Bogamuyaya,
Ampara
District
Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province
Kondachchi,
Mannar
District

March 2nd

Havelock
Road,
Colombo
District

254

1991

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

1

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

2

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1990

3

Suicide
VBIED

Sinhala

8

Landmine/
IED

http://www.sangam.org/a
rticles/view2/?uid=500
Criminal Investigation
Department Sri Lanka,
Major Crimes
Committed by the
Liberation Tigers of the
Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
p.13

Bogamuyaya Village

Sinhala

29

5

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1991

Civilian Bus

?
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

8

28

IED
Explosion

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.392

Ambush

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.392

Suicide
VBIED

http://news.bbc.co.uk/ont
hisday/hi/dates/stories/m
arch/2/newsid_4201000/
4201675.stm

Bandarakumbukkwewa
Village

SL Soldiers

Deputy Defense Minister
Ranjan Wijeratne

Sinhala

332

45

19

73

255

1991

March 2nd

256

1991

March 2nd

257

1991

March 19th

259

260

1991

1991

March 24th

March 31st

261

1991

April 3rd

262

1991

April 14th

264

1991

April 20th

265

1991

April 29th

Kaludaveli,
Batticaloa
District
Erakkandy,
Trincomalee
District
Silavaturai,
Mannar
District

Akkaraipattu,
Ampara
District

Irudayapuram,
Batticaloa
District

Keviliya,
Trincomalee
District
Athymale,
Ampara
District
Niyandalla,
Monoragala
District
Nanaddan,
North Eastern
Province

Kaludaveli Village

Muslim

4

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1991

Erakkandy Village

Muslim
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

5+

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1991

Suicide
VBIED

CPOST Database

SLA Army Base

Akkaraipattu Fishmarket

Muslim

Market

?

5

9

41

32

8

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Fisherman

?

10

Athymale Village

Sinhala

17

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1991

Niyandalla Village

Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

22

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1991

45

Ambush

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.393

SL Army Camp

333

11

IED
Explosion

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

266

267

268

269

270

271

272

273

1991

1991

1991

1991

1991

1991

1991

1991

May 4th

Point Pedro,
Jaffna District

May 11th

Kankesanthura
i Harbour,
Jaffna District

May 19th

Erakkamam,
Ampara
District

Navy Boat

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Navy Personnel

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Muslims &
Sinhala

Farmers

5

8

3

6

1

Suicide
VBIED

CPOST Database

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/database/data_suicide_k
illings.htm

Torture &
Execution

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

May 20th

Malwatta,
Ampara
District

May 21st

Sriperumbudur
, Tamil Nadu,
India

Indian Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi

Indian/
Hindu

15

HBIED

http://news.bbc.co.uk/ont
hisday/hi/dates/stories/m
ay/21/newsid_2504000/2
504739.stm

May 28th

Pulmoddai,
Trincomalee
District

SLA Soldiers escorting
civilian bus

?

8

Ambush

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.394

June 12th

Kokkadicholai,
Batticaloa
District

June 20th

Weli Oya,
Trincomalee
District

Farmers in tractor

Muslim

9

2

Manmunai Ferry

?

14

IED
Explosion

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

SL Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

16

Ambush

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.394

334

274

1991

June 21st

275

1991

June 24th

276

277

1991

1991

Flower Road,
Colombo
District
Weligahakandi
ya, Ampara
District

Military Joint Operations
Headquarters

Weligahakandiya Village

Chopping

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1991
http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Civilian Bus

?

16

8

July 6th

Puddur,
Polonnaruwa
District

Puddur Village

Muslim

14

4

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1991

Karapola & Manapitiya
Village

Sinhala

9

Chopping

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1991

Samanthurai Village

Muslim

6

2

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1991

6

20

IED
Explosion

http://articles.latimes.co
m/1991-09-02/news/mn1145_1_sri-lanka

13

6

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1991

Ambush

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

July 6th

279

1991

August 8th

1991

September 1st

Kaththankudy,
Eastern
Province

Police Station

1991

September
19th

Palliyagoda,
Polonnaruwa
District

Palliyagoda Village

1991

10

Suicide
VBIED

June 27th

1991

282

50+

Claymore
mines &
Shooting

278

281

60

http://www.nytimes.com/
1991/06/22/world/srilanka-bomb-said-to-killup-to-60.html

Lahugala,
Ampara
District

Karapola,
Polonnaruwa
District
Samanthurai,
Ampara
District

280

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

October 24th

Iqbal Nagar,
Trincomalee
District

Muslim

Muslim &
Tamil

Private Van

335

6

283

284

285

286

287

1992

1992

1992

1992

1992

January 26th

Ampara,
Ampara
District

Civilian Bus

?

10

26

Landmine/
IED

February 2nd

Vankalai,
Mannar
District

SL Army Patrol

Sinhala

7

2

Ambush

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument
http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=3aksAAA
AIBAJ&sjid=oRQEAA
AAIBAJ&pg=4543,9658
30&dq=joint+operations
+command+sri+lanka&h
l=en

VBIED

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

VBIED

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

April 10th

Ampara,
Ampara
District

April 10th

Maharagama,
Maharagama
District

April 10th

Maradana,
Colombo
District

288

1992

April 29th

289

1992

May 16th

Welikanda,
Polonnaruwa
District
Kosgolla,
Ampara
District

Civilian Bus

?

Private Car

?

26

8

35

24

Private Car

?

8

23

VBIED

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

Karapola & Alanchipothana &
Muthugala Villages

Muslim

130

71

Sharp
Weapons

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1992

Kosgolla Village

?

5

Swords &
Axes

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1992

336

290

1992

June 2nd

209th Mile
Post, Ampara
District

291

1992

July 6th

Parayankaulam
, Vavuniya
District

292

1992

July 11th

Northern
Province

293

294

295

296

1992

1992

1992

1992

July 17th

Kirankulam,
Batticaloa
District

Civilian Bus

Lorry Drivers

SL Army Base

?

Tamil
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Civilian Bus

Muslim

July 21st

Parangiyamadu
, Batticaloa
District

Public Train

August 8th

Araly Point,
Jaffna District

Lieutenant General Denzil
Kobbekaduwa & his regiment

August 9th

Mailanthenna,
Polonnaruwa
District

Muslim

Mailanthenna Village

Sinhala

Sinhala

337

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

10

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

46

Attack

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.397

Attack

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Shooting

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

10

Landmine/
IED

http://www.defence.lk/ne
w.asp?fname=20100808
_01

25

Swords,
Clubs &
Machetes

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1992

15

19

7

3

7

4

10

297

298

299

300

301

302

303

1992

1992

1992

1992

1992

1992

1992

August 30th

September 1st

Trincomalee
Town,
Trincomalee
District

Sainthamaruth
u, Ampara
District

Civilian Bus

?

Market

Muslim

9

22

34

67

VBIED

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

IED
Explosion

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument
http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

September
10th

Killivedi Point,
Trincomalee
District

Passanger Ferry- Soliders &
Civilians

?

29

3

October 1st

Konwewa,
Polonnaruwa
District

Konwewa Village

?

15

9

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1992

October 15th

Polonnaruwa
District

Madirigiriya, Palliyagodalla
and Ahamedpura Village

83

Shooting,
Hand
Grenades

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1992

November
16th

Galle Face
Green,
Colombo
District

Vice Admiral Clancy
Fernando

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.nytimes.com/
1992/11/17/world/blastkills-sri-lanka-admiraltamils-blamed.html

December
26th

Vakaneri
South,
Polonnaruwa
District

Additional Government Agent
of Batticaloa & Assistant
Government Agent of
Valachchenai

Landmine/
IED

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Muslim

Sinhala

338

Muslim &
Tamil

146

4

6

304

1993

May 1st

Colombo,
Western
Province

305

1993

May 31st

306

1993

July 25th

Nochchiamodd
ai, Vavuniya
District
Janakapura,
Weli Oya
District

July 25th

Janakapura,
Weli Oya
District

August 26th

Kilaly Lagoon,
Jaffna District

307

308

1993

1993

309

1993

August 29th

Point Pedro,
Jaffna District

310

1993

November
10th

Pooneryn,
Jaffna District

President Ranasinghe
Premadasa

Sinhala

14

Nochchiamoddai Road

Predomina
ntly Tamil

13

Janakapura Army Camp

Sinhala

42

25

HBIED

http://articles.latimes.co
m/1993-05-02/news/mn30334_1_suicide-bomber

Attack

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Attack
Shooting,
knifing and
in a
grenade
explosion

Janakapura Village

Sinhala

9

Naval Boats

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

5

Navy Personnel

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

12

Attack
Suicide
VBIEDBlack Sea
Tigers

Pooneryn Naval Base &
Nagathiwanthurai Naval base

Sinhala

241

Attack

339

4

http://www.island.lk/200
2/02/01/featur01.html

http://www.uthr.org/Spec
ialReports/spreport5.htm
#_Toc512569427
CPOST Database- Tamil
Suicide Squad Rams
Naval Vessels, 12
Soldiers Killed,
Associated Press Aug
29th, 1993

CPOST Database

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/961013/sitrep.html

311

1994

January 19th

Ranbewa,
Anuradhapura
District

312

1994

March 16th

313

1994

August 2nd

Kudiramalai,
Puttalam
District
Palaly, Jaffna
District

1994

September
21st

Mannar,
Northern
Province

1994

October 24th

Thotalanga,
Colombo
District

1994

December
24th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

314

315

316

317

318

1995

1995

Civilian Bus

Sinhala

10

51

IED
Explosion

http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument
http://www.unhchr.ch/H
uridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/
6bdc202089eb97848025
671a00590c8c?OpenDoc
ument

Fisherman

?

17

3

Attack

SL Air Force Base

?

1

2

Navy Personnel

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

27

3

Grenade
Suicide
VBIEDBlack Sea
Tigers

CPOST Database

CPOST Database
http://www.nytimes.com/
1994/10/24/world/bombkills-50-at-vote-rally-insri-lanka.html

Gamini Dissanayake (UNP
Leader)

Sinhala

50+

SL Army Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

5

April 19th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

SL Naval Base

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

11

21

Suicide
VBIED

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.399
Criminal Investigation
Department Sri Lanka,
Major Crimes
Committed by the
Liberation Tigers of the
Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
p.21

May 25th

Kalarawa,
Trincomalee
District

Kalarawa Fishing Village

Mix

42

15

Chopping
& Torture

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1995

340

200

HBIED
IED
Explosion

319

1995

May 26th

Dimbulagala,
Pollonaruwa
District

320

1995

June 4th

Coastal area in
Northern
Province

321

1995

July 14th

?

322

1995

July 16th

323

1995

July 28th

Kankesanthura
i Harbour,
Jaffna District
Weli Oya
District

August 7th

Independence
Square,
Colombo

324

325

326

1995

1995

1995

September 3rd

September
20th

Palaly, Jaffna
District

Kankesanthura
i Harbour,
Jaffna District

Ven Matara Kithalagama Sri
Seelalankara Nayake Thera

ICRC Charter Vessel
SL Airforce Pucara Bomber
Aircraft

Sinhala

2

1

Shooting

?

1

2

IED
Explosion
Shooting

Criminal Investigation
Department Sri Lanka,
Major Crimes
Committed by the
Liberation Tigers of the
Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
p.22
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.400
http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/961013/sitrep.html

SL Navy Ship "Edithara"

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

3

Security Forces Camp

Sinhala

2

Attack

http://www.nytimes.com/
1995/07/17/world/worldnews-briefs-60-tamilsand-3-sailors-die-in-srilanka-clashes.html
http://sundaytimes.lk/961
013/sitrep.html

22

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2009/05/22/supstory.asp
?id=s18

Mortars

CPOST Database- Tamil
Rebels Shell Northern
Air Base; Two Killed 12
Injured, Associated
Press, September 4 1995

Exchange
of fire

CPOST Database- 41
Tigers killed in Sri Lanka
clashes, sucide attack on
port foiled, AFP
September 21 1995

West Province Chief Minister

SL Air Force Base

Sinhala

?

SL Navy Personnel

?

341

2

2

18

40

12

HBIEDScuba
Diver

327

328

329

330

1995

1995

1995

1995

October 17th

Havelock
Road,
Colombo
District
Trincomalee
Harbour, North
Eastern
Province

October 20th

Kolonnawa,
Colombo
District

Kolonnawa Oil Tank

October 21st

Mangalagama,
Batticaloa
District

Mangalagama Village

Sinhala

16

Monorathanna Village

Sinhala

36

Galthalawa Village

Sinhala

19

Athimalai & Kotiyagala
Village

?

19

Panama District

Muslim

8

Thamannahalmiwewa Village

Sinhala

26

October 9th

331

1995

October 21st

332

1995

October 21st

Monorathanna,
Polonnaruwa
District
Galthalawa,
Padaviya
District

333

1995

October 23rd

334

1995

October 25th

Athimalai &
Kotiyagala,
Monoragala
District
Panama,
Ampara
district

October 26th

Thammannahal
miwewa,
Anuradhapura
District

335

1995

Douglas Devananda- EPDP
Leader

Tamil

Naval Vessel

4

9

17

342

2

Grenade

Criminal Investigation
Department Sri Lanka,
Major Crimes
Committed by the
Liberation Tigers of the
Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
p.24

6

HBIEDScuba
Diver

CPOST Database

35

Mortars &
Grenades

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/LTT
E_Atrocities14june.pdf

Sharp
Weapons

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1995

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1995

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1995

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1995

torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1995

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1995

12

1

27

336

337

1995

1995

October 26th

Alapathwewa,
Anuradhapura
District

Alapathwewa Village

Sinhala

26

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1995

November 2nd

Siyamalanduw
a, Monoragala
District

Siyamalanduwa Village

?

5

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1995

HBIED

http://www.nytimes.com/
1995/11/12/world/twoattacks-intensify-war-insrilanka.html?scp=1&sq=su
icide+bomb++sri+lanka
&st=nyt

Suicide
VBIED

CPOST Database

32

Attack

http://www.cidcm.umd.e
du/mar/chronology.asp?g
roupId=78002

39

?

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.401

Suicide
VBIED

http://news.bbc.co.uk/ont
hisday/hi/dates/stories/ja
nuary/31/newsid_408300
0/4083095.stm

Shooting

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=11196

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1996

338

1995

November
11th

339

1995

December 5th

Slave Island,
Colombo
District
Batticaloa,
Eastern
Province

340

1995

December
23rd

Batticaloa,
Eastern
Province

Army Detachment

341

1996

January 21st

Northern
Province

Air Force Craft

January 31st

Colombo,
Western
Province

342

1996

343

1996

February 11th

344

1996

February 22nd

Kumarapuram,
Trincomalee
District
Mahanikawew
a,
Kebethigollaw
a District

Army Headquarters

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

17

Special Task Force & Police
Camps

Sinhala

23

Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Central Bank

Mix

91

Kumarapuram Army
Detachment

Sinhala

2

Mahanikawewa Village

Sinhala

6

343

59

1400

3

Across North
& Northeast of
Island

Tamils that 'betrayed cause'

SL Soldiers

Tamil
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SL Navy Vessel

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

345

1996

March
onwards

346

1996

March 24th

Eastern
Province

March 30th

Vettilaikerni,
Northeastern
District

June 11th

Ilaavankulam,
Puttalam
District

Lunuoya Village

July 4th

Stanley Road,
Jaffna District

Nimal Siripala De Silva,
Minister of Housing,
Construction & Public
Utilities

July 9th

Eluwankulama
, Puttalam
District

July 19th

Mullaitivu,
Northern
Province

July 24th

Dehiwala,
Colombo
District

August 29th

Kudapokuna,
Polonnaruwa
District

347

348

349

350

351

353

354

1996

1996

1996

1996

1996

1996

1996

Sinhala

Sinhala

30

?

http://www.sangam.org/
FB_REPORTS/AI96%2
01.htm

40

Ambush

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.401

6

Suicide
VBIED

CPOST Database

7

Torture &
Execution

http://www.tamilaranga
m.net/document/srilanka
n_gov/gov001.pdf

HBIED

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/database/data_suicide_k
illings.htm

10

14

20

Gangawadiya Village

Sinhala

12

Navy Gunboat "Ranaviru"

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

28

Dehiwala Train Station

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Kudapokuna Village

Sinhala

344

64

29

60

Robbery
Suicide
VBIEDBlack Sea
Tigers

400

http://www.tamilaranga
m.net/document/srilanka
n_gov/gov001.pdf

CPOST Database

IED
Explosion

http://www.nytimes.com/
1996/09/04/world/tamilarrested-in-sri-lankatrain-bombing.html

Torture &
Execution

http://www.tamilaranga
m.net/document/srilanka
n_gov/gov001.pdf

355

356

357

358

359

360

361

362

1996

1996

1996

1996

1996

September
12th

October 20th

Aranthalawa,
Ampara
District

Batticaloa,
Eastern
Province

October 21st

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

Civilian Bus

?

SL Army Outpost

?

11

8

Police Post

?

20

October 25th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

SL Navy Dvora Gunboat

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

12

November
25th

Trincomalee
Town,
Trincomalee
District

Police Vehicle

?

Tamil

1

Sinhala

1

1996

November

?

Mahattaya, Former Deputy
Leader of LTTE

1996

December
17th

Ampara,
Ampara
District

Upali Sahabandu, Deputy
Chief of Special Task Force

1996

December
30th

Tavadi, Jaffna
District

Civilian

?

345

27

Attack

CPOST Database- At
least 12 dead in suicide
attack on Sri Lanka navy
boat, Agence France
Presse, October 26 1996

Attack
Suicide
VBIEDBlack Sea
Tigers

1

2

Shooting

http://www.tamilaranga
m.net/document/srilanka
n_gov/gov001.pdf

HBIED

Execution

1

Suicide
VBIED

4

Claymore
mine

CPOST Database- At
least 12 dead in suicide
attack on Sri Lanka navy
boat, Agence France
Presse, October 26 1996

CPOST Database

CPOST Database
http://www.sangam.org/
FB_REPORTS/AI96%2
01.htm

CPOST Database
http://www.tamilaranga
m.net/document/srilanka
n_gov/gov001.pdf

363

364

365

366

1997

1997

1997

1997

January 20th

Elephant Pass
& Panthalan,
Northern
Province
Between
Kudapokuna
and
Welikanda,
Polonnaruwa
District

January 29th

Punnalai,
Jaffna District

February 10th

Ottamwadi,
Batticaloa
District

January 9th

367

1997

March 6th

368

1997

April 27th

Vavunathivu,
Ampara
District &
China Bay,
Trincomalee
District
Northern &
Eastern
Province

May 12th

Morawewa,
Trincomalee
District

June 10th

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province

369

370

1997

1997

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SL Army Base

Civilian passanger van

Muslim

Civilian

?

Ottamwadi Village

Muslim

223

Attack

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.401

6

Landmine/
IED

http://www.tamilaranga
m.net/document/srilanka
n_gov/gov001.pdf

9

Claymore
mine

http://www.tamilaranga
m.net/document/srilanka
n_gov/gov001.pdf

Mortars

http://www.tamilaranga
m.net/document/srilanka
n_gov/gov001.pdf

Attack

http://news.google.com.a
u/newspapers?id=Z5gyA
AAAIBAJ&sjid=5ucFA
AAAIBAJ&pg=4178,33
07412&dq=trincomalee+
attack&hl=en

31

Attack

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.402

6

11

SL Army Base

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Morawewa Village

Sinhala

5

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1997

SL Army Base

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

100

Attack

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.402

Army Bases

346

48

80

371

372

1997

1997

July 2nd

July 2nd

Erakkandy,
Trincomalee
District
Trincomalee
Coast,
Northern
Eastern
Province

Erakkandy Village

Muslim

Fisherman

Predomina
ntly
Muslim

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1997

Tamil
North
Korean

5
1

Hijack

6

Shooting

58

Attack

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.402

67

Attack

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.402

SLA Soldiers

Muslim
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.402
Criminal Investigation
Department Sri Lanka,
Major Crimes
Committed by the
Liberation Tigers of the
Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
p.30
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.402
Criminal Investigation
Department Sri Lanka,
Major Crimes
Committed by the
Liberation Tigers of the
Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
p.31

19

Attack

SLA Soldiers

?

3

?

373

1997

July 5th

374

1997

July 7th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province
Jaffna Coast,
Jaffna District

Mohammed Mahroof, UNP
MP Batticaloa

Arunasalam Thangathurai,
TULF MP for Trincomalee
North Korean cargo ship

375

1997

July 20th

Iluppaikulam,
Trincomalee
District

376

1997

July 21st

Batticaloa
District

SL Army Base

377

1997

August 1st

Omanthai
District

SL Soldiers

378

1997

August 24th

379

1997

September 6th

Batticaloa
District
Polonnaruwa
District

Chopping
& Torture

34

347

41

Abduction

5

Grenade

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.403
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.403

380

1997

September 8th

381

1997

September 9th

382

1997

October 6th

383

1997

October 15th

Kalyanapura,
Trincomalee
District
Mullaitivu
Coast,
Northern
Province
Ampara,
Ampara
District

Kalanapura Army Detachment

?

7

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

Hong Kong Cargo Ship

Chinese

32

Attack

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.403

Police Station

?

6

Attack

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.403

VBIED &
Shooting

http://www.nytimes.com/
1997/10/15/world/17die-100-wounded-byhuge-bomb-and-gunfirein-sri-lanka.html

Colombo,
Western
Province

Galadari Hotel & World Trade
Centre

384

1997

October

?

SP Tharmalingam, SLFP
Organizer for Jaffna

385

1997

December
28th

386

1998

January 25th

Magalle, Galle
District
Kandy, Kandy
District

Navy Commander Cecil
Tissera
Dalada Maligawa- Temple of
Tooth

387

1998

February 6th

Slave Island,
Colombo
District

SL Air Force Base

Mix

Tamil

1

Sinhala

3

Sinhala

11

Sinhala

348

17

9

100

Suicide
VBIED
Suicide
VBIED

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html
http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=jJkkAAA
AIBAJ&sjid=8DEDAA
AAIBAJ&pg=2785,3992
727&dq=cecil+tissera&h
l=en
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/50366.stm

HBIED

http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=wdQtAA
AAIBAJ&sjid=_TEDAA
AAIBAJ&pg=4889,2108
978&dq=kandy+temple+
blast+1998&hl=en

?

20

388

389

1998

1998

February 23rd

Point Pedro,
Jaffna District

March 5th

Maradana,
Colombo
District

390

1998

March 9th

391

1998

March 9th

392

1998

March 11th

393

1998

April 14th

394

395

1998

1998

May 14th

May 14th

Eravur,
Batticaloa
District
Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province
Trincomalee
Harbour, North
Eastern
Province
Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

Cheddikulam,
Vavuniya
District

Point Pedro,
Jaffna District

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Naval Vessel

Civilian

Sinhala

47

38

Civilian

Muslim

5

Police Station

?

3

Naval Vessel

?

Police Station

?

Military Bus

Sinhala

Brigadier Larry Wijeratne

Sinhala

349

58

Suicide
VBIEDBlack Sea
Tigers

260

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.indianexpres
s.com/ie/daily/19980309/
06850674.html

26

Claymore
Mine

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

5

Attack
Suicide
VBIEDBlack Sea
Tigers

4

13

3

37

CPOST Database

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.404

CPOST Database

Attack

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.404

Landmine/
IED

http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=KVtPAA
AAIBAJ&sjid=NiMEA
AAAIBAJ&pg=6848,42
52421&hl=en

HBIED

http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=KVtPAA
AAIBAJ&sjid=NiMEA
AAAIBAJ&pg=6848,42
52421&hl=en

396

1998

May 17th

Vannarpannai,
Jaffna District

Sarojini Yogeswaran, TULF
Mayor of Jaffna

397

1998

May 17th

Rambaikulam,
Vavuniya
District

398

1998

June 5th

Jaffna District

S Shanmuganathan PLOTE
MP Vavuniya
Sub-director of Jaffna TULF
Office

399

1998

September
11th

Nallur, Jaffna
District

Mayor of Jaffna Ponnuthurai
Sivapalan

400

401

402

1998

1998

1999

September
29th

Jaffna District

October 30th

Mullaitivu
Coast,
Northern
Province

March 11th

Pettah &
Maradana,
Colombo
District

Lion Air Passanger Plane

Shooting

http://www.indianexpres
s.com/res/web/pIe/ie/dail
y/19981031/30450704.ht
ml

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.indianexpres
s.com/res/web/pIe/ie/dail
y/19981031/30450704.ht
ml

IED
Explosions

http://news.google.com.a
u/newspapers?id=YqJO
AAAAIBAJ&sjid=zRQE
AAAAIBAJ&pg=6850,6
249734&dq=bus+bomb+
sri+lanka&hl=en

1

Shooting

Tamil

5

4

Claymore
Mine

Tamil

1

Tamil

20

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

350

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/169159.stm

1

?

Civilians

HBIED

Tamil

Tamil

Escort Ship "Dvora"

?

Criminal Investigation
Department Sri Lanka,
Major Crimes
Committed by the
Liberation Tigers of the
Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
p.36
Criminal Investigation
Department Sri Lanka,
Major Crimes
Committed by the
Liberation Tigers of the
Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
p.37
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.405

12

54

15

1

12

403

404

1999

1999

March 16th

Mount Lavinia,
Western
Province

Mohammed Nilabdeen, Chief
Inspector, Terrorism
Investigation Department

May 29th

Trincomalee
Road,
Batticaloa
District

Muthulingam Ganeshkumar,
alias Razeek, Leader of antiLTTE "Razeek Group"

405

1999

July 5th

406

1999

July 15th

Rathmalgahaw
ella, Ampara
District
Jaffna, Jaffna
District

407

1999

July 25th

408

1999

July 25th

Madhu,
Mannar,
Northern
Province
Trincomalee
Harbour, North
Eastern
Province

July 29th

Borella,
Colombo
District

409

410

1999

1999

August 3rd

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

Private Van
PLOTE member & EPDP
member

Muslim

Tamil

4

4

15

HBIED

CPOST Database

8

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2009/05/22/supstory.asp
?id=s18

?

4

Attack

Tamil

2

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml
Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.405

Army Truck

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

3

Ambush

CPOST Database- LTTE
suicide bomber blows up
ferry, BBC Summary of
the World Broadcasts,
July 27, 1999

Passenger Ferry

?

1

HBIED

CPOST Database

Neelan Tiruchelvam (TULF
MP)

Tamil

3

HBIED

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/406644.stm

Claymore
mine

CPOST DatabaseFighting Kills 23 in Sri
Lanka as emergency to
be extended, Xinhua
News Agency, August 5,
1999

Predomina
ntly Tamil

Civilians

351

1

6

6

411

412

413

414

415

416

417

418

419

1999

August 4th

Veppankulam,
Vavuniya
District

Special Task Force Convoy

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

1

13

25

Ambush
(Suicide)

1999

August 15th

Vakarai,
Batticaloa
District
Trincomalee
Harbour, North
Eastern
Province

1999

September
2nd

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province

N Manikkadasan, Top PLOTE
leader

Tamil

3

1999

September
18th

Gonagala,
Ampara
District

Galapitagala, Badirekka and
Borapola Village

Sinhala

60

1999

September
24th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

SL Army Convoy

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

18

1999

Novemer 2nd

Colombo,
Western
Province

Atputharajah Nadarajah,
Member of EPDP & Editor of
Tamil Daily

Tamil

1999

November
20th

Mannar,
Northern
Province

Madhu Catholic Church

Predomina
ntly Tamil

38

66

Small arms
& mortars

1999

December
18th

Town Hall,
Colombo
District

President Chandrika
Kumaratunga

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

23

100

HBIED

1999

August 9th

CPOST Database

SLA Army Base

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SL Navy Dvora Gunboat

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

10

Suicide
attack

IED
Explosion

CPOST Database
Criminal Investigation
Department Sri Lanka,
Major Crimes
Committed by the
Liberation Tigers of the
Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
p.41

Torture &
Execution

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=1999

IED
Explosion

Arai, E., Sri Lanka
Conflict Timeline, p.405

2

Shooting

http://www.cpj.org/killed
/1999/atputharajahnadarajah.php
http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/591352.stm

352

2

4

5

HBIED

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2009/05/22/supstory.asp
?id=s18

420

421

422

423

424

425

426

427

1999

December
18th

Ja-Ela,
Western
Province

UNP Election Rally

Sinhala

1999

December
30th

Jaffna Lagoon,
Northern
Province

SL Navy Boat

?

January 5th

Flower Road,
Colombo
District

Prime Minister Sirimavo
Bandaranaike

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Janaury 14th

Point Pedro,
Jaffna District

Vadivelu Vijeyaratnam,
PLOTE member and
Chairman of Point Pedro
Urban Council

Tamil

1

January 27th

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province

Vavuniya Post Office

Mix

March 2nd

Trincomalee
Town,
Trincomalee
District

Col. Piyal Abeysekara,
Brigade Commander

March 10th

Colombo,
Western
Province

April 7th

Aralangawila,
Polonnaruwa
District

2000

2000

2000

2000

2000

2000

2

HBIED
Suicide
VBIEDBlack Sea
Tigers

28

HBIED

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/591352.stm

1

Shooting

http://www.hindu.com/2
000/01/15/stories/031500
0c.htm

11

70

IED
Explosion

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/620289.stm

Sinhala

1

2

HBIED

CPOST Database

Deputy Defense Minister
Anuruddha Ratwatte

Sinhala

22

50

HBIED

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/673646.stm

Aralangawila Village

Sinhala

4

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=2000

353

12

13

30

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/090524/News/sundayt
imesnews_27.html &
http://www.wsws.org/arti
cles/1999/dec1999/srid23.shtml

CPOST Database

428

429

430

431

432

433

2000

2000

2000

2000

2000

2000

April 12th

Murathankerni,
Kattiaran,
Muhamalai,
Iyakachchi and
Kovilkadu

April 13th

Fort Fredrick,
Trincomalee
District

May 10th

Ariyalai &
Tenankillappu,
Jaffna District

SLA Soldiers

Sinhala

Musical Show

?

?

Mortars

http://www.expressindia.
com/ie/daily/20000414/ii
n14025.html

7

Hand
grenade

http://www.expressindia.
com/ie/daily/20000414/ii
n14025.html

Artillery,
Mortars, &
Suicide
Bombers

http://www.island.lk/200
0/05/11/islnews.html &
http://www.iol.co.za/new
s/world/suicide-bombersbreach-army-defences1.37158 &
http://www.island.lk/200
0/05/12/islnews.html

69

IED
Explosion

http://www.island.lk/200
0/05/19/islnews.html

Several
others

HBIED

CPOST Database

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2009/05/22/supstory.asp
?id=s18

HBIED

http://www.reuters.com/a
rticle/2008/01/16/idUSC
OL119777

SL Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

33

May 17th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

Mangalarama Buddhist
Temple

Tamil

22

May 22nd

Kantale,
Trincomalee
District

MK Gunawardena, Political
leader

Sinhala

June 5th

Vadamarachch
i, Jaffna
District

SL Navy Vessel

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

434

2000

June 7th

435

2000

June 14th

Ratmalana,
Dehiwala
Province
Wattala,
Western
Province

Minister of Industrial
Development C.V. Gunaratne

SL Air Force Bus

354

Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

67

34

22

2

7

IED
Explosion

CPOST Database

436

437

438

439

440

441

June 26th

Point Pedro,
Jaffna District

Sri Lanka Navy Ship "MV
Uhana"

Sinhala

7

August 16th

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province

SL Army Bus

?

1

2000

September 9th

Paandiruppu,
Batticaloa
District

Cheliyan Perinpanayagam,
People's Alliance Candidate

Tamil

2

2000

September
15th

Maradana,
Colombo
District

Health Minister Nimal
Siripala De Silva

Sinhala

7

October 2nd

Muttur,
Trincomalee
District

Mohammed Baithullah, Sri
Lanka Muslim Congress
Candidate

October 5th

Medawachchiy
a, North
Central
Province

Health and Indigenous
Medicine Deputy Minister
Tissa Karaliyadda

2000

2000

2000

2000

442

2000

October 5th

443

2000

October 19th

444

2000

October 23rd

Nagarkovil,
Jaffna District
Town Hall,
Colombo
District
Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

November 7th

Kiran,
Batticaloa
District

445

2000

Muslim

Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

New Cabinet Ministers

SL Naval Base
Nimalan Soundaranayagam,
TULF MP

355

Tamil

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.island.lk/200
0/10/22/news20.html

HBIED

CPOST Database

Shooting

http://www.tamileelamne
ws.com/news/publish/tns
_7147.shtml

25

HBIED

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/925781.stm

49

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

40

HBIED

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/database/data_suicide_k
illings.htm

7

31

Mortars,
artillery &
gunfires

http://www.island.lk/200
0/10/07/news06.html

1

22

HBIED

CPOST Database

2

20

Suicide
VBIED

CPOST Database

Shooting

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=5560

21

12

1

Several
others

446

447

448

449

450

451

452

453

2000

2000

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

November
28th

Kebithigollawa
, Anuradhapura
District

March 21st

Welikanda,
Polonnaruwa
District
Mullaitivu
Coast,
Northern
Province

May 11th

Sungavil,
Polonnaruwa
District

May 22nd

Thambalagamu
wa,
Trincomalee
District

June 9th

Eluthamadduv
al, Jaffna
District

June 25th

Madduvil
North, Jaffna
District

June 27th

Mullamunai,
North Eastern
Province

December 7th

Civilian Bus

?

16

Kurulubedda Village

Sinhala

5

SL Navy Gunboat

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

11

SLA Soldeirs

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SL Navy Convoy

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

Predomian
tly Sinhala

SL Soldiers (Off Duty)

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Tamils that 'betrayed cause'

Tamil

356

36

Pressure
Mine

7

Torture &
Execution
Suicide
VBIEDBlack Sea
Tigers

12

13

1

6

2

31

6

20

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml
http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE/atro.asp?id=2000

CPOST Database

Ambush

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2001.htm

Claymore
mine

http://www.priu.gov.lk/n
ews_update/Current_Aff
airs/ca200105/20010523
LTTE_landmine_attack_
Trincomalee.htm

Mortars

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2001.htm

Claymore
Mine

http://www.priu.gov.lk/n
ews_update/SecurityRep
ort/sr200106/20010625L
TTE_bus_bomb.htm

Execution

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2001.htm

454

455

456

457

458

459

460

461

462

463

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

July 13th

Siththaandy,
Batticaloa
District

July 15th

Aalankerni,
Batticaloa
District

July 16th

Jaffna Town,
Jaffna District

July 16th

Maanal Aaru,
Northern
Province

July 16th

Muhamalai,
Jaffna District

July 17th

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

July 18th

Vaarikuddiyoo
r, Vavuniya
District

July 18th

Mihindupura,
Trincomalee
District

July 18th

Thethraativu,
Batticaloa
District

July 19th

Sithamparapur
am, Vavuniya
District

SLA Soldiers

?

Police Officer

Muslim

SLA Soldiers

Claymore
mine

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=6153

Shooting

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=6157

Claymore
Mine

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=6159

3

Attack

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=6161

1

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2001.htm

Shooting

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=6165

Shooting

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=6168

2

Attack

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=6166

1

Claymore
mine

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=6165

Ambush

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=6172

2

1

?

SLA Soldiers

?

SLA Soldiers

?

SLA Soldier

10

?

SLA Soldiers

2

?

Special Task Force Soldiers

?

Home Guards

?

357

8

1

?

SLA Soldiers

3

4

464

465

466

467

468

469

470

471

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

July 21st

Kallady,
Batticaloa
district

July 24th

Katunayake
International
Airport

July 27th

Weli Oya
District

July 27th

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

July 31st

Nugathenna,
Welikanda
District

August 4th

Poovarasakula
m, Vavuniya
District

August 16th

Kallarawa,
Trincomalee
District

August 21st

Central Camp,
Batticaloa
District

Police Officer

Sinhala

Aircrafts

Sinhala

SL Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Police Officer

Muslim

Home Guards

?

SL Air Force Personnel

1

7

4

1

5

?

SL Navy Personnel

?

Police Station

?

358

12

8

3

17-20

2

17

Shooting
IED,
rocketpropelled
grenades,
anti-tank
weapons,
and assault
rifles

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=6179

http://www.nytimes.com/
2001/07/25/world/rebelattack-on-airport-shocksleaders-of-sri-lanka.html

Attack

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=6188

Shooting

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=6186

Ambush

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=6195

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2001.htm

Ambush

http://www.tamileelamne
ws.com/news/publish/pri
nter_8019.shtml

Attack

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=6261

472

473

474

475

476

477

478

479

480

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

2001

August 22nd

Periyankulam,
Trincomalee
District

September
17th

Trincomalee
Coast,
Northern
Eastern
Province

October 9th

Velverikulam,
Trincomalee
District

SL Air Force detachment

?

4

October 17th

Ruwanpitiya,
Polonnaruwa
District

Army and Police Post

Sinhala

5

October 17th

Kebithigollewa
, Anuradhapura
District

Police officers & Constables

Sinhala

October 25th

Nelliyadi,
Jaffna District

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

7

October 28th

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

Sundaramoorthy
Jeevanandamorthy, EPRLF
Officer

Tamil

1

October 29th

Narahenpita,
Colombo
District

Prime Minister Ratnasiri
Wickramanayake

Sinhala

2

October 30th

Point Pedro
Coast, Jaffna
District

Oil Tanker on sea

?

3

Civilian Bus

?

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SL Navy Vessel

359

IED
Explosion

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2001.htm

Suicide
VBIED

http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=oKktAAA
AIBAJ&sjid=fHgFAAA
AIBAJ&pg=2906,37610
40&dq=jaffna+suicide+a
ttack&hl=en

Attack

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2001.htm

3

Attack

http://www.island.lk/200
1/10/18/news07.html

5

IED
Explosion

http://www.island.lk/200
1/10/18/news07.html

1

Claymore
Mine

www.hindu.com/thehind
u/2001/10/25/stories/032
5000c.htm

Shooting

http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul28.htm

HBIED

http://www.island.lk/200
1/10/30/news01.html

Suicide
VBIED

CPOST Database

18

11

47

17

481

2001

October 30th

Muttur,
Trincomalee
District

482

2001

October 30th

483

2001

November 9th

484

2001

November
15th

Muttur,
Trincomalee
District
Batticaloa,
Eastern
Province
Batticaloa,
Eastern
Province

2001

November
22nd

2001

485

486

487

488

489

2002

2002

2002

Civilians

?

1

http://www.sinhaya.com/
Massacres.htm

15

Attack

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2001.htm

3

HBIED

CPOST Database

4

HBIED

CPOST Database

Police Officers

?

Police Vehicle

?

Military Intelligence
Operatives

?

3

Chenkalady,
Batticaloa
District

Muthusamy Anushamoorthy,
EPRLF Officer

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul28.htm

December 2224th

Mannar,
Northern
Province

Pradeepa & Anandarajah, ExLTTE Militants

Tamil

2

?

http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul28.htm

January 20th

Kothiavalai,
Vavunativu
District

Vijayanathan Vithiatharan, exPLOTE member

Tamil

1

Execution

http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul28.htm

April 3rd

Pasikuda,
Batticaloa

Extortion

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2002.htm

July 6th

Soruwila,
Polonnaruwa
District

Grenade

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2002.htm

Civilian

11

Grenades

6

?

LTTE Deserter

Tamil

360

2

490

2002

September 9th

Colombo,
Western
Province

Subramaniam Muthulingam, a
Tamil engineer from Australia

Tamil

EPDP members- Thangarasa
(36), Nesaraja (48) and
Gnanajothy (49)

Tamil

Army Personnel

Sinhala &
Tamil

1

Ganeshamoorthy Thilakaraj

Tamil

1

491

2002

December 3rd

492

2002

December 4th

493

2002

December
11th

Batticaloa
District
Oddaimavady,
Eastern
Province
Colombo,
Western
Province

2002

December
12th

Nelliady &
Mallakam,
Jaffna District

EPDP Offices

2002

December
16th

?

Poopalapillai Alahathurai, the
EPRLF(V) chairman of the
Mandur local council

496

2002

December
23rd

497

2003

January 2nd

Araiampathy,
Batticaloa
District
Mandur,
Ampara
District

January 2nd

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

494

495

498

2003

Tamil

1

1

1

Supporters of the People‘s
Alliance

Stabbed to
death

http://www.hrw.org/en/n
ode/11456/section/5

Abduction

http://www.island.lk/200
3/01/25//featur02.html

Shooting

http://www.island.lk/200
3/01/25//featur02.html

Shooting

http://www.island.lk/200
3/01/25//featur02.html

Firebombs

http://www.island.lk/200
3/01/25//featur02.html

Torture &
Execution

http://www.island.lk/200
3/01/25//featur02.html

Pistol,
Grenade &
Swords

http://www.island.lk/200
3/01/25//featur02.html

Priest

Tamil

1

Beatings

http://www.island.lk/200
3/01/25//featur02.html

Market

Muslim

5

Grenades

http://www.island.lk/200
3/01/25//featur02.html

361

499

500

501

502

503

2003

2003

2003

2003

2003

January 3rd

Kannankunda,
Batticaloa
District

Torture

http://www.island.lk/200
3/01/25//featur02.html

15

Attack

http://www.lankanewspa
pers.com/news/2006/12/
10882_space.html

http://www.island.lk/200
3/03/22/news01.html

1

Navy Ship

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Chinese fishing trawler

Chinese &
Sinhala

18

Shooting
(Gunfire
attack)

April 18th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

Marimuthu Rajalingam,
Chairman of the
Aalaiyadivembu Pradeshiya
Sabha & senior member of
EPDP

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.island.lk/200
3/04/22/news09.html

May 13th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

PLOTE office

Tamil

Attack

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2003.htm

R Ramachandran, Senior
EPDP Member

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2003/06/16/sec02.html

Kandiah Subathiran, Senior
member of EPRLF

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2003/06/16/sec02.html

Grenades

http://www.tamilnet.com
/art.html?catid=13&artid
=9444

January 7th

March 20th

504

2003

June 15th

505

2003

June 15th

Jaffna, Jaffna
District

July 16th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

2003

Tamil

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province
Mullaitivu
Coast,
Northern
Province

Kallady,
Batticaloa
district

506

Rajaluxmi Thileepan

PLOTE office

Tamil

362

8

4

507

508

509

2003

August 10th

Akkaraipattu,
Ampara
District

2003

September
14th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

October 4th

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

2003

510

2003

October 25th

511

2003

October 25th

512

2003

October 28th

513

2003

514

2003

November
23rd
November
24th

515

2003

November
27th

516

2003

November
29th

Kinniya,
Trincomalee
District
Trincomalee
District
Mollipothana,
Trincomalee
District
Faisalnagar,
Kinniya
District
?
Madathady,
Trincomalee
District
Kurangupanch
an, Kinniya
District

SL Army Intelligence Officer

EPRLF activist

?

Tamil

1

1

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2003.htm

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2003.htm

Abduction

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2003.htm

Execution
- sword
Assault &
Robbery

http://www.island.lk/200
4/01/01/featur03.html
http://www.island.lk/200
4/01/01/featur03.html

Sword

http://www.island.lk/200
4/01/01/featur03.html

Civilians

?

S.H. Mahroof, Ceylon
Electricity Board employee

Muslim

Civilian

Muslim

Civilians

Muslim

3

Civilians

Muslim

1

2

Grenade

Lorry Drivers

Muslim

1

4

Grenade

http://www.island.lk/200
4/01/01/featur03.html
http://www.island.lk/200
4/01/01/featur03.html

Civilian

Sinhala

1

Stabbed to
death

http://www.island.lk/200
4/01/01/featur03.html

Farmers

Muslim

3

Chopping
& Torture

http://www.island.lk/200
4/01/01/featur03.html

363

1

1
1

517

518

2003

November
30th

Trincomalee
Town,
Trincomalee
District

2003

November
30th

Kandaladiyoort
ru, Kinniya
District

Civilians

Muslim

Civilians

Muslim

1

Civilian

Muslim

1

Civilian

Muslim

519

2003

December 1st

520

2003

December 1st

Eravur,
Batticaloa
District
Chembukulam,
Kinniya
District

March 1st

Kaththankudy,
Eastern
Province

S. Sunderampillai, UNP
Candidate

Tamil

1

March 1st

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

Ponniah Yogendran, Member
of EPDP

Tamil

1

March 24th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

Thevanayagam Thiruchelvam,
university lecturer and
supporter of Col Karuna

March 30th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

Rajan Sathiyamoorthy (TNA
MP)

May 9th

Thandamveli,
Batticaloa
District

Lance Corporal of SLA
Intelligence Unit

521

522

523

524

525

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

Tamil

Tamil

?

364

http://www.island.lk/200
4/01/01/featur03.html

2
Grenade &
Shooting

http://www.island.lk/200
4/01/01/featur03.html

Shooting

http://www.island.lk/200
4/01/01/featur03.html

1

Shooting

http://www.island.lk/200
4/01/01/featur03.html

2

Shooting

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2004/03/02/new14.html

Shooting

http://www.island.lk/200
4/03/03/news05.html

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2004.htm

Shooting

http://www.theage.com.a
u/articles/2004/03/30/10
80544484796.html

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2004.htm

1

1

1

1

526

527

528

529

530

531

532

533

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

May 31st

Manmunai,
Batticaloa
District

G. Nadeshan, Journalist

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/year2004.htm

July 3rd

Eravur,
Batticaloa
District

Karuna Faction

Tamil

1

?

http://www.island.lk/200
4/08/08/news11.html

July 5th

Karapola,
Polonnaruwa
District

Karuna Faction

Tamil

1

?

http://www.island.lk/200
4/08/08/news11.html

HBIED

http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=_4FTAA
AAIBAJ&sjid=TYYDA
AAAIBAJ&pg=2516,38
42386&dq=douglas+dev
ananda+blast&hl=en

July 7th

Kollupitiya,
Colombo
District

EPDP Leader Douglas
Devananda

July 15th

Batticaloa Jail,
Batticaloa
District

Kanapathipillai Mahendran
alias Sacthi Master, Karuna
Faction

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.thesundaylea
der.lk/archive/20041017/
politics-1.htm

July 21st

Akkaraipattu,
Ampara
District

Velayutham Raveendran,
Senior member of EPDP

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.island.lk/200
4/09/23/features9.html

July 26th

Kottawa,
Maharagama
District

Karuna Faction

Poisoning

http://www.thesundaylea
der.lk/archive/20041017/
politics-1.htm

July 31st

Bambalapitiya,
Colombo
District

Kandiah Yogarasa, PLOTE
member & Top informant of
SL Military

Shooting

http://www.thesundaylea
der.lk/archive/20041017/
politics-1.htm

Tamil

Tamil

365

Tamil

5

7

1

11

534

2004

August 10th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

535

2004

August 10th

Kalavanchikku
di

Seenithambi Yogarajah, EPDP
Supporter in Kalavanchikkudi

Tamil

1

?

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2004/08/17/new13.html

August 16th

Wellawatte,
Colombo
District

Mr. Kandasamy Iyer
Balanadarajah, Media
Secretary of EPDP, and cofounder of the Eelam
Revolutionary Organization of
Students (EROS)

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2004/08/17/new13.html

August 24th

Akkaraipattu,
Ampara
District

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2004.htm

Shooting

http://web.kyotoinet.or.jp/people/satoyuki
/srilanka/srilankahistory1
0.html

Shooting

http://www.sundayobser
ver.lk/2004/09/19/new50
.html

536

537

538

539

2004

2004

Athmalingam RamaniDeputy Organizer, EPDP
Trincomalee

Tamil

1

?

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2004/08/17/new13.html

Karuna Faction

Tamil

2004

September
11th

Kayts Island,
Jaffna District

Maivan Chandramohan, EPDP
Member

2004

September
18th

Ratmalgama,
Puttalam
District

Thambithurai SivakumarEPDP chief organizer for
Puttalam District

Tamil

Tamil

366

1

1

1

540

541

2004

2004

542

2004

543

2004

544

545

546

2004

2004

2004

September
22nd

Anivilmadu,
Karadiyanaru
District

Vinayagamoorthy
Sivanesadurai alias Reggie,
Karuna faction & Karuna's
elder brother & 2 other faction
members

September
23rd

Colombo,
Western
Province

Somasundaram
Varnakulasingham- EPDP
Central Committee Member &
wife

September
23rd
September
27th

Mannampity,
Batticaloa
District
Jaffna, Jaffna
District

Rajathurai Sivagnanamformer LTTE cadre
Valli Sundaram- member of
EPRLF

October 1st

Vakaneri,
Trincomalee
District

October 2nd

Omadiyamadu,
Batticaloa
District

October 5th

Welikanda,
Polonnaruwa
District

Ruben- close ally of Karuna

Karuna Faction

Tamil

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/3682484.st
m

Tamil

1

Shooting

Tamil

1

Shooting

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2004.htm

Attack

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2004.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2004.htm

Tamil

Muslim

367

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2004.htm
http://www.island.lk/200
4/09/29/news2.html

Tamil

Civilians

3

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/3682484.st
m

1

2

2

3

547

548

549

550

551

552

553

555

October 11th

Batticaloa/Polo
nnaruwa
Districts
border

Karuna Faction

October 17th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

Sinnavan Maheswaran, exLTTE cadre

Tamil

1

October 19th

Kalviyankadu,
Batticaloa
District

Kingsley Rajanaygam
(Former TNA MP)

Tamil

1

October 20th

Anpuvallipura
m, Batticaloa
District

Karuna Faction

November 4th

Colombo,
Western
Province

Velayutham Dayalakumar,
former PLOTE member

2004

November 8th

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

2004

November
18th

Polonnaruwa
District

2004

November
26th

2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

?

Tamil

Tamil

Tamil

EPDP Office

2

SLA Soldiers

Tamil

?

368

1

1

1

?

SL Army Intelligence Officer

6

1

2

2

Attack

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2004.htm

Grenade

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2004.htm

Shooting

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2004/10/20/sec01.html

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2004.htm

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2004.htm

Grenade

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2004.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2004.htm

Attack

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2004.htm

556

2005

?

Batticaloa
District

Alagaiyya Kirukeshwaran

Tamil

1

?

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2005/03/11/pol01.htm

557

2005

?

Eastern
Province

Christi Rathanajothi and other
Tamil youths

Tamil

2

?

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2005/03/11/pol01.htm

January 9th

Vakaneri,
Trincomalee
District

Funeral House

Grenade

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

February 5th

Kaluwnakerni,
Batticaloa
District

Mylwaganam Pulendran &
brother

?

http://www.thesundaylea
der.lk/archive/20050313/
politics-1.htm

February 5th

Kalladi Bridge,
Kallady
District

Kandiah Ganeshalingam

Shooting

http://www.thesundaylea
der.lk/archive/20050313/
politics-1.htm

February 6th

Kaththankudy,
Eastern
Province

Kamaladasan, Ex-TELO &
Journalist for EPDP
Newspaper

Shooting

http://www.thesundaylea
der.lk/archive/20050313/
politics-1.htm

February 20th

Batticaloa/Polo
nnaruwa
Districts
border

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

February 22nd

Killali, Jaffna
District

SLA Soldier

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

?

Displaced tsunami civilian,
also an SLA deserter

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

558

559

560

561

562

563

564

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

February 28th

?

Tamil

Tamil

Tamil

Karuna Faction

Tamil

?

?

369

3

38

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

565

566

567

568

569

570

571

572

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

March 5th

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province
Kolakanawadi
ya,
Polonnaruwa
District

March 5th

Welikanda,
Polonnaruwa
District

Civilians & Karuna Faction

March 5th

Vanthaarumool
ai, Batticaloa
District

Mylvaganam PulenthiranKaruna Faction

March 6th

Eravur,
Batticaloa
District

Velauthan Ilankeshwarn,
civilian

March 7th

Batticaloa
District

S. Kirubeswaran, former
PLOTE member

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

March 8th

Kirimichchaku
lam, Batticaloa
District

Farmers

Muslim

1

Shooting

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2005/03/11/pol01.htm

March 9th

Periyaurani,
Batticaloa
District

Cristin Selvapillai, Karuna
Loyalist

Shooting

http://www.thesundaylea
der.lk/archive/20050313/
politics-1.htm

March 2nd

SLMM Officers

?

Kolakanawadiya Village

Predomina
ntly
Muslim
Predomina
ntly
Muslim

Tamil

Tamil

Tamil

370

2

5

6

1

1

1

Attack

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

?

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2005/03/11/pol01.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

573

574

575

576

577

578

579

580

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

March 9th

Kadjuwatte,
Batticaloa
District

March 11th

Batticaloa
District

April 1st

Kommathurai,
Batticaloa
District

EPDP Supporter

April 4th

Batticaloa
District

T. Kailanandan, Director of
Vocational Training Ministry
at the Kattankudy Technical
College

April 4th

Karaithivu,
Batticaloa
District

EPDP Office

April 5th

Akkaraipattu,
Ampara
District

John Silva Amerasingham,
former EPRLF cadre

April 5th

Upparru coast,
Trincomalee
District

Navy Patrol boat boarding
SLMM Officers

April 6th

Kalmunai,
Batticaloa
District

Abducted Civilian

?

PLOTE office

Tamil

Tamil

Tamil

Tamil

1

1

1

1

1

Norwegian

Police Constalbe

?

371

3

1

1

1

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Grenades

http://www.thesundaylea
der.lk/archive/20050313/
politics-1.htm

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Grenades

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

581

582

583

584

2005

2005

2005

2005

April 11th

Manatchenai,
Kalmunai
District

Seevaratnam Arulpalan

April 11th

Trincomalee
District

Vijayadas Wijendran alias
Kunjan, EPDP member

April 14th

Welikanda,
Polonnaruwa
District

Rival Tamil Group Member

April 21st

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

Sivagnanaselvam
Kirubaharan, member of
Karuna Faciton

Tamil

Tamil

Tamil

585

2005

April 24th

586

2005

April 24th

Batticaloa
District
Batticaloa
District

April 25th

Karapola,
Polonnaruwa
District

Sellathurai Kopalkumar,
member of Karuna Faction

April 27th

Chenkalady,
Batticaloa
District

Shelton Nawaratna, police
personnel

April 28th

Kallady,
Batticaloa
district

Murgesu Wardharaja- EPRLF
member

587

588

589

2005

2005

2005

Tamil

Hindu Procession

Tamil

Rasamanickam Mathiyalahan

Tamil

Tamil

Sinhala

372

Tamil

1

1

5

1

1

1

1

1

Shooting

http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul38.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Attack

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

4

Attack

2

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html
http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul38.htm

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
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590

591

592

593

594

595

596

597

598

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

May 12th

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

EPDP Office

May 14th

Batticaloa
District

Ponniah Thamilvanan, former
LTTE cadre

May 17th

Madathady,
Trincomalee
District

Civilian

?

1

May 18th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

P Sooriyamoorthy, former
mayor of Jaffna

Tamil

May 18th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

Arumugam Murugupillai,
EPDP Officer

May 21st

Periyakallar,
Batticaloa
District

Sinnathamby Annapillai

May 28th

Battocaloa,
Batticaloa
District

J. Felix Thiyagarajah, Police
Sub-Inspector

Tamil

May 31st

Colombo,
Western
Province

Colonel Tuan Nizam
Muthaliph, Former Chief
Army Intelligence Officer

Muslim

June 2nd

Vairavarpuliya
nkulam,
Vavuniya
District

Attack

http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul38.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Grenade
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1

Shooting

http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul38.htm

Tamil

1

?

http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul38.htm

Tamil

1

Grenade

http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul38.htm

1

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

1

Shooting

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2009/06/06/sec05.asp

Grenades
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4

TELO Office

Tamil

Tamil

373

1

4

599

2005

June 4th

600

2005

June 4th

601

2005

June 5th

Mannampity,
Batticaloa
District
Jaffna, Jaffna
District
Wellawatte,
Colombo
District

Former LTTE cadre

Tamil

1

?

Rasathurai Thangarajah

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html
http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul38.htm

Veerabahu Indrakumar

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul38.htm

Baskaran Preman Ashok,
EPDP cadre

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Tamil

602

2005

June 5th

Annaikoddai,
Jaffna District

603

2005

June 6th

Kochikade,

Devadas Emmanuel and
Francis Denisius

Tamil

2

Shooting

http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul38.htm

June 9th

Chenkalady,
Batticaloa
District

Ravi, Chenkalady EPDP
leader

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul38.htm

June 11th

Vavuniya,
Vavuniya
District

EPDP Activist and SLA
Soldier

2

IED
Explosion

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

June 14th

Swamytottam,
Mannar
District

SL Navy Personnel

?

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

June 15th

Kalmunai,
Batticaloa
District

Nallathamby Raveendran &
Friend

Tamil

Shooting

http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul38.htm

604

605

606

607

2005

2005

2005

2005

Mix

374

1

2

608

609

610

611

612

613

614

615

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

June 20th

Akkaraipattu,
Ampara
District

June 20th

Serunuwara,
Trincomalee
District

June 20th

Velikkulam,
Vavuniya
District

PLOTE member

Tamil

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

June 20th

Akkaraipattu,
Ampara
District

Alagiah Ravichandran, EPDP
Member

Tamil

1

Hacked to
death

http://www.uthr.org/bull
etins/bul38.htm

June 21st

Muttur,
Trincomalee
District

Chitravelauthen Satyanathen,
member of Karuna faction

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

June 22nd

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

Ranaweera Sisira, police
officer

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

June 22nd

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

Grenade

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

June 27th

Serunuwara,
Trincomalee
District

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

EPDP Member

Tamil

Home Guard

1

?

Tamil

Sinhala

Civilians

1

1

Sinhala

Sahan Nandasiri, Home Guard

375

Sinhala

3

1

Stabbed to
death

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html
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616

617

618

619

620

621

622

623

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

June 30th

Urani,
Batticaloa
District

SLA Soldiers

July 2nd

Kalkudah,
Batticaloa
District

Chaminda Roshan- police
officer

July 6th

Kalmunai,
Batticaloa
District

Police Officers- M.O.L.
Rafaideen and B.G. Kapilasiri

July 6th

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

July 10th

Madco,
Trincomalee
District

SLA Soldier

July 11th

Eravur,
Batticaloa
District

Sangarapillai Jerrymbanstudent

July 12th

Uppuveli,
Trincomalee

July 13th

Muttur,
Trincomalee
District

?

Sinhala

Selvarajah- Karuna Faction

Mix

Tamil

3

1

2

1

?

Tamil

Police Officers

?

Tsunami relief centre

?

376

1

1

13

9

Shooting
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624

625

626

627

628

629

630

631

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

July 13th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

July 14th

Akkaraipattu,
Ampara
District

July 14th

Thampalakama
m,
Trincomalee
District

July 16th

Eravur,
Batticaloa
District

Security Force Personnel

July 20th

Kalmunai,
Batticaloa
District

Marimuttu Paskaran- village
officer

July 20th

Akkaraipattu,
Ampara
District

Security Force Personnel and
Police officer

July 21st

Pottuvil,
Ampara
District

M. Weerasinghe- Reserve
Police Constable, and another
Civilian

July 21st

Kalmunai,
Batticaloa
District

Army Personnel

?

Civilians

?

Police Officer

13

3

?

?

Security Checkpoint

Tamil

1

1

?

Mix

?

377

1

3

2

3

Grenade
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632

633

634

635

636

637

638

639

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

July 23rd

Thambalagamu
wa,
Trincomalee
District

L. H. Dayananda- retaired
Home Guard

July 25th

Puthur,
Batticaloa
District

Pankirajah George- EPDP
Member

July 28th

Stanley Road,
Jaffna District

Sooriyapillai Nixon, EPDP
Member

July 30th

Pannalagama,
Ampara
District

August 1st

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

R Sivakumar- Civilian

August 2nd

Welikanda,
Polonnaruwa
District

Sampath Kumara, former
Home Guard

August 6th

Ambalama,
Batticaloa
District

S. Handunge ChamindaCivilian

August 12th

Colombo,
Western
Province

Foreign Minister Lakshman
Kadirgamar

Sinhala

Tamil

Tamil

D. Udayasiri- Civilian

1

1

1

Sinhala

Tamil

Sinhala

Sinhala

Tamil

378

1

1

1

1

1

2
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shooting

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/4147196.st
m

640

641

642

643

644

645

646

647

August 12th

Wellawatte,
Colombo
District

August 15th

Dehiattakandiy
a, Polonnaruwa
District

August 15th

Dalukana,
Polonnaruwa
District

Raja Piravu- Civilian

August 16th

Muttur,
Trincomalee
District

Lance Corporal H. K. A.
Hendeniya

August 20th

Vavuniya
District

Nadaraja KesavavarnanEPDP Member

August 24th

Kovilkulam,
Vavuniya
District

Rasarathnam SrikanthPLOTE member

2005

August 29th

Kalubowila,
Dehiwala
District

S. Shivaruparasa- Former
TELO member

2005

September
2nd

Wennappuwa,
Puttalam
District

Former Karuna Faction
member

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

Sinnadorai Selvarajah and his
wife Welangee SelvarajahCivilians

Athukorala- Police Officer

Tamil

Sinhala

Tamil

Sinhala

Tamil

Tamil

Tamil

Tamil

379

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Shooting
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648

649

650

651

652

653

654

655

September 4th

Kahapilima,
Batticaloa
District

Private R. A. Anuruddha
Kumara

September 5th

Chenkalady,
Batticaloa
District

G. R. P. P. Bandara- SLA
Soldier

September 8th

Kaththankudy,
Eastern
Province

Security Forces Personnel

September 9th

Vavuniya
District

Gopal Vilvarasa- PLOTE
member

2005

September 9th

Vavuniya
District

SL Military Intelligence Unit
Office rM.P.M. Mohomed

2005

September
11th

Welikanda,
Polonnaruwa
District

Civilians- Mutturaja
Muralidaran and Kulasekaram
Udayakumaran

2005

September
13th

Innuvil, Jaffna
District

Civilian- Balasingham
Sivanesan,

2005

September
14th

Marandanamad
am, Jaffna
District

2005

2005

2005

2005

Sinhala

Sinhala

?

Tamil

Muslim

Tamil

Tamil

Civilian

?

380
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&
Execution
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&
Execution
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1

1

1

6

1

656

657

658

659

660

661

662

663

2005

September
14th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

Sri Lanka National Guard
Staff Sergeant S. Navaratne
Rajah

2005

September
19th

Ganeshapuram
, Vavuniya
District

Civilian- Selvathurai
Yoganadanrasa

2005

September
19th

Vellaveli,
Trincomalee

Former LTTE cadreMalasurin Wimaleshvaran

2005

September
23rd

Akkaraipattu,
Ampara
District

Reserve Police Sergeant, T.K.
Wimalawardane

2005

September
27th

Navanthurai,
Jaffna District

Leelawathi Subramanium
alias Shanthi

2005

September
27th

Ilannamoddai,
Mannar
District

Civilian- Sinnaiyah
Ramalingam

2005

September
29th

Palangar,
Trincomalee
District

Civilian- A.S. Hakeem

October 1st

Kalmunai,
Batticaloa
District

Civilian - R.B.
Wickramarathne

2005

Tamil

Tamil

Tamil

Sinhala

Tamil

Tamil

Muslim

Sinhala

381

Grenade
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1

Hacked to
death
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1

1

1

1

1

1

664

665

666

667

668

669

670

671

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

October 2nd

Kudapokuna,
Polonnaruwa
District

Candaiah Ponnarasa- former
LTTE activist

October 3rd

Vannarapannai
, Jaffna District

Kitnan ParameshwaramEPDP Supporter

October 3rd

Chunnakam,
Jaffna District

Civilian- Ponnathurai
Subendran

October 3rd

Vallipuram,
Jaffna District

Civilian

October 5th

Kalmunai,
Batticaloa
District

Civilian- S. Mohammed
Vahab

October 6th

Pallaiyuttu,
Trincomalee
District

Kinsley Weeraratne- EPDP
activist

October 7th

Karaiyur,
Jaffna District

Kandasamy Senthil KumarEPDP supporter

October 12th

Jaffna Town,
Jaffna District

Tamil

Tamil

Tamil

Tamil

Muslim

Sinhala

Tamil

Civilian- K. Rajadurai

Tamil

382

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
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676

677

678
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2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

2005

October 13th

Santhiveli,
Batticaloa
District

October 18th

Kalavanchikku
di, Batticaloa
District

October 27th

Trincomalee
District

NGO activist- A.W.P Anura

October 31st

Jaffna District

Police constable G.R.Lalith
Bandara

November 1st

Black Bridge,
Batticaloa
District

November 1st

Nelliady,
Jaffna District

Civilian- Rajendra Rejinikanth

November 2nd

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

Sellathambi PunyamoorthiLTTE deserter

November 5th

Trincomalee
District

Sinnathrai MuratheelanFormer police informant

SF Personnel- Private
D.M.Dilanga Dissanayake

Sinhala

Police Officer Kamal Indrajith

Sinhala

Sinhala

Sinhala

Civilian- Lyyadorai Ganeshan

Tamil

Tamil

Tamil

Tamil

383

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
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681

682

683

684

685

686

687

2005

November 7th

Kannagipuram,
Ampara
District

2005

November
11th

Vaharai,
Batticaloa
District

2005

November
11th

Thirunelvely,
Jaffna District

2005

November
11th

Akkaraipattu,
Ampara
District

Main Mosque

2005

November
16th

Handapanwila,
Polonnaruwa
District

Home Guard Susantha Pathma
Kumara

2005

November
16th

Kalmunai,
Batticaloa
District

2005

November
17th

Kalmunai,
Batticaloa
District

2005

November
18th

Akkaraipattu,
Ampara
District

Civilian- Velayudan
Gnanendran
Civilians-Mohammed Munas
and Athambava Mohammed
Lebbe

Tamil

Police Constable Senanayake

Muslim

Sinhala

Muslim

Home Guard Ranjith Kumara

Muslim religious leader

Sinhala

Sinhala

Muslim

Mosque

Muslim

384
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1

4

10

1

1

1

6

21

Civilian- Marukanda
Sashikara

Tamil

1

?
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Divisional Secretary
A.L.M.Faleel

Muslim

1

Shooting

http://www.island.lk/200
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3

Ambush

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

4

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

4

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

2

Shooting
& Grenade

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Grenade

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

688

2005

November
26th

689

2005

December 2nd

Katys, Jaffna
District
Kaththankudy,
Eastern
Province

December 3rd

Chavakachcher
i, Jaffna
District

December 4th

Kondavil,
Jaffna/Palaly
road

December 5th

Siyabalanduwa
, Ampara
District

Karuna Faction

December 7th

Mavadivembu,
Batticaloa
District

Civilians- Surerasa
Yogeshwari and Surerasa
Lingam Kutti

2005

December 7th

Vavuniya,
Vavuniya
District

Civilians

2005

December
12th

Uppuveli,
Trincomalee
District

Michael Collin alias MuraliEPDP activist

690

691

692

693

694

695

2005

2005

2005

2005

Army Convoy

Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Tamil

Tamil

?

385

Tamil

1

6

1

1

1

8

696

697

698

699

700

701

702

703

2005

December
14th

Paluuththuwa,
Trincomalee
District

Security Force Personnel

2005

December
15th

Kudapokuna,
Polonnaruwa
District

Sivapulandu Passirasa alias
Thran- Karuna Faction

2005

December
19th

Anuradhapura,
North Central
Province

Civilian- H.M.Chandrasiri

2005

December
21st

Jaffna, Jaffna
District

SF Personnel- Private P.A.
Pridarshana

2005

December
22nd

Eravur,
Batticaloa
District

Civilian- Vallinayagi
Thambirajah

2005

December
22nd

Nuwara Eliya,
Central
Province

2005

December
23rd

2005

December
26th

?

Tamil

Sinhala

Sinhala

Tamil

Army intelligence officer

?

Mannar,
Northern
Province

Sailors

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Vavuniya,
Vavuniya
District

Civilian- Veerappan
Thripupathy

Tamil

386

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

15

1

15

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

Ambush

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/fullstory.ph
p?nid=1501668828

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

704

705

706

707

708

709

710

711

712

2005

December
26th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

Auto Rickshaw drivers

2005

December
23rd

Chavakachcher
i, Jaffna
District

Civilian- Markandu
Pushpamalar

Tamil

2005

December
27th

Puloly, Jaffna
District

SLA Soldier

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

2005

December
27th

Kalmunai,
Batticaloa
District

Police officer Constable
Mohammed Meera Naiyaz

January 2nd

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

?

Muslim

2

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

1

Shooting
& Grenade

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

10

Claymore
mine

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/fullstory.ph
p?nid=1501668828

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/Year2005.html

1

Civilian

Tamil

5

January 7th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

Naval Ship "Dvora"

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

13

January 11th

Mattuvil,
Jaffna

Civilian- Pavalarani
Kanapathipillai

January 12th

Cheddikulam,
Vavuniya
District

January 14th

?

Tamil

Sailors

?

Sailors

?

387

8

2

IED
Explosion
Suicide
VBIED
(Sea
Tigers)

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/4575880.st
m

http://www.rte.ie/news/2
006/0107/srilanka.html

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

9

Claymore
mine

http://www.lankanewspa
pers.com/news/2006/12/
10882_space.html

2

IED
Explosion

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/fullstory.ph
p?nid=1678379761

713

714

715

716

717

718

719

720

721

722

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

January 14th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

January 16th

Mannar,
Northern
Province

January 17th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

January 17th

Sarasalai,
Jaffna District

January 19th

Thandavanveli,
Batticaloa
District

January 19th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

January 19th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

Civilian

January 22nd

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

Subramaniam SugirtharajanGovernment worker

Tamil

January 23rd

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

February 11th

Talaimannar,
Jaffna district

Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
Office

Mannar General Hospital

?

Navy Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldier

IED
Explosion

http://www.island.lk/200
6/01/15/news4.html

Grenade

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

12

Landmine/
IED

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/fullstory.ph
p?nid=1327015475

1

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

VBIED

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

13

VBIED

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/fullstory.ph
p?nid=657618423

4

IED
Explosion

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/fullstory.ph
p?nid=657618423

2

Shooting

http://www.thedailystar.n
et/2006/01/25/d6012513
03103.htm

3

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

None

?

Army Truck

?

Civilian

Predomina
ntly Tamil

1

1

4

?

Sailor

?

388

None

1

23

2

723

724

725

726

727

728

729

730

731

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

March 25th

Kuthiramalai
Coast,
Puttalam
District

April 7th

Welikanda,
Polonnaruwa
District

April 8th

Muttur,
Trincomalee
District

April 10th

Mirusuvil,
Jaffna District

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SL Navy Gunboat

Home Guards

Muslim

SLA Soldiers

?

8

Suicide
VBIED

CPOST Database

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

Attack

http://www.asiantribune.
com/ltte-provokedattacks-03-cadres-andsoldier-died

2

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm
http://www.wsws.org/arti
cles/2006/apr2006/srila19.shtml

11

2

1

SLA Soldiers & Civilians

?

April 11th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

Navy Convoy

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

11

8

Landmine/
IED

April 12th

Trincomalee
Town,
Trincomalee
District

Market

Mix

16

50

IED
Explosion

http://in.rediff.com/news/
2006/apr/13lanka.htm

April 12th

Trincomalee
Town,
Trincomalee
District

Police Constables

?

2

Claymore
mine

http://in.rediff.com/news/
2006/apr/13lanka.htm

April 15th

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Claymore
mine

http://www.asiantribune.
com/saturday-seven-srilankan-armed-forceskilled

April 15th

Kappalthurai,
Trincomalee
District

SL Airforce Personnel

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Claymore
mine

http://www.asiantribune.
com/saturday-seven-srilankan-armed-forceskilled

389

7

5

2

2

732

733

734

2006

2006

2006

April 17th

Veppankulam,
Vavuniya
District

April 20th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

April 20th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

735

2006

April 21st

736

2006

April 23rd

Thanganagar,
Trincomalee
District
Gomarakadaw
ala,
Trincomalee
District

April 24th

Dutuwewa,
Vavuniya
District

737

2006

739

2006

April 25th

740

2006

April 26th

Kaduruwela,
Polonnaruwa
District
Army
Headquarters,
Colombo
District
Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

April 27th

Muttur,
Trincomalee
District

738

741

2006

2006

April 24th

Security Forces Personnel

?

LTTE Rival Activist

?

Soldier

5

SLA Soldiers

?

2

Gomarankadalawa Village

Sinhala

6

?

Civilian Infact

Muslim

Shooting

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/fullstory.ph
p?nid=1934302745

1

IED
Explosion

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/fullstory.ph
p?nid=1934302745

1

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/060430/index.html

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

HBIED

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/4941744.st
m

Hacked to
death

http://www.island.lk/200
6/04/28/news15.html

Mortar
bombs

http://www.island.lk/200
6/04/28/news15.html

7

2

1

Army Commander Lt. Gen
Sarath Fonseka

Sinhala

8

Civilians

Tamil

3

Naval Detachment

?

3

390

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

?

Home Guards

Claymore
mine

27

13

742

743

744

745

746

747

748

749

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

April 27th

Naravilkulam,
Mannar
District

April 27th

Kayts Island,
Jaffna District

May 1st

Welikanda,
Polonnaruwa
District

May 1st

Trincomalee
Town,
Trincomalee
District

May 1st

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

May 1st

Trincomalee
Town,
Trincomalee
District

May 1st

May 4th

Trincomalee
Town,
Trincomalee
District
Vavuniya,
Northern
Province &
Pandarakulam,
Eastern
Province

SF Personnel

?

Sailors

?

Karuna Faction

Tamil

Navy Personnel

?

SL Sailors

?

Naval foot patrol

Tamil

Navy Ship

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

10

Attack

http://www.turkishweekl
y.net/news/30886/-srilanka-rebels-killrenegades-.html

5

Landmine/
IED

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/4961536.st
m

Shooting

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/4961536.st
m

IED
Explosion

http://www.bloomberg.c
om/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=aEce.G4D
MtZQ&refer=asia

2

Attack

http://www.taipeitimes.c
om/News/world/archives
/2006/05/02/2003305728

7

Grenades
&
Claymore
mines

http://www.lankanewspa
pers.com/news/2006/5/6
768.html

3

2

2

6

?

Civilians and Police officers

391

?

3

3

8

3

5

750

751

752

753

754

755

756

757

758

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

May 5th

Nelliady,
Jaffna District

Police Cab

May 5th

Batticaloa,
Eastern
Province

Police Constable Wijesiri- On
duty at EPDP Office

May 5th

Adhikovil,
Jaffna District

May 11th

Jaffna, Jaffna
District

May 13th

Kayts Island,
Jaffna District

May 16th

Thoppur,
Trincomalee
District
Batticaloa
Town,
Batticaloa
District
Thambalagamu
wa,
Trincomalee
District

May 17th

Jaffna, Jaffna
District

May 15th

May 15th

?

Private Wimalratna

Sinhala

Sinhala

Naval Ship "Pearl Cruise II"
and Dvoras

Civilians

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

?

Civilian

Muslim

Civilian

Tamil

Home Guards

?

SLA Soldier

?

392

Landmine/
IED

http://www.lankanewspa
pers.com/news/2006/5/6
768.html

Shooting

http://www.lankanewspa
pers.com/news/2006/5/6
768.html

1

Shooting

http://www.lankanewspa
pers.com/news/2006/5/6
768.html

15

Suicide
VBIED
(Sea
Tigers)

http://www.theage.com.a
u/news/world/sri-lankafighting-kills45/2006/05/12/11469406
86534.html

13

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

Hacked to
death

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

2

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

Landmine/
IED

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/print.php?ni
d=608352280

1

2

1

2

759

760

761

762

763

764

765

766

767

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

May 17th

Muhamalai,
Jaffna District

May 20th

Mavadiodai,
Batticaloa
District

May 23rd

Iramperiyakula
m, Vavuniya
District

May 24th

Thandikulam,
Vavuniya
District

May 25th

Kaththankudy,
Batticaloa
District

May 25th

Kovukil, Jaffna
district

SLA Soldier & civilian

May 26th

Kalliyankadu,
Batticaloa
District

Deputy Director of Irrigation
in Batticaloa district, Nava
Rathnarajah

May 26th

Kopay, Jaffna
District

May 26th

Pattiaddy,
Trincomalee
District

SLA Soldier

?

Civilian

Tamil

SLA Soldier

?

Security Force Personnel

?

Police Officers

?

?

SLA Soldier

Tamil

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

3

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

4

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

2

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Attack

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

1

1

?

Karuna Faction

Tamil

393

1

3

2

768

769

770

771

772

773

774

775

776

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

Landmine/
IED

http://articles.cnn.com/20
06-0528/world/lanka.mine_1_s
ri-lankan-cease-firetamiltigers?_s=PM:WORLD

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2006/06/03/sec02.asp

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/5050850.st
m

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

2

Landmine/
IED

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/5050850.st
m

May 27th

Wilpattu
National Park,
Northwestern
Province

May 28th

Dimbulagala,
Polonnaruwa
District

Civilian

Tamil

1

May 30th

Omadiyamadu,
Batticaloa
District

Civilians

Sinhala

12

May 31st

Point Pedro,
Jaffna District

SLA Soldier

June 1st

Pandarikulam,
Vavuniya
District

EPDP members- Thangarasa
(36), Nesaraja (48) and
Gnanajothy (49)

June 3rd

Kaluwnakerni,
Batticaloa
District

June 5th

Kayts Island,
Jaffna District

June 5th

Nanattan,
Mannar
District

June 6th

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province

Tourists

Sinhala

?

Civilians

Tamil

Tamil

Former EPDP Member

Tamil

SLA Soldier

?

Civilian & Police officer

?

394

8

1

2

2

2

2

2

4

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

June 6th

Serunuwara,
Trincomalee
District

Civilians

?

June 6th

Welisara,
Colombo
District

Naval Convoy

Pedominan
tly sinhala

June 11th

Vavunathivu,
Ampara
District

Soldier- Lance Corporal
H.B.S. Kumararathne

June 12th

Eravur,
Batticaloa
District

Former LTTE member- Podi
Pulendran

June 15th

Kebithigollewa
, Anuradhapura
District

June 15th

Bakkiela,
Ampara
District

June 18th

Dutuwewa,
Vavuniya
District

June 19th

Weli Oya,
Batticaloa
District
ArunagiriLlyod Avenue
Road,
Batticaloa
District

June 25th

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

June 18th

Sinhala

Civilian Bus

Tamil

Sinhala

Civilian

?

Police Personnel

?

SLA Soldiers

?

Civilian

?

Expat Civilian

Tamil

395

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Landmine/
IED

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/5050850.st
m

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

63+

Claymore
mine

http://www.guardian.co.
uk/world/2006/jun/15/sri
lanka

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

2

2

1

1

3

2

1

1

42

1

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

June 25th

Jaffna
Hospital,
Jaffna District

PLOTE memberJayahulabdeen Mohamad
Wazeer

June 26th

Pannipitiya,
Colombo
District

Major General Parami
Kulatunga

June 26th

Kayts Island,
Jaffna District

Civilian- Kandiah
Yogeswaran

June 28th

Kantale,
Trincomalee
District
Kalipinya
Lagoon,
Northern
Province

June 28th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

June 28th

Musali,
Mannar
District

June 26th

July 3rd

Batticaloa,
Eastern
Province

Muslim

Sinhala

Tamil

SLA Soldiers

?

Sailors

?

Soldiers and Civilians

?

Civilians

?

Police Checkpoint

Sinhala

396

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

3

Suicide
VBIED

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/5119528.st
m

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

3

Mortar
bombs

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/print.php?ni
d=1461865353

6

Mortar
bombs

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/print.php?ni
d=1461865353

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

VBIED

http://articles.timesofindi
a.indiatimes.com/200607-03/rest-ofworld/27801586_1_bom
b-attack-blast-batticaloa

1

1

5

1

3

4

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

802

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

July 3rd

Anuradhapura
Junciton,
Trincomalee
District

July 3rd

Nelliady,
Jaffna District

July 6th

Ganesh Road,
Trincomalee
District

July 12th

Nallur, Jaffna
District

Police Personnel

July 12th

Jaffna, Jaffna
District

PLOTE leader- Sebastian
Irudarajan

July 12th

Nagarkovil
Forward
Defence Line,
Jaffna District

July 14th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

July 14th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

Police Checkpoint

Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

?

Civilian

Muslim

?

Tamil

Security Force Personnel

Sinhala

Sailor

Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

397

15

VBIED

http://articles.timesofindi
a.indiatimes.com/200607-03/rest-ofworld/27801586_1_bom
b-attack-blast-batticaloa

1

Claymore
mine

http://www.foxnews.com
/story/0,2933,202001,00.
html

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

2

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

Shooting

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/print.php?ni
d=104397773

2

Mortar
Bombs

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/print.php?ni
d=104397773

6

1

7

1

1

5

803

804

805

806

807

808

809

810

811

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

July 14th

Vakaneri,
Trincomalee
District

July 16th

Selvanagar,
Trincomalee
District

July 17th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

July 18th

Jaffna, Jaffna
District

July 18th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

July 19th

Jaffna District

July 24th

Vavuniya
District

July 28th

Kebithigollewa
, Anuradhapura
District

July 31st

Kantale,
Trincomalee
District

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Army Base

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Civilians

?

SLA Soliders & Civilians

?

Civilians

Mortar
bombs

http://news.google.com/n
ewspapers?id=NEMzAA
AAIBAJ&sjid=ASUMA
AAAIBAJ&pg=1170,38
74581&dq=trincomalee+
bomb&hl=en

Mortar
bombs

http://www.dailytimes.co
m.pk/default.asp?page=2
006/07/17/story_17-72006_pg4_21

2

Shooting

http://www.gulf-dailynews.com/NewsDetails.a
spx?storyid=149884

1

7

IED
Explosion

http://www.gulf-dailynews.com/NewsDetails.a
spx?storyid=149884

6

IED
Explosion

http://www.gulf-dailynews.com/NewsDetails.a
spx?storyid=149884

11

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

2

IED
Explosion

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

3

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

18

IED
Explosion

http://www.foxnews.com
/story/0,2933,206460,00.
html

12

2

Tamil

SLA Army Personnel

?

SLA Soldiers

?

Home Guards

?

Military Personnel

Sinhala

398

5

3

1

1

812

813

814

815

816

817

818

819

820

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

August 1st

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

August 3rd

Muttur,
Trincomalee
District

Arabic College

August 3rd

Thoppur,
Trincomalee
District

Al Noori College and Al
Hameema College

Muslim

7

August 4th

Pachchanoor,
Trincomalee
District

Civilians

Muslim

August 7th

Digana, Kandy
District

Upul Seneviratne, SSP Trainer
of Anti-Terror Commandos

August 8th

Colombo,
Western
Province

August 8th

Northeast
Province

August 8th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

August 8th

Ampara,
Ampara
District

Navy Base

Muslim

S Sivathasan- EPDP Member

Government patrol

Sinhala

Tamil

Sinhala

Civilian

Artillery

http://www.lankanewspa
pers.com/news/2006/12/
10882_space.html

Shelling

http://www.hindu.com/2
006/08/04/stories/200608
0408511500.htm

Shelling

http://www.hindu.com/2
006/08/04/stories/200608
0408511500.htm

100+

Slaughter

http://www.asiantribune.
com/node/1420

1

Claymore
mine

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/print.php?ni
d=490915442

VBIED

http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/08/08/world/asia/0
8iht-lanka.2417264.html

Ambush

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/5255728.st
m

Attack

http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/08/08/world/asia/0
8iht-lanka.2417264.html

IED
Explosion

http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/08/08/world/asia/0
8iht-lanka.2417264.html

5

10

2

1

?

STF officers

?

399

30

50

10

1

5

2

1

2

821

822

823

824

825

826

827

828

829

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

August 9th

Nedunkerny,
Vavuniya
District

August 12th

Dehiwala,
Colombo
District

Augut 12th

Trincomalee
District

Naval Base

?

2

August 14th

Colombo,
Western
Province

Pakistani High Commissioner
Bashir Wali Mohamed

Pakistani

7

August 16th

Sittandi,
Batticaloa
District

Family of former LTTE
member

August 16th

Morawewa,
Trincomalee
District

August 18th

Salliya
Sambalathivu,
Trincomalee
District

Navy Personnel

August 20th

Tellippallai,
Jaffna District

Former TULF MemberSinnathamby Sivamaharajah

August 23rd

Ottamavady,
Batticaloa
District

Civilians

?

Kethesh Loganathan- Tamil
Peace Activist

Tamil

Tamil

Civilian

?

?

Police Personnel

Tamil

?

400

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://select.nytimes.com
/gst/abstract.html?res=F
A0610FF3B5A0C758ED
DA80994DE404482

Artillery

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.island.lk/200
6/08/15/news2.html

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

5

1

1

2

6

2

1

2

1

830

831

832

833

834

835

836

837

838

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

August 24th

August 24th

Thirukkovil,
Ampara
District
Mahakachchak
odiya,
Vavuniya
District

New
Zealander

NGO Worker

SLA Soldier

?

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

August 26th

Muhamalai,
Jaffna District

August 26th

Mawadiwembu
, Batticaloa
district

August 30th

Mamaduwa,
Vavuniya
District

September 1st

Kankesanthura
i Harbour,
Jaffna District

September
2nd

Nagarkovil
Forward
Defence Line,
Jaffna District

SLA Soldiers

September 5th

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

EPDP Member- Nallathamby
Punarathnam

Tamil

September 6th

Kadiravely,
Trincomalee
District

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Civilians

Tamil

Home Guard

Sinhala

SL Navy Vessel

1

1

6

2

1

?

?

401

4

2

1

2

1

2

16

Abduction
&
Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Attack

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Landmine/
IED

http://www.iol.co.za/new
s/world/sri-lanka-sjaffna-gets-aid-troopskilled-1.291134

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting
Suicide
VBIEDBlack Sea
Tigers

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/5307058.st
m

Artillery

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Artillery

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

839

840

841

842

843

844

845

846

847

September 7th

Muhamalai,
Kilaly and
Neravilkulam,
Jaffna District

September 8th

Chenkalady,
Batticaloa
District

2006

September 9th

Jaffna, Jaffna
District

2006

September
10th

2006

September
11th

Asikkulama,
Vavuniya
District
Muhamalai,
Kilaly,
Kodikamam,
and
Vidattapalai,
Jaffna Disttrict

2006

September
12th

Kalawanchiku
dy, Batticaloa
District

2006

September
12th

Adikovil,
Jaffna District

2006

September
12th

Nelliady,
Jaffna District

September
12th

Trincomalee
Town,
Trincomalee
District

2006

2006

2006

Predomian
tly Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

Civilian & Soldiers

?

SLA Soldiers

Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

?

Army Detachments

?

Police Officers

6

Mortars &
Artillery

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

3

IED
Explosion

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Artillery

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/fullstory.ph
p?nid=447826115

Landmine/
IED

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Artillery

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

2

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

Stabbed to
death

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

IED
Explosion
&
Shooting

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/fullstory.ph
p?nid=447826115

1

2

35

130

3

2

2

Civilians

?

Civilian

Tamil

Civilians

?

402

6

848

849

850

851

852

853

854

855

September
13th

Nagarkovil,
Jaffna District

September
13th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

September
13th

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province

September
14th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

2006

September
14th

Mathawathakul
am, Vavuniya
District

2006

September
17th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

2006

September
17th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

September
17th

Jaffna, Jaffna
District

SLA Soldier

?

SLA Soldier

?

Civilians & Soldiers

?

Civilians

Tamil

Electricity Board Employee

?

Roadside

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldier

?

403

Mortar
bombs

http://www.dailytimes.co
m.pk/default.asp?page=2
006/09/15/story_15-92006_pg4_20

IED
Explosion

http://www.dailytimes.co
m.pk/default.asp?page=2
006/09/15/story_15-92006_pg4_20

Shooting

http://www.dailytimes.co
m.pk/default.asp?page=2
006/09/15/story_15-92006_pg4_20

Shooting

http://www.dailytimes.co
m.pk/default.asp?page=2
006/09/15/story_15-92006_pg4_20

2

Shooting

http://www.chinapost.co
m.tw/i_latestdetail.asp?id
=41095

4

IED
Explosion

http://www.chinapost.co
m.tw/i_latestdetail.asp?id
=41095

Landmine/
IED

http://www.iol.co.za/new
s/world/massacredmuslims-buried-amidtight-security-1.294153

3

1

?

Civilian

Attack

http://www.dailytimes.co
m.pk/default.asp?page=2
006/09/15/story_15-92006_pg4_20

18

1

3

1

1

856

857

858

859

860

861

862

863

864

2006

September
17th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

2006

September
18th

Pottuvil,
Ampara
District

2006

September
19th

Muhamalai,
Jaffna District

2006

September
21st

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

2006

September
25th

Trincomalee
Town,
Trincomalee
District

2006

September
26th

Eluthumadduv
al, Jaffna
District

2006

September
28th

Muhamalai,
Jaffna District

2006

September
29th

Chenkalady,
Batticaloa
District

2006

September
30th

Vavuniya
District

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldier

Civilians

Muslim

SLA Soldiers

?

Civilian

Tamil

Civilian

Muslim

SLA Soldier

?

SLA Soldier

?

Civilians

?

Police Officers

?

404

4

11

4

1

1

1

1

4

3

2

2

Shooting

http://www.iol.co.za/new
s/world/massacredmuslims-buried-amidtight-security-1.294153

Hacked to
death

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/5355088.st
m&
http://www.sundayobser
ver.lk/2006/09/24/sec01.
asp

Mortars

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Artillery

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Mortars

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

September
30th

Point Pedro,
Jaffna District

October 2nd

Pottuvil,
Ampara
District

October 4th

Kondavil,
Jaffna District

October 5th

Kokkeliya,
Vavuniya
District
Eluthumadduv
al, Nagarkovil,
and
Muhamalai,
Jaffna District

October 7th

Mallakam,
Jaffna District

October 7th

Thirunelvely,
Jaffna District

October 8th

Muhamalai,
Jaffna District

October 9th

Kokuvil, Jaffna
District

October 9th

Averikadu,
Jaffna District

Ocotber 5th

EPDP Member- Ponnaiah
Srikaran

Tamil

Police Officer

?

Civilian

Tamil

SLA Soldiers

?

SLA Soldiers

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

2

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

9

Mortars &
Artillery

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

5

Mortars &
Artillery

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Mortars

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

1

?

Former EPDP Member

Tamil

SLA Soldier

?

SLA Soldiers

?

Civilian

Tamil

SLA Soldier

?

405

1

1

1

4

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

October 10th

Poonthotham,
Vavuniya
District

October 11th

Kodikamam,
Jaffna District

October 12th

Jaffna Town,
Jaffna District

October 12th

Kachcheri,
Jaffna District

October 14th

Muhumalai,
Nagarkovil and
Kilaly, Jaffna
District

October 15th

Madavaithyaku
lam, Vavuniya
District

October 16th

Digampathana,
Habarana
District

October 17th

Galle,
Southern
Province

October 19th

Thandikulam,
Vavuniya
District

Civilians

?

Civilian

Tamil

EPDP Members

Tamil

Civilian & Police officer

?

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Civilians

Sinhala

Navy Convoy

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Dakshina naval facility

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SF Personnel

?

406

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Mortar

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

4

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

5

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Artillery

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Abuductio
n&
Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

150

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.theaustralian.
com.au/news/world/srilanka-suicide-bombingkills-103/story-e6frg6so1111112373263

26

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.guardian.co.
uk/world/2006/oct/18/tra
velnews.srilanka

Landmine/
IED

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

3

3

1

2

13

3

103

2

2

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

892

893

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

October 21st

Batticaloa,
Eastern
Province

October 23rd

Poonthotham,
Vavuniya
District

October 23rd

Serunuwara,
Trincomalee
District

October 25th

Poonthotham,
Vavuniya
District
Galwalmatha
Kovil Road,
Vavuniya
District

October 26th

Chenkalady,
Batticaloa
District

October 26th

Chenkalady,
Batticaloa
District

October 26th

3rd Mile Post,
Trincomalee
District

October 27th

Anjisandi,
Jaffna District

October 28th

Mirusuvil,
Jaffna District

October 23rd

Civilian

Tamil

Civilian

?

Civilian

?

Civilian

?

Civilian

Sinhala

TMVP Office

Tamil

Civilians

?

Civilians

?

Civilian

Tamil

SLA Soldiers

?

407

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

8

Attack

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

4

IED
Explosion

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

1

1

1

1

1

3

2

2

1

2

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

October 29th

Uduppidy,
Jaffna District

October 29th

Eravur,
Batticaloa
District

October 31st

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province

November 4th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province
AmparaPottuvil Road,
Ampara
District

November 5th

Puttur, Jaffna
District

November 5th

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

October 31st

901

2006

November 6th

902

2006

November 9th

Uppuveli,
Trincomalee
District
Nagarkovil,
Jaffna District

2006

November 9th

Anaipathi,
Jaffna District

2006

November
11th

Thippankulam,
Jaffna

903

904

Predomina
ntly Tamil

Civilians

Civilians

Tamil

SLA Soldier

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Home Guard

?

Special Task Force Soldiers

?

EPDP Officer

Tamil

EPDP Supporter

Tamil

Civilians

Tamil &
Muslim

SLA Navy Vessel

?

SLA Soldiers

Sinhala

Civilian

Sinhala

408

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

3

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

3

IED
Explosion

http://www.chinapost.co
m.tw/i_latestdetail.asp?id
=42134

1

Shooting

http://www.chinapost.co
m.tw/i_latestdetail.asp?id
=42134

1

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

?
Suicide
VBIED

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm
http://www.dailynews.lk/
2006/11/10/sec01.asp

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

5

1

1

2

2

1

1

3
3

2

1

905

906

907

908

909

910

911

912

913

914

2006

November
11th

Kantale,
Trincomalee
District

2006

November
11th

Kaththankudy,
Trincomalee
District

2006

November
12th

Anaipathi,
Jaffna District

2006

November
13th

Kodikamam,
Jaffna District

2006

November
14th

Manthottam,
Mannar
District

2006

November
19th

Varadayanagar
, Trincomalee
District

2006

November
22nd

Sangama,
Trincomalee
District

2006

November
23rd

Atambagashan
diya, Vavuniya
District

Home Guards

2006

November
23rd

Ampara,
Ampara
District

Police Personnel & Home
guard

2006

November
23rd

Bakkiela,
Ampara
District

Civilian

Sinhala

Civilian

Tamil

Civilian

Tamil

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Civilians

Tamil

Civilians

Tamil

?

?

Security Force Personnel

?

409

1

1

2

1

2

3

2

2

3

3

4

5

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Mortars

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

IED
Explosion

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Attack

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

915

916

917

918

919

920

921

922

923

924

2006

November
23rd

Kebithigollewa
, Anuradhapura
District

2006

November
26th

Northern
Province

2006

November
28th

6th Mile Post,
Trincomalee
District

2006

November
28th

Kadjuwatte,
Batticaloa
District

Security Force Personnel

December 1st

Colombo,
Western
Province

Defense Minister Gothabaya
Rajapakse

December 2nd

Velvettiturai,
Jaffna District

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

2006

December 6th

Vavuniya
District
Telecommunic
ations
department,
Jaffna District

December 6th

Putukkulam,
Vavuniya
District

December 7th

Kallar,
Trincomalee
District

December 5th

Security Force Personnel

?

EPDP Supporter

Tamil

Civilian

Tamil

?

SLA Soldier

Sinhala

Muslim

Civilians

?

Civilians

?

SLA Soldiers

?

School

Tamil

410

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

2

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

14

Suicide
VBIED

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/6197562.st
m

1

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

2

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

4

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Artillery

http://www.lankanewspa
pers.com/news/2006/12/
10219.html

3

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

3

10

925

926

927

928

929

930

931

932

933

934

December 9th

Vadukoda,
Jaffna

2006

December 9th

Around
Batticaloa
District

2006

December
10th

Vakarai,
Batticaloa
District

2006

December
12th

Kallady,
Batticaloa
district

2006

December
12th

Jaffna, Jaffna
District

2006

December
18th

Vinayagapura
m, Batticaloa
District

2006

December
18th

Chenkalady,
Batticaloa
District

2006

Civilian

T

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

Predomian
tly Sinhala

SLA Soldier

?

Civilians

Predomina
ntly Tamil

Civilians

2006

December
19th

Northeast
Province

2006

December
19th

Kalmunai,
Batticaloa
District

TMVP Office

2006

December
24th

?

Jordanian Merchant Vessel
"Farah III"

?

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Army Camp

Tamil

411

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Artillery

http://www.bdnews24.co
m/details.php?id=45578
&cid=1

3

Artillery

http://www.sundayobser
ver.lk/2007/01/28/fea02.
asp

1

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Abduction

http://www.lankanewspa
pers.com/news/2006/12/
10882_space.html

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Attack

http://zeenews.india.com
/news/south-asia/lankawar-planes-bomb-tigerbases-amidfuneral_343231.html

Grenade

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Abduction/
Piracy

http://www.lankanewspa
pers.com/news/2006/12/
10882_space.html

1

12

40

2

1

3

1

2

1

935

936

937

938

939

940

941

942

943

2006

December
25th

2006

December
27th

Kudamiyan,
Jaffna District
Simbalangamu
wa,
Anuradhapura
District

2006

December
28th

Chavakachcher
i, Jaffna
District

2006

December
30th

Kiren,
Batticaloa
District

2006

December
30th

Welikanda,
Polonnaruwa
District

2006

December
30th

Toppigala &
Paththiruppu,
Batticaloa
District

2006

December
31st

Kiren,
Batticaloa
District

January 1st

Manthottam,
Mannar
District

January 1st

Bakmitiyawa,
Ampara
District

2007

2007

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Army Patrol

PLOTE members

Tamil

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Karuna Faction

Tamil

Karuna Faction

Tamil

Civilians

Sinhala

Civilians

Sinhala

412

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

2

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

3

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

?

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

1

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2006.htm

Attack

http://www.couriermail.c
om.au/news/breakingnews/rebels-attacked-bysplinter-group/storye6freoo61111112760297

?

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

3

2

3

2

2

3

2

2

944

945

946

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

January 1st

Settikulam,
Vavuniya
District

January 5th

Nittambuwa,
Western
Province

January 6th

Seenigama,
Southern
Province

January 6th

Pattamkulam,
Vavuniya
District

January

Vavunathivu,
Ampara
District

January 12th

MannarVavuniya
Road, Northern
Province

January 13th

Mankerni,
Batticaloa
District

January 14th

Akkaraipattu,
Ampara
District

January 16th

Puthukulam,
Vavuniya
District

January 19th

Bakmitiyawa,
Ampara
District

Police Officers

?

Civilian Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Civilian Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers & Civilians

?

SLA Soliders

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Police Officers

?

SLA Soldiers

?

Former LTTE cadres

Tamil

SLA Soldiers

?

STF officers

?

413

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

VBIED

http://www.reuters.com/a
rticle/2007/01/05/ussrilanka-violenceidUSSP13133820070105

HBIED

http://www.defence.lk/ne
w.asp?fname=20070106
_09

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

2

Attack

http://www.sundayobser
ver.lk/2007/01/28/fea02.
asp

2

1

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

2

Artillery&
Mortars

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

2

Shooing

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

5

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Ambush

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

2

5

15

1

30

40

4

4

11

2

11

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

January 19th

Vakarai,
Batticaloa
District

January 20th

Eechalanpattu,
Trincomalee
District

SLA soldiers

?

January 21st

Point Pedro
Coast, Jaffna
District

Civilian Cargoship

?

January 22nd

Poonthotham,
Vavuniya
District

Civilian- Manager of
Vavuniya Transport Central
Board

2007

January 26th

Murunkan,
Mannar
District

Security Force officials &
Civilians

2007

December
31st

Vandaramoolai
, Batticalo
District

SLA Soldiers & Civilians

February 6th

Batticaloa,
Eastern
Province

Rev. Selliah Parameswaran
Kurukkal

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

February 14th

Kilaly, Jaffna
District
AmparaMahaoya
Road, Ampara
District

February 17th

Jaffna Town,
Jaffna District

February 12th

SLA Soldiers

?

Tamil

?

3

4

SLA Soldiers

?

Security Force Personnel

?

Civilians & Soldiers

Predomina
ntly Tamil

414

3

1

3

CPOST Database

4

Attack

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

13

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Shooting

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/6342511.st
m

Mortar

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Several
others

Attack

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

4

Fragmentat
ion Mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

3

3

Mortars
Suicide
VBIEDBlack Sea
Tigers

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Shooitng

1

3

Shooitng

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

1

11

Tamil

4

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

February 21st

Ottamavady,
Batticaloa
District

Security Forces Personnel &
Civilians

February 27th

Batticaloa,
Eastern
Province

Helicopter with Foreign
Delegates

March 4th

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

March 6th

Near Colombo,
Western
Province

March 9th

Wilpattu
National Park,
Northwestern
Province

March 11th

Pandiruppu,
Ampara
District

March 16th

Muhumalai,
Jaffna District

March 18th

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

March 22nd

Vavuniya,
Vavuniya
District

March 24th

Parayankulam,
Mannar
District

?

3

Foreigners

LTTE Deserter

Tamil

16

13

2

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Artillery

http://www.tribuneindia.
com/2007/20070228/wor
ld.htm#1

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Karuna Faction

Tamil

5

Execution

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

8

Ambush

http://www.island.lk/200
7/03/10/news7.html

2

1

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

1

Mortar &
Artillery

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Ambush

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Mortars

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

STF Personnel

?

Security Force Personnel

?

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Civilian (Businessmen)

?

SLA Soldiers

?

415

1

2

12

2

1

3

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

March 24th

March 24th

Jaffna, Jaffna
District
Chenkalady
and
Kommanthurai
, Batticaloa
District

March 25th

Jaffna Town,
Jaffna District

March 25th

Eravur,
Batticaloa
District

March 26th

Katunayake,
Western
Province

March 29th

Chenkalady,
Batticaloa
District
Sittandi,
Sandiliveli and
Morakottanchc
hena,
Batticaloa
District

March 29th

Kanyakumari
Coast, Tamil
Nadu, India

March 27th

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SL Army Roadblock

Civilians

?

Civilians

Tamil

Social Worker

Tamil

Air Force Base

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Army Base

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

1

HBIED

CPOST Database

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Shooting

CPOST DatabaseSuspected Tamil rebels
kill 3 civilians in
northern Sri Lanka, says
military, Associated
Press Worldstream,
March 25, 2007

1

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

3

Aerial
Bombing

http://www.tamileelamne
ws.com/news/publish/tns
_6077.shtml

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.news.lk/hom
e/2025-ltte-suicideattack-on-chenkaladiarmy-camp

Mortar

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Shooting

http://news.outlookindia.
com/item.aspx?468801

1

2

3

6

Civilians

?

10

Indian Fisherman

Indian/
Hindu

5

416

4

15

12

7

982

983

984

985

986

987

988

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

March 30th

Parayanakulam
, Vavuniya
District

March 30th

Sittandikudi,
Batticaloa
District

April 1st

Eravur,
Batticaloa
District

April 2nd

Kondavattavan
, Ampara
District

April 3rd

Kalmunai,
Batticaloa
District

April 5th

April 7th

Nidanwala,
Polonnaruwa
District
Piramanamank
ulam,
Vavuniya
District

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

Civilians

?

Volunteer workers

Sinhala

Civilian bus

?

STF Personnel

?

Civilians

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Civilian Bus

?

417

1

Claymore
mine

http://www.hindu.com/2
007/03/31/stories/200703
3110811400.htmhttp://w
ww.hindu.com/2007/03/
31/stories/200703311081
1400.htm

15

Mortar
bombs

http://www.hindu.com/2
007/03/31/stories/200703
3110811400.htm

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/ne
w.asp?fname=20070401
_04

VBIED

http://web.archive.org/w
eb/20070930215945/http
://www.swissinfo.org/en
g/international/ticker/det
ail/Sri_Lanka_says_rebel
_blast_on_bus_kills_15.
html?siteSect=143&sid=
7678917&cKey=117550
6688000

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

4

Shooting

http://dalje.com/enworld/sri-lanka-saysrebels-kill-4-farmersbomb-defused/32836

8

Claymore
mine

http://www.defence.lk/ne
w.asp?fname=20070407
_02

5

8

6

16

25

1

25

989

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

April 7th

Iruna
Iruppaikulam,
Vavuniya
District

April 7th

Rukam,
Batticaloa
District

April 8th

Pandatirippu,
Jaffna District

April 12th

Awaranthalaw
a, Vavuniya
District

April 13th

Chenkalady,
Batticaloa
District

2007

April 13th

Aiyankerni,
Batticaloa
District

2007

April 15th to
21st

Mannar,
Northern
Province

April 17th

Kovilkudeirup
pu, Batticaloa
District

April 20th

Welikanda,
Polonnaruwa
District

April 21st

Kaththankudy,
Trincomalee
District

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

Security Forces Personnel

?

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Shooting

http://www.indiaenews.c
om/srilanka/20070412/4
7028.htm

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Small arms

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

?

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/070422/Columns/sitre
port.html

2

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

2

2

Landmine/
IED

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

3

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

1

SLA Soldier

3

1

SLA Soldier

?

Awaranthalawa Village

Sinhala

Civilians

?

TMVP Office

Tamil

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Civilians

Tamil

SLA Soldiers

?

Civilians

?

418

1

7

5

5

2

7

1

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

April 23rd

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province

April 23rd

Kankuvely,
Trincomalee
District

April 24th

Palaly, Jaffna
District

April 29th

Bakimitiyawa,
Ampara
District
Kolonnawa
and
Muthurajawela
, Western
Province

May 1st

Thihilaweddi,
Batticaloa
District

May 4th

Nidhanwala,
Polonnaruwa
District

May 6th

Kokadycholai,
Batticaloa
District

May 6th

Vavuniya,
Northern
District

April 25th

Civilian Bus

?

Civilian

?

SLA Army Base

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

STF Personnel

?

5

IED
Explosion

http://www.dailytimes.co
m.pk/default.asp?page=2
007/04/25/story_25-42007_pg4_16

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

6

Aerial
Bombing

http://www.outlookindia.
com/article.aspx?234492

4

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Aerial
Bombing

http://www.hindu.com/2
007/04/30/stories/200704
3005700100.htm

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

2

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

3

Landmine/
IED

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/print.php?ni
d=571523330

Mortars

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/print.php?ni
d=571523330

33

1

2

Oil Tanks

Farmers

?

Farmers

Sinhala

Special Task Force Vehicle

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

419

3

4

3

Several
others

1008

2007

May 13th

1009

2007

May 19th

Morawewa,
Trincomalee
District
Palampidi,
Vavuniya
District

May 21st

Iranai
Iruppakulam
District

May 21st

Salambakulam,
Vavuniya
District

May 23rd

Eravur,
Batticaloa
District

May 24th

Delft Island,
Jaffna District

May 24th

Colombo,
Western
Province

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

1015

2007

May 24th

1016

2007

May 27th

Kirivegam,
Vavuniya
District
Thirukkovil,
Ampara
District

Ven. Nandarathana Thera of
Mahadivulwewa Temple

SLA Soldiers

Security Force Personnel

Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

?

Security Force Bunker

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

8

Mortars

http://www.island.lk/200
7/05/19/news2.html

3

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

1

1

2

?

Few

Security Force Personnel

?

1

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Naval Detachment

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

10 to
35

?

http://www.newstrackind
ia.com/newsdetails/201

Army Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

VBIED

http://www.reuters.com/a
rticle/2007/05/24/ussrilankaidUSSP20468320070524

1

6

Home Guards

?

3

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Civilians

?

3

IED
Explosion

http://www.msnbc.msn.c
om/id/18896713/

420

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

May 28th

Rathmalana,
Dehiwala
District

May 28th

Weli Oya,
Batticaloa
District

May 29th

Salambakulam,
Vavuniya
District

May 30th

MannarVavuniya
Road, Northern
Province
Madhu,
Mannar,
Northern
Province

June 1st

Kebithigollewa
, Anuradhapura
District

May 29th

June 5th

Nallur, Jaffna
District
Ambalanthure
– Thikodai
road, Ampara
district

June 6th

Puwarasakula
m, Vavuniya
District

June 4th

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Police Commandos

SLA Soldier

Claymore
mine

http://articles.cnn.com/20
07-0528/world/srilanka.blast_1
_ratmalana-sri-lankantamiltigers?_s=PM:WORLD

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

?

http://news.nidahasa.com
/print.php?go=fullnews&
id=213

Attack

http://news.nidahasa.com
/print.php?go=fullnews&
id=213

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

3

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

1

1

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

1

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

6

?

Security Force Personnel

?

SLA Soldier

?

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Home Guard & Soldier

?

Civilians

Tamil

STF Personnel

?

SLA Soldier

?

421

25

1

1

1

5

1

2

1

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

1031

1032

1033

1034

1035

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

June 9th

Dutuwewa,
Vavuniya
District

June 9th

Toppigala,
Batticaloa
District

June 20th

Mawadiwembu
, Batticaloa
district
Ampaddailupp
aikulam,
Vavuniya
District
Medawachchiy
a, North
Central
Province

June 21st

Chundikkulam,
Jaffna District

June 28th

Nawaththurai,
Jaffna District

June 29th

Serunuwara,
Trincomalee
District

June 29th

Vannaparanai,
Jaffna District

July 3rd

Kandapuram,
Vavuniya
District

June 10th

June 20th

Home Guard & Civilian

?

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Karuna Faction

Tamil

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Police Officers

?

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

?

Civilians

?

Civilians

Tamil

SLA Soldiers

?

422

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Artillery

http://www.sundayobser
ver.lk/2007/06/10/sec02.
asp

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

2

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

1

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

2

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

3

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

2

1

1

17

1

6

2

3

2

4

?

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

1043

1044

1045

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

July 6th

Toppigala,
Batticaloa
District

July 15th

Thavasikulam,
Vavuniya
District

Civilians

July 16th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

Herath Abeyweera, chief
secretary of the Eastern
Province

July 20th

Mannar,
Northern
Province

July 23rd

Annaikottai,
Jaffna District

July 24th

Thiruwegama,
Vavuniya
District

July 24th

Settikulam,
Vavuniya
District

July 31st

Maseri, Jaffna
District

August 7th

Pandarikulam,
Vavuniya
District

August 12th

Kachchantopp
u, Jaffna
District

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

?

Sinhala

Army Officer

Sinhala

INGO Officer

Tamil

Home Guards

Sinhala

SLA Soldiers & Civilians

?

SLA Soldiers

?

SLA Soldiers

Mortar

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Shooting

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/6902235.st
m

Shooting

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/070722/Columns/sitre
port.html

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

4

Attack

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

12

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

2

HBIED

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

13

IED
Explosion

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

6

4

1

1

1

?

423

13

3

?

SLA Soldiers

2

4

1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

1052

1053

1054

1055

August 19th

Mullikulam,
Omanthai
District

August 20th

Ulukkam,
Vavuniya
District

August 20th

Kasthuri Road,
Jaffna District

August 20th

Valaichchenai,
Batticaloa
District

August 21st

Thampanai,
Vavuniya
District

2007

August 30th

Eravur,
Batticaloa
District

2007

September
14th

Point Pedro,
Jaffna District

2007

September
22nd

Sumathipura,
Vavuniya
District

2007

September
25th

Nilaveli,
Trincomalee
District

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

September
27th

Jaffna, Jaffna
District

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Small Army Detachments

Home Guards

?

NGO Officers

?

Civilian

Tamil

SLA Soldiers

?

EPDP Members

Tamil

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Home Guards

?

Civilian Bus

?

Civlians

?

424

Attack

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/070722/Columns/sitre
port.html

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

?

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Mortars

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

2

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

2

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

4

5

1

2

1

3

Several
others

7

5

2

Shooting

http://www.bbc.co.uk/sin
hala/news/story/2007/08/
070820_home_guard_va
vuniya.shtml

1

Several
others

Claymore
mine

http://www.reuters.com/a
rticle/2007/09/22/idUSC
OL149270

Claymore
mine

http://www.reuters.com/a
rticle/2007/09/25/ussrilanka-violenceidUSSP21430220070925

2

1056

1057

1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

1064

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

October 2nd

October 14th

Chunnakam,
Jaffna District
Kuduruvittankul
am, Vavuniya
District

October 15th

Thampanai,
Vavuniya
District

October 15th

Mannar,
Northern
Province

October 15th

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province

October 15th

Yala,
Monoragala
District

October 22nd

Mullikulam,
Omanthai
District

October 30th

Anuradhapura,
North Central
Province

November 1st

Sittambarampu
ram, Vavuniya
District

SLA Soldiers

?

SLA Soldiers

1

?

Police Vehicle

?

Police Officers

?

Police Officers

?

Thalgasmankada Army
detachment

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Air Force Base

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Ex-PLOTE members

Tamil

SLA Soldier

?

425

2

2

7

1

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

3

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgt
p/countries/shrilanka/ti
meline/2007.htm

15

IED
Explosion

http://english.people.com
.cn/90001/90777/627271
3.html

Shooting

http://www.chinapost.co
m.tw/headlines/2007/10/
16/49659/Tamilrebels.htm

2

Shooting

http://www.chinapost.co
m.tw/headlines/2007/10/
16/49659/Tamilrebels.htm

4

Landmine/
IED &
Shooting

http://www.chinapost.co
m.tw/headlines/2007/10/
16/49659/Tamilrebels.htm

7

Air Strike
& Ground
attack

http://www.nation.lk/200
7/10/21/militarym.htm

Shooting

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

?

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

3

2

2

1

1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

November 5th

Weli Oya,
Batticaloa
District

November 5th

Thambarawew
a, Hambantota
District

November 7th

Pokkaravani,
Vavuniya
District

November 8th

Muhamalai,
Jaffna District

November 8th

Tissamaharam
a, Monoragala
District

2007

November 9th

Jaffna District

2007

November
10th

Kambiliwewa,
Trincomalee
District

2007

November
11th

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province

Farmers

Sinhala

SLA Soldier

?

Air Force Base

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Farmers

Sinhala

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

?

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

1

Attack

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

9

Air Strike
& Ground
attack

http://www.reuters.com/a
rticle/2007/10/22/idUSC
OL223034

2

?

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

11

mortar,
machine
gun, rocket
propelled
grenades
and small
arms fire

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/071111/Columns/sitre
port.html

Claymore
mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Attack

http://www.guardian.co.
uk/world/2007/nov/08/sri
lanka

Artillery

http://www.gulftimes.com/site/topics/pri
ntArticle.asp?cu_no=2&i
tem_no=184084&versio
n=1&template_id=44&p
arent_id=24

3

Home Guards

?

2

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

11 to
24

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

426

1

1

20

41

1073

1074

1075

1076

1077

1078

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

2007

1079

2007

1080

2007

November
26th

Yala,
Monoragala
District

November
28th

Mahawilachchi
ya,
Anuradhapura
District

November
28th

Colombo,
Western
Province

December 5th

Nugegoda,
Dehiwala
District

December 5th

Abimanapura,
Vavuniya
District

December 5th

December
13th
December
13th

Sinasettikulam,
Vavuniya
District
Chinnachippik
ulam,
Vavuniya
District
Point Pedro,
Jaffna District

Civilians

?

Civilians

Sinhala

Douglas Devananda

Tamil

Shopping Centre

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

?

SLA Soldiers

?

Civilian Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Civilian house

Tamil

427

Claymore
mine

http://www.gulftimes.com/site/topics/pri
ntArticle.asp?cu_no=2&i
tem_no=184084&versio
n=1&template_id=44&p
arent_id=24

Shooting

http://www.bbc.co.uk/sin
hala/news/story/2007/11/
071126_civilianskilled.s
html

HBIED

http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/11/28/world/asia/2
8ihtlanka.1.8511133.html

20

IED
Explosion

http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/11/28/world/asia/2
8ihtlanka.3.8515027.html

2

Pressure
Mine

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

3

Attack

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

16

25

Claymore
mine

http://www.sundayobser
ver.lk/2007/12/16/sec01.
asp

6

HBIED

1

1

4

1

16

4

1

CPOST Database

December
15th

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province

2007

December
16th

Mannar &
Vavuniya,
Northern
Province

1083

2007

December
18th

1084

2008

1081

1082

1085

2007

2008

2

Hacked to
death

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Attack

http://satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/shrilanka/timeli
ne/2007.htm

Claymore
mine

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2007/12/28/sec09.asp

Shooting

http://www.nation.lk/200
8/03/16/newsfe1.htm

Claymore
mine

http://www.bloomberg.c
om/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=aMtvh4R5k
1rs&refer=asia

Claymore
mine

http://www.guardian.co.
uk/world/2008/jan/03/1

15

Artillery

http://www.tamileelamne
ws.com/news/publish/tns
_9207.shtml

4

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

5

January 1st

Special Task Force Officer

?

1

January 2nd

Kotahena,
Colombo
District

Thiagarajah Maheshwaran,
UNP Colombo district MP

Tamil

1

Army Bus

Army Truck

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Civil Vehicle

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

January 3rd

1087

2008

January 3rd

Anuradhapura
District

January 8th

Pallakkuli,
Mannar
District

January 14th

Kudakachchik
udi, Vavuniya
District

2008

?

Claymore
mine

?

2008

1089

Civilians

1

Military Outpost

1086

2008

?

Kaithady,
Jaffna District
Weerapuram,
Vavuniya
District

Colombo,
Western
Province

1088

Police Officer

CPOST Database- Tamil
Rebels set off explosive
and kill themselves in Sri
lanka, Deutsche PresseAgentur, December 13,
2007

428

4

1

28

2

10

3

1090

1091

1092

1093

1094

1095

1096

1097

1098

1099

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

January 16th

Ja-Ela,
Western
Province

January 16th

Dambeyaya,
Heenetenna

January 16th

Buttala,
Monoragala
District

January 17th

Buttala,
Monoragala
District

January 18th

Thanamalawila
, Monoragala
District

January 24th

Horowpothana,
Anuradhapura
District

January 30th

Chavakachcher
i, Jaffna
District

February 1st

Mullikulam,
Omanthai
District

February 2nd

Thinnaveli,
Jaffna District

February 3rd

Dambulla,
Central
Province

DM Dassanayake, Minister of
Nationa Building

Sinhala

Farmers

?

Civilian Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Army Personnel Carrier

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Farmers

?

Civilians

?

Civilians

Tamil

Soldiers

?

Market

Predomina
ntly Tamil

Civilian Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

429

IED
Explosion

http://www.guardian.co.
uk/world/2008/jan/08/3

4

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

28

Dozens

Claymore
mine

http://www.guardian.co.
uk/world/2008/jan/16/ter
rorism

3

IED
Explosion

http://www.guardian.co.
uk/world/2008/jan/16/ter
rorism

10

Landmine/
IED

http://www.hindu.com/2
008/01/19/stories/200801
1953651400.htm

16

Hacked to
death

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

3

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

3 to 5

Antipersonnel
Mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

3

13

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.reuters.com/a
rticle/2008/01/31/idUSL
31933624

50

IED
Explosion

http://old.tehrantimes.co
m/index_View.asp?code
=162554

1

20

1100

2008

February 4th

1101

2008

February 4th

Fort Railway
Station,
Colombo
District
Nikawewa,
Weli Oya
District

February 6th

Galge,
Kataragama
District

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

February 7th

Talaimannar,
Jaffna district

February 20th

Pokkaravani &
Umayaratuvara
nkulam, Wanni
District

February 22nd

Mannar,
Northern
Province

February 23rd

Weli Oya
District

February 23rd

Mount Lavinia,
Western
Province

Febraury 23rd

Kalawanchiku
di, Batticaloa
District

Civilian Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala
Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Army Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Commuter Train

Sailors

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

Predomian
tly Sinhala

SLA Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

SLA Soldier

?

Civilian Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

TMVP Members

Tamil

430

12

100+

HBIED

http://www.tribuneindia.
com/2008/20080204/wor
ld.htm#12

12

17

Claymore
mine

http://www.island.lk/200
8/02/05/news5.html

1

2

Claymore
mine

http://www.island.lk/200
8/02/05/news5.html

Rocket
Propelled
Grenade

http://www.sify.com/new
s/ltte-used-indian-boatto-attack-lankan-navynews-internationaljegm9Acabbd.html

Shooting
& Artillery

http://www.tamileelamne
ws.com/news/publish/tns
_9400.shtml

Shooting

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/print.php?ni
d=1929060150

Artillery

http://afp.google.com/arti
cle/ALeqM5g5If2vL4FE
S5OeXbAlOjniPMOstQ

IED
Explosion

http://www.reuters.com/a
rticle/2008/02/23/ussrilanka-blastidUSSP19916820080223

VBIED

http://www.reuters.com/a
rticle/2008/02/24/idUSC
OL143926

6

1

22

3

1

18

3

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

1116

1117

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

March 2nd

?

March 9th

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province &
Polonnaruwa,
North Central
Province

March 17th

Murunkan,
Mannar
District

March 21st

Ampara,
Ampara
District

March 22nd

Nayaru Sea,
Mullaitivu
Coast

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Port

SLA Soldier

?

SLA Soldier

Sinhala

Civilian

Tamil

SLN Sailors

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

March 31st

Omanthai,
Vavuniya
District
Pirmanalankul
am &
Adampan,
Mannar
District

April 6th

Weli Oya
District

Civilian Bus

April 6th

Weliveriya,
Gampaha
District

Minister of Highways Jeyaraj
Fernandopulle

March 26th

HBIED

http://www.asianews.it/i
ndex.php?l=en&art=116
47&size=A

2

Claymore
mine

http://www.reuters.com/a
rticle/2008/03/02/idUSL
02459878

1

2

Claymore
mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

5

IED
Explosion

http://www.reuters.com/a
rticle/2008/03/10/idUSC
OL169977

Sea Mine

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

Small arms

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

2

1

7

11

Fishermen

?

SL Navy Ship

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Sea Mine

http://www.sundaytimes.
lk/080323/Columns/sitre
port.html

?

Claymore
mine

http://www.whec.com/art
icle/stories/S64925.shtml
?cat=10054

HBIED

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/7332952.st
m

431

Sinhala

3

12

14

3

17

90

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

April 23rd

Piliyandala,
Colombo
District

May 8th

Ampara,
Ampara
District

Civilian

May 13th

Nelliady,
Jaffna District

Maheshwari VelyanthanEPDP Senior leader

Tamil

May 16th

Fort, Colombo
District

Police Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

May 26th

Dehiwala,
Colombo
District

Train

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Navali, Jaffna
District

Sirasa TV Jaffna
CorrespondentParamarupasingham
Devakumar

May 28th

May 29th

Jaffna Town,
Jaffna District
Zone 18
Village,
Anuradhapura
District

June 2nd

Eravur,
Batticaloa
District

May 29th

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Civilian Bus

?

Tamil

Civilians

Tamil

Civilians

?

TMVP Eravurpattu
Pradeshiya Sabha Deputy
Chairman Aiyathurai
Pushpanandan

Tamil

432

52

VBIED

http://edition.cnn.com/20
08/WORLD/asiapcf/04/2
5/srilanka.bomb/

36

IED
Explosion

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

1

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

9

90

Suicide
VBIED

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/7404147.st
m

70

IED
Explosion

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/7420231.st
m

Hacked to
death

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

Artillery

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

?

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

23

12

8

2

6

3

2

12

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

June 4th

Wellawatte,
Colombo
District

Train

?

Civilian Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Civilian Bus

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Polgolla,
Kandy District

June 6th

Moratuwa,
Western
Province

June 16th

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province

June 30th

Palamoddai,
Vavuniya
District

June 23rd

Aiyaththamalai
, Batticaloa
District

July 10th

Kalmunai,
Batticaloa
District

Civilians

Sinhala

3

July 11th

Hambantota,
Hambantota
District

Civilian Bus

?

4

July 14th

Kadolana,
Jaffna District

Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

July 29th

Thunukkai,
Mullaitivu
District

Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

?

Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Police Complex

?

433

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/7434886.st
m

12

IED
Explosion

http://www.bbc.co.uk/sin
hala/news/story/2008/06/
080606_polgollalatest.sh
tml

100

Claymore
mine

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/7439193.st
m

23

Suicide
VBIED

http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/06/16/world/asia/1
6ihtlanka.1.13735093.html

2

IED
Explosion

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

1

IED
Explosion

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

25

Shooting

http://www.island.lk/200
8/07/12/index.htm

1

IED
Explosion

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

3

Mortar
shell

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

24

June 6th

Police Complex

IED
Explosion

2

22

12

3

3

3

2

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

August 18th

Muhamalai,
Jaffna District

August 25th

Mullaitivu,
Northern
Province

August 26th

Trincomalee,
Eastern
Province

August 30th

Konketiyawa,
Buttala District

August 30th

Malawi,
Mullaitivu
District

2008

August 30th

Pettah,
Colombo
District

2008

September
12th

Kotiyagala,
Monaragala
District

2008

September
20th

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

Soldiers

Predomint
antly
Sinhala

Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Naval Base

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Civilians

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

1

Mortar
shell

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

4

Mortar
shell

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

10

Aerial
Bombing

http://www.atimes.com/a
times/South_Asia/JI03Df
01.html

4

Mortar
shell

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

9

Mortar
shell

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

IED
Explosion

http://www.channelnews
asia.com/stories/afp_asia
pacific/view/372754/1/.h
tml

7

Shooting

http://www.defence.lk/L
TTE%20Attrocities/Atro
2.xml

Mortar
shell

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

3

4

0

3

3

45

Farmers

?

Vannavikulam,
Kilinochchi
District

Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

3

September
28th

Vavuniya,
Northern
Province

Civilians

?

1

9

Suicide
VBIED

CPOST Database

October 6th

Anuradhapura,
Anuradhapura
District

Maj General Janaka Perera &
UNP Office

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

20+

35+

HBIED

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2008/10/06/news001.asp

434

1147

1148

1149

1150

1151

1152

1153

1154

1155

1156

October 7th

Horowpothana,
Anuradhapura
District

Civilians

?

4

October 9th

Boralesgamuw
a, Western
Province

Agriculture Minister
Maithripala Sirisena

Sinhala

1

October 28th

Kelanitissa,
Colombo
District

October 28th

Thalladi,
Manar District

November 2nd

Kalmunai,
Batticaloa
District

Civilians

2008

November 7th

Tampitiya,
Uva Province

Civil Defence Force & Police
officer

?

3

2008

November
13th

Pangudaweli,
Batticaloa
District

TMVP members

Tamil

2008

November
14th

Oruwela,
Athurugiriya
District

Kumaraswamy Nandagopan
(Secretary to TMVP Chief
Pillayan)

Tamil

2009

December
28th

Wattala,
Western
Province

Civil Defence Force

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

January 2nd

Slave Island,
Colombo
District

Air Force Headquarters

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

2008

2008

2008

2008

2008

2009

Power station

?

Army Camp

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Tamil

435

Chopped
to death

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

Suicide
Attack

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sout
h_asia/7660829.stm

Aerial
Bombing

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

Aerial
Bombing

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2008.htm

2

Shooting

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2008/11/15/sec01.asp

2

Shooting

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2008/11/15/sec01.asp

HBIED

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/h
i/south_asia/7801724.st
m

HBIED

http://www.hindu.com/th
ehindu/holnus/00120090
1021919.htm

5

1

3

4

5

2

1

4

30

1157

1158

1159

1160

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

1166

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

January 3rd

Pettah,
Colombo
District

January 4th

Omadiyamadu,
Batticaloa
District

January 9th

Morawewa,
Trincomalee
District

Bus

?

7

6

Claymore
mine

January 10th

Paranthan,
Mullaitivu
District

Civilians (trying to flee from
LTTE)

Tamil

7

2

Shooting

January 10th

Killivedi,
Batticaloa
District

TMVP Members

Tamil

1

1

Attack

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2009/01/12/sec05.asp

January 18th

Buttala,
Monoragala
District

Civilians

?

3

Hacked to
death

http://news.nidahasa.com
/news.php?go=fullnews
&newsid=667

January 19th

Mullaitivu,
Northern
Province

SLA Soldiers (Prisoners of
War)

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Execution
(Shooting)
& Burnt

http://www.nation.lk/201
0/11/28/news9.htm

January 21st

Batticaloa,
Batticaloa
District

Police & Civilians

Predomina
ntly Tamil

11

VBIED

http://www.hindu.com/th
ehindu/holnus/00020090
1211240.htm

February 4th

Chalai,
Puthukudiyirup
pu District

SLA Soldier

?

1

HBIED

http://www.dailynews.lk/
2009/02/07/sec02.asp

February 9th

Sugandirapura
m, Mullaitivu
District

HBIED

http://www.irishtimes.co
m/newspaper/breaking/2
009/0209/breaking6.html

Civilians

?

SLA Soldier

?

IDP Camp (Civilians)

Tamil

436

IED
Explosion

http://www.hindu.com/th
ehindu/holnus/00120090
1091611.htm

1

Attack

http://www.tamileelamne
ws.com/news/publish/tns
_10744.shtml
http://www.newstrackind
ia.com/newsdetails/5821
2

2

1

2

26

2

28

90

1167

1168

1169

1170

1171

1172

1173

1174

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

February 10th

Puthukudiyirup
pu, Mullaitivu
District

February 13th

Pulliyankulam,
Vavuniya
District

February 20th

Colombo,
Western
Province

February 21st

Kirimetiya,
Polonnaruwa
District

February 21st

Inginiyagala,
Ampara
District

March 4th

Monoragala
District

March 6th

?

March 6th

Chalai,
Puthukudiyirup
pu District

Civilians

Tamil

Civilian Bus (Carrying
Refugees)

Tamil

Military installations &
around Colombo

Mix

Farmers

Sinhala

Civilians

?

Police Officers

?

IDP Camp (Civilians)

Tamil

Civilians

Tamil

437

19

1

4

10

12

Shooting

http://uk.reuters.com/arti
cle/2009/02/10/uksrilanka-waridUKTRE5192F5200902
10

Grenade &
Shooting

http://www.channelnews
asia.com/stories/afp_asia
pacific/view/409015/1/.h
tml

Suicide
VBIED Air Tigers

http://www.theaustralian.
com.au/news/raidshows-tamil-tigers-nottamed/story-e6frg6t61111118932114

5

Shooting

http://www.lankabusines
sonline.com/fullstory.ph
p?nid=1003944992

7

Grenade &
Shooting

http://www.lankaenews.c
om/English/news.php?id
=7183

Attack

http://www.bloomberg.c
om/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=avWYhcH2
S2Wk&refer=asia

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2009.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2009.htm

69

13

50

2

3

3

2

1

1175

1176

1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

1182

1183

1184

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

2009

March 10th

Akuressa,
Matara District

March 11th

Karadiyanaaru,
Batticaloa
District

March 24th

Kantale,
Trincomalee
District

March 25th

Menikdeniya,
Polonnaruwa
District

April 6th

Ramanathapur
am, Mullaitivu
District

SLA Soldiers

?

April 12th

Mahagodayaya
, Moneragala
District

Mahagodayaya & Galitemara
Village

Sinhala

April 13th

Puthukkudiyiru
ppu, Mullaitivu
District

SLA Soldier

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

April 13th

Galvetiyamand
iya Village,
Monoragala
District

Civilians

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

April 13th

Puttumattalan,
Jaffna District

April 25th

Morawewa,
Trincomalee
District

Civilians (Milad-un-Nabi
procession)

Muslim

Special Task Force Soldiers

Predomina
ntly
Sinhala

Farmers

?

Farmers

15

2

5

4

Civilians trapped in NFZ

Tamil

Civilians

?

438

12

1

3

17

4

HBIED

http://zeenews.india.com
/southasia/2009-0310/513876news.html

Attack

http://www.tamileelamne
ws.com/news/publish/tns
_11177.shtml

?

http://news.nidahasa.com
/news.php?go=fullnews
&newsid=755

Shooting

http://news.nidahasa.com
/news.php?go=fullnews
&newsid=755

1

HBIED

http://www.defence.lk/ne
w.asp?fname=20090407
_10

1

Shooting

http://www.island.lk/200
9/04/16/news13.html

1

Mortar
shell

http://www.newstrackind
ia.com/newsdetails/8513
8

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2009.htm

HBIED

http://ibnlive.in.com/new
s/17-killed-in-sri-lankasuicide-blast/906692.html

Shooting

http://www.colombopage
.com/archive_09/April26
50658RA.html

20

2

2

4

1

1185

1186

1187

1188

2009

2009

2009

2009

May 1st

Vellamullivaik
kal, Mullativu
District

May 5th

Konketiyawa,
Buttala District

May 5th

Vellamullivaik
kal, Mullativu
District

May 9th

No Fire Zone,
Mullaitivu
District

Civilians

Tamil

Civilians

Tamil

Civilians

Tamil

Civilians

Tamil

439

Several

1

Several
others

Several
others

Several

9

19

VBIED

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2009.htm

Claymore
mine

http://www.ndtv.com/arti
cle/world/ltte-almostwiped-out-rajapaksa2817

Fire Arms

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2009.htm

Shooting

http://www.satp.org/satp
orgtp/countries/shrilanka
/timeline/2009.htm

Appendix 2: List of Tamil Militant Organisations
1. Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam
2. Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation
3. People‘s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam
4. Tamil Eelam Liberation Army
5. Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students
6. Eelam People‘s Liberation Front
7. Tamil Eelam Army
8. Tamil Eelam Liberation Extremists
9. Tamil Eelam Revolutionary Organisation
10. Tamil Eelam Revolutionary People‘s Liberation Army
11. Red Front of Tamil Eelam
12. Tamil Eelam Liberation Guerillas
13. National Liberation Front of Tamil Eelam
14. Tamil Eelam Defence Front
15. Tamil Eelam National Army
16. Tamil Eelam Commandos
17. Tamil Eelam Eagle Front
18. Guerrillas Aspiring of Tamil Eelam
19. Red Crescent Guerrillas
20. Eagles Movement
21. Solidarity of Revolutionary Socialist Liberation
22. Movement
23. Tamil Eelam Blood Movement
24. Tamil Speaking Commando Unit
25. Eelam Liberation Tigers
26. Tamil Liberation Defence Front
27. Revolutionary Eelam Liberation Organisation
28. Tamil Eelam Security Service
29. People‘s Liberation Party
30. Tamil People‘s Democratic Front
31. Tamil People‘s Security Organisation
32. Tamil Liberation Cobras
33. Tamil People‘s Security Front
34. Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front
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Appendix 3: Reported Procurement of Warlike Equipments During
Peace Process 2002-20061140

1140

Humanitarian Operation: Factual Analysis, (2011), Ministry of Defense, Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka, Rajagiriya: Central Bank Printing Press
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Appendix 4: Map of Sri Lanka

Map of Sri Lanka1141

1141

Sri Lanka Map, <http://www.edulanka.lk/edugallery/index.php/Geography/sri-lanka-map> at January
31, 2013

442

Map of Northern Sri Lanka and Strategic Points1142

1142

―Thousands flee Sri Lanka combat‖, BBC News, April 20, 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8007465.stm> at January 31, 2013
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Appendix 5: List of Major Sri Lankan Forces and LTTE Military
Operations (1985-2009)
Time

Perpetrator

Operation

Area

Result

Period

Eelam War I (1983-1987)
LTTE

Kokkilai Offensive1143

Mullaitivu

LTTE Victory

May- June

Sri Lankan

Operation Vadamarachchi1144

Jaffna

Partial SLA

1987

Army

District

Victory

February
1985

(SLA)

Indian Intervention (1987-1990)
Ceasefire (June 1989- June 1990)
Eelam War II (June 1990-December 1994)
June- July

LTTE

Battle of Kokavil1145

Kokavil

LTTE

Operation Charles

Elephant Pass

LTTE Victory

1990
July-

1146

August

Anthony

1991

SLA base

(First Battle of Elephant Pass)
Operation Balavegaya1147

Elephant Pass

August

(in response to the seizure of

military base

1991

Elephant Pass SLA base)

July-

June-July

SLA

SLA

1992

Operation Balavegaya II1148

SLA Victory

Elephant Pass

SLA Victory

Pooneryn

LTTE Victory

(to link Elephant Pass to
Vettilaikerni)

November

LTTE

Operation Thavalai1149
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―Don‘t worry sir, I will fight till I die‖, Sunday Times, October 1, 2000
<http://sundaytimes.lk/001001/plus4.html> at October 3, 2012
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Late Lt. General Denzil Kobbekaduwa: an exceptional Third World General, SL News Online
Website, August 2011, <http://www.slnewsonline.net/kobbe.htm> at October 3, 2012
1147
Balasuriya, M., The Rise and Fall of the LTTE (2011) Colombo: Asian Network on Conflict Research,
182
1148
Ibid.
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1993

Naval Base

Ceasefire (January 1995-April 1995)
Eelam War III (April 1995-February 2002)
October-

SLA

Operation Riviresa1150

Jaffna

SLA Victory

SLA

Operation Rivi Kirana1151

Batticaloa

SLA Victory

December
1995
January
1996
July 1996

District
LTTE

Operation Unceasing

Mullaitivu

LTTE Victory

1152

Waves
July-

SLA

Operation Sathjaya1153

Kilinochchi

SLA Victory

SLA

Operation Edi Bala1154

Vavuniya to

SLA Victory

October
1996
February
1997
March

Mannar
LTTE

Vavunathivu Offensive1155

1997
May 1997-

Batticaloa

LTTE Victory

SLA Base
SLA

Operation Jayasikurui

1156

December

Vavuniya to

LTTE Victory

Kilinochchi

1998
June 1997

September
1998

LTTE

LTTE

Thandikulam- Omanthai

Vavuniya

Offensive1157

District

Operation Unceasing Waves

Kilinochhci

II

LTTE Victory

LTTE Victory

1158

1149

Athas, I., ―Inside story of female Tigers‖, Sunday Times, June 16, 2002
<http://www.sundaytimes.lk/020616/columns/sitrep1.html> at October 4, 2012
1150
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<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/5/newsid_4618000/4618661.stm>at October
5, 2012
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March

SLA

Operation Rana Gosa1159

Wanni

SLA Victory

LTTE

Operation Unceasing Waves

Oddusuddan

LTTE Victory

Battle for Elephant Pass & A9 Elephant Pass

LTTE Victory

1999
November
1999
March-

III
LTTE

April 2000

1160

Highway

1161

& A9
Highway

Ceasefire (February 2002- July 2006)
May 2006

LTTE

Battle of Point Pedro (against
Sri Lanka Navy)

1162

Off Point

SLN Victory

Pedro

Eelam War IV (July 2006- May 2009)
July 2006

SLA

Operation Liberation1163

Mavil Aru

SLA Victory

anticut
August-

LTTE

1164

Battle of Jaffna

Jaffna

Stalemate

October
2006
August-

SLA

Battle of Sampur1165

Sampur

SLA Victory

SLA

Battle of Vakarai1166

Vakarai

SLA Victory

September
2006
January
2007
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April-July

SLA

Battle of Thoppigala1167

Thoppigala

SLA Victory

SLA

Battle of Viddattalativu1168

Mannar

SLA Victory

2007
July 2008

District
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SLA

Battle of Kilinochchi

SLA

1169

Kilinochchi

SLA Victory
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Mullaitivu

SLA Victory

SLA

Battle of Elephant Pass1171

Elephant Pass

SLA Victory

SLA

Battle of Chalai1172

Chalai,

SLA Victory

2008January
2009
January
2009
January
2009
February
2009

Mullaitivu
District

April 2009

SLA

Battle of

Puthukkudiyi

Puthukkudiyiruppu1173
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SLA Victory
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Appendix 6: LTTE Suicide Attacks 1987-2009

Suicide Bombings in Sri Lanka
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Appendix 7: Summary of Research Findings

Emergence
Ideology

Ceasefire &
Peace
Agreements

-Identification
of cause and
justification for
violence
-Provide
organisational
unity
-Identify target
selection
N/A

Public
Support,
Terrorist
Networks &
External
Supporters

-Consolidation
of public
support, mostly
on voluntary
basis
- Upsurge of
voluntary
recruitment
- Beneficiary of
Indian state
sponsorship

Funding

-Primary means
of fundraising
(robbery and
extortion)
-Indian
sponsorship

Escalation

De-Escalation

Demise

-Strengthening of
ideological
commitment of
members
- Target selection
reflected strategic
objectives of the
time

-Erosion of
ideological
commitment and
morale of
members
- Target own
constituents

-Opportunity for
military
recuperation and
intend to return to
violence
-LTTE continue to
attack rival militant
groups and
dissents, though on
a low scale
-Consolidate public
support, coerced or
otherwise
- Expand territorial
control and
operational strength
to run a de-facto
state (provision of
administrative and
welfare services)
-Lost Indian
sponsorship, but
continue to
strengthen own
terrorist networks
and resources

- Opportunity for
military
recuperation and
intend to return to
violence
- Mass
organisational
splintering occur

-Separatist
ideology still
lingers within
the small
segment of
the Diaspora
community
after demise
of group
N/A

- Lost significant
local support,
turn to Diaspora
support
- Resort to
coerced
recruitment
- Towards
demise, attack
own constituents
and use as human
shields

-Pro-LTTE
Diaspora
support
remain to a
certain degree

- Tap into Diaspora
funding (extortion
and voluntary
donation)
- Establish LTTE
fronts abroad and

- International
proscription of
organisation
yields minimum
impact to global
fundraising

-LTTE assets
remain even
after demise
of group
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Organisational - Target rival
militant groups
Dynamics
to ascend to
superiority

Military
Interventions

N/A

establish
illegal/legal
businesses
-Establish
international
criminal network
- Taxation from defacto state
- Political wing
established
superficially to
enter elections. The
role of political
wing remains
ambiguous
throughout whole
campaign
- Continue to
eliminate rival
militant groups to
ascend and retain
superiority
- LTTE increases
number of
conventional
military battles
against the security
forces
-Government
interventions
temporarily weaken
the LTTE
operational
capability but
militants recuperate
during ceasefire
-Indian intervention
halted
confrontation
between the
warring parties, and
instead instigate the
LTTE-IPKF war
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efforts
- Gradual loss of
territorial control
affect domestic
revenue

-Mass defection
of Karuna group
de-stabilise
LTTE
organisational
cohesion and
weaken group
morale
- Upsurge of
eliminating
Karuna faction

- Death of
Prabhakaran
marks demise
of LTTE
lifecycle and
terrorist
campaign

- LTTE increases
use of suicide
attacks and shift
attack theatre to
compensate for
lack of retaliatory
capabilities in
conventional
warfare

-Government
successfully
defeat the
LTTE
militarily

Appendix 8: LTTE Terrorist Attacks by Each Eelam War
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